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1 Introduction
Scope of the study
Conflict is universal and ubiquitous. It is an activity that even
small children grasp rather quickly and are quite adept in
practising. Throughout their lives, people are faced with all kinds
of conflicts. Many conflict situations go by just as quickly as they
emerge. Others, however, have a long-lasting (positive or negative)
impact on people’s lives and their social relationships. But
although conflict is an everyday occurrence in our lives, its
mechanisms have not been sufficiently clarified. Even though
conflict has attracted considerable attention in the academic world,
many issues are still unaccounted for. In discourse analytic
research, verbal means of carrying out conflict have not received
much notice. Only since the early 1980s have studies in the field of
linguistic conflict research begun to examine aspects of conflict
communication, and many questions are still open.
Like conflict, power is a social phenomenon that we encounter
every day in our lives. “Power is everywhere” (Foucault 1978: 334).
Many of our social relationships can be characterised as relations
of power: employer and employee, teacher and student, parent and
child, and so on. Power has been the focus of study and concern
across all social science disciplines. Yet, as with conflict, many
questions remain unanswered.
A primary locus of conflict (Simmel 1955) and power struggles
(Emery 1992; Tannen 2001, 2003; Watts 1991) is the family. Emprical
research on family interaction has shown that family discourse
(Emery 1992; Vuchinich 1984), and in particular mother-daughter
interaction (Tannen 2001, 2003; Wodak 1984), is characterised by the
frequent occurrence of disagreement and dispute. However, there is a
relative paucity of discourse analytic research on conflict
interaction in families and almost a complete lack of studies
focussing on linguistic aspects of mother-daughter disputes. With
this study, I will attempt to fill this gap. I will investigate how
9mother-daughter disputes and underlying power relations are created
and negotiated by characters in the fictional world of contemporary
drama.
The observation that aggravated conflict is an essential aspect
of mother-daughter interaction runs counter to the fact that in
studies on gender and discourse cooperation, supportiveness and
harmony are frequently cited as organising principles of women’s
talk (cf. Coates 1989, 1991, 1994, 1998; Maltz & Borker 1991).
Likewise, female disputing style has often been described as
mitigated and conciliatory and as displaying an orientation towards
consent (Kotthoff 1984; Sheldon 1996; Trömel-Plötz 1992, 1996). A
number of studies have demonstrated, however, that conflict is in
fact omnipresent in the interaction of females, and that in the
context of argument the communicative behaviour of women may well be
offensive and confrontational (cf. Goodwin 2003: 231ff; Günthner
1992). These findings call into question the still-prevalent notion
of women as generally displaying an orientation towards cooperative,
face-saving interaction and consent. They show that in examining
women’s talk-in-interaction it is vital to avoid generalisations
about female discourse and instead to adopt a context-sensitive
approach. Specifically, what is required is detailed descriptions of
women’s discursive practices in particular interactional situations,
which take into account contextual features such as the conversants’
socio-cultural backgrounds, the situational context and
interpersonal relationship aspects (cf. also Cameron 2003; Wodak
1997). This is in keeping with the recent trend in sociolinguistics,
and in particular in research on language and gender, to look at
specific “communities of practice” (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992,
1999), rather than to conceive of gender as a monolithic,
essentialist concept. A community of practice as defined by Eckert &
McConnell-Ginet (1992, 1999) is a group of people who, united by a
common enterprise, develop and share ways of doing things, ways of
talking, beliefs, values, and power relations - i.e. practices. It
is precisely such a detailed description of women’s discursive
practices in a particular interactional context in a specific
community of practice that will assume centre stage here, namely the
family.
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To date, women’s conflict discourse has largely been neglected
as an object of research. As Goodwin (1988: 55) points out, research
on female interaction patterns has tended to restrict analysis to
those features of female communication which clearly differ from
those of male discourse, excluding those which women’s and men’s
talk have in common. For example, cooperative aspects of female
language usage have been examined (e.g. Brown 1980; Coates 1989,
1991, 1994, 1996; Maltz & Borker 1982), while ways in which
disagreement may be expressed have been largely ignored (cf. however
Kulick 1993 and Sidnell 1998). Correspondingly, in her 2001 survey
of studies on conflict and discourse, Kakavá (2001: 663) states: “An
area that further needs exploration is women’s conflict.” This
dissertation will try to contribute to the clarification of this
desideratum of research on the basis of an exploratory study of
mother-daughter disputes.
Since disputes usually arise suddenly and are considered a
private matter in Western societies, the study of verbal conflict,
in particular in close relationships, faces a major methodological
difficulty: data are very hard to obtain. Therefore, I will base my
investigation on a corpus of contemporary plays by women, conflict
talk being an essential feature of drama. Characters in plays
frequently insult and interrupt one another, dispute each other’s
claims, or oppose each other in some other way.
Even though my research focuses on constructed dialogue, it has
implications for the study of naturally occurring conflict
sequences, because it reveals patterns of knowledge about the
workings of real (mother-daughter) disputes. The principles, norms
and conventions of use which underlie ordinary conversation are the
resource that dramatists use to create dialogue in plays. Hence, the
interaction in plays represents an internalised model or schema for
the production of conversation – a competence model that speakers
have access to. Thus, by looking at artificial dispute sequences
between mothers and daughters, we can reconstruct the tacit
knowledge by which women organise verbal conflict in a specific
community of practice, i.e. the family.
This study investigates the interface of conflict and power in
mother-daughter interaction. To this end, data from contemporary
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plays by women will be analysed. The analysis sheds light on a
number of questions, most significantly the following:
•  How do mother-daughter disputes arise; which mechanisms drive
them forward?
•  Why do some disputes escalate; which elements aggravate or defuse
them?
•  How are mother-daughter disputes terminated? Are they usually
resolved? And if not, what happens instead?
•  What are mother-daughter disputes about? Getting one’s way? A
contentious issue or problem? Finding agreement?
•  How are social relations of power (re)constructed or resisted by
participants in the course of mother-daughter disputes?
•  What are the discursive resources that female interactants employ
in conducting verbal conflict?
•  How do the disputants deal with each other?
Thus, the present study has implications for several scholarly
fields, including research on conflict talk, family interaction,
intergenerational communication, female discourse, stylistics, as
well as power in talk-in-interaction.
Organisation of the study
This study is divided into the following chapters: Chapter 2
provides an overview of previous research on conflict talk both
between children and adults, both in private and institutional
contexts. It then indicates some of the problems related to data for
the analysis of conflict talk such as the problem of obtaining data
and the problem of the generalisability of data. Subsequently, it
discusses the value of dramatic dialogue as a data source for
discourse analytic research in general and for research on conflict
talk in particular. Finally, it describes the corpus used in the
present study.
Chapter 3 briefly discusses some of the ways in which
(interpersonal) conflict and its discourse has been conceptualised
and then proposes a process-oriented notion of conflict. Conflict is
conceived of as a dynamic interactional relationship.
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Chapter 4 gives a concise overview of the main differences in
theories on power leading up to a working definition of power for
the purpose of this study.
The analytical framework used in this study is presented in
chapter 5. The chapter, firstly, discusses various approaches to the
analysis of situated verbal interaction and conceptualisations of
the relationship between context and language (use), and then gives
a brief outline of the basic assumptions and concepts of
interactional sociolinguistics as developed by John Gumperz, which
forms the methodological basis of the present investigation.
Chapters 6 and 7 constitute the empirical part of this study.
They consist of turn-by-turn analyses of selected examples from the
corpus, which explore the ways in which verbal conflict is
interactively produced and framed (Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) or
contextualised (Gumperz 1982) by the participants.
Chapter 6 explores structural aspects of the mother-daughter
disputes in my data. It examines the sequential organisation of
openings (Ch. 6.1) and closings (Ch. 6.2) of conflict episodes in my
data and discusses the implications for social functions of mother-
daughter disputes. Subsequently, it investigates how the sequential
organisation of the mother-daughter disputes in my data differs from
other interactional contexts and thus contributes to the framing
(Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) or contextualisation (Gumperz 1982) of
this speech activity (Ch. 6.3). It looks at the relationship between
various sequential aspects of conversation, in particular preference
and turn-taking organisation and formal cohesion, and the procedures
by which the adversative character of oppositional moves in my data
is highlighted (rather than downplayed). The results of this
analysis allow a characterisation of the verbal conflicts in my data
on the structural plane of interaction.
Chapter 7 focuses on the speech act level of interaction. It
investigates what kinds of speech actions the disputants in my data
use most frequently to oppose each other. It examines the ways in
which these argumentative actions and their responses are formatted
and considers how these speech actions contribute to the
confrontational character of the interaction. In so doing, it
uncovers the dynamics of the delicate power play that can take place
between mothers and daughters and that is enacted in conflict talk.
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In the process, it inspects whether these argumentative resources
are equally available to both mothers and daughters, and how they
can be effectively employed by participants to seize control over
various aspects of the ongoing interaction.
Chapter 8 summarises and discusses the findings of the analyses
and offers suggestions for further research.
Finally, chapter 9 describes the role of paralinguistic and
nonverbal cues in the co-construction of meaning and presents the
drama-reading conventions used in this study.
Notes On Pronoun usage and spelling
Throughout the text, the feminine pronouns she, her, etc. are used
as generic pronouns to refer to both sexes. The reason for this is
twofold: firstly, the data this investigation is based on portray
exclusively interaction between women. Secondly, the generic use of
the feminine pronoun avoids a tiresome repetition of phrases like
“he or she” and thus facilitates both the writing and reading
process.
I follow the conventions of British English in the main text.
However, the majority of examples and a large number of references
are American English and have retained their original spelling.
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Go to the poets.
(Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents)
2 Dramatic Dialogue as a data source for conflict analysis
The linguistic means of conducting conflict have not received much
attention in research on language and communication. As Grimshaw
(1990) reports, in the 1970s, there has only been a handful of
pioneering studies on conflict talk (e.g. Brenneis & Lein 1977;
Labov 1972a, b; Labov & Fanshel 1977; Mitchell-Kernan & Kernan
1975). Not until the early 1980s did a growing body of literature on
the topic develop, including contributions on different aspects of
conflict talk in the areas of sociology, anthropological
linguistics, sociolinguistics, social psychology, pragmatics,
communication analysis, discourse analysis and conversation analysis
(cf., for example, the publications cited in Brenneis 1988; Kakavá
2001; Schwittala 2001; the papers in Schank & Schwitalla 1987 and
Grimshaw 1990; and M. H. Goodwin 1990; Gruber 1996; Messmer 2003;
Spiegel 1995). A number of discourse analytic studies have dealt
with the interactional dynamics of verbal conflicts, examining, for
example, the opening and closing of conflict episodes, or features
of interactional moves with respect to their aggravating or
mitigating functional potential. However, as Kallmeyer (1996: 15)
notes:
Allerdings liegen insgesamt zum Streiten und zu Kampfformen
der Kommunikation nicht sehr viele sprachwissenschaftliche
Arbeiten vor – die linguistische Konfliktforschung ist
eindeutig unterentwickelt. (my emphasis; cf. also Apeltauer
1978; Gruber 1996a; Spiegel 1995)
One reason for the shortage of linguistic/discourse analytic studies
on conflict talk is that it has been considered as constituting a
type of “disorderly discourse” (cf. Briggs 1996) and, as a result,
researchers did not venture into this form of ostensibly disruptive
behaviour. In addition, there are several difficulties in obtaining
authentic data for the analysis of verbal conflict (cf. Apeltauer
1978; Aronsson 1987; Gruber 1992, 1994, 1996a; Kakavá 2001; Keppler
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1994; Kienpointer 1997; Messmer 2003; Schwitalla 1987; Vuchinich
1987; Weatherall 1996). On the one hand, disputes usually come about
spontaneously, which makes it very difficult to obtain recordings of
complete verbal conflicts. On the other hand, in Western culture,
dispute is viewed as part of the private sphere, as “backstage talk”
(Goffman 1959) that has to be kept secret. 1 Hence, if a researcher
by chance happens to record an authentic dispute, the participants
rarely give their consent for this tape to be analysed, let alone
published. Schwitalla (1987: 99) puts his finger on the problem when
he states:
Nichts ist so schwierig, wie von seinen Bekannten ein Tonband
zu erbitten, auf dem zu hören sein soll, wie sie sich mit
ihren Gesprächspartnern um etwas streiten.
This is especially true for conflicts in families. As Hughes
(1971/1962: 91) notes:
People can and do keep a silence about things whose open
discussion would threaten the group’s conception of itself,
and hence its solidarity ... It is a mechanism that operates
in every family and in every group which has a sense of group
solidarity.
At the same time, there are ethical issues involved in making
surreptitious recordings, complicating the issue even further. These
problems in obtaining suitable data for the analysis of verbal
conflict are mirrored in the research on conflict talk. As Keppler
(1994) reports, empirical studies of naturally-occurring conflicts
among adults and in families are rare; studies of children’s
disputes are more numerous, “nicht zuletzt wohl aufgrund der
Tatsache, dass sich hier empirisches Material leichter erheben
lässt” (102).
As pointed out by Keppler, disputes between children and
adolescents often serve as data for studies on conflict interaction,
both in natural situations, in which conflict occurs spontaneously
(e.g. Abrahams 1962; Corsaro & Rizzo 1990; Dundes et al. 1972;
Eckert 1990; Eder 1990; Eisenberg & Garvey 1981; Emihovich 1986;
Evaldson 1993; Genishi & di Paolo 1982; C. Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin
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1990; M. H. Goodwin 1982, 1983, 1988, 1990, 1993; M. H. Goodwin & C.
Goodwin 1987; Katriel 1985, 1986; Kochman 1981, 1983; Logothetis
1990; Maynard 1985a&b, 1986; Rehbock 1987; Shantz 1987; Shantz &
Hartup 1992; Shantz & Shantz 1985; Sheldon 1992, 1993, 1996) and in
experimental situations, in which conflict is elicited for
observation (e.g. Brenneis & Lein 1977; Lein & Brenneis 1978; Camras
1977; Gottman 1986). Children are less self-conscious about arguing
in front of others and behave more “naively” than adults in (well
planned) experimental settings, and thus provide fruitful data for
the investigation of verbal conflict behaviour. However, the
question arises whether the findings of the studies are also valid
for conflicts among adults.
Conflict researchers also often draw on data from “exotic”
cultures (e.g. Boggs 1978; Dundes et al. 1972; Edwards & Sienkewicz
1990; Goldman 1980, 1983, 1986; Gossen 1976; Hickson 1979; Kotthoff
1992b, 1995; Merlan & Rumsey 1986; Sidnell 1998; Tolosana 1978). In
non-western cultures, conflict talk is often not considered as
private, as it is in Western societies (cf. Brenneis 1988; Kotthoff
1995). Such cultures provide data on aspects of disputes which would
hardly be accessible otherwise. It is open to discussion, however,
whether the results of the studies can be applied to other cultural
contexts.
Besides, much research on conflict talk is based on data from
institutional contexts such as, for instance, courtroom interaction
(e.g. Bilmes 1981; Atkinson & Drew 1979; Drew 1990, 1992), staff,
association and other official meetings (e.g. Bilmes 1995; Kallmeyer
& Keim 1996; Keim & Schwitalla 1989; O’Donnel 1990), doctor-patient-
interaction (e.g. Bloor & Horobin 1975; Fisher & Groce 1985; Fisher
& Todd 1983, 1986; Nothdurft 1992), therapeutic discourse (e.g.
Labov & Fanshel 1977), mediation hearings (e.g. Depperman 1997;
Garcia 1991; Nothdurft 1986, 1993, 1995, 1996; Schwitalla 1996;
Spranz-Fogasy 1986), classroom discourse (e.g. Adger 1984; Davies
1982; Kakavá 1993a), naturally-occurring (e.g. Kakavá 1995) and
elicited discussions between university students (e.g. Stein et al.
1997) and between students and lecturers (e.g. Günthner, Kotthoff
1984, 1989, 1990, 1993a), broadcast news interviews (e.g. Clayman
1988, 1992; Greatbatch 1988, 1992; Heritage 1985, 2002a, b; Holly
1993; Schegloff 1989), discussions on radio or TV (e.g. Apeltauer
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1978; Bilmes 1999; Gruber 1992, 1994, 1996a, b, 1998a, b, 2001;
Gruber et al. 1993; Hutchby 1992, 1996a, b, 1999, 2001; Kallmeyer &
Schmitt 1996; Kotthoff 1991, 1992a, b, 1993b, c). Since much
institutional interaction takes place in front of the public anyway,
it is unproblematic to get access to such data. However, there are
problems with trying to apply findings of research on conflict talk
in institutional settings to other communicative contexts.
Institutional contexts impose severe restrictions on how arguments
are conducted. For instance, in the case of TV discussions and
interviews, the point at issue is usually pre-established.
Similarly, the participant framework (i.e. distribution of
proponents’ and opponents’ roles as well as the formal role of a
chairperson or interviewer) is usually fixed beforehand. Likewise,
individual contributions are often planned in advance. In addition,
the organisation of turn-taking differs from that in natural
arguments, as speaking rights are usually allocated by the host or
interviewer rather than locally negotiated by the participants
(Greatbatch 1988; Heritage & Greatbatch 1991). These limitations
obviously do not hold for spontaneous conflict talk in informal
settings such as family arguments, or, more precisely, mother-
daughter disputes.2
Studies of verbal conflicts in families have often relied on
self-report surveys (e.g. Straus 1974; Scanzino 1978), therapy
sessions with distressed couples or families (e.g. Frankenberg 1979;
Millar et al 1984; Millar & Rogers 1976, 1988), or artificial tasks
in laboratory settings to induce conflict (e.g. Billings 1979;
Gottman 1979, 1994; Gottman et al. 1977; Knudson et al. 1980) for
their data. This raises the question whether arguments in a
laboratory setting correspond to those that occur in the family’s
daily routine at home.
Some researchers have addressed this problem by relocating the
experimental setting to the family home. For instance, Billig’s
(1991) investigation of rhetorical aspects of holding strong views
is based on family discussions that were initiated by an
interviewer, who visited the family at home and was present during
the recording. Similarly, researchers based at the Mannheim Insitute
of German Language (Hofer et al. 1990a, b, 1991, 1993; Pikowsky
1993; Spranz-Fogasy & Fleischmann 1993; Spranz-Fogasy et al. 1993)
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have based their analysis of argumentative discussions between
mothers and their adolescent daughters on elicited conflict
episodes.3 As in Billig’s study, the recordings took place at the
subjects’ homes, with the interviewer present but not intervening in
the discussion. However, in contrast to Billig’s study, in which the
interviewer’s task was to inaugurate the family’s conversation
rather than to raise specific issues, the subjects were explicitly
asked to discuss a contentious issue (e.g. help with household
tasks, curfew, clothes, school, rights and obligations in general)
for about ten minutes, trying to convince the partner of their
position by supporting it with arguments. The researchers report
that despite the conflict sequences being elicited and an
interviewer being present during the recording, the subjects did not
role play their discussions but seemed to have “real” arguments, as
indicated by an increase in tempo, the use of dialect, mutual
interruptions and overlapping speech. According to the authors, this
“authenticity” is partly due to the fact that the conversations
centred on issues that were important for both parties, which led to
emotional involvement in the discussion (Hofer et al. 1993: 17-18;
Pikowsky 1992: 62).
Again, it is debatable if elicited arguments are representative
for unprompted disputes that occur in the participants’ everyday
life and, thus, if the research findings also apply to spontaneous
disputes. Stein et al. (1997) argue that “naturally occurring
language behaviour can be studied quite easily within an
‘experimental’ setting, without disrupting the natural flow of
negotiation or conversation” (259). But as Goodwin (1982) notes,
“while studies of elicited or role-played speech events provide
information about the formal properties of such events, they cannot
answer the questions concerning how it comes to be that these events
emerge in talk in the first place” (91). For instance, in the
elicited mother-daughter discussions investigated by Hofer and his
colleagues, a controversial issue is given to be argued about by the
subjects, and, as a result, the subjects’ argumentation revolves
around this issue.4 By contrast, in naturally-occurring mother-
daughter disputes contentious issues are not given in advance. In
fact, as we will see later on, disputes are precisely the processes
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by which controversial matters are interactively constructed by the
participants by means of mutual disagreement.
Some researchers have tried to come to grips with the
aforementioned problems by doing naturalistic data collection in
routine situations in the home (e.g. dinner conversations), in which
dispute sequences occurred as part of the family interactions (e.g.
Keppler 1994; Knoblauch 1991, 1995; Miller et al. 1982; Patterson
1982; Vuchinich 1984, 1986, 1987, 1990). However, as Vuchinich
(1987) notes, in this approach, measures must be taken to be as
inconspicuous as possible, and a large amount of talk must be
recorded in order to capture the odd spontaneous conflict episode.
To sum up, the investigation of verbal conflict faces a major
methodological problem: disputes usually occur spontaneously and are
viewed as a private affair in Western societies. As a result,
researchers of conflict communication have investigated mainly
children’s disputes, conflict behaviour in non-western cultures,
interaction in institutional contexts or arguments that were
elicited in experimental settings. With all these kinds of data,
however, the problem of generalisation of results to spontaneous
disputes in every-day contexts arises.
For this reason, I will draw on a different data source for the
analysis of mother-daughter disputes and base my investigation on a
corpus of contemporary plays by women. The underlying assumption is
that the mother-daughter disputes in these plays are comparable to
naturally-occurring disputes in all relevant aspects on the macro-
and micro-levels of discourse such as, for example, the organisation
of turns and sequences, opening and closing procedures, turn-taking
patterns. As Schank (1987) notes, several studies have shown that
from the perspective of conflict analysis “sind kaum Unterschiede
zwischen Alltag und Fiktion auszumachen” (20). Watzlawick et al.
(1967) go even further, suggesting that some plays may even be “more
real than reality” (150).
Drama is notorious for involving a high degree of controversial
and confrontational talk. In plays, the fictional participants
disagree with each other, blame each other, interrupt each other,
deny or refute each other’s claims, and so on. According to Burton
(1980: 16), “drama dialogue presents conflict.” Similarly, Wandor
(1982: 12) maintains that “some form of conflict and resolution,
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even in its most subtle form, is present in every play.” In fact,
conflict has been argued to constitute the core element of drama. To
quote Broobs et al. (1952: 605):
The basis of drama is conflict. The most obvious feature of a
good drama is the clash of wills as the various characters
come into conflict with each other’s purpose and desires.
And these conflicts are for the most part dramatised through verbal
interaction.5 Consequently, dramatic dialogue is a key site for
investigating how interpersonal conflicts are constructed by
participants in and through talk-in-interaction.
In fact, several researchers have drawn on dialogues in plays
for the analysis of conflict and its discourse. For example,
Apeltauer (1978) uses disputes in plays alongside transcripts of
authentic dispute sequences, in his speech-act analysis of dispute.
Likewise, Schank (1987) uses both authentic everyday conversations
and fictitious dialogues (from prose and drama) as data for the
linguistic study of conflict talk, on the assumption that that the
differences between conflict talk in real life and fiction are
minimal. Tannen (1990) investigates the function of silence as a
conflict management strategy in Pinter’s Betrayal from an
interactional sociolinguistic perspective. Similarly, Jaworsky
(2000) examines the interactional relevance of silence to the
dynamics of social relations between the characters in Albee’s Who’s
Afraid of Virginia Woolf? and Edward Thomas’s TV drama Fallen Sons.
Aronsson (1987) analyses the organisation of turn-taking and topic
management in the disputes in Eugene O’Neill’s play Long day’s
journey into night, arguing that, although the script does not offer
a direct recording of real disputes, due to its autobiographic
aspects, “it echoes authentic struggles once fought” (194).
Watzlawick et al. (1967) investigate the relational functions of
communicative patterns in the fictional domestic arguments in
Albee’s Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?. They account for their use
of a fictitious system rather than actual clinical data for the
illustration of their theory of interactional systems and the axioms
of interpersonal communication by claiming that Albee’s play
satisfies the major criteria of appropriate data, namely manageable
size, reasonable independence (of both the therapists point of view
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and the therapeutic context) and public accessibility (150). As
mentioned above, rather than considering the fictionality of the
data as a drawback, they regard it as a benefit: “The limits of the
data presented in the play are fixed by artistic licence, though the
play is possibly even more real than reality” (150, my emphasis).
Similarly, in their analysis of pathological family relationship
patterns in plays by Terence Rattigan, William Shakespeare, Eugene
O'Neill, Arthur Miller and Edward Albee, Manocchio & Petitt (1975)
treat the literary characters as if they had the same relationship
problems as real people.
Research on women’s literature has shown that in plays by
women, certain issues, which are rooted in the writers’ experiences
as women, keep emerging. Of these, the central one is the mother-
daughter relationship in its various facets. In particular the issue
of mother-daughter conflict is crucial to the lives of women and has
been found to be a recurrent motif in women’s drama (cf. Goodman
1994; Griffiths 1993; Pearlman 1989; and Robson 1991).6 Thus, to
analyse mother-daughter dispute in dramatic dialogue is to approach
the issue of conflict most directly while at the same time examining
one of the key aspects of women’s plays.
The working hypothesis of this study is that the procedures for
the analysis of naturally-occurring conversation are profitable for
the study of play-talk and, conversely, that dramatic dialogue is a
rewarding research object for the analysis of everyday conversation,
and in particular for the study of conflict talk. Before I move on
to a more detailed discussion of the dual value of the application
of discourse analytical procedures to dialogue in plays,7 some
preliminary remarks are in order to clarify the relation between
real-life talk and dramatic dialogue.
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All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players. 
(William Shakespeare, As You Like It)
2.1 Dramatic dialogue versus naturally occurring conversation
Dramatic dialogue, however realistic it may seem, is not identical
to naturally occurring conversation. A most obvious difference
between the two is that everyday conversation is a spontaneous
exchange between a speaker and one or more interlocutor(s), whereas
characters in plays are simply not real people in the way that
participants in conversation are. Instead, in dramatic dialogue,
words are thought up by a playwright to be spoken by fictional
characters, created for, existing and interacting within the
invented action that takes place in the imaginary world of a play.
Obviously, then, in contrast to real conversation, dramatic dialogue
is not spontaneous but highly pre-planned speech that is comprised
of invented sequences designed to be staged and overheard by the
audience. By contrast with real talk, speaker change is not locally
managed but totally author-controlled with turn-taking rights being
established on dramaturgical grounds rather than on democratic
conversational principles (cf. Caldas-Coulthard 1992; Coulthard
1985; Elam 1980; Simpson 1997, 1998).
Another, related difference is that while naturally occurring
conversation is straightforwardly face to face, in dramatic dialogue
the communication process is more complex. More precisely, there are
(at least) two communicative layers at work in dramatic discourse:
on the one hand, there is interaction within a play - this is the
character-to-character dialogue which is displayed on stage or in
the text. On the other, there is communication between the
playwright and the audience/reader. At this higher level, the
playwright controls the displayed interaction, and the conversation
between the characters is part of what is communicated to the
audience. Each turn of a speaker on stage addressing her
interlocutor, at the same time, explicitly (as, for instance, in the
case of Brecht’s Epic theatre) or implicitly, addresses a hypothetic
receiver of the message outside the fictional world. Thus, the
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messages passed between characters within the play become, at the
higher communicative level, messages about the play itself.
Short (1981, 1989, 1994) describes dramatic discourse in terms
of “embeddedness.” On one level, the dramatist addresses the
reader/audience, and on another embedded level, the dramatic
characters interact with one another. This embedded level is part of
what the playwright communicates to the reader/audience. Thus,
“features which, for example, mark social relationships between two
people at the character level become messages about the characters
at the level of discourse which pertains between author and
reader/audience” (Short 1989: 149). Short’s model, which has been
adopted by various researchers in the field of stylistics (cf.
Simpson 1997; Culpeper 2001), echoes Widdowson’s (1975) claim that
dramatic discourse represents “a communication situation within a
communication situation” (50). Similarly, Clark (1996) distinguishes
several layers or domains of action, which are created on top of one
another, each of which is in principle a complete world. On the
topmost layer, the dramatis personae interact within the fictional
world of the play. (In case of theatrical performance, on a lower
layer, the actors on stage pretend to be the dramatic characters.)
On the basic layer, the audience/reader watches/reads the play
(text), “imagining” that the interaction between the dramatic
characters on the highest layer of action takes place and
“appreciating” the techniques involved in the creation of that
layer.8
With regard to the participant roles in dramatic discourse,
Short (1989) cautions that, despite our intuition, the audience or
reader of a play (text) cannot be considered an eavesdropper in the
sense of Goffman (1976, 1979) because “dramatic discourse is
arranged to be overheard on purpose” (149). Likewise, according to
A. Kennedy (1983) the unique distinctness of dramatic dialogue is
that “the audience is being allowed to ‘overhear’ the dialogue” (10)
and the spectator or reader “does not have the role of an
interlocutor in conversation, or that of a listener silently nodding
or shaking his or her head by way of active response, or even the
role of one eavesdropping behind the door” (ibid).9
We have to be careful, however, to keep apart the different
levels of discourse, and bear in mind that it is not the interactors
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on the character level who design their talk for an overhearing
spectator/reader but the playwright - and, in the case of theatrical
performance, the actors, the director, and others involved in the
staging of the play (cf. Elam 1980: 37-39). To quote Goffman (1979:
13):
the words addressed by one character in a play to another (at
least in modern Western dramaturgy) are eternally sealed off
from the audience, belonging entirely to a self-enclosed,
make-believe realm.
Hence, I want to argue that in the complex communication situation
of drama, the audience/reader is both addressee and overhearer,
depending on the level of discourse one is looking at: on one level
of discourse (the basic layer in Clark’s model), the playwright
designs the dramatic dialogue specifically for the spectator/reader
of the play (text). On this level, then, the recipient of a drama is
the addressee. As mentioned above, Clark (1996) states that the
primary participants (i.e. the audience/readers) “are intended to
imagine what is happening in the highest current layer of action” as
well as “to appreciate the instigator’s purposes and techniques in
creating the highest current layer of action” (359). This
appreciation can take various forms. For instance, as Elam (1980:
38) notes, in the situation of live theatre, the spectators will
interpret the complex of messages (speech, gesture, etc.)
transmitted to them by the source (i.e. dramatist, director
designer, performers, etc.) according to the theatrical, dramatic
and cultural codes at their disposal and will in turn assume the
role of transmitters of signals to the source (laughter, applause,
boos, etc.), which will be interpreted in terms of approval,
hostility, and so on. Thus, the playwright, director, actors etc.
and the audience collaborate in the construction of meaning in
theatrical discourse. By the same token, although the readers of a
play text do not take an active part in the interaction in drama,
they are still active participants in the joint construction of
meaning, in dramatic discourse as in mediated discourse in general
(cf. Aston & Savona 1991; Bakhtin 1986; Bubel forthcoming; Bubel &
Spitz forthcoming; Duranti 1986; Esslin 1987; Klemm 2000; Morley
1994).10 On another level of discourse (the embedded level in Short’s
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and the top layer in Clark’s model), the situation of the
spectator/reader who is listening to/reading the dramatic dialogue
is similar to that of an overhearer in everyday situations who is
bystander or eavesdropper to a conversation. Both are unratified
participants to a social encounter having no rights or obligations
in it. In both cases, the interaction they are overhearing - whether
it is factual or fictional - is sealed off from them, belonging to a
self-enclosed realm.
In addition to the fictionality and multi-dimensionality of
dramatic discourse, there are literary conventions at work governing
the dramatic representations of talk, so that the depicted dialogue
is quite different from a transcription of a natural conversation.
In fact, a comparison between transcriptions of real-life talk and
even the most naturalistic dramatic dialogue shows that the latter
is a representation of ordinary conversation, and not a mirror image
of it. For instance, dramatic discourse generally exhibits fewer
characteristics of spoken language: it contains occasional rather
than pervasive false starts, repetition, interruption, overlaps,
simultaneous speech, etc. (cf. Betten 1975, 1980, 1985; Person
1999). For that reason, it has been considered a “pure,”
“concentrated,” “condensed,” or “tidied up” version of social
intercourse (cf. Burton 1980; Elam 1980; Herman 1991, 1998, Piazza
1999).
This is not to say, however, that the character-to-character
level of interaction cannot be subjected to the same analytic
procedures as naturally-occurring conversation. On the contrary,
despite the aforementioned differences between dialogue in plays and
real-life discourse, dramatic dialogue can be analysed as
conversation, since it relies on the same mechanisms as natural
communication. It is hard to see how readers and spectators are able
to recognise and respond to fictional dialogue as a version of real-
life conversation if the two did not share significant properties.
In fact, dramatic dialogue can only be accessed through its
relationship to the social context outside the play text. The norms,
values and conventions of behaviour which regulate how real people
organise their social encounters form the basis for interpreting the
interactions of the fictional characters in the world of plays. The
intelligibility/accessibility and success of constructed dialogue
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thus depends on how well it confirms to cultural understandings of
and expectations about appropriate discursive practice. By the same
token, the creation of dramatic worlds draws on given, existing
resources – of language, (inter)action, etc. and the conventions of
use underlying these – but exploits and artfully develops them in
the design of speech and (inter)action in plays. To conclude, the
conventions of behaviour, action and speech in real life are made
operative in the creation, assessment and understanding of behaviour
in the fictional world of the play (cf. also Hall & Daniels 1992;
Herman 1991, 1995; Kennedy 1983; Khader 2000; Lemert 1997; O’Barr
1984; Person 1999; Schneider 1988; Simpson 1997, 1998; Tannen 1989,
1990, 1997; Toolan 1990).
This claim is analogous to Bakhtin’s (1986) notion of dialogue
as growing out of a view of language as fundamentally interactive
and grounded in context; of meaning as the result of interplay
between novelty and formulaicity; of meaning as created by listeners
as well as speakers in response to prior text; and his conception of
ordinary conversation as made up of primary genres that are
“absorbed” and “digested” by “secondary genres” such as novels and
drama (62). According to Baktin (1986: 87), “when we select words in
the process of constructing an utterance ... we usually take them
from other utterances, and mainly from utterances that are kindred
to ours in genre, that is, in theme, composition, or style.”
Similarly, Becker (1984: 435) states: “The actual a-priori of any
language event ... is an accumulation of remembered prior texts.”
Consequently, “our real language competence is access, via memory,
to this accumulation of prior text.”
By the same token, recipients of discourse can make sense of
what they hear/read only by reference to recognisable scenes
composed of people engaged in meaningful activities. They imagine
these scenes in response to the clues provided by the discourse,
thereby participating in the mutual process of sense-making. In
drama dialogue a similar process is at work. The play text
represents visually recognisable elements of conversation which
provide the basis for the listener’s/reader’s recreation of a
complete meaningful conversation. In other words, dramatic dialogue
gives the impression of representing real conversation through the
suggestion of remembered conversations. In the same way that Bakhtin
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claims that every conversation echoes other conversations, by the
same speakers and others, dramatic dialogues echo both other
dramatic dialogues and remembered conversations from real life. That
is dramatic dialogues conform to expectations established by other
dramatic dialogues and remembered conversations from real life. As
Tannen (1997: 153) puts it:
By a process of synecdoche, the representation of
recognizable conversational parts triggers in the reader the
re-creation of a conversation like those that have been
experienced.
For that reason, in spite of the dissimilarities to everyday
conversation, in many respects, the dialogue in which dramatic
characters engage is similar to that found in naturally occurring
conversation and thus lends itself readily to similar kinds of
analysis.11
For example, it is generally acknowledged that crucial
structural and functional principles and patterns are at work in
fictional dialogue, just as they are in natural conversation (cf.
Burton 1980; Herman 1991, 1995; Kennedy 1983; Lowe 1998; Noguchi
1978; Person 1999; Toolan 1985, 1990). In the fictional situation of
the dramatic scene, the participants act as if they were subject to
the same rule systems valid in everyday discourse and produce
conversation by using procedures similar to those used by people in
real life. For instance, both dramatic dialogue and everyday
conversation have interlocutors who (generally) speak alternately
and not simultaneously.12 Furthermore, just as in natural
conversation, the characters in plays can be seen as socially
organising their speech by linking their utterances to preceding
utterances and thus have similar procedures for raising, developing,
changing and closing topics. It is above all this sequential
organisation of conversational contributions in dramatic dialogue
that makes it amenable to analysis as conversation. To quote Noguchi
(1978: 15):
Insofar as characters in literature, like conversationalists
is real life, produce conversation through a series of
concerted actions, the characteristic patterns in dialogue
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exemplify, or at least reflect, characteristic patterns of
social interaction.
In fact, although dramatic discourse is not equivalent to the
dialogue spontaneously produced in interaction, paradoxically, it
often strikes audiences and readers as extremely realistic and
apparently represents something that rings true to them. Indeed, as
Lakoff & Tannen (1984) point out, if we look at transcripts of
natural conversation, “we are struck, often, in a perverse way by
their apparent unnaturalness, their difficulty in being understood”
(323). Compared with dialogue in a play, “naturalistic conversation
strikes us not as what we expected, not working by preconceived
patterns” (ibid). They suggest that “artificial dialog may represent
an internalized model or schema for the production of conversation –
a competence model that speakers have access to” (ibid). Likewise,
according to Schneider (1988: 115), “dramatic discourse is authentic
in that it is a projection of the playwright’s communicative
competence, who relies on the competence of the audience.” In other
words, play texts are created by individuals who have grown up and
participate in the society/culture they portray and to which they
play. Dramatists base their dialogue on their intuitions about and
(implicit) knowledge of how conversation works - intuitions and
knowledge they share with their audience/readers.13 Hence the
interaction portrayed in a drama reveals how the author perceives
the workings of conversation in real life, and thus provides a
fruitful site for the discourse analyst. To quote Lakoff & Tannen
(1984: 323):
If, then, we are interested in the ideal model of
conversational strategy, there is much to be gained by
looking at artificial conversation first, to see what these
general, unconsciously–adhered-to assumptions are; and later
returning to natural conversation to see how they may
actually be exemplified in literal use.
From this perspective, then, rather than presenting a drawback, the
lack of some typical features of everyday speech and conversation,
such as deficient syntax, hesitation phenomena, redundancies,
simultaneous talk, interruptions, etc. may even aid empirical
analyses to focus on typical global structures of discourse
29
regardless whether real or constructed (cf. also Apeltauer 1978;
Betten 1975; Hess-Lüttich 1985; Watzlawick et al. 1967).
To sum up so far, dramatic dialogue can be a rich source of
insight about the workings of everyday talk. The principles, norms
and conventions of use which underlie spontaneous communication in
everyday life are exploited and manipulated by dramatists in their
constructions of dialogues in plays. They are the resource that
dramatists use to create conversations in plays (cf. also Herman
1995; Tannen 1989). Through the creative elaboration and
manipulation of these resources, i.e. by presenting critical
situations of interaction and highlighting and foregrounding
features of ordinary conversation, dramatic dialogues reach a degree
of condensation in the communicative mechanism which can hardly be
found in the everyday practice of interacting individuals, and that
renders it a rewarding research object for the discourse analyst
(cf. Betten 1975; Kallmeyer 1979; Schlieben-Lange 1980; Schnebly
1994; Schütze 1980; Ungeheuer 1980). In other words, examining what
playwrights do can yield valuable insight into the workings of
natural conversation.
Likewise, fictional dialogues provide a valuable testing ground
for assessing the reliability and validity of linguistic and
especially discourse analytical concepts, models and theories. As
Halliday (1967: 217) emphasises:
It is part of the task of linguistics to describe texts; and
all texts, including those, prose and verse, which fall
within any definition of literature, are accessible to
linguistic analysis.
Many linguistic theories are highly abstract and the creative
discourse that characterises many plays makes it an excellent site
for investigating theories about language and social interaction. It
has become an axiom in stylistics that we often perceive
conventional modes of language and interaction only through exposure
to deviant or distorted ones. In this respect, literary discourse
has an important role to play in that it highlights the norms of
communication by exploiting and manipulating them.14 Hence, the
application of discourse analytical procedures to dramatic dialogues
is an important heuristic device for generating theoretical
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hypotheses concerning fundamental rules of interaction and refining
analytical concepts for the analysis of the overall structure of
conversation and thus contributes to the development of linguistic
theory (cf. Aronsson 1987; Burton 1980; Carter 1994; Carter &
Simpson 1989).
Finally, a discourse analytical approach to drama also provides
a basis for fuller understanding and interpretation of language
effects in plays (cf. Aston & Savona 1991; Brumfit & Carter 1986;
Burton 1980, 1982; Carson 1974; Carter 1982b, 1984; Carter & Simpson
1989; Herman 1991: 99; Hess-Lüttich 1985; Khader 2000: 21; Noguchi
1978; Schnebly 1994; Short 1982, 1988, 1995; Thornborrow & Wareing
1998; Wales 1989). As discussed above, the principles, norms and
conventions of use which underlie spontaneous conversation in daily
life are the resource that dramatists use to construct dialogue in
plays and that readers/spectators draw on in understanding
interactions in plays. Therefore, attention to these can enable us
to analyse and appreciate the resourceful and creative exploitation
of such conventions and processes by dramatists. More precisely, a
discourse analytical approach to drama has a critical potential for
literary study, since it highlights and explains linguistic patterns
in play texts and shows their functional significance for the
textual interpretation. It can assist critical readings by providing
a sound methodology for understanding how dramatic dialogues are
constructed, how they convey certain effects to their readers and
audiences. It is therefore more profitable than the traditional
approaches to drama, which remain essentially descriptive, since it
proceeds beyond an identification of the effects of language to an
analysis of how such effects are achieved, why it is that large
numbers of recipients respond to similar effects in any play text,
and how to locate these effects in the details of the text itself.
In a nutshell, if looking at what playwrights do leads to a better
understanding of real-life conversation, then knowing about real-
life conversation is an extremely effective way of finding out about
what playwrights are doing. The upshot of this is that approaching
dramatic discourse by drawing on procedures for the analysis of
naturally-occurring conversation can inform our understanding of
both in various ways.
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So far, I have argued that the procedures for the analysis of
naturally-occurring conversation are profitable for the study of
play-talk and, conversely, that dramatic dialogue is a rewarding
research object for the analysis of everyday conversation, and in
particular for the study of conflict talk. I have shown that
notwithstanding obvious differences, dramatic dialogue – especially
in the case of modern plays – closely resembles ordinary talk, and
thus can be analysed by drawing on procedures for the study of
natural conversation. Dramatic dialogues are created by individuals
who live and participate in the society they portray in plays.
Accordingly, the interaction rendered in plays reflects how
dramatists envisage the mechanisms of interpersonal exchange in real
life. This is also, or especially, true for plays by women. As
Pearlman (1989: 6) states: “It is obvious that literature by women
is not removed from ‘lived female experience’.” Similarly, Griffiths
(1993: 48) maintains that “plays can be seen as reports from the
front line of women’s experience, examining ... the family through
the focus of mother-daughter relationships.” To put it differently,
many plays by women can be considered slice-of-life accounts of
family life, and in particular of mother-daughter relationships,
reflecting the authors’ personal experience as conversationalists
and professional observations as lay sociologists, as it were. Thus,
play texts allow us to see how women perceive and conceptualise
crucial relationship issues, such as power and conflict in mother-
daughter relationships, and the manifestation of these issues in
(verbal) interaction. Consequently, dialogues in plays by women have
particular merit as a source of data for the analysis of conflict
talk between mothers and daughters - and it is as such that they
will be exploited here: in the present study, I will investigate how
verbal conflicts and underlying power relationships are jointly and
interactively created and negotiated by mothers and daughters in the
fictional world of contemporary plays by women.
This is certainly not the first time play texts have been
subjected to pragmatic, discourse-analytic, or sociolinguistic
investigation. While until fairly recently, any type of data other
than naturally occurring conversation was rejected as unsuitable for
linguistic analysis, researchers have started to appreciate a wider
range of data and now accept material that was rejected earlier.
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Thus, the data is no longer restricted to recordings of spontaneous
conversations. Especially dramatic dialogues have been the object of
investigation, since theatrical works are generally considered to
mimic spoken interaction more faithfully than other types of
literary works. Analysts in the past have looked at dialogue in
plays from various angles: in a study exploring differences in the
language behaviour of men and women, due to a lack of historical
archives of natural conversation Biber & Burges (2000) use dramatic
dialogue as a source that provides useful representations of
historical spoken language: “Drama represents extended
conversational dialogue played out in live settings and thus allows
for detailed analyses of the perceived language use patterns
associated with men and women” (Biber & Burges 2000: 23). Similarly,
in his study of comparison in Middle English, Norrick (1987) takes
into specific consideration the Towneley Plays, arguing that they
provide a plausible representation of spoken late Middle English,
because they were written and produced by local guildsmen, and hence
a valuable source for analysis of natural syntactic constructions.
Likewise, in his discussion of jokes and comic narrative passages in
drama in chapter seven of Conversational Narrative, Norrick (2000:
182-195) compares a spontaneous conversational story with the
Nurse’s story of the young Juliet in Shakespeare’s Romeo & Juliet
(Act 1, Scene iii), citing evidence that it represented folk speech
and narrative in 16th-century England. He also contrasts the tailor’s
joke from Beckett’s Endgame with conversational joke telling,
showing that the tailor’s joke is effectively introduced into
dialogue with the typical hesitations of everyday talk ("I never
told it worse," 191). Brown & Gilman (1960, 1989) draw on
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth and Othello for their study
of politeness as reflected in pronoun usage in Early Modern English.
They account for their use of Shakespearian plays pointing out that
“there is nothing else” (1989: 170) as well as by referring to
Salmon, who claimed that “the more skilful the dramatist, the more
skilful he will be, if presenting the normal life of his time, in
authenticating the action by an acceptable version of contemporary
speech” (1965: 105). Salmon (1965, 1967) argued a long time ago that
at least certain portions of the dialogues in Shakespeare’s dramas
are “reasonable imitations of Elizabethan speech” (Salmon 1965:
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106). Mazzon (2003), too, studies address term patterns in King
Lear, Othello and Hamlet and focuses in particular on the social
relationships between individual characters. Stein (2003)
investigates the social, pragmatic and emotional meanings of the
occurrences of you and thou in King Lear and As You Like It.
Kielkiewicz-Janowiak (1985) also examines the use of pronominal
address in As You Like It. Similarly, Calvo (1992, 1994) looks at
pronouns of address and social negotiation in Shakespeare’s As You
Like It. Busse (2003) analyses the co-occurrence of nominal and
pronominal forms of address in Shakespeare’s plays. Hunt (2003)
studies the usage of T and V pronouns in the Anglo-Norman play
Seinte Resureccion dating from the second half of the twelfth
century, and Brown & Ford (1961) investigate norms of address in
American plays. Leech (1992) examines deviations from pragmatic
principles such as Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle and
conversational maxims, and Leech’s (1983: 104-151) principle of
politeness in Shaw’s You never can tell. Short (1989) draws on
insights in pragmatics (i.e. speech act theory, presupposition, co-
operative principle, and terms of address) in his analysis of the
dialogue in Pinter’s short sketch Trouble in the works to account
for the ‘absurdity’ of the play. Similarly, Schlieben-Lange (1980)
draws on Gricean theory and conversation analysis in her analysis of
the (mis)communication in Ionesco’s The bald primadonna. Magnusson
(1992) studies the rhetoric of politeness in Shakespeare’s Henry
VIII. Simpson (1989a) examines politeness phenomena in Ionesco’s The
lesson. Culpeper (1996, 1999, 2001) draws on politeness frameworks
to account for phenomena of impoliteness in drama and film and their
importance for the development of character and plot. Similarly,
Kienpointer (1997) examines instances of “rudeness” in Albee’s Who’s
afraid of Virginia Woolf. Bennison (1998) explores the relationship
between turn-taking patterns, the use of politeness strategies and
the perception of power relationships among the characters in
Stoppard’s Professional Foul. Cooper (1981) examines the use of
implicature in Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew. Schmachtenberg
(1982) discusses the application of speech act theory to dramatic
dialogues as a method of interpreting plays. Lowe (1994, 1998) draws
on speech act theory to examine the speech act confession in
Miller’s The Crucible. Frilling (1991) employs speech act theory in
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her investigation of the absurd dialogue in Ionesco’s The bald
primadonna. Fish (1976) examines the use of speech acts in
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus. Petit (1980) looks at performatives in
Shakespeare’s Richard II. Coulthard (1985: 184-192) examines
question-answer sequences in Shakespeare’s Othello. While cautioning
that the analyst must keep in mind that these are invented
sequences, shaped for an artistic purpose and that some of the rules
and conventions are different, he claims that “drama texts, being
scripts for the performing of pseudo-conversations, can be
successfully approached with techniques originally developed to
analyse real conversation” (182). Klammer (1971, 1973) applies
tagmemic analysis to Shakespeare’s Henry IV and Dickens’ Great
Expectations to investigate the dialogue structures in these works.
Herman (1991, 1995, 1998) draws on the findings of conversation
analysis in her investigation of turn management in plays (e.g.
Pinter’s Homecoming, Shakespeare’s King Lear). Gautam (1987) draws
on Grice’s (1975) principles of conversation, Sack’s (1974) insights
on questions and answers, as well as Sinclair & Coulthard’s (1975)
model of discourse in his analysis of Pinter’s The Caretaker. Nash
(1989) makes use of sociolinguistic, pragmatic and discourse-
analytic concepts in his examination of the opening of Shakespeare’s
Hamlet. Piazza (1999) draws on the findings of conversation analysis
in her study of repair mechanisms in contemporary plays (Norman’s
’night mother, Hayes’ Skirmishes, Shepard’s Fool for love, and
Pinter’s The Caretaker). Burton (1980, 1982) offers a modified and
extended version of Sinclair & Coulthard’s (1975) model of classroom
discourse and applies it to drama dialogue, mostly from the plays of
Harold Pinter, in order to systematically account for the
“alienated” structure of the dialogues, in which silences, non
sequiturs, breaking of rules for turn-taking, etc., serve to
underline the kinds of power relations which obtain in the
dramatised conversations. Weber (1998) also draws on discourse
analytic concepts to examine manifestations of power in Mamet’s
Oleanna. Rommetveit (1991) draws on IR analysis (Linell et al. 1988)
to investigate dominance and asymmetries in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House.
It is also not the first time dramatic dialogues have been the
object of conflict analysis (cf. above). But to my knowledge it is
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the first time dramatic dialogue has been studied with the focus on
mother-daughter disputes.
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Drama is life with the dull bits cut out.
(Alfred Hitchcock)
2.2 Data
The investigation is based on a corpus of eleven contemporary plays
by British and American women playwrights: Home by Laura Cahill;
Neaptide by Sarah Daniels; The Alto Part by Barbara Gilstrap; Stuck
by Jessica Goldberg; A raisin in the sun by Lorraine Hansberry; My
mother said I never should by Charlotte Keatley; My sister in this
house by Wendy Kesselman; Perfect days by Liz Lochhead; Avenue of
dream by Elyse Nass; ‘night Mother by Marsha Norman; and Tell me
another story, sing me a song by Jean Lenox Toddie.15
The plays were chosen because they all portray intense family
relations which are marked by the frequent occurrence of mother-
daughter disputes. Moreover, the dialogues in the dramas selected
display a close similarity to real-life talk, exhibiting
characteristic features of ordinary conversation. The restriction to
plays by female authors is based on the research interest of this
study. As mentioned above, the mother-daughter relationship, and in
particular mother-daughter conflict, is crucial to the lives of
women and constitutes a key motif in women’s plays. Playwrights draw
their material for the creation of dramatic dialogues out of the
mundane conversations in which they participate and which they
overhear. In other words, dialogues in plays are rooted in the
authors’ own personal experience and observations as amateur
ethnographers or sociologists. Thus, plays by women provide a window
on how women themselves perceive and conceptualise crucial aspects
of mother-daughter relationships, such as power and conflict, and
the construction and negotiation of these relationship aspects in
(verbal) interaction.16
Each of the plays in my corpus contains a whole array of
dispute sequences, each of which in turn includes a wide range of
different disputing practices. In the empirical part of this study,
I will analyse a series of selected examples from the plays in my
corpus, in which the characteristic aspects of mother-daughter
disputes are particularly prominent. The majority of these examples
are extracts from longer conflict sequences. Almost each of the
sample passages displays a multitude of communicative features,
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which cannot all be discussed in one go. Thus, one extract may be
used as the basis for illustrating a variety of different discursive
phenomena. As a result, I will look at some of the examples more
than once, but each time with a different analytical focus. That is
to say, the repeated analysis of the same segments is by no means
due to a lack of suitable data, but on the contrary due to the
richness of data provided by the plays.
Although I will generally focus on dyadic exchanges between
mothers and daughters, I will occasionally look at stretches of
multi-party talk to exemplify certain characteristics of the
disputes in my corpus; but in these cases, too, I will concentrate
mainly on the contributions of the mother-daughter dyads. Following
Burton (1980) and Rommetveit (1991), in the analytical sections, I
will deal with the play scripts as if they were transcripts of real-
life face-to-face conversations, and read the stage directions as
accounts of paralinguistic and nonverbal components of natural
dialogues.17
38
                                                                                                                                                        
Notes for chapter 2:
1 As Bach & Wyden (1975: 14) state: “Die meisten Menschen meinen, sie müssten ihren
Ärger und ihre Streitigkeiten geheim halten.”
2 For critique of the application of findings of research on conflict talk in
institutional settings to informal discussions cf. also Knoblauch (1991, 1995).
3 Argumentative discussions are a type of conflict management in which the speakers
use arguments in order to convince the interlocutor of their position or to get her
to perform the desired activity (Hofer et al 1993: 16).
4 Within the framework of argumentation theory, argumentative exchanges are
considered to presuppose a quaestio, i.e. a contentious issue that is to be
resolved. Argumentation is then defined as the process of solving the problem posed
in the quaestio (cf. and Klein 1985; Kotthoff 1984, 1989; Maas 1974; Toulmin 1983;
Van Eemeren et al. 1992). In terms of argumentation theory, then, in the elicited
discussions analysed by Hofer and his co-workers, the quaestio is pre-given by the
interviewer.
5 Aristotle (1965) in his Poetics (VI) first stressed the significance of dialogue
as an element of drama, arguing that the dialogue has a unique function which
cannot be replaced by other dramatic elements. Correspondingly, in Szondi’s (1970,
1987) Theory of the modern drama, dramatic dialogue is considered the most
significant vehicle of the interpersonal world and the unique element in the
texture of the drama. It attains a supreme place in the hierarchy of dramatic
elements, mirroring interpersonal relations. Likewise, A. Kennedy (1983: 2) states:
“The governing concept for all dramatic dialogue is verbal interaction.” This view
is echoed by several authors approaching dramatic dialogue from a linguistic (or,
more precisely, a discourse analytic) perspective, who argue that the crucial role
of verbal interaction in plays accounts for the preference of drama over other
genres in stylistic research. For instance, Lakoff and Tannen (1994: 141) note that
“novelists have many other techniques to fall back on, but for a playwright, dialog
and its concomitant extralinguistic behavior is all the audience has to go on.
Interpretation must be done by the viewer or listener – as in actual conversation.”
Similarly, Thornborrow and Wareing (1998: 121) maintain that “one crucial aspect in
which drama differs from poetry and fiction is in its emphasis on verbal
interaction, and the way relationships between people are constructed and
negotiated through what they say.” Burton (1980) also argues that since plays have
to be concerned with human interaction, and have to be realised by human dialogue,
play scripts are an extremely rich resource for discourse analysts.
6 For instance, in his collection of articles on the “mother-daughter puzzle” in
contemporary American literature, Pearlman (1989: 1) notes that there is a
“superabundance” of recent American literary works by women about mothers,
daughters and, above all, the mother-daughter relationship. Griffiths (1993: 64)
also contends that “many plays by women focus on mother-daughter relationships.”
7 The use of linguistic theories and procedures to approach literary texts is
traditionally referred to as “stylistics,” which, according to Leech (1983: 151),
“may be regarded simply as the variety of discourse analysis dealing with literary
discourse” (cf. also Carson 1974, Carter 1984, 1988; Carter & Simpson 1989;
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Halliday 1967; Short 1988, 1995; Thornborrow & Wareing 1998; Wales 1989; and
others).
8 For discussion of the multi-levelled character of dramatic, theatrical, and film
discourse cf. also Aston & Savona (1991); Bubel (forthcoming); Bubel & Spitz
(forthcoming); Elam (1980); Esslin (1987); Herman (1991); Kennedy (1983).
9 In his participation framework, Goffman (1976, 1979), differentiates various
hearer roles in conversation: (1) addressed recipients: ratified participants who
are oriented to by the speaker in a way that suggests that her words are directed
specifically at them. (2) unaddressed recipients:  ratified participants, who – in
the case of multi-party conversation - are not specifically addressed by the
speaker. (3) bystanders: unratified, participants who have no rights and no
obligations in a conversation but who are recognised and allowed to be present by
the speaker. These are further distinguished into (3a) overhearers: bystanders who
unintentionally and inadvertently follow the talk, and (3b) eavesdroppers:
bystanders who secretly and deliberately access the social encounter. 
Drawing on Goffman’s framework, Clark (1996) defines four categories of
participant status in everyday conversation, as illustrated in figure 1 below. A
speaker addresses an utterance to an addressee. A side participant is a ratified
participant, i.e. a participant recognised by speaker and addressee as a full
member of the conversation but not currently being addressed. All other listeners
are overhearers, who have no rights or responsibilities in the conversation.
Overhearers come in two main types. Bystanders are those who are openly present but
not part of the conversation. Eavesdroppers, on the other hand, are those who
listen without the speaker’s awareness. Clark emphasises, however, that in reality,
there are several varieties of overhearers on a continuum between bystander and
eavesdropper.
Figure (1): participant roles (adapted from Clark 1996: 14)
Speaker
Side participant Bystander   Eavesdropper
Adressee
 
10 To quote Duranti (1986: 243-244): „interpretation of texts, sounds, etc.) is not
a passive activity whereby the audience is just trying to figure out what the
author meant to communicate. Rather, it is a way of making sense of what someone
said (or wrote or drew) by linking it to a world or context what the audience can
make sense of.”
11 The similarity between real life and drama has been pointed out before, notably
by Goffman. In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) Goffman used the
idea of the “theatrical performance,” in which human interaction is viewed in terms
of a stage play:
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almost anyone can quickly learn a script well enough to give
a charitable audience some sense of realness in what is being
contrived before them. And it seems this is so because
ordinary social intercourse is itself put together as a scene
is put together, by the exchange of dramatically inflated
actions, counteractions, and terminating replies. Scripts
even in the hands of unpractised players can come to life
because life itself is a dramatically enacted thing. All the
world is not, of course, a stage, but the crucial ways in
which it isn’t are not easy to specify. (Goffman 1959: 78)
In his dramaturgical approach Goffman used theatre and drama as a metaphor to
explain how the individual works to manage impressions and accomplish a successful
presentation of the self to others. Goffman argued his point (as did Shakespeare),
claiming that in interacting with others we play roles just like actors on a stage.
To stay in character we speak the right lines, use certain non-verbal behaviours as
well as appropriate props how. In other words, we “stage manage” the images we try
to convey to those around us. This presentation varies from situation to situation,
so that there is a possible gap between “frontstage” and “backstage” performances.
For instance, a waiter may have a very different manner in the kitchen and out in
the dining room taking orders from guests. The theatre metaphor is thus a means of
illustrating the structure of social encounters that occur in all social life.
12 It must be noted, however, that “one-at-a-time” is not a conversational
universal. As several studies of shown, the degree to which overlapping talk is
acceptable varies by culture and occasion. Different kinds of organisation of
speaker change will be discussed in more detail Ch. 6.3.2.
13 Sociolinguistic research, too, relies on people’s intuitions and communicative
experience. In a study of gender, race and speech style stereotypes by Popp et al.
(2003), participants were asked to generate dialogues for a fictional character
whose race and gender were varied and subsequently rate the character’s talk. The
instructions read as follows: “Try to make your character’s talk as real as
possible” (320). The experiment aimed at investigating how Black and White men and
women are perceived to talk.
14 As Burton (1980: 111) states, "plays are a means of presenting the social world
in a specifically alienated, and therefore graspable way" (cf. also Betten 1975;
Herman 1995; Schnebly 1994; Simpson 1989b).
15 For complete bibliographical references see Ch. 10.
16 Correspondingly, in a corpus-based study exploring differences in the language
use of men and women as represented, for instance, in drama dialogue, Biber &
Burges (2000) note that the sex of the author is an important parameter, since the
perspectives of female and male authors on the language of men and women differ
considerably.
17 For drama-reading conventions see the Appendix.
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No doubt there are other important things in life
besides conflict, but there are not many other things so
inevitably interesting. The very saints interest us most
when we think of them as engaged in a conflict with the
Devil.
(Robert Lynd, The Blue Lion)
3 Conceptualisations of interpersonal conflict: causes versus process
In this section, I will discuss some of the ways in which conflict
and its discourse has been conceptualised. The many-sided nature of
research into conflict (talk) has resulted in a multitude of
conceptualisations, terms and definitions. While this study is not
concerned with producing a comprehensive definition of conflict
(talk), a brief discussion of some of the conceptualisation issues
is pertinent in order to delineate the scope of the study.
Numerous investigators focus on the underlying sources of
conflict and define conflict as goal incompatibility occurring
between two or more individuals or groups. For example, one of the
most influential theorists, Galtung (1973: 113), stresses the
importance of irreconcilable motives and goals for the occurrence of
conflict: “Ein Handlungssystem liegt dann im Konflikt, wenn das
System zwei oder mehrere unvereinbare Zielzustände vereinigt.”1
Similar notions can be traced in linguistic studies of conflict
talk. For instance, Shantz (1987:284) maintains that “a state of
conflict denotes incompatible behaviours or goals.”
Such motive-centred conceptions put the accent on the
preconditions of conflict rather than on the process of conflict
itself. However, as Mack & Snyder (1973: 41) have pointed out, “the
presence or persistence of underlying source factors does not
necessarily mean that conflict, as defined, will arise.” Moreover,
while such emphases provide an insight into possible causes of
conflict, they do not clearly identify an occurrence of conflict in
ongoing interaction. On the contrary, the notion of conflict as goal
incompatibility allows conflict to exist in the absence of its
expression: two individuals who have opposing goals but who do not
act on or express their opposition nevertheless are considered to be
in conflict. In addition, from this source-oriented perspective,
conflict can also be one-sided. When one person views her goals as
being in opposition to another’s, conflict exists even if the second
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person does not share the perception (cf. Fincham & Bradbury 1991).
Finally, and most importantly for this study, while such motive-
centred approaches reveal possible sources of conflict, the ways in
which conflict emerges, progresses and ends remain concealed; the
conflict itself remains the analytical black-box (Messmer 2003).
By contrast, other researchers focus on the expression of
underlying incompatibilities in interaction as a defining
characteristic of conflict. From this perspective, conflict is
conceptualised as mutual opposition, the overt display of
differences between (at least) two individuals or groups. For
instance, Mack & Snyder (1973: 36) view social conflict as an
interactional relationship. They assert that “conflict requires
interaction among parties in which actions and counteractions are
mutually opposed.” Foss (1980: 123) defines conflict as “active
opposition between parties holding contradictory values and claims
over scarce status, power and resources” and emphasises that the
“term conflict refers to the actual behaviour of group members.”
Similarly, while viewing participants’ perception of incompatible
goals, scarce rewards, and interference from the other party in
achieving their goals as potential sources of conflict, Frost &
Wilmot (1978: 10) stress that these incompatibilities have to be
somehow expressed, and define conflict in terms of communicative
interaction:
relational conflict is communicative behaviour; it is
impossible to have conflict without either verbal or non-
verbal behaviour, or both. The ‘expression’ may be very
subtle, but it must be present for the activity to be
interpersonal conflict. ... All interpersonal conflicts are
expressed struggles, even if that expression is nonverbal or
very subtle.
In other words, there is no conflict without communication.
In his linguistic study of children’s disputes, Rehbock (1987: 177,
fn1) also emphasises the process character of conflict, when he
defines conflict as:
jede Interaktion, deren Teilnehmer antagonistische
Handlungsziele und/oder beziehungs-, wert-, wissens-,
urteilsbezogene Geltungsansprüche wechselseitig ‘behaupten’,
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d.h. kundtun und wenigstens ansatzweise gegeneinander zu
verteidigen bzw., durchzusetzen versuchen. Konflikte werden
demnach konstituiert durch mindestens dreischrittige
Sequenzen gegeneinander gerichteter (,konflitärer’)
Handlungen ... Als ‚Konfliktgespräch’ möchte ich jedes
Gespräch bezeichnen, in dem ein Konflikt konstituiert oder
... aktualisiert und in irgendeiner Form ausgetragen wird.
Here, conflict is defined as an interactional process that emerges
from the moves and countermoves that constitute it. It is conceived
as an expressed struggle over contradictory goals, interests,
values, and/or resource distributions, which arises from the
perception of incompatible wants, goals, behaviours, etc. The
incompatibility is expressed when the conflicting parties
reciprocally oppose each others’ actions or statements. In other
words, the essence of conflict is interaction, as we can only
realise that an opposition exists once we interact. The
conceptualisation of conflict as the mutual display of opposition
provides a much clearer focus than definitions that centre on
possible causes of conflict and view conflict simply as the presence
of incompatible interests or goals, i.e. as a state rather than a
dynamic process.
While Rehbock (1987) differentiates between conflict and its
verbal enactment (i.e. conflict talk), Bavelas et al. (1985) go one
step further. On the assumption that the nature of a relationship is
immanent in the participants’ communication (Bateson 1972, 1982;
Danzinger 1976; Millar & Rogers 1976; Rogers & Farace 1975; Sluzki &
Beavin 1980; Watzlawick et al. 1967),2 they equate interpersonal
conflict with the conversational (inter)activity of arguing:
Most interpersonal conflict is verbal, not physical; the
conflict is the argument itself. Thus, to analyze such
dialogue is to approach and study the phenomenon most
directly. In linguistic terms, interpersonal conflict is a
speech event; it is performative in that saying equals doing.
The argument, quarrel, insults, or disagreement are the
conflict. In other words, people do not relate, then talk;
rather, they relate in talk (Duncan 1967: 249); the
relationship is the exchange of messages (Bateson 1972: 275).
(Bavelas et al. 1985: 9)
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This view is echoed by Garvey & Shantz (1992: 93) in their review on
studies of children’s disputes: “Conflict is considered here as a
social activity, created and conducted primarily by means of
talking.”
In keeping with this interactional view of language as the
means for establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships
and for performing socially organised interactions between
individuals, I view interpersonal conflict as an emergent process,
which is jointly accomplished by the participants in and through
talk-in-interaction. Therefore, rather than analyse why people
conflict and with what outcomes, we should examine how people
conflict, i.e. the interactional procedures participants employ to
accomplish the activity (cf. also Bavelas et al. 1985; Gruber 1996a;
Messmer 2003). Consequently, the analysis of the participants’
verbal exchanges becomes the principal means of investigating
conflict. In the present study, the emphasis is thus on the
interactive processes through which actual conflicts emerge and
develop in order to study conflict as a structured and functional
(inter)activity in and through which participants construct social
reality (cf. Goffman 1959, 1963; Berger and Luckmann 1966).
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Notes for chapter 3:
1 For similar views cf. also Coser (1956); Deutsch (1971, 1973a, b); Fincham &
Bradbury (1991); Thomas (1976); and Waln (1982).
2 Following Bateson (1951, 1972, 1982), Watzlawick et al. (1967) propose that every
message has a content (report) aspect and a relational (command) aspect. The
content aspect conveys information. At the same time, on the relational level,
interactors offer definitions of self and other and their position relative to one
another and, thus, of their relationship. Thus, each message in an interaction
serves either as the definition, confirmation or redefinition of the nature of the
interactors’ relationship. On this view, the communication process is essentially a
negotiation process whereby individuals reciprocally define their relationships and
themselves. As Danziger (1976: xiii-xiv) puts it, it is “the process of
communication which constitutes the ongoing interrelationship between individuals.”
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The fundamental concept in social science is power, in
the same sense in which energy is the fundamental
concept of physics.
(Bertrand Russell, Power: A new social analysis)
4 Power in (conflict) interaction
Previous research has shown that verbal conflicts perform a range of
social functions. Many scholars agree with Simmel’s (1955/1908; cf.
also Coser 1956) observation that conflict provides a central force
for the constitution of social relations.1 Proposals about the basic
dimensions of social relationships all include the concept of power
or the comparable terms control or dominance (cf. Danziger 1976;
Emery 1992; Jacob 1975; Millar & Rogers 1976, 1987, 1988; Russel
1938/1969; Rogers 1998; Rogers & Millar 1988; Tannen 1994c, 2001,
2003; Thimm & Kruse 1991; Watts 1991; Wiemann 1985; Wiemann &
Krueger 1980). Status, leadership and authority have also been used
to refer to the organisation of social order, but power is typically
viewed as the “regnant construct” of the set (C. Berger 1985: 440).
Hence, verbal conflicts are generally conceived of as arenas for the
display and negotiation of power (cf. for instance, Emery 1992;
Emihovich 1986; Genishi & di Paolo 1982; Goodwin 1980, 1982, 1983,
1990, 1993; Hofer et al. 1991, 1993; Katriel 1985; Mack & Snyder
1973; Maynard 1985b; Millar et al. 1984; Pikowsky 1993; Ross &
Conant 1992; Vuchinich 1984, 1987, 1990).2
While there is substantial agreement about the fundamental
significance of power, there is much less agreement on how to define
the concept (cf. C. Berger 1980; Davis 1988; Kramarae et al. 1984b;
Hutchby 1996a,b; Ledyaev 1997; Locher 2004; Lukes 1974, 1978, 1979,
1988; Millar & Rogers 1988; Rogers & Millar 1979; Rollins & Bahr
1976; Safilios-Rothchild 1970; Thimm & Kruse 1991; Thimm et al.
1995; Thornborrow 2002; Watts 1991; Wrong 1968, 1979). Due to the
scope of this study, a comprehensive overview and detailed
discussion of the various different conceptualisations of power
cannot be provided here. However, some of the major differences in
theories on power can be summed up as follows: (1) Power is a
potential, capacity, ability or dispositional property that does not
have to be actualised (Weber 1947; Giddens 1976; Wrong 1988, 1993
and Morriss 1987). Power is actual social behaviour; to have power
in relation to a subject is to exercise power over the subject.
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Unused potential is not power, since power implies a successful use
of the potential (e.g. Dahl 1957, 1986). (2) Power involves
intention (will, purpose, objective); it is the production of
consciously intended social effects (Dahl 1957; Russel 1938; Winter
1973; Wrong 1988, 1993). There is no inherent connection between
power and intention, motivation or wanting (Millar & Rogers 1988;
Giddens 1976, 1979). Power can be both intentional and
unintentional; individuals might exercise considerable influence
over others without intending to do so but still be credited with
possessing power over the others in question (Betts 1993; Cartwright
1959; Emerson 1962; 1972; Gibson 1971; Huston 1983; Lukes 1974;
Mokken & Stokman 1976; Nagel 1975; Oppenheim 1961; 1981). (3) Power
belongs to the individual (Dahl 1969). Power belongs to
collectivities (Arendt 1970, 1986; Parsons 1969, 1986). Power does
not belong to anyone, but is a feature of social systems (Foucault
1980). (4) Conflict is a necessary condition of power (Bachrach &
Baratz 1963; Dahl 1957; Etzioni 1968; Weber 1947). Power usually
involves conflict, but does not have to (Baldwin 1978; Oppenheim
1981; Ledyaev 1997). (5) Power is tied to domination and repression
(Dahl 1957, 1969; Weber 1947). Power is productive and enabling
(Arendt 1970, 1986; Foucault 1980; Morris 1987; Parsons 1969, 1986).
Power can be both repressive (power over) and enabling (power to)
(Fairclough 1998; Grillo 2000; Ng & Bradac 1993; Zelditch 1992). For
a detailed review and discussion of basic views on power cf. Clegg
(1989), Davis (1988), Ledyaev (1997), Locher (2004), and Lukes
(1978).
Many conceptualisations of power (e.g. Bachrach & Baratz 1970,
1993; Dahl 1957, 1969; Lukes 1974; Morriss 1987; Watts 1991; Wrong
1988) are rooted in Weber’s classic definition:3
Power is the probability that one actor within a social
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will
despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this
probability rests. (Weber 1947: 152)
Compare this with the definitions of power given by several
linguists, who set out to examine power and its manifestations in
language (use). For instance, in their classic linguistic study on
address terms and power, Brown & Gilman (1960: 255) state that “one
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person may be said to have power over another in the degree that he
is able to control the behavior of the other.” Similarly, Fowler
(1985: 61) defines power as “the ability of people and institutions
to control the behavior and material life of others.” Extending the
scope of power, Johnson (1976: 100) contends that “interpersonal
power may be defined as the ability to get another person to do or
to believe something he or she would not have necessarily done or
believed spontaneously.”
According to these definitions, power is the potential ability
of one actor to get her way and to control (influence) another’s
actions and/or beliefs. This potential rests on participants’ access
to power resources (bases of power), which are mobilised by the
actors involved in the course of their interaction in order to exert
control. These include occupation of certain social positions,
attribution of power by others, age, expert knowledge, possession of
information, economic resources, and many others.4 However, this
ability or capacity to control others and influence social outcomes
can be made manifest only in interpersonal dynamics. Thus, power is
not a property or an attribute of individuals but an “inherent
component” of social interaction (Giddens 1981). Moreover, power is
not a static social category that is imposed by some pre-existing
social structure; rather it is a dynamic relationship that is
constantly (re)produced or modified in and through social
interaction.
A large body of research has attempted to uncover the
interrelationship of interaction and social organisation, of talk
and social structure. Crucial to much thinking on this issue is
Giddens’ (1976, 1981, 1984) notion of the “duality of structure.”
Rather than viewing people’s actions and the relatively stable
structures in social systems as disparate elements, Giddens (and
other theorists such as Cicourel 1981 and Fairclough 1989) argues
that the details of interaction and the features of social structure
are intrinsically and reflexively related. Within the notion of the
duality of structure, social structure is treated as both a resource
for people’s actions and an emergent outcome of those actions.
Structures are described as “sets of rules and resources recursively
implicated in the reproduction of social systems” (Giddens 1984:
23). In the course of their interaction, actors draw upon pre-
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existing structures by mobilising resources, and, in that process,
reproduce or transform these social structures. Thus, structural
aspects of society both operate as resources for and are products of
social interaction.
Olson and Cromwell (1975) have suggested a model of power that
is consistent with Giddens’ notion of the duality of structure. They
view power as a generic construct consisting of three different but
interrelated domains: (1) power base, i.e. the potential to affect
social outcomes; a capacity which primarily depends on the resources
each participant brings to an interaction. (2) power process, i.e.
the dynamic interaction process within which control attempts are
exerted and accepted or resisted; and (3) power outcomes, i.e. the
actual outcomes of interaction. The three domains are closely
interconnected, since the (assumed) potential to influence affects
the actual process of interaction, which in turn affects outcomes;
and the accumulating “history” of outcomes, again, partially
determines the potential to influence.5
Correspondingly, Linell & Luckmann (1991) distinguish between
“exogenous” and “endogenous” asymmetries, as two interdependent
elements. Exogenous asymmetries are imposed or imported from
outside; they are social-structural conditions for interaction,
which are derived from social power and pre-established as
constraints on interaction. Endogenous asymmetries, on the other
hand, are dialogue-produced, i.e. interactively and dynamically
achieved by the participants in and through interaction. Exogenous
and endogenous asymmetries are mutually dependent:6
Asymmetries dependent on extrinsic sources must be
occasioned, reconstructed, sustained or confirmed in actual
discourse, thus re-established in situ, and, conversely,
dialogue-generated asymmetries are constrained by
predetermined conditions (social structures existing prior to
the interaction). (Linell & Luckmann 1991: 10)
The upshot of this is that we cannot adequately understand global
phenomena such as power without explicit reference to the actual
local practices of social interaction through which such structures
are brought into being, and without which they would not exist. But
at the same time, interaction does not take place in a vacuum, nor
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are structural phenomena created anew in each new interaction. Past
practices and regularities inform people’s actions, while those
actions in turn recursively recreate (and also potentially change)
the macro-structural frameworks that partially shape them. In other
words, structural phenomena such as relations of power are
constantly (re)produced, and transformed by the participants in the
course of interaction. Thus, in order to gain an understanding of
the dynamics of power we have to take into account contextual
factors such as the participants’ socio-cultural and personal
background(s), their interactional history, their social roles (e.g.
mother vs. daughter) and the related rights and obligations as well
as the details of the ongoing interaction.7
That is to say, power relationships are joint interactional
accomplishments; they are interactively and dynamically achieved,
maintained, and transformed by the participants in and through
interaction by drawing on various  resources (both intrinsic and
extrinsic to the interaction) to influence each other and affect
social outcomes. And a prime locus for the (re)construction and
negotiation of power relationships is conflict interaction, i.e. the
open clash of control attempts and resistance.
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Notes for chapter 4:
1 For instance, Newell & Stutman (1989/1990: 156) maintain that “since social status
and role may be ambiguous in any given situation or relationship, the social
confrontation episode is a way in which to enact or negotiate the relationship.”
For similar views see, for instance, Grimshaw (1990b: 284), and Muntigl & Turnbull
(1998: 226).
2 Intimacy (closeness, solidarity) is assumed to be another central relationship
dimension (cf. Emery 1992; Millar & Rogers 1976, 1987, 1988; Rogers 1998; Rogers &
Millar 1988; Tannen 1994c, 2001, 2003), and thus another aspect of relationships
that is displayed and negotiated in verbal conflict. In her study of arguments
between American Jews, Schiffrin (1984) suggests that arguing can serve as an
important means conveying sociability among adults. Building on Simmel’s
(1908/1955, 1911/1961) distinction between the form and content of social relations
and his notion of sociability, she defines sociable argument as a “speech activity
in which a polarising form has a ratificatory meaning” (331). This inversion of
meaning and form is common: The “ritual insults” and “verbal duels” described by
Abrahams (1970); Dundes et al. (1972); Edwards & Sienkewicz (1990); Fox (1977);
Gossen (1976); Katriel (1985); Kotthoff (1995); Labov (1972a,b, 1974) Kochman
(1968, 1970, 1972, 1981, 1983); Mitchell-Kernan (1972); and Tolosana (1978) turn on
this very transformation. Although the sociable arguments in Schiffrin’s data are
less formalised than ritual insults, they appear to have a similar function: “They
seem designed to show that the interactants’ relationship is close enough to
withstand what would be considered by outsiders to be verbal assaults” (Schiffrin
1984: 331). As indicated above, the speakers in Schiffrin’s data did not use
disagreement to reach common ground; they seemed to value the arguments as
processes and activities in their own right rather than for their outcome. Byrnes
(1986) and Koffhoff (1989, 1990, 1992b, 1993a) have reported a similar observations
for Germans, Kakavá (1993a, b) for Greeks, Kochman (1981) for African Americans,
and Kotthoff (1984, 1989, 1991, 1992b, 1993c) and Tannen (1990a, 1994b, 1998) for
men. These findings suggest that in some “communities of practice” (Eckert&
McConnell-Ginet 1992, 1999) arguing may be a practice by means of which
participants display and maintain their solidarity and closeness.
3 However, in the 1960s and 70s, the Weberian view of power was challenged by
interpretations of power that were substantially different. For instance, Parsons
(1969, 1986) views power as the capacity to achieve social and general societal
objectives. Similarly, Arendt (1970) defines power as the “ability to act and to
carry out concerted actions.” She argues that the traditional conceptualisation of
power as the potential of exerting some kind of influence upon people’s behaviour
or thoughts reduces power to domination and thus merely describes what power
relations become in conflicting contexts. To her, power is a property of groups,
not individuals. People create power collectively through their communicative
action and interaction. Power, then, is coordinated action in pursuit of collective
goals, and as such is equal to empowerment.
Foucault (1980) also criticises existing conceptualisations as too negative
and narrow, reducing power to repressive force. He claims that “what makes power
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weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (119). Rather than view
power as a property of individuals or collectivities, Foucault sees it as an
omnipresent and neutral force, implicated and implemented by means of discursive
practices. He describes power as “something which circulates ... something which
only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never
in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is
employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously
undergoing and exercising this power” (98).
4 There is general agreement among researchers that the bases of power are numerous
and varied and that there is no universal resource of power. There have been
several attempts to establish all possible bases of power, and many different
classifications of power resources have been suggested (cf. Bacharach & Lawler
1981; Dahl 1961; Etzioni 1971; Hillmann 1994; Lasswell & Kaplan 1959; Ledyaev 1997;
Marshall 1994; and others).
5 For an uptake and extension of this model cf. Rogers-Millar & Millar (1979) and
Spitz (2001).
6 For similar distinctions cf. Thornborrow (2002) and Weber (1998).
7 For similar views of the interplay of micro- and macro-structural aspects, of
global and local contextual factors, of diachronic and synchronic phenomena and the
importance of both for the analysis of power cf. also Kotthoff (1993c) and
Thornborrow (2002).
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Methods and means cannot be separated
from the ultimate aim. (Emma Goldman)
5 Methodology
As discussed above, in this study, (interpersonal) conflict is
viewed as an emergent process, which is jointly and sequentially
accomplished by the participants in and through talk-in-interaction.
Conflict provides an important arena for the constitution of social
relations, and in particular for the negotiation of power
relationships. Power relationships are interactively and dynamically
achieved, maintained, and transformed by the participants in and
through (conflict) interaction by drawing on various resources - or
bases of power - (e.g. social status, age, expert knowledge,
economic resources, etc.) to exert control over each other and
affect social outcomes. Thus, while power is not a static social
category that is imposed by some pre-existing social structure, it
is nevertheless also grounded in social structures that exist prior
to/ are external to interaction. Hence, in order to examine the
interactive sequential procedures by means of which participants
jointly accomplish conflict and thereby (re)construct and negotiate
social (power) relationships, we need an analytic framework that
takes into account both local (micro) aspects of talk-in-interaction
and global (macro) aspects of social structure. There are various
approaches to the analysis of socially situated (verbal) interaction
and several conceptualisations of the relationship between context
and language (use),1 which have entered into my analysis.
One approach to the study of the relationship between language
use and socio-cultural context assumes that the extra-linguistic
context manifests itself in the interaction and argues that in order
to investigate language in actual social settings it is necessary to
provide a description of those settings. Hymes (1962, 1964, 1972a,
b, 1974) developed a schema for analysis of the socio-cultural
context of verbal interactions that has as its prime unit of
analysis the speech event. The term “speech event” refers to
“activities ... that are directly governed by rules or norms for the
use of speech” (Hymes 1972a: 56). Speech events include interactions
such as a conversation at a party, ordering a meal, a lecture at
university, debates or discussions of various kinds, etc. Any speech
event comprises several components and these are listed in what has
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come to be known as the SPEAKING grid, which is illustrated in
figure 1.
Figure 1: the SPEAKING grid (adapted from Hymes 1972a)
S setting where the speech event is located in
time and space
P participants who takes part in the speech event
and in what role (e.g.
speaker/addressee/
audience/eavesdropper)
E ends what the purpose and the goals/
outcomes of the speech event are
A act sequence what speech acts make up the speech
event, and what order they are
performed in
K key the tone and manner of performance
(serious or joking, sincere or
ironic, etc.)
I instrumentalities what channel or medium of
communication is used (e.g. speaking,
singing, writing, drumming, etc.) and
what language/variety is selected
from the community’s repertoire
N norms of
interaction and
interpretation
the rules and norm for producing and
interpreting speech acts
G genres textual categories, i.e. what ‘type’
does a speech event belong to and
what other pre-existing conventional
forms of speech are drawn on or
‘cited’ in producing appropriate
contributions to talk (e.g. do people
quote from mythology or scripture?)
Hymes argues that the values of these components on any given
occasion determine members’ use and interpretation of language. The
analysis of these components of a speech event is central to what
became known as the ethnography of communication or the ethnography
of speaking, with the ethnographer’s aim being to discover rules of
appropriateness in speech events. In other words, within the
anthropological approach of ethnography of communication, socio-
cultural background knowledge is seen as revealed in the performance
of speech events. These are in form and content culture specific and
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reflect culture specific norms. In essence, variables extrinsic to
interaction such as, for instance, the participants’ social
statuses, are viewed as critically relevant in shaping the talk.
A rather different approach to context can be found in the work
on the sequential organisation of conversation by Sacks and his co-
workers. They take a social constructivist position, claiming that
social reality is ultimately shaped through (conversational)
interaction and that analysis of the construction of social
organisation requires looking at local interactive processes. The
approach adopted within ethnomethodological conversation analysis
(CA), aims to demonstrate the recursivity of action and structure at
the empirical level by focusing on the sequential details of talk-
in-interaction.
As an off-shoot of ethnomethodology, CA views talk as a
structurally organised form of social (inter)action, as meaningful
conduct, which is jointly produced and understood by the
participants based on shared procedures or methods. It approaches
naturally occurring conversation with the twin aims of describing
the structural organisation informing its production, and thereby
explicating the procedures and resources used by interactants to
engage in mutually intelligible courses of action, i.e. members’ own
methods of production and interpretation.2 It is concerned with how
the jointly organised activity of talk-in-interaction is carried
out, and how participants produce joint accomplishments such as the
organisation of turn-taking, conversational openings and closings,
storytelling, disputes, news interviews, medical diagnosis, and the
complementary roles of interviewer and interviewee or doctor and
patient, and so on.
It is argued that a key resource participants use to build and
understand talk is the precise positioning of an utterance within an
environment of other talk or action. Thus, sequences are the prime
focus of analysis and each contribution to interaction is understood
as a step in a joint activity and is assumed to be contextually
oriented, in that the meaning of any utterance (action) is always
dependent upon the context, and in particular the local context or
co-text, of its production. As noted by Heritage & Atkinson (1984:
11):
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in examining talk the analyst is immediately confronted with
an organization which is implemented on a turn-by-turn basis,
and through which a context of publicly displayed and
continuously updated intersubjective understandings is
systematically sustained.
CA treats talk-in-interaction as the means by which social
organisation is mutually constructed and maintained in interaction,
and hence as the major site in which we can examine agents’
orientation to an evocation of social context, in the sense of the
features of social context informing their activities. Taken on
their own, most utterances tend to be vague and sometimes even
unintelligible; members need to draw upon the context in which the
talk takes place in order to create and sustain orderly and
meaningful interaction. In other words, utterances are not produced
as isolated actions but as actions embedded in an ongoing context of
interaction, and they can only be understood with reference to that
context of interaction. Within the framework of CA, the local
sequential environment is assumed to constitute a core aspect of the
context the participants use to make sense of the talk they are
hearing and to engage in the activities they are performing. Hence,
contributions to an interaction cannot be separated from the
sequences in which they occur within a concrete conversation. This
idea is expressed by Sacks et al. (1974: 36) as follows:
A turn is to be thought of as a turn-in-a-series, with the
potential of the series being made into a sequence. Turns
display gross organizational features that reflect their
occurrence in a series. They regularly have a three-part-
structure: a part which addresses the relation of a turn to a
prior, a part involved with what is occupying the turn, and a
part which addresses the relation of the turn to a succeeding
one.3
Each turn is seen as having a Janus-like nature, as being both
context-shaped and context-renewing (Heritage 1984: 242). On the one
hand, utterances, and the social actions they embody, are context
shaped because they are produced and understood in light of the
context set up by preceding actions and interpretations. This
contextual aspect of utterances is significant both because speakers
57
routinely draw upon it as a resource in designing their utterances
and because hearers must also draw upon the local context of
utterances in order to make adequate sense of what is said. On the
other hand, utterances and actions are context-renewing because each
in turn forms part of the context in which next actions will be
produced and understood, so that the interactional contextual
framework is constantly renewed (or altered) by each successive
action. In other words, each turn is both responding to what came
before and initiating what will follow. In this way, the
interactional context is continually being developed with each
successive action. Likewise, each current action will function to
renew (i.e. sustain or transform) any broader or more generally
existing sense of context which is the object of the participants’
orientations and actions.4 There is then another sense, in which
(inter)action is simultaneously shaped by and shapes context: in
everyday talk, speakers respond to their sense of the particular
occasion of talk - who is interacting with whom, where, when and why
- fashioning their contributions according to the ongoing context,
and the conduct of talk in turn constructs the identity of the
ongoing context for the interactants.
The conversation analytic view of context involves the break
with what has been termed the “bucket” (Drew & Heritage 1992: 19) or
“container” (Hutchby 1996: 11) model of context, in which some pre-
established social framework is considered as ‘containing’ the
participants’ actions. Instead, CA puts forward a dynamic
perspective, in which context is viewed as “both the project and
product of the participants’ own actions” (Drew & Heritage 1992: 19)
and thus as inherently locally produced and changeable at any
moment. Context is both attended to in discourse and constituted as
a dynamic phenomenon through discourse. Thus, the emphasis is placed
not on how the social context somehow determines the activities,
strategies and procedures adopted within it, but on how those
activities, strategies and procedures make available (both for
participants and analysts) the participants’ orientation to, and
reproduction of the interactionally relevant features of the
context. Rather than constituting a frame that shapes the speech
within it, aspects of social context stand in a reflexive
relationship to the talk; they are invoked within the talk while
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simultaneously providing resources for its appropriate
understanding. The external context is thus invoked and shaped
within the details of the very talk that it is context to, and
because of its ties to the emerging sequential organisation of the
talk, such context is not fixed and static but rather fluid and
dynamic. In brief, the sequential organisation of talk provides a
key locus for the analysis of context. To quote Zimmerman (1992:
35):5
the sequential environment of talk provides the indispensable
context for participants’ understanding, appreciation, and
use of what is being said, meant, and, most important, done
in and through the talk.
CA assumes that people’s understanding of ‘what we are doing here’,
i.e. of the interaction they are engaged in, the actions performed,
the matters talked about as well as participant’s identities and
relationships, is based on a close monitoring of design specifics,
notably the positioning of items in relation to prior items within
sequences and the specific format of items (the format specifics
being describable at any of the conventional levels of linguistic
description, such as syntax, lexis, prosody, as well as taking into
account accompanying non-verbal behaviour, if available to the
analyst). The form, content, and sequential placement of utterances
continuously reflect interactants’ understandings of the previous
utterance and also of the kind of interpersonal relationship they
perceive at that very stage of the interaction.
While CA undoubtedly takes into account the immediate
sequential context when analysing stretches of talk, the reference
to the wider situational context for an analytic interpretation of
discourse data is problematic within the strictly empirical
conversation analytic framework. Social context is not invoked as
“an external interpretative resource” (Heritage 1984: 283) but
rather is endogenously grounded in the detail of participants’
actions within talk in interaction. A major requirement is that the
contextual features considered relevant are “those that persons in
the setting are themselves demonstrably aware of and/or oriented to
in the course of their actions” (Pasthas 1995: 46). Conversation
analysts have argued that one cannot assume the relevance of
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particular contextual features, for example specific categorisations
of participants or events, unless it can be demonstrated within the
talk being examined that the participants themselves are orienting
to such phenomena as a constitutive feature of the activities they
are engaged in. This is an understanding of context that is based on
analyses of participants’ displayed orientations to features of
context, as shown in special design features of talk. In a series of
articles, Schegloff (1987a, 1989, 1991, 1992b, c, 1997) argued that
aspects of social context (such as the participants’ gender, age,
their social roles and relationships and the related rights and
obligations, their interactive history, etc.) should be treated as
relevant to analysis only insofar as they feature as a participants’
concern; that is, only inasmuch as they are invoked, formulated,
oriented to, or displayed in actual interaction. Research
conclusions should be disciplined by attending to the procedural
consequentiality of any claimed contextual particular. Schegloff
argues as follows: if an aspect of the external context, such as the
setting or the participants’ social roles, can be shown to be
relevant for the participants on the basis of the participants’
behaviour, then the analysis has to deal with the means by which the
participants within the interaction enact this relevance or how they
invoke the setting, rather than describe the setting itself. If,
however, the relevance of the external context can not be shown to
be relevant for the participants in terms of their behaviour, then
the analyst has no objective grounds to determine which of the
potentially infinite number of contextual elements should be
included in an analytic description. Consequently, any description
of and analytical reference to the external context is either
irrelevant or of questionable validity.6 Thus, for instance, the fact
that a mother is talking to her daughter, is considered irrelevant.
It is assumed that in the stepwise development of the interaction
the participants will display in their behaviours which contextual
parameters are made relevant at which points in the interaction. To
conclude, CA takes the position that if structure informs talk, and
talk simultaneously constitutes structure, then those processes must
be observable in the details of talk itself. Participants’
interaction has to reveal the “demonstrable relevance to the
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participants” (Schegloff 1992c: 215) of the social-structural
context.
Because CA stresses the local character of situated actions, it
analyses the features of observable communicative interaction in a
very detailed way. Thereby CA is able to demonstrate how
participants jointly accomplish any meaningful interaction via the
subtle reflexive linking between turns at talk. However, the purely
social constructivist position of CA on context, the methodological
restriction of analysis to the mechanisms of communicative
interaction and the related exclusion of pre-existing social
structures and relationships in the analysis of talk-in-interaction
has its drawbacks and has been widely criticised in the literature.
Goffman (1981: 14-15) called the conversation analysts
“communication engineers,” because they only capture “the sheer
physical constraints of any communication system.” Especially the
conversation analytic postulate to restrict investigation to the
analysis of local contexts provoked Goffman’s (1981: 32ff) critique:
How can CA account for those elements which are not observable in
the momentary interaction (a problem especially pertinent for those
conversation analysts who restrict themselves to the audio channel)?
And how can CA account for those elements of the situation which lie
beyond the few communicative turns under investigation? Goffman
argues that in stressing the local character of actions, CA ignores
the broader social context in which they occur. Similarly, Gumperz
criticises conversation analysts for conducting the investigation of
the process of conversational management “without making any a
priori assumptions about the social and cultural background of
participants” (1982a: 158). This argument is even more accentuated
by Bourdieu (1990a, b) who criticises CA for its “pointilist hyper-
empirism.” In his view, CA falls prey to a radical situationalism,
which takes actors to construct social reality in every moment anew
without being able to rely on rituals, conventions and institutions.
While participants actively shape context in and through
interaction, this does not mean that context is created from scratch
within the interaction so that larger structural patterns in a
society can be ignored. That is, although social identities and
relationships are actively and jointly constructed by participants
in and through interaction, they do not need to be established
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afresh every time. Instead, in face-to-face interaction participants
invoke structural patterns whose existence extends well beyond the
local encounter. Consequently, we have to take into account the
interactive construction of social meaning and organisation and its
relation to pre-existing social structures and hierarchies,
integrating both local, micro-level aspects of context (such as the
structural details of turns and sequences) and global macro-level
aspects of context (such as participants’ social roles and
relationships as well as their shared interactional history).
Kotthoff (1993c, 1994, 1998) calls into question the
conversation analytic claim that all the categories that are
relevant for the analysis of talk-in-interaction are displayed and
oriented to by the participants, and can thus be gathered solely
from the interaction itself. She points out that power asymmetries,
for example, are not always manifest in the surface structure of
conversations because they may be papered over, e.g. for reasons of
politeness. Therefore, she argues, in order to arrive at an adequate
interpretation of what participants are doing in a given
interaction, analysts must (and do) draw on their socio-cultural
world knowledge7: the more acquainted the analysts are with the
circumstances in which the conversations take place, the more
appropriate their analyses will be. She emphasises, however, that
the integration of ethnographic information does not replace
detailed analysis of the data, but rather complements it.
Wood and Kroger (2000: 25) also advocate an interdisciplinary
approach to discourse analysis. While their claim that researchers
have to ground themselves in “participants’ concerns, with the way
that they themselves work up the issues at hand” as they enact their
own conversational events, they note that the meaning underlying a
communicative act might not be analysable solely through empirically
gathered, naturally occurring, moment-to-moment talk.8
Moerman (1998), too, maintains that talk-extrinsic data are
needed to understand talk and the social work that it accomplishes.
He suggests that CA “provides some foothold on the technical
specification of context as significant place” but does not take the
further (and necessary) step of finding “the meaning and consequence
of a conversational event” (29). He suggests that these meanings
reside in the history of interactions, in participants’
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“relationships and biography” and other data external to the details
of talk and interaction. Therefore, he proposes a culturally
contexted conversation analysis (CCCA), i.e. a synthesis of
ethnography, “with its concern for context, meaning, history, and
intention” with conversation analysis and its “sometimes arid and
always exacting techniques ... for locating culture in situ” (xi).9
In line with the above authors, the present analysis of mother-
daughter disputes will draw on the analytical methods (and copious
findings) of CA without sharing its methodological restriction to
the formal sequential analysis of talk-in-interaction and its
exclusion of the external. In recent years, the framework of CA has
been extended by a number of researchers in ways that allow for the
consideration of macro-level, socio-cultural aspects of context as
resources for the interpretation of verbal interaction. Many
researchers who integrate micro-analyses of verbal interaction with
ethnographic information (e.g. about the setting, the participants’
social roles and relationships, etc.) work in the tradition of
interactional or interpretive sociolinguistics (cf. Auer & di Luzio
1984, 1992; Cook-Gumperz & Gumperz 1976, 1994, 1996; Gumperz 1982a,
b, c, 1984, 1992a, b, 1999; Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 1981; Kotthoff
1996b, 1998, Tannen 1989; Schiffrin 1994, 1996). Interactional
sociolinguistics (IS) developed from the ethnography of
communication (Gumperz & Hymes 1972), but it is also based in
sociology, ethnomethodology, discourse analysis, anthropology,
linguistics and pragmatics/politeness theory, and thus shares the
concerns (and some of the analytical concepts and procedures) of all
these fields with the study of language (use), society and culture.
IS represents an approach to discourse which attempts to
‘bridge the gap’ between top-down theoretical approaches, which
privilege macro-societal conditions in accounting for communicative
practices, and those which provide a bottom-up social constructivist
account, such as CA (Gumperz 1999: 453-454). IS shares many
analytical procedures and notions with CA, such as the view of
social structure and meaning as jointly constructed in (verbal)
interaction. Both traditions work with data recorded in natural
situations; like conversation analysts, researchers working within
the framework of interactional or interpretive sociolinguists do not
take isolated sequences, but rather sequences of action as their
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starting point. IS draws heavily on conversation analytic techniques
in its micro-analytic approach to verbal interaction, but unlike CA,
IS views context as extending beyond the immediate context of the
discourse sequence (the local context), explicitly recognises the
wider socio-cultural context impacting on participants’ production
and interpretation of (inter)actions.10 In contrast to the structural
approach taken by conversation analysts, interactional
sociolinguists pursue a functional perspective (Kotthoff 1998;
Schiffrin 1994). They do not primarily aim to uncover structural
patterns of conversation. Instead they seek to reconstruct how
social identities and social relationships are interactively
created, confirmed and modified, how socio-cultural norms of
interaction (e.g. politeness norms) are (re)constructed and
transformed by participants by drawing on linguistic aspects of
utterances, which relate what is said to shared background knowledge
of social, cultural, linguistic and interactional norms, and to
specify the background knowledge that needs to be shared in order to
maintain conversational involvement, i.e. to interpret correctly
what the conversation is about, what communicative goals are being
pursued, what others say, mean and do, and to respond in an
appropriate way.
John Gumperz, who is generally regarded as the founder of IS,
characterises the approach as building from a conversation analytic
approach in the following way:
We must turn to a speaker-oriented perspective and ask what
its speakers and listeners must know or do in order to take
part in a conversation or to create and sustain
conversational involvement. By formulating the basic issues
in this way, the focus shifts from the analysis of
conversational forms or sequential patterns as such to the
necessarily goal-oriented interpretive processes the underlie
their production. (Gumperz 1992c: 306).
The interactional sociolinguistic approach is characterised by
methodological variety. For the empirical analysis of verbal
interaction, IS integrates micro-analysis and ethnographic
information; it combines detailed sequential analyses à la  CA with
reflections on socio-cultural structures, power relationships and
ideologies, emotion politics, and relational politics/politeness
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(Auer & di Luzio 1992; Cook-Gumperz & Gumperz 1994, 1996; Kotthoff
1996c, 1998; Ochs 1989). Some researchers elicit the participants’
perceptions and include these in their analyses (Erickson & Schulz
1982; Tannen 1984). Many studies use detailed linguistic and
sequential analyses in the investigation of code switching (Heller
1982; Auer 1984a, b, 1995), prosody (Auer 1996, Selting 1994;
Cooper-Kuhlen & Selting 1996), conversational coherence/discourse
markers (Schiffrin 1985b, 1986, 1987), and conversational style
(Kakavá 1993a, b, 2002; Kallmeyer 1994, 1995; Kallmeyer & Keim 1996;
Keim 1995, 1997;  Keim & Schwitalla 1989; Kotthoff 1989b; Sandig
1983; Sandig & Selting 1996, 1997; Schiffrin 1984, 1985a, 1990;
Schwitalla 1995; Tannen 1984, 1986a, 1989, 1990a 1994a, b). Other
research interests lie in the field of intercultural communication
(Gumperz 1982a, b, c; Kotthoff 1989a, Günthner 1993; Scollon &
Scollon 1995) and institutional communication (Wodak 1981a, b;
Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 1982; Jacquemet 1996).
In the following I will give a brief overview of the basic
assumptions and concepts of the interactional sociolinguistic
approach to the analysis of verbal interaction as developed by John
Gumperz. He was centrally concerned with the importance of context
in the production and interpretation of discourse. Gumperz’ work is
grounded in the assumption that the meaning, structure, and use of
language are contextually, i.e. socially, culturally and
situationally relative. The same utterance can be interpreted in
many different ways given the context in which it occurred. As
Gumperz explains, our (inter)actions take place against the
background of - and are critically affected by - our socio-cultural
and situational context. He suggests that, in order to understand
these influences, we need to integrate what we know about grammar,
culture, and linguistic and related interaction conventions into a
general theory of verbal communication, which is built upon a single
theoretical and methodological framework. The central concept of
this framework, namely that of contextualisation,11 and the related
concepts of contextualisation cues, contextual presupposition and
situated/conversational inference are part of Gumperz’ integrated
programme for the analysis of verbal communication and will be
briefly discussed in the following.
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The basic assumption on which the concept of contextualisation
is based is that participants in an interaction use certain signs
(contextualisation cues) to point to the background knowledge that
is relevant for the appropriate interpretation of their activities.
Only if the current behaviour is viewed against this background
knowledge, does it acquire its context-specific social meaning. In
other words, participants signal to each other the relevant context
(aspects) for the interpretation of their behaviour. Roughly,
contextualisation comprises all activities by means of which
participants make relevant any aspect of context that, in turn, is
responsible for the interpretation of a word, utterance or action in
its particular place of occurrence.12 Potentially relevant aspects of
context include, for instance, the larger activity participants are
engaged in (the “speech activity,” or “activity type”), the small-
scale activity or “speech act,” the mood, tone or “key” in which the
interaction is performed, the topic(s) of talk, but also the
participant framework, comprising the roles of “speaker,”
“recipient,” “bystander” etc., the participants’ social identities
(e.g. gender, age, ethnicity, social roles) and relationships, and
the sequential organisation of longer stretches of interaction (e.g.
turn-taking and preference organisation).
The notion of contextualisation implies a dynamic and reflexive
conceptualisation of context. As in CA, context is not understood as
fixed, but as being continually reshaped in time. Moreover,
contextualisation proposes a reflexive relationship between language
(use) and context, in which language (use) is not determined by
context but itself contributes in an essential way to the
construction of context. In addition, it stresses the importance of
socio-culturally specific background knowledge for the production
and interpretation of interactional events and for the constitution
of relevant contextual presuppositions. Gumperz emphasises this
reflexive notion when he states that contrary to the notion that
culture has a unidirectional influence on language or that language
has a unidirectional influence on culture, “the two, to the extent
that they could be considered as separate, are closely intertwined”
(1992b: 51). Thus, language is not only affected by the context of
its occurrence but is also responsible for the availability of the
very context which is necessary to interpret the information it
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conveys.13 Hence, context is not simply a given in an interaction but
the outcome of participants’ joint efforts to make it available. It
is not a collection of data about the material or social
surroundings of the interaction (e.g. where/when the interaction
takes place and/or who is participating in it) but a set of
assumptions and expectations about what is relevant for the
interaction at any given point in time. What is relevant in this
sense may exclude or include certain aspects of the material and
social environment of the interaction as they might be perceived by
an outside observer, but it may also include aspects that are not
available independent of the interaction. These emergent context
parameters may include types of linguistic activities that are not
predictable from the material or social environment of the
interaction, but also facets of knowledge which, while they may be
shared by the participants from the very beginning, have to be
turned from imperceptible - and interactionally irrelevant -
categories into commonly available grounds on which to conduct (and
understand) the interaction. Thus, context aspects such as gender,
age, ethnicity, participant’s social statuses and relationships and
their interactional history, but also the local setting in which the
interaction takes place can be treated as (ir)relevant categories in
situated practice.14 In this perspective, context is viewed as both
existing independently of talk and as (re)created in and through
talk; or as Auer (1992), using Giddens’ (1976) terminology, puts it,
context is both “brought along” to and “brought about” in
communicative interaction.
Gumperz’ approach to the analysis of verbal interaction
coincides with (and is informed by) several others in this dynamic
and reflexive view of context, most notably, Garfinkel’s (1967)
ethnomethodology and Bateson’s (1951, 1956, 1958, 1972) and
Goffman’s (1974/1986) work on “frames.” But, as mentioned above, it
also draws on various other approaches that investigate
communication from different angles and with different methods of
analysis.15
With ethnomethodology, he shares the view of social reality as
interactively constructed by the participants in interaction and
transfers this view to questions of context meaning and
construction. Using ethnomethodological terminology, Gumperz himself
67
talks at various places about context as “accomplishment” or
“achievement.” He explicitly refers to Garfinkel’s sociology and his
notion of social knowledge which is revealed in and through
interaction:
Garfinkel ...  demonstrates that social knowledge cannot be
adequately characterized in the forms of statistically
countable, abstract categories such as scalar ratings of
role, status or personality characteristics. He argues that
social knowledge is revealed by the process of interaction
itself and that interactants create their own social world by
the way in which they behave. (Gumperz 1982: 158)
Goffman’s analyses of face-to-face interaction provide an
understanding of how language is situated in particular
circumstances of social life and how it both reflects and adds
meaning and structure to those circumstances. Goffman located the
relationship between self and society at a micro-level of analysis,
i.e. within the everyday encounters, interactions, and activities in
which we routinely engage. Roughly, our identity is a product not
only of social processes that operate at the level of social
institutions (e.g. family, school, work) but of social processes
that are embedded in the situations, occasions, encounters, and
rituals of everyday life. These micro-level processes help organise
and give meaning to our everyday behaviours and help provide us with
a sense of self. By using certain behaviours (both verbal and
nonverbal) we not only construct and sustain social interactions but
also express our sense of who we are and who our co-participants
are. Our everyday actions and interactions with one another thus
play a crucial part in creating and maintaining our social
identities, i.e. the roles we fill, the statuses we occupy, and our
personal identities, i.e. the personalities we attribute to
ourselves and others, and our relationships with others. The
identities we adopt and attribute to others also help produce social
order and stability, and thus help to give social institutions their
meanings and foundational structures. Thus, a ‘mother’ is not a
mother simply because she gave birth to a child and a ‘daughter’ is
not a daughter because she was borne by her mother. Rather, both
become incumbents of the complementary roles of ‘mother’ and
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‘daughter’ through the ways in which they interact, taking on the
respective rights and obligations of parent and child in this
asymmetrical relationship. At the same time, their subscriptions to
these social identities and the behaviours through which these
identities are displayed reinforce the familial social structure.
That is to say, although there may be a pre-existing repertoire of
possible roles people can take over in a society, the actualisation
of (one or more of) these roles has to be achieved in and through
interaction, and is therefore changeable: ‘mother’ and ‘daughter’
may become ‘two theatre-goers’ or ‘two chorus members’ and vice
versa.
Bateson (1951, 1956, 1958, 1972) was the first to introduce the
idea that every interactional move incorporates signals that
indicate how it is to be interpreted. His concept of meta-
communication refers to the information interactants need to send
off in addition to the message they want to convey, in order to
indicate how their action or utterance is to be understood. Bateson
formulated part of his theory based on his observation of otters
‘playing’ a fight and how they seem able to distinguish between
potentially hostile moves that are meant to be merely playful and
those that are truly aggressive; he wondered what kind of cues
indicated to the participants of this pseudo-fight that there was no
real fighting going on. He suggested that, in general, actions are
framed as either serious or play by the meta-messages accompanying
them, and that these framings are just as important as the messages
themselves in determining how an interaction will unfold.16
Goffman (1974/1786) extended Bateson’s concept of frames in
order to explain more thoroughly the processes through which people
create meaning in interaction. He suggested that individuals use
information drawn from real experience (so-called “primary
frameworks”) as frames of reference, and he described framing as the
largely subconscious process by which individuals “locate, perceive,
identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete
occurrences” and define them in terms of the primary frameworks they
are familiar with (1986: 21). He notes that how the play activity of
animals Bateson observed
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is closely patterned after something that already has a
meaning in its own terms – in this case fighting ... Real
fighting here serves as a model, a detailed pattern to follow
... the pattern for fighting is not followed fully, but
rather is systematically altered in certain respects. In
brief, there is a transcription or transportation – a
transformation ... of a strip of fighting behaviour onto a
strip of play.
(Goffman 1974/1986: 40-41, original emphasis)
Goffman (1981) later built on Bateson’s notions of meta-message and
framing to include in frame analysis the concept of “footing”, i.e.
the way participants relate to each other, the way they continually
(re)position themselves within the ongoing interaction, thereby
determining (i.e. framing) how the event unfolds. A key point for
Goffman is that these footings are liable to shift and that a change
in footing signals a change in the way a speaker positions herself
vis-à-vis the interlocutor(s) and what is being talked about. He
describes how “a change in footing implies a change in the alignment
we take up for ourselves and the others present as expressed in the
way we manage the production and reception of an utterance” (1981:
128). Changes in footing also, at times, indicate a change in the
overall frame or the definition of an interaction (e.g. whether it
is serious or play, or whether it is a friendly conversation or an
argument).
According to Goffman, shifts in frame and footing (i.e.
interpersonal alignments) are somehow indicated in the surface
structure of the message, and interactants can be seen to react to
them. Goffman (1986/1974: 44) linked framing to Hymes’ (1962, 1972,
1974) notion of “key” (the tone or mood of a speech event). Goffman
defined “keying” as a process of systematic alteration or
transformation of a situation that shapes our understanding of what
is happening during the speech event is shaped and that affects our
interpretation and production of talk or activities within that
event.17 Keying, thus, is a framing procedure. For instance, in
conversation, once an argumentative key has been introduced, i.e.
once an argument frame has been established, anything we say will be
interpreted as contributing to this frame. Likewise, we will orient
our contributions to the ongoing interaction towards this frame. In
other words, the dispute frame affects the production and
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interpretation of conversational contributions. Goffman sees keying
as a situated, interactive process, prompted by cues that establish
(or bracket) where and when the transformation begins and ends.
Although they approach the idea of framing from different
perspectives, Bateson’s and Goffman’s understanding of interpretive
frames and of footing and keying as framing devices can be linked to
Gumperz’ theory of conversational inference, and in particular his
notion of contextualisation cues. Gumperz introduced the notion of
contextualisation cues, which he defined as “a system of verbal and
nonverbal signs that both channel the progress of an encounter and
affect the interpretation of intent” (1982a: 153). They are
constellations of surface features of messages by means of which
“speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how
semantic content is to be understood and how each sentence relates
to what precedes and follows” (1982: 131). Contextualisation cues
are meta-pragmatic signs that serve to construct the contextual
ground for situated interpretation, that signal to interlocutors and
observes what the current activity is and how the constituent
messages are to be understood and any on point in the ongoing
interaction. Generally speaking, the class of contextualisation cues
comprises all the form-related means, by which participants
contextualise language, i.e. place what is being said into the
proper context.18 There is therefore no a priori restriction to the
class of contextualisation cues. Speakers communicate and identify
meta-messages through such features as, for example, prosodic
phenomena (e.g. changes in loudness, intonation, variations in vowel
length,  stress or accenting, and pitch register shifts);
paralinguistic signs (e.g. tempo, pausing and hesitation,
conversational synchrony, including latching or overlapping turns
and other “tone of voice” expressive cues); code or style switches;
choice of lexical forms (such as endearment versus first name) or
formulaic expressions; choice among syntactic options; sequential
placement of utterances; etc., but also a number of non-verbal signs
(e.g. facial expressions, gestures). These aspects of language and
behaviour can all have similar contextualising functions.
The central concept of contextualisation theory is
conversational inference, the process of interpretation, in which
the participants draw situated inferences from contextualisation
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cues, which relate what is said to contextual presuppositions, i.e.
background knowledge, about the type of interaction they are engaged
in, about the interpersonal relationships between participants as
well as about what one’s interlocutor intends to convey. Gumperz
defines conversational inference as “the situated or context-bound
process of interpretation, by means of which participants in an
exchange assess others' intention, and on which they base their
responses” (1982a: 153). Gumperz calls attention to the fact that,
in contrast to the retrieval of referential meaning of an element,
inferring is only possible within the specific context, in which the
element occurs: “Situated interpretations are intrinsically context-
bound and cannot be analysed apart from the verbal sequences in
which they are embedded” (1992a: 232). Moreover, he emphasises that
“our knowledge and use of contextualization cues is a function of
shared interactive history and rests on socially based pre-
suppositions” (1992b: 50). In other words, the appropriate use and
interpretation of contextualisation cues requires both knowledge of
linguistic and related communicative conventions (comprising both
grammar and contextualisation), and socio-cultural knowledge, or
knowledge of the world, which members of a given community acquire
as a result of their interactive and conversational experience. In
addition, Gumperz stresses that the result of the process of
inference, i.e. the interpretation of the interlocutor’s
communicative intentions, of what s/he wants to convey or achieve
with a specific utterance, cannot be called ‘right’ or ‘wrong’
objectively and independent of the context, but can only be assessed
in terms of the ensuing progress of the interaction:19
What distinguishes successful from unsuccessful
interpretations are not absolute, context-free criteria of
truth value or appropriateness, but rather what happens in
the interactive exchange itself, i.e. the extent to which
proffered context bound inferences are shared, reinforced,
modified or rejected in the course of an encounter.
(Gumperz 1982a: 171)
That is to say, any interpretation the listener arrives at, far from
being definite, is initially a tentative and temporary hypothesis,
liable to revision at any time:
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The judgements made at any one time are contingent
judgements. They are either confirmed or disproved by what
happens subsequently. If they are confirmed, our expectations
are reinforced; if they are disconfirmed, we try to recode
what we have heard and change our expectations or goals,
outcomes and speakers’ intent. (Gumperz 1982b: 18)
One of the key points of Gumperz’ approach is the assumption that
any understanding depends on inferences with regard to the
interactional frame of the ongoing talk:
all understanding is framed understanding, ...  it ultimately
rests on contingent inferences made with respect to
presuppositions concerning the nature of the situation, what
is to be accomplished and how to be accomplished.
(Gumperz 1992b: 43-44)
For the description of communicative situations, Gumperz draws on
the terms (speech) event and (speech) activity or activity (type),
which refer to two different levels of analysis: at the level of
ethnographic description, units of verbal behaviour can be treated
as speech events. The speech event (a category Gumperz adapted from
the ethnography of communication) is an interaction-external
category referring to “stretches of interaction bounded in time and
space” (Gumperz 1992b: 44), or “longer strings of talk each of which
is marked by a beginning, middle and an end.”
Unlike (speech) events, which refer to interaction-external
labels like “lecture” or “joke-telling,” the speech activity or
activity type20 is an interaction-internal category, which accounts
for “the constantly changing presuppositions in terms of which
interaction is framed and constituent moves are interpreted”
(Gumperz 1992b: 44). People constitute such contextual
presuppositions “by experiences over time and culturally transmitted
knowledge in relation to their shared environment” (1992b: 45). At
this level of analysis, then, units of verbal behaviour are treated
as “members’, and for that matter also analysts’ constructs with
respect to which the interaction is managed and interpreted” (1992b:
44). Gumperz (1982a: 166) defines the speech activity as
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a set of social relationships about a set of schemata in
relation to some communicative goal. Speech activities can be
characterized through descriptive phrases such as ‘discussing
politics’, ‘chatting about the weather’, ‘telling a story to
someone’ and ‘lecturing about linguistics’. Such descriptions
imply certain expectations about thematic progression, turn
taking rules, form, and outcome of the interaction, as well
as constraints on content.
As this definition implies, the speech activity or activity type
comprises a set of structures of expectation,21 and as such is highly
conventional and culture specific and refers primarily to the
participants’ social relationships: “activity frames basically
reflect conventionalized or stereotypical notions of interpersonal
relationships” (1992b: 45). It is thus connected to the abstract
cognitive concepts scripts and schemata which have been developed in
discourse analysis: “the notion of activity is in many ways
equivalent to the discourse analyst’s schema, defined as knowledge
of the world” (ibid, original emphasis). However, the (speech)
activity is not a static accumulation of world knowledge like the
schema in discourse analysis but a "dynamic process which develops
and changes as participants interact” (1982a: 131); it does not
presuppose constant contextual presuppositions but leaves room for
dynamically changing and emerging contexts.22
To sum up so far, one of the key assumptions of Gumperz
approach is that “all understanding, whether what is at issue is a
word, a phrase or an utterance, rests on inferences made with
reference to activity constructs” (1992b: 44). This does not mean,
however, that the conveyed content directly depends on the given
activity or is determined by it. Rather, the number of possible
interpretations is restricted by the participants’ expectations with
regard to the activity type: “By channelling inferences so as to
foreground or make relevant certain aspects of background knowledge
and to underplay others” (1982a: 131, original emphasis)
“socioculturally based notions of how an activity is accomplished
constrain how something is interpreted. They do not
deterministically specify the content of what is said” (1992b: 45).
As the prior discussion has shown, the interpretation of
contextualisation cues is strongly influenced by the current
activity frame. By the same token, the current frame or speech
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activity is, at least in part, signalled by contextualisation cues.
As discussed above, contextualisation cues guide the interpretation
and lead to situated inferences. They enter into the inferential
process at several interrelated levels: the global level of framing
and the local level of speech acts. At the global level of framing,
contextualisation cues signal what the (speech) activity is. They
may raise expectations about what an exchange is about and what
mutual rights and obligations apply, what is expected at any one
point in the interaction, what communicative outcomes can be
expected, what can be said explicitly and what is to be implied,
what topics can be brought up and when, as well as what types of
interpersonal relationships are involved and how they are signalled,
(Gumperz 1989: 78; 1992a: 233; 1999: 463). As discussed above, such
global expectations provide the grounds against which possible
ambiguities, for instance, at the word or sequential level can be
resolved.
At the local level, that is, the level of utterance, turn of
speaking, interactional move or speech act, contextualisation cues
enter into the assessment of illocutionary force of utterance or
speakers’ communicative intent. This level is concerned with “local
inferences concerning what is intended with any one move and what is
required by way of a response” (Gumperz 1999: 464). Using CA
terminology, Gumperz states that this level deals with “what
conversational analysts call ‘sequencing’” (Gumperz 1982a: 232). At
this level, the sequential context, i.e. the co-text of utterances
or actions plays an important part. Gumperz (1982a: 208) notes that
the meaning of contextualisation cues is ambiguous and therefore has
to be co-constructed by the participants in the course of the
interaction:
The mechanisms by which [contextual] information is signalled
... are inherently ambiguous, i.e. subject to multiple
interpretations. In conversation such ambiguities are
negotiated in the course of the interaction, through the
manner in which second speakers respond to what they hear and
through the reception that their countermoves receive.
Thus, (the analysis of) interlocutors’ inferences about each others’
meanings, requires close attention not only to what is said by one
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party but also to how it is responded to by another. As Schiffrin
(1996: 322) points out, “in fact, it is often the response to an
utterance (rather than the utterance itself) that provides the most
reliable clue to the interactional importance (as well as the
situated inferences) of an utterance.”
This view is analogous to what in CA is referred to as the
“next-turn proof-procedure” (Heritage 1984; Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998)
or the “response-as-understanding perspective” (Bilmes 1993). From
this perspective, it is primarily the sequential placement of an
utterance or action that reveals its communicative function:
the sequential ‘next positioned’ linkage between any two
actions can be a critical resource by which a first speaker
(and, of course, ‘overhearing’ social scientist) can
determine the sense which is made of his or her utterance.
(Heritage 1984: 256)
For example, an utterance cannot be identified as an answer (as
opposed to a statement, assertion, declarative, proposition, etc.)
on the basis of its phonological, syntactical or semantic features
but only on the basis of its sequential placement within the
interaction, e.g. its placement after a question (cf. Schegloff &
Sacks 1973: 299).
As Gumperz points out, in everyday interaction,
contextualisation cues operate on several levels of inference
simultaneously. For example, in an institutional context like
doctor/patient interaction, features of verbal interaction such as
the choice of lexical items (i.e. the doctor’s use of medical
terms), the organisation of turn-taking (i.e. the doctor allocating
turns to the patient), the sequencing of actions (e.g. question-
answer sequences in the diagnosis part), topical choice and
organisation (restrictions on the topics that can be brought up, the
doctor initiating most of the topics) lead to situated inferences
about the meaning of words, utterances and actions and about
appropriate responses, but also about the current activity type
(i.e. doctor-patient consultation), the participants’ social roles
(i.e. doctor and patient; expert and layperson) and the related
rights and responsibilities (e.g. who gets to control the turn-
taking and the topics of talk, who can say what to whom and when).
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To recapitulate the discussion so far, work in interactional
sociolinguistics is grounded in the assumption that participants in
an interaction use contextualisation cues to put their utterances
and actions into context, i.e. to relate what is said to shared
background knowledge of social, cultural, linguistic and
interactional norms and expectations. Listeners draw on these
contextualisation cues to make situated inferences about each
others’ meanings and to make appropriate contributions to the
current interaction. Contextualisation cues operate on various
levels of context, pointing to such features as, for instance, the
current speech activity, the topic(s) of talk, the meaning of words
and utterances, but also the participants’ social identities (e.g.
gender, age, social status) and relationships (e.g. relations of
power) as relevant aspects of context for the interpretation and
production of activities. Thus, taking an interactional
sociolinguist approach allows us to investigate how participants
jointly and interactively accomplish verbal conflicts and
(re)construct and negotiate social identities and relationships from
a local, sequential perspective, while taking into account more
global aspects of context such as activity frames, pre-existing
social structures and interactive histories.
Another well-known approach to discourse analysis that looks at
the interrelationship of social variables and language use - and
that is frequently used in interactional sociolinguistic studies -
is Brown & Levinson’s (1987) work on politeness.23 Building on
Goffman’s (1967) notion of face, i.e. “the positive self-image every
member wants to claim for himself” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61),
Brown & Levinson propose two universal face wants, notably “the want
to be unimpeded and the want to be approved of in certain respects”
(1987: 58), which they refer to as negative and positive face
respectively. Brown and Levinson state that “face is something that
is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained or
enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction” (1987:
61). They claim that a person’s face concerns can only be sustained
by the actions of others, and therefore people generally cooperate
(and assume each others’ cooperation) in maintaining each others’
face. Hence, the way we use language is adapted to balancing one or
both of these aspects of face.
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Certain kinds of speech acts, however, intrinsically threaten
the (negative, positive or both) face of the speaker, hearer or both
interactants (1987: 65-68). For example, the hearer’s negative face
is threatened by acts such as orders, requests, advice, threats,
offers, expression of envy or admiration and expressions of strong
(negative) emotions toward the hearer. The hearer’s positive face is
threatened by expressions of disapproval, criticism, contempt or
ridicule, complaints and reprimands, accusations, insults,
contradictions or disagreements, challenges, mention of taboo
topics, etc. The speaker’s negative face is threatened by acts such
as expressing thanks, acceptance of the hearer’s thanks or apology,
acceptance of offers, and the like, while the speaker’s positive
face is threatened by apologies, self-humiliation, confessions, etc.
When performing such a face-threatening act (FTA), speakers may
select from a range of communicative strategies (i.e. politeness
strategies) to minimise the face threat. The more face-threatening
an act is considered by the speaker, the more care s/he will take in
its execution. Brown and Levinson (1987: 60, 68ff.) list five
general categories of politeness strategies, which can be realised
in discourse by a wide range of output strategies. These
superstrategies are ordered according to their relative degree of
politeness: (1) baldly on record, without redressive action; (2)
with redressive action, positive politeness; (3) with redressive
action, negative politeness; (4) off record; and (5) avoidance of
FTA.
Strategy 1 is the least polite way of performing an FTA. This
approach involves no attempt by the speaker to acknowledge the
hearer’s face wants by means of redressive action. For instance, the
speaker might express explicit disagreement with the hearer’s
previous utterance, or state a direct criticism of the hearer,
without hedging the utterance in any way. Strategies 2 and 3 involve
the use of mitigating devices for FTAs to attend to (an aspect of)
the hearer’s face wants. Depending on which aspect of face is being
oriented to, Brown & Levinson distinguish between (2) positive
politeness, which “is approach-based; it ‘anoints’ the face of the
addressee by indicating that in some respects, the speaker wants the
hearer’s wants (e.g. by treating him as a member of an in-group, a
friend, a person whose wants and personality traits are known and
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liked)”; and (3) negative politeness, which “is essentially
avoidance-based” and consists in “assurances that the speaker ...
will not interfere with the addressee’s freedom of action” (70).
Positive politeness is thus concerned with demonstrating closeness
and positive affiliation (e.g. by using first name or endearment
terms to soften criticism) whereas negative politeness is concerned
with expressing distance and deference (e.g. using hedges or
indirect speech acts (Searle 1969, 1975) to package a request in
order to minimise imposition).24 Strategy 4 (off record) means that
there is more than one possible interpretation of an utterance,
therefore leaving open a way out for both speaker and hearer,
because the speaker can claim never to have done the FTA and the
hearer can choose not to interpret it as an FTA but as a neutral
remark. For instance, instead of stating a complaint directly (e.g.
“You forgot to close the door again!”), the speaker can choose to
package it as a neutral noticing (“The door is still open.”).
Strategy 5 (avoidance of FTA) is not to do the FTA at all. This
superstrategy is the most polite. It is chosen when the risk to
actually do the FTA is considered too great.
Politeness strategies are not arbitrarily chosen by speakers in
interaction; their choice is constrained by contextual features,
such as the social distance (D) of the interlocutors, the relative
power (P) of the interlocutors, and the ranking (R) of a particular
speech act as more or less imposing, and hence more or less face-
threatening, by the members of a community (Brown & Levinson 1987:
74 ff.).
Brown & Levinson (1987: 130) propose that, in general, the
closer the interactants’ social relationship and/or the smaller the
power differential between them, the less they will use negative
politeness strategies and the more they will use positive politeness
strategies, because negative politeness strategies are useful for
social distancing and positive politeness strategies are ways of
minimising social distance.
Moreover, they suggest that one tends to be more polite to
people who are somehow socially superior to oneself or socially
important (e.g. one’s boss, the doctor, etc.).25
One also tends to be more polite to people one doesn’t know,
people who are somehow socially distant (e.g. strangers, persons
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from very different spheres of life). In the first case, politeness
tends to be directed upwards in the status hierarchy (social
inferiors are generally more polite to social superiors and vice
versa), while in the second case, politeness tends to be
symmetrically exchanged by both parties.
However, Brown and Levinson (1987: 79) note that each of these
socio-cultural dimension is context relative in the sense that
situational factors enter into the values for P, D and R, so that
the assessed values hold only for S and H in a particular context,
and for a particular FTA. They give the following examples: While
two American strangers might be socially distant if they met in the
streets of New York and would hence treat each other with formality
and respect, the social distance between them would be perceived as
considerably smaller if they were to meet in the Hindu Kush, and
this would be reflected in their mutual use of positive politeness.
Similarly, when a speaker passes from her own field of expertise
into that of the interlocutor, the relative power of the
participants changes along with the roles of expert and layperson.
Brown & Levinson’s model has been frequently criticised for its
oversimplistic view of the assessment of politeness (Holmes 1995,
Mills 2002) and its unidirectional view of the impact of social
variables on language use. Regarding oversimplification, Holmes
(1995) notes, linguistic forms cannot be said to be inherently
polite. For example, while a request like “Do you think it would be
possible for you to contact Jean Thomas today?” used by a boss to
her/his secretary would be interpreted by Brown & Levinson as
polite, since it includes mitigating features to minimise the
potential face threat, it might in fact be interpreted as impolite,
if the boss and his/her secretary usually have an informal style of
communicating, and this is not the first time that the request has
been made. Thus, the very features that according to Brown &
Levinson seem to indicate politeness may in fact be used to express
impoliteness.26
Regarding the unidirectional influence of social factors on the
degree of politeness assumed by Brown & Levinson, several authors
(Held 1995; Kasper 1990; Werkhofer 1992) stress the reflexivity of
pre-existing social structures and the interactional
(re)construction and negotiation of social relationships. 27
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Communicative interaction not only reflects existing relationships,
but also defines and recreates them. Thus, social variables such as
power and distance are not stable categories but are themselves
constituted and negotiated in ongoing interaction. Likewise,
positive politeness strategies such as complimenting, joking or
teasing not so much presuppose solidarity and rapport as create it
(Herbert & Straight 1989; Holmes 1998; Kotthoff 1998; Norrick 1993).
In spite of these drawbacks and although Brown & Levinson’s
politeness theory does not explicitly focus on the (re)construction
and negotiation of social relationships, by bringing together the
notion of face (an individual’s self-image) and socio-cultural
variables (such as power and social distance) and relating them to
motivated linguistic strategies, their framework allows us to
investigate how speakers position themselves relative to their
interlocutor(s): since two of the three factors influencing the
level of politeness concern the interactants’ social relationship,
we can infer degrees of intimacy and of relative power in the
participants’ relationship from the degree and kind (i.e. positive
vs. negative) of politeness used in an interaction. Thus, politeness
strategies are an index of (aspects of) social relationships and are
therefore analogous to contextualisation cues. Gumperz (1992b: 43)
comments on the contextualising function of pronouns of address -
which Brown & Levinson list as politeness strategies:
By choosing one or another of the pronouns in question,
speakers can mark the interaction as having ... relevant
social characteristics. Pronoun usage, in other words, can
function like nonverbal signs to determine how the
interaction is framed. But framing in this case is more than
just a means of separating out one stretch of the
interaction, it also conveys presuppositions about the social
relationship among participants, and about how they intend
their messages are to be interpreted.
Politeness theory ties in with the interactional sociolinguistic
framework in two ways. While its manifestations in actual discourse
are socially and culturally specific, the universality of politeness
is generally corroborated. Therefore knowledge about politeness
norms constitutes part of members’ shared background knowledge and
thus guides participants’ production and interpretation of
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utterances. In addition, the choice and enactment of individual
politeness strategies in verbal interaction signals how speakers
position themselves vis-à-vis each other and contributes to the
(re)creation of social relationships.
To conclude, the present study operates within an interactional
sociolinguistic framework of discourse analysis. It integrates two
aspects of context in the analysis of verbal interaction between
mothers and daughters: the local, sequential context of talk and the
global, socio-cultural context. In terms of methodology, it draws
heavily on the analytical procedures and findings of CA. That is,
the study includes a micro-analysis of talk-in-interaction,
examining the sequencing of actions (e.g. turn-taking organisation,
preference organisation and tying techniques) and the design
specifics of actions (e.g. syntactic structure, wording, prosody, as
well as paralinguistic and non-verbal features). However, it also
takes into account macro-level aspects of context such as background
knowledge about socio-cultural, linguistic and interactional norms
(e.g. norms of politeness) as well as such “supportive ethnographic
particulars” (ten Have 1997: 1) as participants’ gender, age, social
roles and relationships, and interactional history. By combining
micro-level analysis of the form, content, and sequential placement
of utterances with ethnographic and socio-cultural information, we
are able to analyse how verbal conflict is jointly and sequentially
accomplished by participants in interaction, how the activity type
is contextualised or framed, and how participants (re)construct and
negotiate their social identities and (power) relationships in the
course of (conflict) interaction.
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Notes for chapter 5:
1 For more detailed discussion of various notions of context cf. C. Goodwin & M. H.
Goodwin (1990); Knoblauch (1995); Schiffrin (1994a), among others.
2 In Heritage’s (1984: 241) words, the central goal of conversation analytic
research is “the analysis of the competences which underlie ordinary social
activities. Specifically it is directed at describing and explicating the
competences which ordinary speakers use and rely on when they engage in
intelligible, conversational interaction. At its most basic, the objective is to
describe the procedures and expectations, in terms of which speakers produce their
own behaviour and interpret the behaviour of others” (cf. also Heritage & Atkinson
1984: 1).
3 Similarly, Schegloff (1996) argues that any utterance in conversation goes through
“three phases: as (incipient) next (in relation to the preceding utterance), as
current, and as prior (i.e. prior to the anticipated following utterance(s))” (97).
4 For a more detailed account of these ideas cf. Drew (1994, 1998); Drew & Heritage
(1992b); Heritage (1984); Heritage & Atkinson (1984) Hutchby & Wooffitt (1998);
Pomerantz & Fehr (1997); Psathas (1990); Schiffrin (1994a); and Wootton (1981a).
5 For more detailed discussion of the relationship between conversational
organisation and context cf. Garfinkel (1967), Garfinkel & Sacks (1970) Goodwin &
Goodwin (1990), and Heritage (1984).
6 To quote Schegloff: “if some ‘external’ context can be shown to be proximately (or
intra-interactionally) relevant to the participants, then its external status is
rendered beside the point; and if it cannot be so shown, then its external status
is rendered equivocal” (1992c: 197).
7 She states that by blinding out socio-cultural categories, conversation analysts
only reject their explicit inclusion and relegate them “in die Grauzone des in der
Analyse immer schon mitgedachten” (Kotthoff 1994: 77). For a similar argument cf.
Depperman (2000).
8 Similarly, Zahn (1984: 64) states that “an [exclusively structural] approach to
conversation which ignores what communicators are doing with their talk, how they
are understanding the content of that talk, and the strategies they take toward
conversing in light of the social context in which they find themselves cannot be
expected to describe and to explain rich and complex conversational phenomena.”
Likewise, Mey (1993) criticises CA for its methodological narrowness: “However,
restricting oneself to the problems of description that one encounters during the
analysis of actual conversation puts a severe limitation on the explanatory
potential of one’s analysis. A satisfactory account of the realities of
conversation relies heavily on the wider context of the conversational interaction,
and will not limit itself to strictly linguistic or strictly CA-relevant factors. A
pragmatic analysis cannot remain in the object language level, describing “the
facts, all the facts, and nothing but the facts,” as the conversational analysts
(often implicitly) seem to advocate. A pragmatic explanation requires a meta-level,
where the facts and factors of the analysis are placed in an overall framework, and
where the analyst him-/herself is engaged beyond the immediate context. This higher
level of analysis (often called ‘critical’) is where societal critique and social
action have their places” (271-272).
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9 Numerous researchers have argued for the combination of detailed sequential
analyses and reflections on ethnographic contexts. This kind of micro-macro level
study of talk has been variously referred to as “ethnographic discourse analysis”
(Gwyn 2002: 26), “ethnographische Gesprächsanalyse” (Depperman 2000, 2001) or
“ethnography of interaction” (Wieder 1999).
10 IS shares this concern with socio-structural aspects of language use with
critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough 1985, 1992, 1995; Kress 1987; Wodak
1989). Within CDA, “the adoption of critical goals means, first and foremost,
investigating verbal interactions with an eye to their determination by and effects
on, social structures” (Fairclough 1995: 36). In other words, the micro-
interactions of everyday life are viewed by critical discourse analysts as the
realisations of macro-social structures, so that “the question of how discourse
cumulatively contributes to the reproduction of macro structures is at the heart of
the explanatory endeavour” (1995: 43). For critical discourse analysts, the micro-
event and the macro-social structures are inextricably linked: “‘micro’ actions or
events, including verbal interaction, can in no sense be regarded as of merely
‘local’ significance to the situation in which they occur, for any and every action
contributes to the reproduction of ‘macro’ structures” (Fairclough 1995: 34). Given
this reproductive relationship between everyday interaction and global social
structures, Fairclough argues that “it makes little sense to study verbal
interactions as if they were unconnected with social structures” (1985: 35,
original emphasis).
11 The concept of contextualisation was introduced by Jenny Cook-Gumperz & John
Gumperz in 1976 and further elaborated, above all, by Gumperz in his 1982 monograph
and in a number of articles (e.g. Gumperz 1989, 1992a, b, 1999; Gumperz & Cook
Gumperz 1981). For detailed discussion of this concept cf. also Auer 1984, 1992;
Ericson & Shultz 1977, 1982; Hinnenkamp 1989).
12 To quote Gumperz (1992a: 230): “I use the term ‘contextualisation’ to refer to
speakers’ and listener’s use of verbal and nonverbal signs to relate what is said
at any one time and in any one place to knowledge acquired through past experience,
in order to retrieve the presuppositions they must rely on to maintain
conversational involvement and access what is intended.”
13 As Schiffrin (1996: 314) puts it, this is a view of language as a “socially and
culturally constructed symbol system that is used in ways that reflect macrolevel
social meanings (e.g. group identity, status differences) but also create
microlevel social meanings (i.e., what one is saying and doing at a particular
moment in time).”
14 To quote Gumperz: “[Sociolinguists] customarily take gender, ethnicity and class
as given parameters within which we create our own social identities, the study of
language as interactional discourse demonstrates that these parameters are not
constants that can be taken for granted but are communicatively produced” (1982b:
1).
15 The multitude of reference points prompted the following remark from Erickson
(1992: 365): “The notion of contextualization as presented by Gumperz is eclectic
in the best sense of that term. It synthesizes insights from a variety of
approaches to studying the conduct of talk.” Cf. also the description of influences
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by preceding research, competing approaches and comparable conceptualisations of
context in Auer (1992: 21-24).
16 As mentioned above, Bateson’s notion of meta-messages and meta-communication
respectively was adopted and elaborated by various researchers approaching the
analysis of communication. In Pragmatics of human communication, Watzlawick et al.
(1967) propose five axioms of communication, of which the second holds that every
communication has a content and a relationship aspect such that the latter defines
the former and is therefore metacommunication. Similarly, researchers working
within the framework of relational communication analysis (Millar & Rogers 1976,
1987, 1988; Millar et al. 1984; Rogers 1981; Rogers & Farace 1975; Rogers et al.
1980; Rogers & Millar 1988, 1998; Rogers-Millar & Millar 1979) draw on these two
aspects of messages in the investigation of interpersonal communication. Likewise,
Tannen’s (1986, 2001) builds on Bateson’s concept of metamessage in her
interactional sociolinguistic approach to interpersonal and intercultural
communication: “We react on only to the meaning of the words spoken – the message –
but also to what we think those words say about the relationship – the metamessage”
(2001: XVII, original emphasis). She defines the metamessage as “what is
communicated about relationships - attitudes toward each other, the occasion, and
what we are saying” (1986: 16). Ways of expressing implicit relationship
definitions include paralinguistic, prosodic and non-verbal means, modality, modal
particles, lexemes with specific connotations, sequential placement of utterances,
etc.
17 The key or mood of an interaction is also referred to as “interaction modality”
in the literature (e.g. Kallmeyer & Keim 1996; Kotthoff 1996c, 1998; K. Müller
1992).
18 To quote Gumperz (1982: 131): “Roughly speaking, a contextualization cue is any
feature of linguistic form that contributes to the signalling of contextual
presuppositions.”
19 In particular in the case of the class of utterance which in speech act theory
has been classified as indirect speech acts, such as, for instance ironic
statements or indirect directives, the speaker’s intention can differ considerably
from the proposition.
20 Gumperz adopts these terms from Levinson (1978, 1992). Levinson’s notion of
activity type embraces verbal as well as nonverbal activities. It refers to “goal-
defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on participants,
setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions (Levinson
1992: 69). Examples are teaching, a job interview, a football game, a task in a
workshop, a dinner party, etc. “The degree of cooperation, the ranking or
precedence of topics, and so on are intrinsically related to the nature of the
activity in question” (Levinson 1992: 78). “Allowable contributions” include
speech, gesture, and other forms of meaningful action. By definition, then, such
activities are contextually situated and governed by norms of interaction.
21 As Tannen so eloquently put it, “people approach the world not as naive, blank-
slate receptacles ..., but rather as ... veterans of perception who have stored
their prior experiences as ‘an organized mass,’ and who see events and objects in
the worlds in relation to each other and in relation to their prior experience.
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This prior experience or organized knowledge then takes the form of expectations
about the world, and in the vast majority of cases, the world, being a systematic
place, confirms these expectations, saving the individual the trouble of figuring
things out anew all the time” (1993b: 20f). The conceptualisation of how we
organise our experiences in a way that facilitate the identification and
interpretation of new situations has long played an important role in a broad range
of disciplines that are concerned with human thinking and behaviour. Tannen (1993)
lists cognitive and social psychology, sociology and anthropology, artificial
intelligence (AI) research, and linguistics. For this basic concept, the various
disciplines have developed various terms, of which the most general is probably
that of structures of expectation, introduced by Ross (1975). In addition, there
are the terms script (associated with the work of Schank & Abelson 1977), schema
(which traces back to Bartlett 1932), and the most widespread term frame, which, as
discussed above, goes back to Bateson and is used in particular in sociological and
anthropological research. A basic distinctive feature of the view of this concept
in the different research disciplines is the conceptualisation of structures of
expectations as static or dynamic. Some AI-researchers (e.g. Minsky 1974) view
frame as a static collection of information about a stereotypical situation. A
similar view is put forward in linguistics, for instance in the classic discourse
analysis, which developed from speech act theory and pragmatics. Here, frame is
conceptualised as an abstract semantic construct, through which world knowledge is
applied to the interpretation of an interaction. The basic question is which
knowledge a participant has to have, to be able to correctly identify speech acts.
By contrast, the ethnographically and sociologically oriented research traditions
stress the culture specific, interactive and dynamic character of structures of
expectations. An approach that emphasises the interactive character of the frame
concept is that of the anthropologist Frake (1977). In his view, which is consonant
with that of Gumperz described above, frames are not static cognitive structures
that are present in the mind of each individual and simply have to be retrieved by
the analyst, but "the key aspect of frames is what the people are doing when they
speak" (Tannen 1993: 19, original emphasis). For more detailed discussion of the
various concepts of knowledge structures cf. Tannen (1993c) and Gumperz (1982:
154ff.).
22 A related concept that is used in the literature is that of (communicative or
speech) genres. Drawing on Bakhtin (1986), accounts of genre within interactional
sociolinguistics (IS), systemic functional linguistics (SFL), and critical
discourse analysis (CDA), make reference to the socio-cultural and historical
contexts embodied by types of texts and explore the ways in which genres function
as discursive practices. The concept of genre stems from work in critical literary
theory. Bakhtin (1989: 52) defines speech genres as “the typical form of the
utterance associated with a particular sphere of communication (e.g. the workplace,
the sewing circle, the military) which have therefore developed into ‘relatively
stable types’ in terms of thematic content, style and compositional structure.”
As mentioned above, he argues that the more complex “secondary” genres of writing
(including literary genres) are derived from the primary speech genres. Examples of
speech genre include “short rejoinders of daily dialogue,” “everyday narration,”
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“business documents” and “the diverse world of commentary” (60). Their structure
derives from situations from which they arise such that “even in the most free, the
most unconstrained conversation, we cast our speech in definite generic forms,
rigid and trite ones, sometimes more flexible, plastic and creative ones. ... We
learn to cast our speech in generic forms and when hearing others’ speech we guess
from the very first words; we predict a certain length and a certain compositional
structure; we foresee the end; that is from the very beginning we have a sense of
the speech whole. If speech genres did not exist and we had not mastered them, if
we had to originate them during the speech process and construct each utterance at
will for the first time, speech communication would be almost impossible” (78).
Bakhtin claims that the lexical, grammatical and compositional structures of
particular genres are a reflection of the specific context of communication and he
has identified genres as “relatively stable types” of interactive utterances with
definite and typical forms of construction.
These particular features of Bakhtin’s analysis are echoed in the approach to
genre analysis taken by IS. Communicative genres are viewed as conventionalised
solutions for specific (communicative) problems. They are culture-specific,
established forms of talk (and communication in general) - traditions of speaking -
which serve as an orientation for participants in the production and interpretation
of social meaning. These established patterns map out communicative processes by
laying down more or less detailed rules for their components (Luckmann 1986, 1988;
Günthner & Knoblauch 1994; Günther & Luckmann 2002). Communicative genres
constitute routine knowledge about the form of communicative (inter)action, and
members orient towards such underlying knowledge in the production of
(inter)actions, thereby (re)producing (knowledge about) communicative genres.
Hence, genres are not fixed but subject to change (e.g. telegram vs. short
message). Genres are characterised by (1) external factors: communicative milieu
(habitual place of communication, shared interactional history); social roles; e.g.
family dinner conversation; university lecture; (2) internal factors: linguistic
code; choice of variety, prosody, specific syntactic patterns, topics, specific
lexical choices, formulaic expressions, non-verbal phenomena (facial expressions,
gestures); and (3) the situated level of realisation, which connects the exterior
and interior aspects: sequential organisation, participant framework, turn
distribution and allocation, topical organisation. Genres are not unidirectionally
determined by the context in which they occur; they do not exist independent of the
context; rather, they are contextualised in interaction. In the enactment of
underlying knowledge about genres, the context is being constituted. For example,
on the one hand, teasing is only possible in close social relationships (e.g. among
friends); on the other hand, teasing can constitute social closeness. Thus, the
realisation of genres is related to the negotiation of specific social identities
(cf. Gunthner & Christmann 1996; Knoblauch 1995; Kotthoff 1998). Examples of
communicative genres in this sense are family dinner conversations (Keppler 1994;
Knoblauch 1995);  conversational narrative (Blum-Kulka et al 2004; Norrick 2000,
2005; Quasthoff & Kern 2005); conversational argument (Kotthoff 1993a), toasts
(Kotthoff 1995, 1999), conversational joking (Norrick 1993; Kotthoff 1998).
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Similarly, in SFL, the term has been used “to describe how people use langue
to achieve culturally recognized goals” (Eggins & Slade 1997: 24). Genres (e.g.
service encounters, narratives) are characterised by obligatory elements of
structure, which are realised through specific discourse-semantic and lexico-
grammatical patterns, and, as Hasan argues, “the appearance of all these elements
in a specific order corresponds to our perception of whether the text is complete
or incomplete” (Halliday & Hasan 1985: 61). Other elements which are optional may
occur in some instance of the genre and may also occur in other genres. However,
these do not occur randomly, and the conditions under which they are likely to
occur can be described. Hasan also claims that it is the interactional or generic
structure of a text that is defining of a genre, so that texts of the same genre
will realise the same obligatory elements of structure. Drawing on this work,
Martin defines genre as a “stated, goal oriented, purposeful activity in which
speakers engage as members of our culture” (1984: 25). More recently, Eggins &
Martin (1997: 239) have defined genre as “a theory of the unfolding structure texts
work through to achieve their social purposes.”
In CDA, genre is defined as “a socially ratified way of using language in
connection with a particular type of social activity (e.g. interview, narrative
exposition)” (Fairclough 1995: 14). Genre is “the abstract constituent of text
types” (13). There are the ideal text types which people orient to but do not
necessarily conform to, but there are also “texts which closely match ideal types
(as well as others which do not), so that people learn them from concrete textual
experience” (13). Genres in CDA are seen as social actions occurring within
particular social and historical contexts. The similarities in form and discursive
function are seen as deriving from the similarity in the social action undertaken.
Moreover, in CDA genres are seen as both social and textual categories, no longer
fixed and immutable but dynamic and changing. While recognising that there are
generic conventions in text, researchers within CDA stress the need to see genres
not as fixed and rigid schema but as abstract, ideal categories open to negotiation
and change. As Kress argues, “genres are dynamic, responding to the dynamics of
other parts of social systems. Hence genres change historically; hence new genres
emerge over time and hence, too, what appears as ‘the same’ generic form at one
level has recognisable distinct forms in differing social groups” (1987: 42).
In the ethnography of speaking, genre refers to one component in the complex
communicative context of interactions. As the SPEAKING grid (cf. above) shows,
Hymes used the term genre to refer to just one component of the speech event.
Defining genre as including such categories as joke, story, lecture, greeting, and
conversation, he argued that “genres often coincide with speech events, but must be
treated as analytically independent of them. They may occur in (or as) different
events. The sermon as a genre is typically identified with a certain place in a
church service, but its properties may be invoked, for serious or humorous effect,
in other situations” (1974: 61).
23 For alternative conceptualisations of politeness (strategies) cf. R. T. Lakoff’s
(1973, 1989) Rules or Politeness and Leech’s (1983) politeness principle.
24  Brown & Levinson’s negative and positive politeness strategies concur with
Goffman’s (1967) notion of interpersonal rituals as means of maintaining face.
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Goffman identifies two types: (1) presentational rituals, i.e. those “acts through
which the individual makes specific attestations to recipients concerning how he
regards them” (71); and (2) avoidance rituals, i.e. “those forms of deference which
lead the actor to keep at a distance from the recipient” (62).
25 Correspondingly, Goffman (1967: 10) maintains: “Just as the member of any group
is expected to have self-respect, so also he is expected to sustain a standard of
considerateness; he is expected to go to certain lengths to save the feelings and
the face of others present, and he is expected to do this willingly and
spontaneously because of emotional identification with the others and with their
feelings. Of course, the more power and prestige the others have, the more a person
is likely to show consideration for their feelings.”
26 Similarly, Tannen (1986a, 1993a, 1994c) argues that any interactional move can be
understood as an expression of solidarity (an attempt to establish rapport) and/or
as an expression of power (an act of imposition).
27 Kasper (1990: 203) argues that despite the attempt to take into account the impact
of macro-social factors on politeness enactment, Brown & Levinson’s model “remains
unsatisfactory in that it suggests an unidirectional effect of social factors on
politeness styles, thereby failing to reconstruct the dialectic relationship between
communicative activity and social relationships... in other words it is not the case
that previously earned social entitlements are simply acted upon but that
entitlements are mutually conveyed in conversational (as well as other types of)
interaction.”
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It takes two to tangle. (Source unknown)
When one will not, two will not quarrel.
(English proverb)
6 The sequential organisation of mother-daughter disputes
Earlier, I put forward a concept of (interpersonal) conflict as a
situated local interactional accomplishment. Conflict progresses in
and through the ways in which participants communicate with each
other. It is a dynamic interactional process expressed and
progressing by way of mutual opposition between two or more people.
Since talk is the prime means of communication among human beings,
it is also the prime means by which the social activity of conflict
is interactionally achieved. Thus, the analysis of the particulars
of talk-in-interaction constitutes the principal means of uncovering
how conflict is created and conducted by the participants in the
local context of the interaction. In the following, I will show how
the ongoing, sequential organisation of talk itself constitutes the
social practice of conflict.
6.1 Opening and progress of verbal conflicts: the crucial role of opposition
Various studies of conflict interaction have stressed the crucial
role of adversative activities such as challenges, contradictions,
disagreements, negations, refusals and other forms of opposition
(e.g. Antaki 1994; Boggs 1978; Brenneis & Lein 1977; Coulter 1990;
Eisenberg & Garvey 1981; Garvey 1984; Genishi & DiPaolo 1982; M. H.
Goodwin 1982, 1990; Gruber 1996, 1998, 2001; Hutchby 1996a,b, 2001;
Kotthoff 1993a; Maynard 1985a; Messmer 2003; Millar et al. 1984;
Muntigl & Turnbull 1998; Pomerantz 1975; Rehbock 1987; Schiffrin
1985; Schwitalla 1987; Shantz & Shantz 1985; Sheldon 1992, 1993,
1996;  Spiegel 1995; Vuchinich 1984, 1986, 1987, 1990; Willard 1978)1
In one of the earliest studies on naturally occurring conflict,
Eisenberg & Garvey (1981: 150) see conflict in terms of what they
call an “adversative episode”:
the interaction which grows out of an opposition to [an
antecedent event such as] a request for action, an
assertion, or an action. ... The negating responses or
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oppositions include refusals, disagreements, denials, and
objections. Thus, an adversative episode is a sequence
which begins with an opposition and ends with a resolution
or dissipation of conflict.
Although, as we will see below, Eisenberg & Garvey’s stress on
resolution as the principal way of terminating conflict has
subsequently been challenged by other research, their model of
adversative episodes is still important because of its emphasis on
the way in which argument emerges sequentially out of opposition to
some antecedent event, or in Maynard’s (1985a: 3) terms “arguable
action.”
Eisenberg & Garvey identify a range of specific antecedent
events that may initiate a dispute, which seems to suggest that the
start of an argument can be somehow predicted. By contrast, in his
studies of children’s arguments, Maynard (1985a) finds that almost
any interactional move can in principle contain objectionable
features and may become part of a conflict episode if it is opposed.
Similarly, in her study of children’s disputes Garvey (1984) notes
that it was not possible to predict in advance how a conflict would
begin: “Almost any remark could be challenged, and even a seemingly
innocuous suggestion or request could be opposed” (143-144). That is
to say, any action (whether an utterance or some other form of
action) can in principle be treated as arguable and, hence, as the
basis for starting an argument (cf. also Messmer 2003; Knoblauch
1991, 1995; Schiffrin 1984; Tannen 2001). All these studies put the
analytical focus on how verbal conflicts emerge out of opposition,
treating argument as a response-centred event: the crucial point is
not what a speaker says or does – which is ambiguous – but how what
she says or does is taken by the recipient. There are of course
actions, utterances or topics that are more likely to spark a
conflict than others, but the point is that in principle any
activity can with hindsight be the starting point of an argument.
To sum up so far, opposition is the second move in any conflict
sequence, and the first move is an antecedent event or arguable
action. Accordingly, the initial sequential unit in any verbal
conflict is an “action-opposition sequence” (Hutchby 1996a, b). This
is illustrated by the following three examples:
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example (1): My mother I, 7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of
131 the valley!
> 132 MARGARET He's not.
133 DORIS He is.
134 MARGARET He's not, just parking.
135 DORIS Curious method of parking.
example (2): Stuck 6b
121 LULA Mom, I am going to leave someday.
> 122 MOM You wouldn't do that.
123 LULA I might!
124 MOM You wouldn't.
125 LULA I might, I might, so you die? It's not my
126 fault. It's not like anyone would miss you.
127 You've been useless for the last ten years
128 anyway, so I don't care. I can do anything!
example (3): Alto I, 2
31 WANDA He'll find a way if I ask him.
> 32 FLORENE No, he won't!
33 WANDA Yes, he will!
34 FLORENE He'll say yes, and then leave it up to me
35 to find a way!
In the above segments, each of the utterances with an arrow
represents an antecedent event which is treated as an arguable by
the recipient, thereby setting up an opposition and constituting the
arrowed utterance as the initial part of a verbal conflict. That is,
based on the initial opposition, one can identify the antecedent or
arguable event. The point is that for an analysis of conflict
episodes it is necessary to put the oppositional response of one
participant to an initial move by another participant in the centre
of attention.
While in the preceding extracts both arguable action and
opposition consist of verbal activities, the following two extracts
illustrate that both arguables and opposition may consist of verbal
as well as nonverbal actions.
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example (4): Avenue
> 342 OLGA (Turns on the radio and switches it fast to
343 different channels.)
344 MOTHER Hey, you're gonna break that radio, switching
345 it fast like that. Someday I just might break
346 that radio myself. Don't want nothing in this
347 house reminding me of that bastard father of
348 yours. Now what was I saying? Oh. About your
349 shadow. I finished that, didn't I? Oh, he says
350 you're too quiet. You need someone to liven
351 you up.
352 OLGA I saw him livening some woman up on liquor
353 when I passed him on the street.
354 MOTHER So, men are men, whiskey and women go
355 together.
example (5): My sister 3
1 MADAME DANZARD Don't toy with your food, Isabelle.
2 It's so disagreeable. Always making
3 those little piles.
4 ISABELLE I'm not, Maman.
5 MADAME DANZARD You mean to tell me I don't see what
6 you're doing.
7 ISABELLE I'm not toying, Maman.
8 MADAME DANZARD (Coldly.) Very well, my dear, call it
9 what you will.
In these examples, the antecedent event is the nonverbal action
occurring prior to the talk, and an opposition is constructed with
the first utterance.
Conversely, in the two extracts below, the arguable is a verbal
action, and the oppositional move consists in a nonverbal action:
example (6): Avenue
128 OLGA (Turns on the radio. Mother listens. An up
129 tempo song is playing.)
130 MOTHER Make that louder. I like that song.
> 131 OLGA (Turns it off.)
132 MOTHER You're spiteful and you're always listening
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133 to that radio.
example (7): Avenue
181 MOTHER Your father's dead, Olga, the no-good
182 sonavabitch is dead and buried.
> 183 OLGA (Gives her a defiant look.)
184 MOTHER Whatsa matter with you? You know it's true.
185 We got proof of it. Sometimes you're stupid
186 about things.
Approaching verbal conflict as a response-centred emergent event and
putting the focus on opposition as the crucial element, enables us
to investigate participants’ use of locally emergent features of the
talk in constructing conflict sequences. For instance, we can
examine what types of actions get treated as arguables,2 and what
kinds of norms and values are invoked by speakers in identifying
actions as arguables (cf. Maynard 1985b). Similarly, we can
investigate what kinds of resources are employed by disputants in
building opposition in the light of previous moves in the
interaction (cf. M. H. Goodwin 1990; Kotthoff 1993a).
This view does not rule out, however, that people can try to
stir up a dispute, for instance, by attempting to provoke or offend
an interlocutor, nor does it imply that only recipients can be
active parties in treating a turn as arguable. Especially once an
argument is in progress, speakers may make strong assertions which
they can expect others to disagree with. A similar idea is expressed
by Coulter (1990), who places “declarative assertions”, i.e.
“assertions designed to make some point to be addressed by ...
interlocutors” (185), in the centre of his model of argument
sequences. According to Coulter, the basic structure of an
argumentative exchange is comprised of a declarative assertion,
followed by either an agreement (in which case no argument ensues)
or a disagreement token or counter-assertion (triggering off a
dispute). Yet, even though speakers may try to pick a quarrel by
producing a declarative assertion, whether an argument actually
emerges still depends on the interlocutor’s response. As Antaki
(1994) points out, “the first utterance is only latent with
argumentative meaning until the second utterance comes along and
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decides the issue one way or another” (179). Similarly, Newell &
Stutman (1989/90: 157) maintain that “no one act is sufficient to
initiate anything. The production of communication episodes is
negotiated through interaction.” In their analysis of how
individuals successfully initiate a “social confrontation episode,”
they show that the nature of the communication episode initiated by
a speech action is not determined by particular qualities or
conditions of the action itself but rather depends on how the
recipient responds to the initiating action. In other words, the key
for a conflict episode lies in the recipient’s willingness to treat
the speaker’s action as arguable - and a recipient may choose to
pass over or even agree with a prior controversial claim and thereby
neutralise it and forestall an argument.3
Conversely, as indicated above, even apparently innocent and
essentially non-argumentative statements or actions can be treated
as arguables. As Tannen (2001: 20) notes in her study of family
discourse, “even the most mundane activity ... can spark a
conflict.” Likewise, as mentioned above, in his analyses of
children’s arguments during collaborative classroom work, Maynard
(1985a, b, 1986) illustrates how seemingly innocuous actions such as
moving a pencil or mispronouncing a word can be responded to in a
way that makes them the starting point for extended stretches of
conflict talk.
It must be emphasised, however, that disagreement, i.e. a
single (arguable) action-opposition sequence, need not eventuate in
a full-blown dispute. Initial opposition is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for argument because it can be responded to in
various ways. For example, opposition may be complied with, ignored,
or responded to playfully (cf. Maynard 1985a; M. H. Goodwin 1983).
That is, particular interactional work is necessary to transform
opposition into a verbal conflict episode: Only if a conflicting
response to an initial oppositional move occurs, the first
oppositional move retrospectively marks the beginning of the
conflict episode. As Maynard (1985a: 8) puts it:
The summary point is that initial opposition does not
constitute an argument. An utterance may oppose a prior
action, but its status as part of an argument is dependent
on whether it is treated as a legitimate repair initiation
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or whether it is let pass or whether it is itself
counteracted. Thus, in addition to the notion of the
“antecedent event,” as an arguable utterance or action that
can potentially be opposed, we also need a concept of an
“argumentative” which would capture how an initial
statement of opposition is only contingently turned into an
element of an argument or dispute.
This is illustrated by the following example from Maynard (1985a:
5), in which the argument stays potential due to Barb’s diplomatic
response to Ralph’s initial opposition:
example (8)
(Ralph and Barb are at the drawing table)
1 Ralph: That doesn’t look like a duck
2 (1.6)
3 Duck’s are supposed to have a beak
4 (2.0)
5 Barb: [shrugs] Well, I could make a beak
Ralph’s utterance in line 1 comprises an initial opposition which
treats Barb’s drawing as an antecedent event. Barb’s silence in line
2 (during which she presumably considers Ralph’s assertion), allows
him to resume the floor and back up his claim by explaining how
Barb’s drawing doesn’t look like a duck (line 3). At this point,
Barb could turn the interaction into a quarrel. If she produced a
counter like “It does look like a duck,” or “What do you know?” an
argument would be on. However, by treating Ralph’s initial
opposition to her drawing (line 1) as a legitimate repair initiation
and indicating that she will change the drawing, Barb nips the
dispute in the bud.
Similarly, in the following extract from my data, Mama averts a
potential argument by producing a self-repair in response to
Jessie’s opposition in line 1080:
example (9): ‘night Mother
1077 MAMA You had those quiet little conversations
1078 after supper every night. What were you
1079 whispering about?
1080 JESSIE We weren't whispering, you were just across
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1081 the room.
> 1082 MAMA What did you talk about?
1083 JESSIE We talked about why black socks are warmer
1084 than blue socks.
Jessie’s turn initial utterance “We weren’t whispering” in line 1080
treats Mama’s prior formulation as an arguable action and thus
constitutes an initial opposition. Subsequently, she supports her
claim by pointing out that Mama simply could not hear what they were
saying because she was “across the room.” Mama’s following turn is
crucial, as it determines whether the interaction will turn into a
dispute or not. If she counter-opposes Jessie and insists on her
initial formulation, the argument will be on. However, in line 1082,
by reformulating her prior question, substituting “talk” for
“whisper,” she ratifies Jessie’s opposition and thereby diffuses the
situation. Thus, by treating Jessie’s initial opposition as a
legitimate repair initiation, Mama precludes a potential argument.
As these extracts demonstrate, an interlocutor’s opposition can
be taken as a repair initiation in the sense of Schegloff et al.
(1977) that provides an opportunity for the party whose utterance or
action contains the repairable to remedy the trouble. If that party
rejects the initiation, i.e. chooses not to repair the trouble
source, a potential repair sequence may develop into an argument.
That is, whether an oppositional move is an item in a repair
sequence or a conflict sequence depends, in part, on how the
recipient of the oppositional move elects to treat it. To quote
Maynard (1986: 265):
An initial statement of opposition, even when strongly
provocative, may be taken as a repair initiation. It is when
opposition itself receives disagreement that a dispute is
advanced.
An argument does not begin until two opponents ‘square off’ and the
occurrence of a third move by the initial speaker is crucial for
establishing a conflict episode. If she performs any other action
than a counter-opposition to the recipient’s initial opposition in
position 3, no conflict develops.
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Thus, we can say that verbal conflicts contain a minimum of
three consecutive oppositional moves.4 Only if the opposed person
responds with a counter-opposition, a conflict is fully under way.
This tripartite entry-structure has been observed in a number of
studies of conflict talk (cf. Antaki 1994, 1996; Coulter 1990;
Genishi & DiPaolo 1982; Gruber 1996, 1998, 2001; Hutchby 1996a, b,
2001; Maynard 1985; Millar et al. 1984; Muntigl & Turnbull 1998;
Messmer 2003; Newell & Stutman 1989/90; Rehbock 1987; Schiffrin
1984; Shantz 1987; Vuchinich 1984, 1986, 1987, 1990).
In my corpus, the mother-daughter dialogues are rife with such
oppositional or “dissent-turn” (Kotthoff 1993a) sequences. Consider
the following two extracts:
example (10): My mother I, 7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of the
131 valley!
> 132 MARGARET He's not.
> 133 DORIS He is.
134 MARGARET He's not, just parking.
135 DORIS Curious method of parking.
example (11): ‘night Mother
1373 MAMA I married you off to the wrong man, I admit
1374 that. So I took you in when he left. I'm
1375 sorry.
> 1376 JESSIE He wasn't the wrong man.
> 1377 MAMA He didn't love you, Jessie, or he wouldn't
1378 have left.
1379 JESSIE He wasn't the wrong man, Mama. I loved Cecil
1380 so much. And I tried to get more exercise
1381 and I tried to stay awake. I tried to learn
1382 to ride a horse. And I tried to stay outside
1383 with him, but he always knew I was trying,
1384 so it didn't work.
Both of these examples exhibit the following entry structure:
speaker A puts forward a position in turn 1 that is opposed by
speaker B in turn 2, following which speaker A in turn 3 counter-
opposes speaker B’s initial opposition by either directly contesting
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speaker B’s oppositional move as in example (10), or supporting the
original position as in example (11). Thus, in accordance with the
findings on naturally occurring conflict talk, the primary
sequential unit of these conflict episodes is a three-step sequence
in which the participants exchange oppositional moves to challenge
each other’s and/or support or insist on their own position, as
illustrated in figure (1) below. The typical opening-structure of an
argument then is a three-step sequence which comprises the following
moves:
Figure (1): three-step opening-structure of arguments
1 A: antecedent event/
arguable action
i.e. verbal or nonverbal action
2 B: initial opposition i.e. disagreement with 1
3 A: counter-opposition i.e. disagreement with 2 and/or
     supporting or insisting on 1
These three steps form a minimal unit of conflict, which can be
expanded by means of oppositional turns being subsequently treated
as arguable actions (i.e. counter-opposed). It is this underlying
form of mutual opposition that makes it possible (for
conversationalists and observers alike) to recognise when an episode
of conflict occurs. In this way, the sequential organisation
contributes to the framing (Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) or
contextualisation (Gumperz 1982) of verbal conflict.
To sum up, verbal conflict is a form of social interaction
(Simmel 1908/1955) characterised by participants mutually opposing
one other in successive turns at talk. A speaker opposes the other
person (or something she said or did) in some way; if the opposed
person responds with a counter-opposition, then a conflict is fully
under way. Verbal conflicts thus contain a minimum of three turns in
which the participants mutually oppose each other. Episodes of
verbal conflict have recognisable beginnings and endings: they begin
with mutually expressed opposition and end with mutual abstinence
from opposing moves. The boundaries of a conflict episode are
therefore structurally identified by the onset and termination of
mutual opposition rather than being determined, for instance, by
content factors. For example, rather than centring around one
specific problem, verbal conflicts often ramble from one subject to
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another, with the opponents talking on and on without finding an
agreement (cf. Knoblauch 1991, 1995). Similarly, what appears to
start off as an argument about a specific issue such as the use of
an object (e.g. a toy) may evolve into a character contest (Goffman
1967), which affects the participants’ status in their group (cf.
Emihovich 1986; C. Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin 1990). Verbal conflicts
can be acted out in many different ways and are referred to
variously by participants and researchers as argument(ation)s,
disputes, quarrels, controversies, discussions, debates, fights,
rows, spats, squabbles, run-ins, and so on. As we will see below,
such episodes may vary in intensity from mild bickering to bitter
quarrelling, and their topical content, too, is variable. They may
be ritualised or more loosely organised, serious or playful, and
they may serve a range of social functions.5 But within this
flexibility there remains a basic discourse structure which allows
participants to coordinate their actions. The key element of this
structure is that each consecutive turn is an oppositional move.6
Thus, the definition of verbal conflict that forms the basis of the
present study is structural in nature and specifies and locates an
occurrence of conflict in successive turns at talk. Verbal conflict
is conceptualised as a sequential, interactional process proceeding
by means of an action that can be construed as arguable being
opposed, with the initial opposition itself being treated as an
arguable action in the subsequent turn. Episodes of verbal conflict
are thus constituted by means of “chained” (Goffman 1971, 1976)
opposition or disagreement sequences. Approaching verbal conflict in
this way places the analytic focus directly on the sequential
organisation of talk-in-interaction as the framework within which
participants accomplish conflict talk. In the following section, I
will focus on examples from my data. I will examine how the
termination of conflict sequences is interactionally and
sequentially achieved by the participants and discuss what this
reveals about the potential social functions of mother-daughter
disputes.
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A quarrel is quickly settled when deserted by one party;
there is no battle unless there be two.
(Lucius Annaeus Seneca)
Somebody has to have the last word. It not, every
argument could be opposed by another and we’d never be
done with it. (Albert Camus, The Fall)
6.2 Conflict termination
As the prior section has shown, verbal conflict is sequentially and
interactionally accomplished by the participants through the
reciprocal exchange of oppositional moves in successive turns at
talk. Verbal conflicts contain a minimum of three mutually opposing
turns. They proceed by means of each opposition being consecutively
treated as an arguable action. They end when oppositional turns
cease to be produced and other activities are taken up. As I will
show in this section, like conflict opening, its termination, too,
is collaboratively and sequentially achieved by the participants.
As Vuchinich (1987, 1990) has shown, verbal conflicts are
closed in similar ways as discourse units in general, exhibiting a
two-slot sequential closing mechanism. Schegloff & Sacks (1973) note
that one possible solution to the “closing problem” for the “single
conversation” discourse unit involves the use of a “terminal
exchange,” such as an exchange of “good-byes.” The first slot of the
utterance pair implicitly proposes that the conversation end; in the
second slot the other speaker shows “that he understood what a prior
[speaker] aimed at, and that he is willing to go along with that”
(297). Through the terminal exchange, consensus regarding
termination is displayed and silence or leave-taking can occur
without untoward interpretation. In verbal conflict, the closing
problem is how to organise the arrival of the opponents at a point
where one speaker's oppositional turn will not elicit an
oppositional turn from the other. As in ordinary conversation,
participants employ the terminal exchange to coordinate the closing
of conflict episodes. Vuchinich (1987, 1990) identifies two basic
forms of the terminal exchange in verbal conflict. Both have a
fundamental two-slot structure: one form displays a
dominant/submissive relationship between participants; the other
displays consensus on a compromise. In the “submission terminal
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exchange,” the first slot is an oppositional move; the second slot
is assent (i.e. agreement or compliance). Assent placed after the
opponent’s oppositional turn signals submission. It displays
acceptance not only of the validity of the other’s prior opposition
but also of a subordinate position regarding the dispute.
In the “compromise terminal exchange,” the first slot is a
concession offering; the second slot is acceptance. This terminating
sequence displays a consensus on the terms specified by the
concession. The basic two-slot form can be extended to include
multiple concession offerings, as concessions offered may not be
accepted straight away. In such cases, a concession may serve as a
“pre-closing” (Schegloff & Sacks 1973; Levinson 1983) signalling
that a participant is ready to close a conflict.
In addition, there are a number of systematic variations of the
basic two-slot structure. For instance, participants may avoid the
performance of the second slot in a terminal exchange leading to
another conflict-termination format – the “stand-off.” In these
cases, oppositional turns continue until the topic is changed or
until the opponents withdraw from participation. The conflict
terminates with participants continuing to maintain opposing
positions, with neither submitting (nor dominating).
Conflict termination may also occur if one opponent withdraws
from the conversational activity or physically leaves the scene. As
with the stand-off, in the case of “withdrawal” the conflict ends in
a draw with no terminal exchange.7 The resulting four basic conflict-
termination formats are illustrated in figure (1) below:8
Figure (1): basic conflict-termination formats (adapted from
Vuchinich 1990: 135)
Submission Compromise Stand-off Withdrawal
A: opposition opposition opposition opposition
B: opposition opposition opposition opposition
A: assent concession
offering
topic shift withdraws
B: concession
acceptance
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In the following, I will illustrate these termination formats with
examples from my data and then discuss their possible significance
for the mother-daughter disputes under analysis.
As described above, a conflict may be terminated when one
participant gives in and accepts the opponent’s position. This kind
of closing is accomplished by the submission terminal exchange. As
the following three extracts demonstrate, submission may be
expressed verbally, non-verbally or both.
In the fragment below, Mary Jane and her mother disagree on
whose idea it was that Mary Jane should come back home after her
divorce. After an initial (though mitigated) opposition, in line 150
Olivia agrees with her daughter’s claim that she asked her to come
back.
example (1): Tell me
147 MARY JANE I'm glad you asked me to come back.
148 OLIVIA Well, you wanted to. It was your idea.
149 MARY JANE I think you asked.
> 150 OLIVIA Okay, I'm wrong I suppose.
In the extract below, the mother and her five–year-old daughter are
arguing about whether the daughter should get out of bed again to
say her prayers. Following an extended disagreement sequence (lines
70-78), the daughter eventually complies with her mother’s command
and gets out of bed again and starts to pray (line 79).
example (2): Tell me
59 MOTHER Here, give Mama a kiss. That's a good girl.
60 Goodnight, now.
61 DAUGHTER Goodnight.
62 MOTHER Wait a minute. Did you say your prayers?
63 DAUGHTER Uh huh.
64 MOTHER On your knees?
65 DAUGHTER Uh huh.
66 MOTHER (Pause.) Did you say your prayers?
67 DAUGHTER (No answer.)
68 MOTHER Did you say your prayers or didn't you?
69 DAUGHTER (No answer.)
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70 MOTHER Alright, young lady, out of bed.
71 DAUGHTER Mama ...
72 MOTHER Out of bed and down on your knees.
73 DAUGHTER But it's cold.
74 MOTHER It wasn't too cold to come wandering into
75 my room asking for a glass of water.
76 DAUGHTER But I needed a drink of water.
77 MOTHER And now you need to say your prayers.
78 Out of bed.
> 79 DAUGHTER (Mumbling.) "Now I lay me ..."
In the following fragment, the mother and daughter are arguing about
whether the daughter should go up to her room. Again, the argument
terminates with the daughter’s submission, this time in the form of
a non-verbal compliance:9
example (3): Tell me
312 MOTHER Alright, that's it. That is it. I've heard
313 enough. It might be a good idea, young lady,
314 if you went up to your room.
315 DAUGHTER That's not fair.
316 MOTHER Right this minute.
317 DAUGHTER Why can't I? Just tell me why?
318 MOTHER Because I said so.
319 DAUGHTER But all the other kids can, why can't I?
320 MOTHER Up to your room, and stay there until you've
321 learned not to argue with your mother.
322 DAUGHTER Everybody but me! What am I supposed to do?
323 And next time they won't even ask me because
324 they'll think I can't go. Because I can
325 never go anywhere.
326 MOTHER Up to your room.
327 DAUGHTER But...
328 MOTHER Up to bed, young lady.
329 DAUGHTER But I...
330 MOTHER Not another word. March. ((end of scene))
In verbal conflict, participants place themselves in symbolic
positions that are opposed to one another. As mentioned above,
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opposition can take many forms, ranging from stating opposing
arguments in a rational debate format to the exchange of personal
insults and threats.10 Whatever form it takes, though, this
oppositional positioning establishes preconditions for the display
of dominance and submission. Once the oppositional positions have
been taken up, one of the participants may give in or submit to the
other. Submission by one party marks the superiority of the opposing
party (cf. Simmel 1908/1950: 113; Vuchinich 1990: 120). In terms of
game theory the dominant participant is the winner and the
submissive participant is the loser. This mutual establishment of
dominant and compliant parties is one possibility of terminating
verbal conflicts. By submitting, a person tacitly accepts the
position maintained by the other party.11 This acceptance dismantles
the oppositional discourse structure and usually marks the
termination of a conflict episode. The submission not only displays
consensus on some controversial issue but also willingness to change
the speech activity to something other than conflict. According to
Vuchinich (1990), dominant participants usually accept their victory
and are willing to move to another speech activity. However, as we
will see below, in the middle of a heated dispute, sudden
concessions may be rejected as insincere, leading to the
continuation of the dispute.
Participants know that once a conflict is under way, there may
be winners and losers, and opponents commonly seek to win disputes
and evade losing them. In verbal conflicts, social status as well as
self esteem is at stake, so there is much to be gained by winning
(cf. Goffmans’ (1967) description of the win/lose logic of
“character contests”). However, the establishment of winners and
losers is a possible but not inevitable outcome of conflict.
In the submission format, the termination of a conflict episode
is achieved through dominance. Another mechanism for accomplishing
conflict termination is the negotiation of a compromise. The crucial
move in this kind of negotiation is the concession. As Vuchinch
(1990) notes, “in a concession a participant offers a position that
is between the opposing positions that define the dispute” (127).
Thus, a concession does not give in to the other position but rather
establishes a middle ground which moves toward the other position
but still opposes it. A concession proposes a compromise position
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between the two opposing positions. If the concession offered is
accepted by the opponent the conflict episode can terminate. The
basic compromise terminal exchange has two slots: (1) concession
offering and (2) acceptance of the offering. This basic two-step
structure may be expanded to include multiple concessions, and
acceptance may be tacit. An important feature of compromise
terminations is that none of the participants must lose face, in
particular when both opponents make concessions. But even when only
one participant makes a concession, it is self-initiated, not
externally enforced, and hence face-loss is minimised.12 As mentioned
above, in many cases, a concession functions as a pre-closing
(Schegloff & Sacks 1973; Levinson 1983), which signals that one
participant is ready to close the argument but is unwilling to
submit. The opponent may accept the concession, reject it, or offer
a counter-concession. The conflict episode is terminated when a (set
of) concession(s) is accepted. Concessions can be direct or
indirect; acceptance may be verbal or nonverbal, explicit or tacit.
This terminal-exchange format is illustrated by the following two
extracts:
example (4): My sister 9
22 ISABELLE One, two, three ... begin. Maman - that
23 is not fair.
24 MADAME DANZARD What's not fair?
25 ISABELLE You started at two.
> 26 MADAME DANZARD I did not. I absolutely did not.
27 However, if you insist, we'll start
28 again.
29 ISABELLE One ... two ... three ... start.
In example (4), Madame Danzard and her daughter Isabelle are playing
cards. When Isabelle accuses her mother of being unfair (line 23)
and having started too early (line 25), Madame Danzard at first
vehemently rejects her daughter’s blame (line 26). Immediately
afterwards, however, she offers a concession, proposing to restart
the game. While she does not admit having cheated, her proposal lays
the groundwork for the termination of the conflict episode. Isabelle
accepts her mother’s compromise offer, which she signals by starting
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to dole out cards again. In so doing, she collaborates in closing
the argument.
In example (5), Mother and Olga are arguing about whether Olga
has to change her clothes just because Mother’s new boyfriend is
(supposed to be) having dinner with them.
example (5): Avenue
136 MOTHER Now you fix up nice for tonight.
137 OLGA Why? I've met him before.
138 MOTHER
139 OLGA I don't like it.
140 MOTHER Then wear something else, something that will
141 give- give an illusion.
142 OLGA I don't have to fool anybody.
143 MOTHER (Starts applying eyebrow pencil and
144 eyeliner.) Look, do what I say. I do you
145 favors. Who bought you that damn piano? You
146 think it costs peanuts? It took me more than
147 seven months to get the money for that.
148 OLGA Yes, I know. Didn't you ever get tired and
149 sore from all that work?
150 MOTHER (Stops activity and looks angrily at her.)
151 I'm thinking of two ways to take what you just
152 said. And if it's the bad way I'm thinking to
153 be right, you're gonna get a bar of soap in
154 your mouth.
> 155 OLGA Can't I wear what I have on?
156 MOTHER (Looking at her, slowly.) All right. ((...))
Following an extended series of disagreements,13 in response to her
mother’s threat (line 151-154) Olga offers a concession, asking
Mother for permission to keep on the clothes she is wearing (line
155). In so doing, she makes way for the termination of the conflict
sequence. By responding with an agreement (line 156), Mother
collaborates in closing the argument - or at least this round.
In the two preceding extracts, the conflict episode is closed
with a compromise terminal exchange. However, in my data, more often
than not, concession offers are rejected by the opponent. Consider
the following two examples:
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example (6): Alto I, 2
11 WANDA Mama, she thinks I ought to take singing
12 lessons. Can I?
13 FLORENE What? Lessons? No, Wanda. I don't think
14 so... How much would that cost?
15 WANDA Just 3.00 a lesson.
16 FLORENE That's a lot of money. We just couldn't
17 afford that right now.
18 WANDA Mama, I don't see why not. I bet Daddy will
19 let me.
20 FLORENE Now, Wanda, you can't jump into something
21 like that.
22 WANDA Why not?
23 FLORENE You just can't. We can't even pay the rent.
24 WANDA But, Mama, she say's I'm talented!
25 FLORENE I can't help it. Your daddy's trying to get
26 established in his career. Once he gets
27 where he needs to be, then everything will
28 be different.
> 29 WANDA It might be too late then. He'll find a way
30 if I ask him.
31 FLORENE No, he won't!
example (7): My mother I, 6
18 JACKIE (Panics). Mummy - she's got to know - I can't
19 come and visit, with her not knowing I can't!
20 MARGARET Jackie, darling, we can't go over this
21 again- you know as well as I do it would be
22 impossible-
23 JACKIE I don't believe you!
24 MARGARET When she's grown up, you can tell her; when
25 she's sixteen.
> 26 JACKIE It'll be too late!
27 (Silence.)
28 Give me back the bags.
In both fragments, the mother submits a concession offer after a
series of oppositional turns. In example (6), Florene offers Wanda a
compromise, promising her that once her father has established his
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career and earns enough money, she will be allowed to take singing
lessons (lines 26-28). In example (7), Margaret concedes that Jackie
can tell her daughter that she is her mother “when she’s sixteen”
(lines 24-25). In both extracts, the daughter rejects the mother’s
offer of compromise on the same grounds, and the dispute continues.
The compromise terminal exchange allows conflict to be closed
without loss of face. However, it requires the willingness of one or
both participant(s) to modify their own initial position and to
accommodate the other’s view. This requirement makes compromise a
relatively difficult termination to achieve, and in fact, this type
of conflict termination hardly ever occurs in my data. The scarcity
of compromise closings in the mother-daughter disputes under
analysis will be discussed below.
 As the preceding discussion shows, conflict termination, like
its initiation and continuance, is a joint product. The closing of a
dispute sequence has to be mutually accomplished by the participants
in a step-by-step fashion. To quote Vuchinich (1990), “a crucial
feature of the terminal exchange is that it requires the
participation of at least two parties. There is no unilateral
terminal exchange” (130). The termination of verbal-conflict
episodes may be achieved by establishing a dominance/submission
relationship or by negotiating consensus on contested issues in
successive turns at talk. But there are other ways of closing off
verbal conflicts.
As mentioned above, verbal conflict can also end in a stand-
off, with participants continuing to maintain opposing positions,
with neither submitting. In a stand-off, the disputants drop the
conflict without any kind of resolution; any attempts to induce the
opponent into submission or to work out a compromise fail. At some
point it becomes apparent that none of the opponents is going to
submit and that compromise is not possible. As Vuchinich (1990)
maintains, unless the argument displays strong antagonism,
participants usually seek an opportunity to get out of a conflict
that is not getting anywhere. At the same time, however, neither
party is willing to give in. Oppositional turns continue until
participants drop the conflict, typically by way of changing the
topic. Thus, there is no terminal exchange. Rather, the disputants
tacitly agree to disagree and move on to other subjects and
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activities. In terms of game theory, a stand-off is a draw, with no
winner and no loser. Thus, in a stand-off none of the disputants
must lose face through submission (cf. Garcia 1991; Greatbatch 1997;
Katriel 1985; Kotthoff 1993; Vuchinich 1990), nor do opponents have
to make concessions or engage in the complex negotiation of a
compromise position.
In the following example, the two women are arguing about
Mother having read Olga’s personal notes without permission.
example (8): Avenue
306 OLGA (Putting papers inside notebook.) How dare you
307 read my personal property?
308 MOTHER (Angry, scared, she has gone too far.) I
309 wanted to see what you write. Sometimes I see
310 you writing, so I wanted to see what it was.
311 Just a bunch of junk. You'd think you'd write
312 something good, like them confession stuff. I
313 read a story the other day about this girl,
314 just out of high school and she got mixed up
315 with a bunch of college men and-
316 OLGA I never look in your drawers!
317 MOTHER If you did, you'd find nothing silly like that.
318 OLGA I'd find something like jelly!
319 MOTHER Watch that tongue, you hear me! It's getting
320 lazy like you, sleeping all day and thinking of
321 dirty things to say to your own mother! (Goes to
322 table, gets cigarette out pocketbook, lights it,
323 sits.)
> 324 OLGA You don’t love that pig, do you?
325 MOTHER Now you're always asking questions. I'll tell
326 you this. We got to get used to each other
327 first.
In line 324, following her mother’s threat, Olga initiates a topic
change, by asking Mother if she loves her current boyfriend. In so
doing, she provides an opportunity to drop the conflict, which
Mother takes in the following turn. The argument closes with neither
of the disputants submitting and with no compromise having been
achieved on the initial issue.
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If a dispute dissipates in this way, the conflict between the
parties is not resolved. The conflict structure is dropped without
the disputants having reached agreement. Instead, the difference of
opinion is put on hold for the time being, as the participants move
on to other activities, with the conflict ‘waiting in the wings.’
Hence, once the contentious issue comes up again, the argument is
bound to be resumed (cf. also Dersley & Wootton 2001; Gruber 1996,
1998; Knoblauch 1991, 1995).14
Conflict may also be terminated with one participant
withdrawing entirely from the interaction. As in the stand-off
situation, the conflict is left in a stalemate with no terminal
exchange. Withdrawal may occur when an opponent becomes too upset to
continue the argument.15
In the following fragment, Doris is arguing with her daughter
about whether Margaret’s boyfriend is about to crush flowers with
his car:
example (9): My mother I, 7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of the
131 valley!
132 MARGARET He's not.
133 DORIS He is.
134 MARGARET He's not, just parking.
135 DORIS Curious method of parking.
136 MARGARET That's typical, you think all Americans are
137 brash and wear loud check shirts and chew
138 gum and want to marry English girls. You're
139 just prej— ...
140 DORIS Margaret, that's enough! (Pause.) After
141 all, he is going to marry an English girl.
142 MARGARET Oh Mother, don't look at me like that with
> 143 your lips pressed together. (exits.)
Following an extended disagreement sequence, in the course of which
both disputants insist on their respective positions, Margaret
accuses her mother of being prejudiced against Americans (lines 136-
139). In the following turn, Doris moves to terminate the argument
by cutting Margaret off, cautioning her not to pursue her line of
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action: “Margaret, that’s enough!” (line 140). Subsequently, she
issues an assertion, challenging Margaret’s prior attribution of
prejudice by pointing out that her daughter’s American boyfriend
does indeed want to marry her (lines 140-141). The dispute sequence
terminates with Margaret leaving the scene exasperated, after making
a negative remark about her mother’s disapproving look. In the
following turn, Margaret again counter-opposes her mother. However,
since she obviously cannot dispute Doris’s claim, she opposes her by
challenging her facial expression (lines 142-143). Directly
following her reproach, she withdraws from the interaction by
leaving the area. Thus, the dispute ends in a stand-off with none of
the opponents submitting.
As the extract below illustrates, verbal conflicts may also be
closed by a combination of different termination formats:
example (10): Home
293 OLIVIA I can't believe you're doing this to me.
294 MARY JANE I can't believe you're doing this to me.
295 I guess my plans don't matter. Do they?
296 The failure daughter comes home but that's
297 just not good enough for you, I guess.
298 OLIVIA Just shut up. Shut up.
299 MARY JANE You shut up. You just shut up forever. How
> 300 about that? (She rushes into the bedroom.)
301 I'm so sick of this. (She returns with a
302 suitcase, throws it on the floor. She goes
303 back again and retrieves some clothes and
304 things. She throws them on top of the
305 suitcase.)
306 OLIVIA What are you doing?
307 MARY JANE What's it matter? It so obviously doesn't
308 matter to you. (She packs.)
309 OLIVIA Okay. Okay. You do what you have to. I'm not
310 gonna keep you here. Leave your mother to
311 do everything herself. Just go ahead and go.
312 MARY JANE I am.
313 OLIVIA Where do you think you're gonna go?
314 MARY JANE I don't know.
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315 OLIVIA (Olivia's up and trying to stop Mary Jane.)
316 Just stop it. (They fight over the
317 suitcase.) Stop it now!
318 MARY JANE No!
319 OLIVIA Stop! Let go. Be a big girl now.
320 MARY JANE Give me my stuff!
321 OLIVIA Come on. Let go!
> 322 MARY JANE Ma!! (She gives up and throws the clothes
323 down. She jumps up and walks away.)
324 OLIVIA (Quickly unpacks all the clothes and closes
325 the suitcase.)
Prior to this fragment, Mary Jane and Olivia were having a fierce
dispute in the course of which they repeatedly accused, challenged
and shouted at each other. Following an exchange of mutual
accusations (lines 293-297), the dispute escalates when mother and
daughter tell one another to “shut up” (lines 298-299).
Subsequently, Mary Jane moves to close the conflict episode by
leaving the room (lines 300) and explicitly stating her
unwillingness to continue the argument (“I’m so sick of this.” line
301). In fact, by starting to pack her suitcase (lines 301-305), she
signals that she intends to leave and thus withdraw completely from
the interaction with her mother. However, by asking her to account
for her packing (line 306), Olivia manages to draw her back into the
conversation, and a few lines later, the women are at each other
again, fighting over Mary Jane’s suitcase (lines 315-321). When it
becomes obvious that Olivia will not let go, Mary Jane eventually
gives in. The exclamation “Ma!!” (line 322) and the fact that she
throws down her clothes signals high emotional involvement.
Moreover, her agitation is displayed by her jumping up and walking
away. To sum up, following a first attempt on Mary Jane’s part at
closing the argument by withdrawing from the interaction in line
300, the dispute is first resumed and eventually terminated by a
combination of submission terminal exchange (lines 321-322) and
withdrawal.
As we have seen, terminal exchanges can serve as mechanisms for
displaying dominance and consensus. While such displays provide a
routine basis for terminating arguments, the use of stand-off and
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withdrawal formats shows that disputes may well be closed without
completed terminal exchanges – and thus without being resolved or
settled. In other words, participants can terminate a dispute-speech
activity without achieving a consensus on the contentious issue(s).
In fact, in my data this is more often the case than not.
As indicated above, the various termination formats are not
equally frequent in my data.16 A large number of the mother-daughter
disputes under analysis end in a stand-off. In most cases, the end
of an argument occurs when one of the disputants does not tie her
talk to the topic of the ongoing dispute, but instead produces an
action that shifts to another subject and thus breaks the argument
frame and her opponent accepts the shift. Although consensus is not
reached, by shifting to non-conflictual talk, the participants
cooperate in closing the dispute. However, since the controversy is
not resolved, as soon as the contentious issue comes up again, the
argument is usually resumed, too. Thus, in closing a conflict
episode by means of a topic change, the participants are typically
merely taking a breather from the dispute before they continue
arguing again. Another relatively frequent termination format in my
data is the submission terminal exchange, where one of the parties
gives in. Usually, but not always it is the daughter who submits to
the mother – especially in those dyads in which the daughter is
still under age and financially as well as emotionally highly
dependent on the mother, as, for instance, in extracts (2) and (3).
Considering the stress on resolution as the principal way of
terminating conflict in much of the (especially earlier) literature
on conflict, perhaps the most striking finding is that almost none
of the arguments under analysis are terminated by compromise.17 In
the mother-daughter disputes portrayed in my data, conflict
resolution is a very rare occurrence. In other words, while
conversational argument has traditionally been studied within the
framework of conflict resolution, in my data disputes frequently
terminate without resolution of the issues being argued about. In
fact, not only is resolution rarely reached, it is apparently not a
goal of the interaction.18 This suggests that mother-daughter dispute
may be a process-oriented rather than a goal-oriented activity.
These findings are consonant with the observations in earlier
studies of naturally occurring conflict talk. Previous research on
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arguments between both children and adults from a range of social
and ethnic backgrounds has revealed that conversationalists do not
share the bias against argumentative behaviour that is prevalent in
the literature.
For instance, studies of preadolescent urban black children’s
disputes (C. Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin 1990; M. H. Goodwin 1982b,
1983, 1990; M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin 1987), as well as studies of
upper-middle-class preschool white children’s disputes in a
classroom setting (Corsaro 1985; Corsaro & Rizzo 1990; Genishi & di
Paolo 1982; Maynard 1985a, b), part-Hawaiian children (Boggs 1978),
Israeli children (Katriel 1985) found that the children’s arguments
were often quite protracted and seldom ended in compromise or
settlement young children’s conflict (cf. also Ross & Conant 1992;
Tesla & Dunn 1992). The majority of disputes were terminated without
any clear indication that either party had won or lost. They usually
ended with one of the disputants shifting the topic of the
conversation to an uncontroversial subject and the opponent
accepting the shift.
While older children might seem more likely to resolve
conflicts, studies have found that most conflict exchanges among
adolescent boys are not resolved, and resolution is not even a
relevant goal (M. H. Goodwin 1980, 1982, 1993; Kochman 1983; Labov
1972b). According to Vuchinich (1987), Smetana (1989) and Tesla &
Dunn (1992), children do not necessarily compromise more or become
more sensitive to another’s position as they get older. Instead,
they often learn to become better arguers in order to maintain their
own position. Thus, compromise is not a frequent outcome of disputes
between adolescents (cf. Hofer et al. 1993; Pikowsky 1993; Smetana
1989; Smetana et al. 1991; Vuchinich 1987, 1990; Vuchinich &
Angelelli 1995).
Numerous researchers have reported similar findings for
disputes in families of various socio-cultural backgrounds. For
example, Montemayor & Hansom (1985); Vuchinich (1984, 1987, 1990)
and Smetana (1989) have shown that family conflicts (especially
those involving adolescents) usually end in stand-offs. In
Vuchinich’s data of verbal conflict during American family-dinner
conversations, 66 percent of the conflicts that occurred were
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terminated by stand-offs, whereas compromise terminated only 9
percent of the arguments.
Likewise, in a study of arguments among Jewish American couples
during dinner conversations, Schiffrin (1984) observed that “very
few arguments ended with speakers realigned toward a previously
disputed issue. Rather, arguments ended when the topic of talk
changes or when a new activity began” (320-321). Kakavá (1993a, b,
2002) reports similar observations for arguments in Greek families.
She finds that in intimate contexts, Greek participants frequently
engaged in sustained disagreement sequences in order to match their
wits and compete for ideas. However, instead of resolving their
differences, they agreed to disagree. In his analysis of arguments
among British family members, Billig (1989) also observes that
rather than trying to resolve their disagreement, the participants
can be seen to actively maintain disagreement. Similarly, Keppler
(1994) and Knoblauch (1991, 1995) note that in informal discussions
during German family dinner conversations, the participants appeared
to appreciate arguing for its own sake, rather than striving for the
resolution of dissent. The discussions were mostly very lengthy, and
instead of pursuing one topic straight away, the speakers
continually shifted from one subject to the next (and back again),
usually without ever arriving at a consensus on the issues they
started arguing about.
Corresponding findings have been reported in previous studies
of argumentative sequences between mothers and daughters. In their
analyses of elicited argumentative discussions (i.e. verbal
conflicts in which the speakers use arguments in order to
convince/persuade the interlocutor of their goal/position or to get
her to perform the desired activity) between mothers and their
adolescent daughters, Hofer et al. (1990a, 1991, 1993) and Pikowsky
(1993) note that the mother-daughter conflicts in their corpus
frequently terminated without resolution with the participants
maintaining their original positions.
Similar observations have been made for verbal conflicts
between adults in institutional contexts. For instance, Gruber
(1992, 1994, 1996a, 1998) notes that the disputes in his data of
Austrian TV-discussions often had no outcome in the sense that the
conflict between the parties was resolved. Instead, they were
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terminated by means of a topic change, which led to a closing of the
dispute sequence but prevented a resolution of the controversy. This
sort of termination sine resolution typically resulted in a
temporary ‘time out’ followed by the resumption of the initial
conflict in a ‘second round’ as soon as the controversial topic was
introduced again.
In the preceding paragraphs, I have presented data and reviewed
research showing that verbal conflicts are often unresolved and
rather lengthy, although conflict research has traditionally focused
on conflict talk as a tool for conflict resolution. Instead of
taking opportunities for resolution, participants can frequently be
seen to continue in their efforts to maintain the dispute, and
arguments often end in a stand-off with neither party acquiescing
and without a compromise having been reached. The paucity of
resolution in the mother-daughter disputes under analysis suggests
that these intergenerational arguments serve other purposes than the
reconciliation of opposing views.19
As noted earlier, previous research has shown that verbal
conflicts perform a range of important functions other than
resolution. In line with Simmel’s (1955/1908; cf. also Coser 1956)
observation that conflict provides a central force for the
constitution of social relations, numerous scholars (e.g. Grimshaw
1990b; Muntigl & Turnbull 1998; Newell & Stutman 1989/1990) posit
that while social structure is negotiated in every conversation,20
verbal conflict is a primary activity in and through which social
identities and relationships are enacted and negotiated. Since, as
discussed above, power constitutes one of the basic relationship
dimensions, verbal conflicts are arenas for the display and
negotiation of power.
Power has been conceptualised in various different ways.
Building on Weber’s (1947: 152) classic definition of power as “the
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of
the basis on which this probability rests,” linguists concerned with
the study of power and its actual use or manifestation in discourse,
interaction and other social practices have defined power as the
potential ability of one actor to get her way and to control
(influence) another’s actions and/or beliefs (cf., for instance,
117
Brown & Gilman 1960; Fowler 1985; Johnson 1976). This potential is
based on participants’ access to (a range of different) power
resources such as, for example, social status, age, expert
knowledge, which they draw on in the course of their interaction to
exert control over each other and affect social outcomes. However,
since this ability to control others and influence social outcomes
can be made manifest only in interpersonal dynamics, power is not a
property or an attribute of individuals, but part and parcel of
social interaction. Furthermore, rather than a static social
category that is predetermined by social structure, power is a
flexible relationship that is perpetually reconstructed or changed
in and through social interaction. Power relationships, then, are
interactional achievements; they are jointly negotiated by the
participants in the course of their interaction through the ways in
which they communicate with one another. And a major site for this
power relationship negotiation process is conflict interaction, i.e.
the open collision of control manoeuvres and opposition.
The interconnection of power and conflict has been noted by
various researchers. For instance, according to Mack & Snyder
(1973), “opposed actions are directed to changing or preserving
existing power relations” (36), and “the function of conflict is the
clarification and stabilization of power relations” (76). Likewise,
Millar et al. (1984) view “conflict as necessarily taking place
within the power dimension of relationships” (232).
This view is echoed in numerous empirical studies of conflict
talk. One of the most commonly cited meanings of verbal conflict
among children and adolescents is the negotiation of status
hierarchies. For instance, in their study of children’s disputes,
Ross & Conant (1992) note that conflict holds a great potential “for
the social organization of relationships and group structure” (153).
Similarly, Maynard (1985b: 212) claims that a manifest function
of argumentative exchanges among children is the negotiation of
local social order, and that this function is achieved independent
of conflict resolution:
The reason for the empirical lack of resolution in children’s
disputes is that a basic function of conflict is to achieve a
concrete, particular social organisation through the display
of opposition and the constitution of accountable alignment
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structures. Such organization is accomplished with or without
resolution of a dispute episode. That is, the issue displayed
interactionally is not how to resolve conflict, but in what
direction will the construction of social organization
proceed.
Likewise, in their study of preschoolers’ disputes, Genishi & di
Paolo (1982) maintain that social negotiation seems to be the
primary reason for arguing, rather than resolution. They observe
that “the children’s goal often seems to be not the fair resolution
of the argument but the control of another’s behaviour” (66). Their
arguments contain many examples of “social control acts” (Ervin-
Tripp 1982), which are used to simultaneously manipulate other’s
actions and enhance the speaker’s own status. They conclude that for
children, “the act of arguing or negotiation may be more important
than its termination” (67).
Goodwin (1980, 1982, 1983, 1990, 1993), too, states that an
important aspect of dispute talk among children, and in particular
preadolescent boys, is the achievement and negotiation of local
social organisational structures, such as hierarchy and authority.
Her data from the talk of urban black boys playing in the street
demonstrates how through opposition, the participants can
interactively construct roles and identities for themselves and
others. Dispute talk thus allows boys to negotiate directly their
positions of relative power with respect to one another. Following
Mitchell-Kernan’s (1977) argument, she shows that the formatting and
sequencing of directives and reactions to them can be used “to
define, reaffirm, challenge, manipulate, and redefine status and
rank” (1982: 78).
Correspondingly, in her study of the role of disputes among
white and black preschool boys, Emihovich (1986) claims that
arguments occur during children’s play because children view
argumentative talk as “status assertion.” In line with Goodwin’s
observations, she finds that directives serve to challenge one
another’s status and opposition to these challenges is a means of
defending one’s status. An important aspect of the boys’ disputes
was to establish a dominance hierarchy which helped them frame their
role (e.g. as the leader) within a group.
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Katriel (1985) finds that the ritualised conflict activity
brogez (“being in anger”) functions as a form of “status
competition” among Israeli children who belong in the same “social
sphere.” Brogez is a type of ritual insult similar to sounding and
verbal duelling in African American discourse (Abrahams 1962, Labov
1972b; Kochman 1968, 1970, 1972, 1981, 1983), which allows both boys
and girls in same-sex groups to vent their anger and hostility
through “ritually constrained interactional channels” (Katriel 1985:
486), and to discover status hierarchies within groups through the
competitive display of verbal skills.
Similarly, the negotiation of social order, i.e. relations of
power, has been argued to be an important function of conflict
between family members, and in particular between mothers and
daughters. For instance, in his study of family conflicts, Emery
(1992) differentiates between the surface meaning of conflict (i.e.
its literal content) and the deep meaning of conflict (i.e. the
meaning that the process and outcome of conflict conveys about the
structure of the relationship). He maintains that “in terms of deep
meaning, conflict serves the normative functions of testing (or
asserting) and changing (or resisting change) in the structure of
family relationships” (273). Based on the assumption that intimacy
(emotional closeness) and power (designated authority and actual
social influence) are the two most basic relationship dimensions, he
argues that “all conflicts are intimacy struggles or power struggles
at their deep level of meaning” (278).21  Thus, a (family) conflict
that is unresolved in terms of content still carries deep meaning as
a power and/or intimacy struggle.
Likewise, Vuchinich (1984, 1987, 1990) states that the small
number of resolved family conflicts in his data is not surprising,
as verbal conflict “accomplishes functions other than resolution”
(1984: 219), such as expressing negative emotions (i.e. hostility),
clarifying rights and obligations, marking interpersonal boundaries,
and establishing and maintaining power hierarchies.
Similarly, in their analyses of argumentative sequences between
mothers and their adolescent daughters, Hofer et al. (1991, 1993)
and Pikowsky (1993) maintain that based on the conflicting needs of
control and autonomy, the relationship between mothers and their
adolescent daughters is characterised by a range of everyday
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conflicts.22 Through the enactment of the conflict between the
mother’s attempts to control her daughter and the daughter’s need
for individuation the relationship is being restructured and new
interaction patterns are established. Conflict interaction thus
plays an important part in the negotiation of the mother-daughter
relationship - and this process takes place independent of
resolution.
To sum up so far, a crucial function of mother-daughter
conflicts (and of verbal conflicts in general) is the negotiation of
social relationships, and in particular of power relationships. This
function is accomplished whether conflict is resolved of not. This
explains why, in the mother-daughter disputes in my data, resolution
rarely occurs and is apparently not a goal of the interaction.
The function of conflict talk to (re)produce or transform power
relationships also becomes manifest when a dispute sequence is
terminated by submission. As discussed above, in closing an argument
by means of a submission terminal exchange, the participants
mutually establish a local hierarchy. Following a series of mutual
oppositions, one of the speakers backs away from her position to one
that is compatible with the opponent’s, thus tacitly marking the
superiority of the opposing party. This display of hierarchy, of
dominance and submission, is a collaborative achievement,
accomplished as much through the actions of the subordinate party as
through those of the dominant party. Thus, in terminating a conflict
episode by means of submission, the disputants jointly, sequentially
establish a local social organisation, thereby reproducing or
modifying global social structures – depending on the outcome of the
dispute. As this discussion shows, the investigation of the process
and outcomes of verbal conflicts between mothers and daughters
reveals how the social order of the moment can be formulated,
challenged, and reconstituted through talk-in-interaction.
Although social structure is negotiated in every interaction
(Bateson 1951, 1972; Berger & Kellner 1964; Berger & Luckmann 1967;
R. Brown 1965; Danziger 1976; Duncan 1967; Goffman 1959, 1963;
Goldsmith & Baxter 1996; Labov and Fanshel 1977; Mandelbaum 2003;
Millar & Rogers 1988; Pomerantz & Fehr 1997; Robinson 1985; Rogers
1981, 1998; Rogers et al. 1985; Rogers & Millar 1988; Tannen 1987,
1993, 2003; Thimm & Kruse 1991; Thornborrow 2002; Van Dijk 1985,
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1990; Watzlawick et al. 1967; Wood & Kroger 1991; Wood & Ryan 1991),
conflict talk constitutes a crucial activity through which
participants (re)produce social organisation and negotiate social
relationships. Thus, an understanding of how social structure is
negotiated will benefit from an understanding of how arguing is
accomplished. By examining closely the ways in which conflicts are
mutually and interactionally constituted, sustained and terminated,
we can obtain insights into the central role of conflict in the
joint accomplishment and transformation of social order.
To conclude, drawing on a model of verbal conflict as a
sequential interactional accomplishment, which is jointly
constituted by the participants through the mutual exchange of
oppositional moves in successive turns at talk, I have examined the
ways in which the mother-daughter disputes in my data terminate. I
have shown that like conflict opening, conflict termination is
jointly and sequentially accomplished by the participants. Verbal
conflicts begin and proceed through mutually expressed opposition
and end with mutual abstinence from opposing moves. Opposition
ceases either because the conflict has been resolved or settled by
the participants or because it has been dropped by one or both of
them. Despite the stress on resolution as the principal way of
terminating conflict in much of the literature on conflict, almost
none of the mother-daughter disputes under analysis are resolved. In
fact, not only does resolution rarely occur in my data, it is
apparently not a goal of the interaction. This finding suggests that
the intergenerational arguments in my data serve other purposes than
the reconciliation of opposing views. A crucial function of mother-
daughter conflicts is the negotiation of power relationships
(through the exchange of oppositional moves, i.e. control attempts
and resistance), and this function is accomplished whether conflict
is resolved of not. Consequently, verbal conflict represents a
fruitful site for examining the ways in which participants negotiate
their status with respect to one another. By looking at the form and
sequencing of actions and their responses we can examine how, within
the mother-daughter dyad, the social order of the moment is
formulated, challenged, and reconstituted in the course of an
ongoing dispute, thereby exploring the interplay of conflict and
power. In the following, I will investigate how the sequential
122
organisation of the mother-daughter disputes in my data differs from
other interactional contexts and thus contributes to the framing
(Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) or contextualisation (Gumperz 1982) of
this speech activity. I will begin by examining the relationship
between various aspects of the sequential organisation of
conversation and the procedures by which the adversative character
of oppositional moves in my data is highlighted (rather than
downplayed). Subsequently, I will look specifically at the types of
argumentative actions that occur in my data and the ways in which
these actions and their responses are formatted and sequenced to
uncover the dynamics of the delicate power play that can take place
between mothers and daughters and that is enacted in conflict talk.
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Conflict is inevitable, but combat is optional.
(Max Lucade)
If you go in for argument, take care of your temper.
(Joseph Farrell)
6.3 Aggravated versus mitigated forms of disagreement
In the previous section, I offered a structural definition of verbal
conflicts, arguing that they emerge by means of consecutive action-
opposition sequences, in which participants oppose one another in
successive turns at talk. This is illustrated by the following two
examples.
The first extract from Tell me portrays a typical goodnight
routine; the mother is putting her daughter to bed:
example (1): Tell me
2 DAUGHTER I hear something. There's something in the
3 corner.
4 MOTHER Nonsense. There's nothing in the corner.
5 DAUGHTER But, Mama, I hear something!
6 MOTHER (With a sigh.) Alright, we'll turn on the light
7 and take a look. There, you see, there's
8 nothing in the corner.
The daughter’s assertion that she hears something and that “There’s
something in the corner” (lines 2-3), is treated by the mother as an
arguable action. By categorising what her daughter has just said as
“Nonsense” (line 4), she displays opposition at the very beginning
of her turn. Moreover, by negating her daughter’s utterance
(“There’s nothing in the corner.”) she reinforces disagreement. The
daughter counter-opposes her mother’s challenge in the following
turn through repeating her initial assertion, “I hear something!”
(line 5), reinforcing her claim by raising her voice. Thus, Mother’s
initial opposition, in which she treats her daughter’s assertion as
an arguable action, becomes itself an arguable action in the
daughter’s following turn. In response to her daughter’s
reassertion, the mother gives in and agrees to “turn on the light
and take a look” (lines 6-8), thus terminating the dispute sequence.
As discussed above, in the following fragment from Alto,
Florene and her daughter Wanda are arguing about whether Wanda might
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take singing lessons. After a lengthy series of disagreements,
Florene issues a compromise offer, promising Wanda that once her
father is financially established, there will be enough money for
singing lessons (lines 26-29).
example (2): Alto I, 2
26 FLORENE I can't help it. Your daddy's trying to get
27 established in his career. Once he gets where
28 he needs to be, then everything will be
29 different.
30 WANDA It might be too late then. He'll find a way
31 if I ask him.
> 32 FLORENE No, he won't!
> 33 WANDA Yes, he will!
34 FLORENE He'll say yes, and then leave it up to me to
35 find a way! ((...))
In lines 30-31, Wanda rejects her offer of compromise, arguing that
by the time her father settles down in business “it might be too
late,” and claims that “He’ll find a way” to make her wish come true
if she asks him. Her challenge is counter-opposed by Florene in line
32, who negates the content of Wanda’s turn-final utterance: “No, he
won’t!” The increase in volume signals high emotional involvement
and intensifies disagreement. Wanda again counters her mother’s
challenge by reasserting her own prior claim: “Yes, he will!” (line
33). Her raised voice turns up the emotional heat of the argument
even further. In the following turn, Florene issues another counter-
opposition, exclaiming that even though her husband might permit
Wanda to take singing lessons, it would still be up to her to find a
way to finance them (lines 34-35). By this means, she both
undermines Wanda’s position and at the same time defends her own
standpoint. Again, the escalated volume of her voice indicates
emotional agitation and reinforces her counter.
These fragments show that, argument sequences evolve from the
exchange of mutually oppositional turns. However, this does not
capture the whole picture. Apart from the succession of dissent
turns, the specifically argumentative character of the preceding
extracts can also be located in the ways disagreeing turns are
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constructed so as to stress, rather than minimise, their
oppositional character. That is to say, the speakers frame (Bateson
1972; Goffman 1974) or contextualise (Gumperz 1982) their talk as an
argument not only by selecting specific types of actions (i.e.
disagreements) but also by packaging these actions in specific ways
that underscore their antagonistic nature.
In Labov & Fanshel’s (1977) terms, the speakers in the above
extracts are engaging in the exchange of “aggravated” oppositional
turns. As Labov & Fanshel have shown, speakers can mitigate or
modify speech actions to avoid creating offence or they can use more
aggravated forms of speech actions. By the same token, opposition
can vary in its intensity: speakers can disagree with one another in
mitigated or modulated ways or in a more aggravated or unmodulated
fashion, thereby emphasising dissent, as in the preceding examples.23
The aggravated nature of opposition in the above fragments
becomes most obvious if we look at alternative means that are
employed by conversationalists engaging in disagreement. In the
following, I will therefore focus on practices that are commonly
used in ordinary conversation to mitigate and systematically
downplay (rather than emphasise) the oppositional properties of
disagreeing turns.
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They say that blood is thicker than water. Maybe that's
why we battle our own with more energy and gusto than we
would ever expend on strangers.
(David Assael, Northern Exposure, Family Feud)
Your very silence shows you agree. (Euripides)
6.3.1 Preference (for disagreement) order
Mitigation and aggravation are techniques that function in a broad
system in the social use of language, namely that of “preference
organisation,” as described in the framework of CA.
The concept of “preference” as it is used in CA was developed to
characterise a range of phenomena associated with the fact that
choices among alternative, but non-equivalent, courses of action
which are available to participants are routinely implemented in
ways that reflect an institutional ranking of alternatives such that
there is at least one “preferred” and one “dispreferred” type of
action. Despite its connotations, the term is not intended to refer
to the psychological motives of individuals. Rather, it concerns
structural features of the design of turns and sequences associated
with particular activities, by which participants can draw
conventionalised inferences about the kinds of action a turn is
performing.
Before I embark on a discussion of the concept of preference,
however, it is pertinent to first talk about another key notion in
CA, namely that of “adjacency pairs”. As discussed above, CA views
talk as a structurally organised, orderly form of social
interaction. It approaches naturally occurring conversation with the
twin aims of (a) describing the structural organisations informing
its production, and (b) thereby explicating the methods used by
interactants to engage in mutually intelligible courses of action. A
basic finding of CA is that conversation progresses by means of
speakers taking turns at talking (cf. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson
1974). Moreover, conversation analytic research has shown that these
alternating turns are sequentially ordered, i.e. they occur one
after the other and are linked together into distinct sequences in
systematic ways.
According to conversation analysts, the basic type of
conversational sequence is the “adjacency pair” (Schegloff & Sacks
1973). Adjacency pairs are pairs of utterances which are (a)
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“relatively ordered,” i.e. there is a recognisable difference
between “first pair parts” and “second pair parts” of a pair, and
(b) “type connected,” i.e. given first-pair parts require particular
(or a particular range of) second-pair parts:
if a party produces a first pair part of some type, such as
greeting, question, offer, request, compliment, ... then the
party who is going to do a second pair part to that first pair
part picks it from the sorts of alternatives that fit the type,
i.e. for greetings this involves greetings; for questions,
various sorts of answers; for offers, acceptances and
rejections; for announcements, congratulations and condolences;
and so on. (Sacks 1973/1987: 55-56)
These paired action sequences are called adjacency pairs because, ideally,
the two parts should be placed adjacent to each other. Schegloff & Sacks
(1973: 295) formulated the basic rule for adjacency pairs as follows:
given the recognisable production of a first pair part, on its
first possible completion its speaker should stop and a next
speaker should start and produce a second pair part from the
pair type the first is recognisably a member of.24
This is, however, an idealised characterisation. The parts of
adjacency pairs do not need to be strictly adjacent. There is a
range of systematic insertions that can legitimately come between
first and second pair parts.25 But the main point is that on the
production of a first pair part, the second part is “conditionally
relevant” and expectable and remains so even if it is not produced
in the next turn. If such a second pair part does not occur, it is
“officially” or “noticeably” absent; and if some other first pair
part occurs in its place then that will be heard where possible as a
preliminary to the doing of a second part (Schegloff 1968, 1972).
To sum up so far, one aspect of adjacency pairs is that certain
first pair parts make certain alternative actions relevant in second
position. Examples include offers, which can be accepted or
declined; assessments, which can be agreed with or disagreed with;
and requests, which can be granted or declined. However, research,
most notably by Sacks (1973/1987) and Pomerantz (1975, 1984), has
shown that these alternatives are not equivalent. Second-pair parts
such as agreements, acceptances, grantings and the like are produced
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in systematically different ways than their negative counterparts,
and are thus noticeably characterised as “preferred” and
“dispreferred” responses respectively, with agreeing responses
generally being preferred. As earlier conversation analytic work has
shown, preference organisation operates on various levels, and the
preferred and dispreferred status of actions respectively is
displayed and embodied in talk in a number of ways.26
For instance, some first-pair parts (e.g. invitations, offers
and requests) can be seen to ‘project’ or ‘invite’ some type of
second-pair part as their preferred responses (e.g. accepts or
grants) and others as dispreferred (e.g. declines or refusals). For
example, Sacks observes how sequence-initial actions can be designed
to prefer a particular kind of response or “questioner-preferred
answer.” In his paper on the preference for agreement (1973/1987),
he looks at sequences with agreeing or disagreeing answers to
questions of the yes/no type. He shows that whether a question
“prefers” a yes or no response is a matter of the speaker’s
construction of it. Thus a question like “You’re going, aren’t you?”
is built to exhibit a preference for a yes answer, while “You’re not
going, are you?” is build to exhibit a preference for a no answer.27
Moreover, Sacks shows that questioners display an orientation
to getting agreement: on sensing an upcoming disagreement, they can
be seen to modify their initial question to end up with a form that
can be agreed with. This is illustrated by the following examples,
quoted from Sacks (1973/1987: 64):
example (3)
1 A: They have a good cook there?
2 ((pause))
3 Nothing special?
4 B: No, everybody takes their turns.
example (4)
1 A: Ken you walk?
2 (0.4)
3 A: Ud be too hard for yuh?
4 B: Oh::: darling I don’t know. Uh it’s bleeding a
5 little, e’jis took the bandage off yes’day...
129
In each fragment, speaker A asks a question exhibiting some sort of
preference and there is a pause (line 2), i.e. no agreement occurs
(or agreement is noticeably absent), after which the speaker revises
the original question to exhibit the reverse preference in order to
end up with a form that can be agreed with contiguously (line 3).
And in response to this modified question, without further delay,
she gets an answer in accord with it (line 4).
Sacks (1973/1987: 65) takes these instances as evidence that
the preference for agreement is an aspect of an abstract or “formal
apparatus” rather than a “matter of individual preferences,” since
the questioners are designing the questions not to get a personal
preference, but are (re)designing the questions with an orientation
to getting agreement.
Similarly, in a study of sequences involving invitations,
offers, requests, and proposals, Davidson (1984) demonstrates that
the producers of such first-pair parts interpret ensuing recipient
silence as implicating an unstated dispreferred action (i.e.
rejection) and seek to preclude the occurrence of a dispreferred
response with a subsequent modified version of the initial action,
which provides a further opportunity for a preferred response.
These findings indicate that when a first-pair part invites
agreement and the recipient is silent, the silence signals - and is
interpreted as - an unstated or as-yet-unstated disagreement. As
Bilmes (1988) puts it: “when an invitation is not responded to ...
the lack of response is taken to imply or presage refusal” (166). By
the same token, as Pomerantz (1984) demonstrates, hesitations,
questioning repeats, requests for clarification, weakly stated
agreements, and the like, may signal potential disagreement.
Expanding on Sack’s observations on agreement following yes/no
questions, Pomerantz (1984) finds that, generally, agreement is the
preferred response to a first assessment, and that initial
assessments can be designed to prefer a particular kind of response:
the proffering of an initial assessment, though it provides
for the relevance of a recipient’s agreement or disagreement,
may be so structured that it invites one next action over its
alternative. A next action that is oriented to as invited will
be called a preferred next action; its alternative, a
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dispreferred next action. (Pomerantz 1984: 63, original
emphasis)
For instance, question tags like isn’t it? might be appended to an
assessment, thereby inviting the recipient’s agreement, as in the
examples below, quoted from Pomerantz (1984: 61).
example (5)
Jo: T’s - it’s a beautiful day out isn’t it?
Lee: Yeh it’s just gorgeous.
example (6)
Pat: It’s a really clear lake isn’t it?
Les: It’s wonderful.
Preference, while operating over much of conversation, has been
shown to be context sensitive. For instance, Pomerantz (1978, 1984)
observes that although in an overwhelming majority of cases,
agreement with a previous utterance is the preferred second-pair
part, it is not always the preferred response. She provides evidence
that disagreements are expected to occur in certain environments.
Whether agreement or disagreement is the preferred response depends
in part on the action performed with the initial assessment. For
instance, subsequent to self-deprecations and compliments,
disagreement is the preferred response. Likewise, several
researchers (Atkinson & Drew 1979; Bilmes 1988; Garcia 1991) have
shown that, after accusations, denials are preferred. Apparently, in
certain types of sequences, the usual preference for agreement is
reversed.
As the preceding discussion has shown, the preference for
agreement or disagreement is built into the sequence type involved.28
That is, whether agreement or disagreement is the preferred response
is determined (at least in part) by the sequence-initial action.
Speakers may thus design first-pair parts in particular ways in
order to invite, i.e. prefer, a particular kind of response. To
quote Sacks (1973/1987: 57):
if a question is built in such a way as to exhibit a
preference as between ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or ‘yes-’ or ‘no-’ like
responses, then the answerers will tend to pick that choice,
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or a choice of that sort will be preferred by answerers, or
should be preferred by answerers.
However, the preferred or dispreferred status of an activity is also
exhibited in the participants’ ways of doing a second-pair part. As
Pomerantz (1984) maintains, there is an association between an
action’s preference status and the turn shape in which it is
produced, in that “an action, by virtue of how the participants
orient to it, will be housed in and performed through a turn shape
that reflects their orientation” (64). In other words, speakers
display the kind of action they are doing, and the kind of stance
they are taking toward what they are doing, in their use of
sequential properties and structural devices.
The observation that participants have different ways of
enacting a responsive activity can again be traced to Sacks
(1973/1987). He notes that speakers’ orientation to the preference
for agreement is displayed by the different designs of agreeing and
disagreeing responses:
If an agreeing answer occurs, it pretty damn well occurs
contiguously [to that with which it agrees], whereas if a
disagreeing answer occurs it may well be pushed rather deep
in to the turn that it occupies. (Sacks 1973/1987: 58)
One way speakers can indicate the dispreferred status of a turn is
by starting a turn with components such as “Well,” “Um” or “I don’t
know.” Consider, for instance, the following two extracts, the first
illustrating a preferred acceptance of an invitation, the second a
dispreferred negative response to a yes/no question.
example (7) (Schegloff 1988: 446)
1 B: Why don’t you come and see me some [time.
2 A: [I would like to.
example (8) (Sacks 1973/1987: 58)
1 A: You coming down early?
2 B: Well, I got a lot of things to do before getting
3 cleared up tomorrow. I w- probably won’t be too early.
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In extract (7), the preferred acceptance is produced straight-
forwardly and contiguously (in fact, in slight overlap with the
preceding invitation) in one short turn with no accounts or
mitigations (line 2). By contrast, in fragment (8), A’s first turn
appears to indicate that he expects B to be “coming down early” (as
the opposite expectation would be conveyed by “You’re not coming
down early are you?”). The construction of B’s incongruent response
exhibits two principal features of dispreferred seconds. First, the
response is “formed up so that the disagreement is as weak as
possible” (Sacks 1973/1987: 58). Notice in particular line 3, where
“I w-,” which looks like a start on “I won’t be too early,” is
changed into the weaker form “probably won’t be too early.”
Secondly, the actual disagreement is not produced early in the turn,
like the agreement in extract (7) but is held off until B has not
only produced a “Well,” but also has presented an account for why he
will not be early (lines 2-3).
Elaborating Sacks’ (1973/1987) finding that the preference for
agreement operates to shape an answerer’s behaviour, Pomerantz
(1984) contrasted dispreferred-action turn shapes with preferred-
action turn shapes and showed that dispreferred formats commonly
display the following “dispreference markers”: delay devices prior
to stated disagreements like silences, hesitating prefaces, requests
for clarification, and/or weakly stated disagreement components,
i.e. partial agreements/disagreements.
As Levinson (1983: 307) points out, the structural notion of
preference corresponds to the linguistic concept of markedness.
Preferred second actions are typically unmarked, while dispreferred
seconds are marked by various kinds of structural complexities. For
instance, dispreferred seconds may be accompanied by accounts,
whereas preferred ones generally are not. Dispreferred seconds may
be expressed in attenuated or mitigated form, or even shaped as
preferred seconds, but the opposite is not the case. Preferred
responses generally are packaged in short turns, or at the very
start of longer ones, whereas dispreferred responses regularly come
in long complex turns, are placed late within them, and are preceded
by various other components such as accounts, excuses, mitigations,
attenuations, and apparent offerings of preferred responses.
Usually, dispreferred seconds are preceded by some delay component
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at the start of the turn (e.g. an initial “Uh,” “Well” or “I don’t
know”), whereas preferred seconds come at the very start. Moreover,
when a dispreferred response is delivered, the turn start itself is
frequently delayed, either by silence intervening between it and the
talk being responded to, or by some other intervening talk, most
commonly a “repair” sequence (cf. Schegloff et al. 1977) initiated
by a clarification question displaying some “trouble” in hearing or
understanding the preceding talk. Some of these characteristic
features of dispreferred-action turn shapes are illustrated by the
following extract, quoted from Schegloff (1988: 446):
example (9)
1 Vicky: I ca:lled um to see if you want to uh
2 (0.4)
3 c’m over en watch, the Classics Theater.
4 (0.3)
5 Vicky: Sandy ‘n Tom ‘n I,=
6 Karen: =She Sto [ops t’Conquer?
7 Vicky: [(  )
8 (0.4)
9 Vicky: Yeh.
10 (0.3)
11 Karen: Mom j’s asked me t’watch it with her,h
In this fragment, the dispreferred rejection of the prior invitation
is delayed first by a silence after the end of the invitation (line
4), then by a clarification question (line 6), then by another
silence after the answer to the clarification question (line 10),
and when a response to the invitation is finally delivered, the
rejection is so mitigated that, in fact, it is not articulated at
all but has to be inferred from an account replacing it (line 11).29
As we have seen, when agreement is invited by sequence-initial
actions, delay devices prior to stated disagreements and/or weakly
stated disagreement components are part of turn and sequence
organisations associated with dispreferred seconds. In addition,
Pomerantz (1984) emphasises that these turn and sequence shapes not
only package disagreements when agreements are invited, “but
constitute part of the apparatus for accomplishing disagreements as
dispreferred” (75-76, original emphasis). To quote Schegloff (1988),
in deploying certain turn shapes, speakers “do the response they do
134
‘as a preferred’ or ‘as a dispreferred,’ rather than doing ‘the
preferred or the dispreferred response’” (453). The
institutionalised design features of preferred/dispreferred actions
can be used as a basis for inferences about the kinds of action a
turn is performing.
Based on the preceding discussion, we can distinguish that (1)
the first pair part of an adjacency pair may be structured in a way
that favours (i.e. prefers) some particular next over an
alternative; and (2) the second pair part can be structured in a way
that it is recognisable as being invited (i.e. preferred) or as
being uninvited (i.e. dispreferred).30
In contrast to the notions of preference discussed above,
Bilmes (1988) defines preference in relation to the CA-concept of
“relevant absence” (as discussed above). He argues that certain
contexts make relevant some preferred action. When that action is
not taken, it is experienced as being relevantly absent. Its absence
is noticeable and a basis for inference. Bilmes’ view of preference
draws on the following principle:
Preference operates with three (or more) alternatives – a
preferred (X), a nonpreferred (Y), and no mention of X or Y
(N). … The principle is simply that, if X is preferred, N
implies Y, and it is this principle that, in all cases,
defines preference. (Bilmes 1988: 165)
Bilmes thus limits preference to cases where participants in an
interaction draw inferences based on the presence or absence of
certain actions. In line with Sacks (1973/1987), he assumes that for
many adjacency pairs, there are alternative but non-equivalent types
of second-pair parts available, i.e. one of the types of responses
is preferred. For instance, an acceptance is the preferred response
to an invitation, so the absence of any response will be interpreted
as a refusal. Because acceptance is preferred, an absence of
response suggests refusal. By contrast, the inviter could take the
lack of a response at face value, that is, simply as no response,
and go back and repeat the invitation to force a response.
Similarly, after accusations, denials are preferred: “If one fails
to deny an accusation, a denial is noticeably absent and is a cause
for inference, the most common inference being that the accusation
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is true” (167).31 By extrapolation, he argues that following
attributions on a recipient, there is a preference for
contradiction:
When someone makes an attribution about you, contradict,
unless you want others to understand that you accept the
truth of the attribution. When such attribution occurs
without contradiction, a contradiction is relevantly absent.
… A reason for this absence is sought. Generally the
conclusion drawn is that the recipient is acknowledging the
truth of the attribution. (Bilmes 1988: 167)
Thus, Bilmes views preference structure in terms of participants’
expectations. Yet, this way of conceptualising preference, too,
implies that participants generally perform the expected action in
an unmarked way (i.e. straightforwardly and contiguously), and the
alternative contrastive action in a marked way. When a participant
does not perform the expected action, its absence is experienced as
a relevant absence, and co-participants typically make inferences to
account for it. As such, the technical preference concept interacts
with assumptions on normality. In Antaki’s (1994) words, “preference
is a normative matter of what is the usual case” (86).
As mentioned above, it has been assumed that there is an
association between an action’s preference status and the turn shape
in which it is produced. However, Bilmes (1988) points out that
speakers can and do use dispreference markers, or what he calls
“reluctance markers,” as a strategic resource in interaction.
Drawing on Sacks’ (1973/1987) notion of preference as built in the
sequence type, Bilmes argues that the preferred status of an
activity does not necessarily imply absence of reluctance markers
and is not necessarily negated by the presence of reluctance
markers.32 That is to say, speakers might produce a preferred
response with a show of reluctance without affecting the preferred
status of that response. For example, a speaker might - for the sake
of being polite - preface a preferred response such as a
contradiction of an attribution (e.g. “That wasn’t what I said”),
with reluctance markers (e.g. “Well, uh, actually, that wasn’t what
I said”) without implying that the contradiction is not entirely
sincere (at least in a non-confrontational situation).33 Conversely,
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a dispreferred response (e.g. “Yes, that’s exactly what I said”)
does not have to be prefaced by reluctance markers. As a result,
Bilmes (1988: 176) maintains that the preferred or dispreferred
status of a response is neither indicated nor contraindicated by the
presence of reluctance markers, “because reluctance marking is a
strategic resource available for any speaker to deploy at any time
for any reason.”
The strategic use of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes to
accomplish various interactional goals has been observed in a number
of studies. For example, Schegloff (1988) observes that, although
generally guesses prefer confirmations and disprefer rejections,
bearers of bad news produce rejections as preferred responses (i.e.
without delay) in response to too strong guesses in order to gear
recipients’ guesses in the right direction.34
Moreover, Atkinson & Heritage (1984) suggest that doing a
dispreferred response type with the sequential characteristics of a
preferred response can have substantial consequences for the
occasion and for the relationship of the participants involved in
the interaction. For instance, since acceptance is generally the
preferred response to an invitation, whatever the speaker’s real
inclination may be, a delayed refusal of an invitation (e.g. because
of a competing obligation) may, as the standard form for a
dispreferred action, be treated as opaque concerning the speaker’s
real disposition. By contrast, an early and unmitigated refusal will
give rise to inferences and may be interpreted as revealing the
respondent’s personal desires and, indeed, as designed to do so.
Likewise, Heritage (1984: 267-268) and Goodwin & Heritage (1990:
297) state that, based on the institutionalised design of
dispreferred actions, while a prompt acceptance of an invitation is
treated as unremarkable rather than as a sign of enthusiasm, a
delayed acceptance is often heard as reluctant. Similarly, a prompt
or unmitigated or unaccounted-for rejection tends to be treated as
indicative of rudeness or hostility. That is to say, departures from
the conventionalised patterns for preferred/dispreferred actions are
normatively accountable matters and the objects of inferential
reasoning. This implies that the institutionalised designs for
actions can be exploited by conversationalists to communicate
personal dispositions and relational meanings.
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As the preceding paragraphs have shown, research in CA has
demonstrated that for many adjacency pairs, there are alternative
but non-equivalent types of second-pair parts available, i.e. one of
the response types is preferred, the other dispreferred. Generally,
with the exception of a few sequence types, agreement is the
preferred response to the action in prior speaker’s turn, so the
absence of any response will be interpreted as disagreement.
Moreover, commonly, there is an association between an action’s
preference status and the way in which it is produced, i.e. second-
pair parts can be enacted as preferred or dispreferred responses.
Thus, a disagreement in response to an assessment is conventionally
produced in a dispreferred turn shape, i.e. with dispreference or
reluctance markers such as prefaces and delays. However, while such
markers are characteristically employed in dispreferred activities,
their presence does not necessarily signal the dispreferred status
of a response, nor does their absence per se indicate the preferred
status of a response. Rather, reluctance markers are a
conversational resource that speakers can exploit in talk-in-
interaction to accomplish various interactional goals.
The upshot of this is that, in ordinary conversation, speakers
may display an orientation to the potential oppositional properties
of disagreement by using the dispreferred turn shape (i.e.
reluctance markers) to systematically downplay, and minimise the
occurrence of, opposition. By the same token, however, the features
associated with the production of dispreferreds provide a framework
in terms of which disagreements can be upgraded. Since reluctance
markers present resources for the avoidance and mitigation of overt
opposition, speakers may strengthen their disagreements by declining
to use them.
To recapitulate so far, in ordinary conversation, there exists
a preference for agreement, which is manifested through various
aspects of turn and sequence organisation. With the exception of
certain sequence types - notably those initiated by compliments,
self-deprecations, accusations and too strong guesses of bad news -
disagreement with a prior utterance is described as a dispreferred
type of conversational action, displaying structural features like
hesitation phenomena, mitigating prefaces and accounts. This yields
a picture of disagreement as an activity that is generally performed
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in modulated ways that avoid the production of starkly
confrontational counter-positions.
The preference organisation as discussed above has been shown
to have the following underlying rationale: preferred format
responses are normally affiliative actions, which are supportive of
social solidarity, while dispreferred format responses are largely
disaffiliative actions, which are destructive of social solidarity
(cf. Goodwin & Heritage 1990: 297; Heritage 1984: 268-269). Thus, in
response to self-deprecations, where agreement would constitute
criticism of the other, it is disagreement which is packaged in the
preferred format (cf. Pomerantz 1984). By the same token, in
response to sequence initial actions that invite agreement, the
standard preface and delay features associated with up-coming
disaffiliative actions prefigure the actions to come and thus
provide opportunities for the about-to-be-disagreed with party to
modify their ongoing actions to make them more acceptable. Thus, as
Pomerantz (1984) has pointed out, the institutionalised prefacing
and delaying of disaffiliative actions is systematically associated
with opportunities to minimise occurrences of stated disagreements,
while the promptness with which affiliative actions are performed
maximises their occurrence. As an institutionalised pattern, this
preference organisation then has a bias for affiliative actions.
Sacks (1973/1987) indicates that the preference for agreement
is determined by societal expectations. In his words, people “may
not like to disagree because they are supposed to not like to
disagree” (69). This notion of the preference organisation as a
result of a conventionalised underlying attempt to maintain
“sociability, support, and solidarity” (Pomerantz 1984: 77) is
spelled out by Heritage & Atkinson (1984: 55), who state that
the institutionalized design features of preferred/
dispreferred actions are ... actively used so as to maximize
cooperation and affiliation and to minimize conflict in
conversational activities.
Thus, while the CA concept of preference is thought of as a purely
structural phenomenon, which is not related to speakers’
motivations, there seems to be a link between what speakers say -
or, more precisely, how they say it - and their consideration for
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face (Brown & Levinson 1987; Goffman 1967), which is congruent with
Goffman’s view of deference in conversation and the principles of
“face-saving” behaviour or “politeness” as delineated by Brown &
Levinson (1987) and Leech (1983).
Goffman’s (1967: 47-95, 1971) analysis of face-to-face
communication is based on the assumption that displaying deference
to others is implicated in the organisation of a range of behaviour
that occurs in human interaction. This is accomplished in part
through watchful concern that potential discord not emerge as an
explicit event in encounters. A similar evaluation of
contentiousness can be found in the work of Brown & Levinson (1987:
112-117), who list the strategies “seek agreement” and “avoid
disagreement” as positive politeness strategies. These include
raising “safe topics,” which are conducive to agreement, and using
token agreements (i.e. the Yes, but ... strategy). Likewise, Leech
(1983: 132) includes in his Politeness Principle an “agreement
maxim,” according to which one needs to “minimize disagreement
between self and other” and “maximize agreement between self and
other.” While he proposes that his principles have universal
validity, he concedes that the weighting of the principles may vary
in different cultural, social, or linguistic environments. This
suggests that there is a connection between the turn shape of
actions and considerations of face. As Heritage & Atkinson (1984:
56) put it:
it may be suggested that the design features associated with
the production of preferred/dispreferred activities may
inform and may be informed by a logic of “face”
considerations (Brown & Levinson 1978; Goffman 1955) at the
level of both form and usage.35
As discussed above, researchers in conversation analysis have
generally considered disagreement a disaffiliative action that
threatens solidarity and is therefore something speakers in
conversation try to avoid. As Pomerantz (1984) claims, “across
different situations, conversants orient to agreeing with one
another” (77). However, several studies have shown that a range of
contextual parameters such as cultural norms, age, gender, and
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situational context, and interactional goals may affect how
disagreement is done and interpreted.
For instance, Fox (1974) reports a positive attitude towards
disagreement, both in private and public domains, for the
inhabitants of Roti island in eastern Indonesia. Israelis are also
reported to frequently engage in direct confrontation and express
their disagreement straightforwardly. Taking an ethnographic
approach, Katriel (1986) describes a speech style called “dugri”
(i.e. straight) talk among Sabra Israelis, which is characterised by
directness, simplicity, and brevity. Speakers express their
intentions as clearly as possible, using simple, laconic types of
utterances. According to Katriel, dugri speech does not conform to
Goffman’s (1967) notion of considerateness, as Sabra Israelis place
more emphasis on “true respect – rather than consideration” (177).
The assumption underlying dugri speech is that a listener “has the
strength and integrity required to take the speaker’s direct talk as
sincere and natural” (ibid).36
Schiffrin’s (1984) sociolinguistic study of arguments among
Jewish Americans yields similar results. Schiffrin finds linguistic
evidence showing that the disagreements that occurred in her data
were positively evaluated. This suggests that in this speech
community, argument is not an activity that threatens social
interaction, but instead a form of sociability (Simmel 1961). In the
arguments in her data, the speakers repeatedly disagreed, were
constantly non-aligned with each other and competed for
interactional negotiable goods (such as the conversational floor or
the topic talked about). However, despite sustained and unmitigated
disagreement the speakers managed to display and maintain their
solidarity and intimacy. Therefore, Schiffrin defines sociable
argument as “a speech activity in which a polarizing form has a
ratificatory meaning” (331). Her findings, she claims, demonstrate
the cultural relativity of notions such as disagreement and dispute.
Kakavá (1993a, b, 1994, 1995, 2002) makes comparable
observations in Modern Greek discourse. She finds that family talk,
conversations among friends, as well as classroom discourse between
members of a Greek speech community display sustained disagreement
over the course of various topics. Moreover, in all contexts
studied, she observed a preference for disagreement: most of the
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time disagreement was foregrounded rather than prefaced with
preference markers or postponed. She finds that both in the intimate
conversation and the classroom discourse “participants retain their
position and keep firing arguments at each other, sustaining their
opposing stances over several ‘adversative rounds’” (2002: 1557).
However, similar to the sociable arguments described by Schiffrin,
sustained unprefaced disagreement did do threaten the interpersonal
relationships of the participants. Based on these findings, Kakavá
suggests that in Modern Greek discourse, disagreement is an
interactional ritual that does not necessarily threaten solidarity;
rather it constitutes a social practice that is pervasive and
preferred because it is expected and allowed.37
These studies suggest that participants’ attitudes towards and
use of disagreement and argument may vary according to cultural
norms.38 Another contextual factor that has been shown to influence
how disagreement is used and evaluated is gender.
Several empirical studies on gender and discourse have proposed
that male speakers exhibit a competitive style of discourse, while
women use a more cooperative and harmonious style of speech (Coates
1994: 72). In addition, studies on gender specific disputing styles
have claimed that women tend to avoid offensive arguing, evade
direct confrontation, defend their positions less vehemently and
show a stronger concern for harmony in the interaction than men
(Eckert 1990; Kotthoff 1984, 1992a; Sheldon 1992, 1993, 1996; Tannen
1990, 1994b; Trömel-Plötz 1992, 1996).39 However, the examination of
actual social interaction clearly shows that conflict is omnipresent
in the interaction of females. Extended arguments constructed
through turns that highlight rather than mitigate disagreements have
been observed in the interaction of girls’ groups with various
ethnic and social backgrounds (cf. Goodwin 2003: 231ff). Similarly,
in a study of office-hour interaction, Günthner (1992) notes that in
the institutional context of the interaction, the communicative
behaviour of female lecturers was both offensive and
confrontational. They frequently produced dissent turns without
delay and without markers of mitigation.
Several studies have examined specific situational contexts in
which disagreements occur. For instance, in psychotherapy groups,
Krainer (1988) posits that the expression of discord is expected,
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since disagreement, complaints, and dissatisfactions should be
discussed in the open. She found both strong and mitigated
challenges in her data. The strong challenges were intensified by
prosodic emphasis and other intonational features and included overt
features of negation, negative evaluative lexical items, etc. The
mitigated challenges exhibited pauses, requests for clarifications,
and “discord particles” such as “Well.”
Moreover, Greatbatch (1992) argues that in the specified
context of British television news interviews, the notion of
preference is suspended due to the positioning and design of the
turn allocation. Since the interviewer controls the turn-taking,
interviewees never address each other directly, and this allows
unmitigated disagreement to occur. Moreover, he observes that even
when interviewees depart from the standard structure of the news
interview in order to directly disagree with their co-interviewees,
the preference features associated with disagreement in ordinary
conversation are not observed: instead of de-escalating their
disputes by attenuating their disagreements, interviewees frequently
intensify their disputes by entering into direct, unmitigated and
unmediated disagreement. These findings confirm Ervin-Tripp’s (1976)
claim that underlying differences in the continuum of mitigated and
aggravated language forms can be attributed to the norms governing
situationally appropriate language use.
The interactional context has been shown to be another
determinant of the structural form of disagreements. Several
researchers have illustrated that in the context of arguments,
ordinary preference structures may be removed or even reversed,
which is shown by a change of turn formats. Analysis has shown that
in dispute sequences, disagreements are frequently enacted as
preferred activities, not only in response to specific first-pair
parts but in general after opponents’ turns, while agreements are
produced as dispreferreds.
For instance, M. H. Goodwin (1983, 1988, 1990, 1993), M. H.
Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987) and Evaldsson (1993) have found that in
children’s disputes, unprefaced disagreements occur regularly.
However, similar observations have also been reported for conflict
interaction between adults both in institutional and informal
settings.
143
Hutchby (1996a, b), too, observes that arguments on British
talk radio frequently take aggravated forms and are enacted as
“confrontation talk.” He notes that the absence of markers of
reluctance or mitigation represents a means by which participants
foreground their opposition and intensify their conflict. Similarly,
in a study of controversial TV discussions, Gruber (1996a, 1998)
reports that dispute phases of talk display a change in the
preference organisation: disagreements no longer show any features
of dispreferred seconds and are in fact intensified by means of
disagreement markers. In the televised news show Crossfire, Scott
(1998, 2002) reports that participants engaged in two types of
disagreements: “backgrounded” (lengthy, less explicit, calm) and
“foregrounded” (direct) disagreement (ranging from collegial
disagreements to openly hostile attacks), which seem to range on a
continuum of increasing explicitness and escalating hostility.
In a study of discussions between university students and
lecturers, Kotthoff (1993a) shows that dispute is typically staged
by suspending the conventional consensus expectations of friendly
interaction, and that this affects participants’ production and
interpretation of talk. She finds that in some conversations, once
an argument has been contextualised, the preference organisation
changes; rather than being modulated, disagreement is stressed and
oriented to. This “preference for disagreement order” typically
occurs when an argumentative context has been established, in which
opponents are expected to defend their positions rather than accept
those of their interlocutor, and that it holds more for aggravated
than for mitigated disputes. Kotthoff observes that the change of
participants’ expectations from consensus to disagreement is
performed step by step in the process of arguing: while in the
beginning of a dispute sequence disagreements usually display
features of the dispreferred format, in the subsequent exchange, the
participants’ show an orientation toward disagreement by expressing
dissent in an unmodulated or nearly unmodulated way through reducing
reluctance markers.
 Similarly, in a study of office-hour interaction, Günthner
(1992) reports that in the discussions under analysis, dissent turns
are produced without delay and without markers of mitigation. She
concludes that for the German participants the interaction is
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apparently framed as argumentative by the fact that argumentative
actions take a preferred form, in which dissent is focussed on and
maximised.
These findings demonstrate that verbal conflict can vary in
intensity with disagreeing turns being produced in a more or less
mitigated fashion,40 depending on such factors as, for instance, the
situational context and the participants’ interactional goals.
Especially heated phases of dispute seem to be characterised by a
systematic departure from the normal preference organisation.
This confirms Bilmes’ (1988: 175) claim about the potentially
preferred status of disagreement within the context of an argument –
especially aggravated arguments:
The situational context is a possible determinant of
preference. In the context of an argument, the preference
for agreement may be reversed. If, in the midst of an
argument, A makes a significant point and B does not
produce a disagreement in response, a disagreement may be
noticeably, relevantly absent, and it may be inferred from
this absence that B lacks credible grounds for disagreeing.
Furthermore, in contentious discussions, it may be
agreement rather than disagreement that is marked for
reluctance.
While the preceding studies have investigated conflict interaction
in institutional settings and between participants that did not know
each other very well, similar findings have been reported for casual
arguments among intimates. 41
As discussed above, Schiffrin (1984) and Kakavá (1993a, b,
1994, 2002) have found that in arguments between both Jewish
American and Greek friends and family, disagreement is a preferred
and expected activity and does not jeopardise the participants’
interpersonal relationships. In fact, the enactment of aggravated
argument appears to be a way of displaying and maintaining intimacy.
Moreover, both researchers note that although the speakers in these
intimate settings exhibit a preference for disagreement, they do not
use that disagreement to reach common ground. Rather, disagreement
seems to be “merely the indispensable medium through which the
lively exchange of speech unfolds its attraction” (Simmel 1911/1961:
52). The participants in these settings appear to engage in and
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appreciate argument as a process and activity in its own right
rather than for its outcome.
Similarly, in his study of American family dinner
conversations, Vuchinich (1984, 1987, 1990) reports a high number of
conflict episodes, most of which were not resolved but ended in a
stand-off. According to Vuchinich (1984: 219), “this should not be
surprising, as it is well known that conflict accomplishes functions
other than resolution.” Following Simmel (1908/1955) and Coser
(1956), he maintains that verbal conflict “provides a format for the
display and maintenance of social relationships” (ibid). Moreover,
his data display a frequent occurrence of unmitigated forms of
disagreement.
Likewise, studies of German family dinner conversations have
shown that argument is a regular (and even popular) occurrence. For
instance, Keppler (1994: 98) notes that in close relationships like
friends and family, disputes are by no means an exception:
“Konflikte gehören zweifellos zur Familie und zum familiären
Beisammensein.” She states that particularly in circles of friends
and family, difference of opinion has to be managed, and a prominent
mode of this management is dispute. Apart from disputes (“Streit”),
Keppler also describes controversial discussions (“Diskussion” or
“Argumentation”) as a recurrent mode of conflict management during
family dinner conversations. According to Keppler (1994: 104),
discussions differ from disputes in that the participants oppose
each other on the content level rather than the interpersonal
level:42   
Der Meinungskonflikt führt hier nicht in eine persönliche
Konfrontation. Diskussionen unter Familienmitgliedern sind
Kontroversen, bei denen es den Beteiligten gelingt, bei der
Sache zu bleiben.
Keppler notes that one characteristic of such discussion sequences
is that dissent is not dispreferred but is an important and
necessary driving power of the conversation. In fact, however, a
closer look at her data reveals that in the family-dispute
sequences, disagreement is indeed enacted as a preferred action,
whereas the disagreements in the family discussions display a high
rate of delaying and mitigating devices such as agreement tokens
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(“Ja aber”) and hedges (“Ja ich mein”).43 Knoblauch (1991, 1995),
too, finds that German family dinner talk displays a regular
occurrence of a type of argumentative sequence he calls “informal
discussions,” and that a salient feature of this form of talk
(Goffman 1981) is the frequent use of unmitigated disagreements:
Opposing the harmonistic view held by Pomerantz (1984; see
also Jacobs & Jackson 1982), which states that disagreement
is a ‘dispreferred activity,’ informal discussions provide
one example of the frequent and even cherished use of
disagreement. (Knoblauch 1991: 170)
Rather than avoid or mitigate disagreements, speakers seem to stress
them. The inherent dynamics of disagreement is the machinery that
drives the interaction while maintaining a high degree of
sociability. Like Schiffrin, Kakavá and Keppler, Knoblauch (1991:
187) states that rather than striving for the resolution of dissent,
the participants in his data “cherish discussion almost for its own
sake – and for the sake of maintaining the conversation.”
In his analysis of arguments among British family members,
Billig (1989) also observes that the interactants frequently
disagree and disagree with gusto: in many cases, the speakers do not
hesitate to disagree, nor are their disagreements mitigated.
Moreover, he suggests that in this argumentative context, when forms
of hedged agreement (i.e. “yes buts”) are used, they may not
indicate a reluctance to disagree but instead may be a device to
avoid agreement, and thus to continue the argument. Thus, rather
than trying to resolve their disagreement, the participants can be
seen to actively maintain disagreement.
Furthermore, while not explicitly addressing the
preferred/dispreffered status of disagreement, Tannen (2001) finds
that argument is a frequent occurrence in families, and that
participants recurrently use direct disagreements, overt criticism
and sarcasm.44
In addition, several sociological studies of conflict and
family interaction respectively have claimed that arguments between
intimates, in particular between family, are frequent and are often
characterised by a high degree of hostility and intensity. For
instance, Sprey (1971: 722) goes so far as to view the family
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process per se as “a continuous confrontation between participants
with conflicting – though not necessarily opposing interests in
their shared fate.” Cahn (1992: 1) puts forward a less radical
position, maintaining that intimates “are more likely than are
acquaintances to engage in frequent and intense disagreements.”
As indicated above, the interrelationship between aggravated
forms of conflict management and intimacy or closeness was noted
earlier by Simmel (1955: 44-45), who contends:
A hostility must excite consciousness the more deeply and
violently, the greater the parties’ similarity against the
background of which the hostility arises ... The more we have
in common with another as whole persons, however, the more
easily will our totality be involved in every single relation
to him ... Therefore, if a quarrel arises between persons in
such an intimate relationship, it is often so passionately
expansive. (original emphasis)
Indeed, Simmel (1955: 47) further states that when
we are certain of the irrevocability and unreservedness of
our feelings, ...  peace at any price is not necessary. We
know that no crisis can penetrate to the foundation of the
relationship.
In sum, research on interaction between family and friends has shown
that conflict is a frequent occurrence. Moreover, close
relationships offer an opportunity to oppose others directly because
the disputants know each other very well, and their relationships
are stable. If people are on intimate terms, they are less reluctant
to produce outright disagreements because the foundation of their
relationships is stronger than in less close relationships. In
intimate settings, then, arguments do not jeopardise interpersonal
relationships, therefore the disagreement can be and often is
aggravated without endangering future interaction. This corresponds
to Brown & Levinson’s (1987) claim that one of the social
determinants of the level politeness with which a speaker will
address a hearer is social distance between the speaker and the
addressee. As Tannen (2001: 75) puts it: “We don’t stand on ceremony
when talking to family members because we are close.”45
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However, as some studies have shown, disagreement is not always
enacted as a preferred action in conflicts between intimates. While
Muntigl & Turnbull (1998) and Locher (2004) found both aggravated
and mitigated disagreements in arguments between family and friends,
they report that in their data, overall, mitigated forms were used
more often than unmitigated forms. Both studies assume that forms of
disagreement are associated with considerations of face. Locher
(2004: 146) claims that the relatively low number of non-mitigated
disagreements in her data demonstrates that “the sociability of the
event had more weight than scoring points by risking face damage.”46
As these findings illustrate, conflict between family is a
frequent occurrence; in fact it is a constitutive element of family
relationships. While the intimacy and stability of the relationship
allows for - and may even be conducive to - the production of direct
disagreement and the expression of hostility, family conflict, like
any other type of conflict, may take more or less aggravated forms,
ranging from factual discussions to mild bickering to heated
disputes, with disagreeing turns being enacted in a more or less
mitigated form.
Against this background I will now consider the ways in which
the participants in the mother-daughter disputes in my corpus build
their disagreements, in order to trace the seemingly confrontational
character of these exchanges.
As indicated at the beginning of this section, when the mothers
and daughters in my data oppose one another, they usually organise
their talk so as to highlight rather than downplay that opposition.
For example, rather than being preceded by delays, turns containing
disagreement are commonly produced immediately following the talk
they oppose or in overlap with it. Consider the following two
extracts:
example (10): ‘night Mother
1407 MAMA Ricky is too much like Cecil.
> 1408 JESSIE He's not. Ricky is as much like me as it's
1409 possible for any human to be. We even wear the
1410 same size pants. These are his, I think.
> 1411 MAMA That's just the same size. That's not you're
1412 the same person.
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example (11): My mother said I, 4
35 MARGARET It's a serious step you've taken, you've no
36 idea—
> 37 JACKIE It was no big deal. It was a relief to get it
38 over with. I cried afterwards. Then I laughed.
39 I expect it's better with someone you're in
40 love with.
41 MARGARET You could have waited.
In both of these fragments, the disputants oppose each other through
the use of unprefaced, unmitigated disagreements. In extract (10),
Jessie challenges her mother’s assertion with a direct negation:
“He’s not” (line 1408), and then goes on to add a series of
assertions, supporting her position (lines 1408-1410). In the
following turn, Mama dismisses her daughter’s argument as invalid by
disputing that the fact that they wear the same size implies that
they also have a similar character (lines 1411-1412). Her turn, too,
does not show any features of mitigation. In extract (11), Jackie
opposes her Mother’s assertion with an unmitigated disagreement (“It
was no big deal” line 37). Like Jessie in the preceding extract, she
adds a series of assertions supporting her claim (lines 37-40). The
oppositional character of her disagreement is further aggravated by
the interruptive placement of her turn.
Furthermore, disagreeing turns in my data frequently contain a
preface that announces right at the beginning of the turn,
characteristically in the first word said, that opposition is being
done. For instance, opposition may be signalled immediately through
an expression of polarity (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 178) that is used
to initiate the turn, as the following three examples illustrate:
example (12): Alto I, 3
37 WANDA (With animation) I'm coming with you!
38 There's no reason why I can't! (She begins
39 to grab clothes from her closet.) I'll
40 wear pedal pushers on the bus.
41 FLORENE Put those things back, Wanda. You're not
42 going anywhere.
> 43 WANDA Yes, I am.
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example (13): ‘night Mother
1071 MAMA But you, you knew what he was thinking
1072 about and you're going to tell me.
1073 JESSIE I don't know, Mama! His life, I guess. His
1074 corn. His boots. Us. Things. You know.
> 1075 MAMA No, I don't know, Jessie! You had those
1076 quiet little conversations after supper
1077 every night. What were you whispering about?
example (14): Alto II, 3
60 WANDA We'll sing so good we'll bring that time
61 back, Mama.
> 62 FLORENE No. I think it's over. Over for good, Wanda.
> 63 WANDA No. I won't let it be. I'll bring it back.
64 I know all about it.
In each of these extracts, an expression of opposite polarity   is
placed at the very beginning of a disagreeing turn. By introducing
their turns in this way, the speakers signal that they are starting
a turn that opposes the other party in some respect. For instance,
in example (12), “Yes” rather than “No” at the beginning of Wanda’s
turn signals polarity in that Florene’s preceding utterances was
phrased as negative statement. Conversely, in examples (13) and
(14), each of the disagreeing turns is prefaced with “No,”
indicating right at the beginning that opposition is being produced.
The disagreements in these fragments are designed in such a way that
they do not delay or disguise the negative alignment the second
speaker is taking up with respect to the prior move but instead
emphasise opposition.47
In addition, disagreeing turns in my data are frequently
prefaced by the discourse marker “But.” In the literature, “But” has
been discussed as a “contrastive” or “cancellative” discourse
marker, which “signals a sense of ‘dissonance’” (Fraser 1988: 30).48
As Schiffrin (1987) has illustrated, “But” is a disagreement
preface, which “marks an upcoming unit as a contrasting action”
(152). It is used, for instance, when speakers issue challenges,
i.e. when they initially disagree. Speakers also use “But” to
present points which have been interrupted, misunderstood, and/or
challenged. Schiffrin shows that individuals strongly expect “But”
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to preface disagreements – whether they are disagreements which
challenge, defend, or both. Accordingly, by initiating their turns
with “But,” disputants signal that the following utterance is (in
whatever respect) a disagreeing move with something the previous
speaker has said or done.49 Consider, for instance, the following
four extracts:
example (15): Alto I, 2
20 FLORENE Now, Wanda, you can't jump into
21 something like that.
22 WANDA Why not?
23 FLORENE You just can't. We can't even pay
24 the rent.
> 25 WANDA But, Mama, she say's I'm talented!
26 FLORENE I can't help it. Your daddy's
27 trying to get established in his
28 career. Once he gets where he needs
29 to be, then everything will be
30 different.
example (16): Home
507 MARY JANE It's good to talk like this.
508 OLIVIA People talk too much these days. They
509 think it solves the world's problems.
> 510 MARY JANE But you can tell people what you want.
511 You can tell me, you know, what's
512 going on in your head.
example (17): ‘night Mother
755 MAMA You could keep books. You kept your
756 dad's books.
> 757 JESSIE But nobody ever checked them.
758 MAMA When he died, they checked them.
example (18): My sister 9
220 MADAME DANZARD What is the world coming to? I
221 couldn't believe my eyes.
> 222 ISABELLE But Maman-
223 MADAME DANZARD There are no buts involved here.
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In each of these fragments, one of the disputants initiate a
disagreeing turn with the dissent marker “But.” Thus, like the
instances above, these turns are designed in such a way that they
emphasise rather than delay or disguise opposition. In extracts (15)
and (16) “But” is used to initiate a turn that defends or reasserts
the speaker’s own prior claim, following a challenge on the part of
the opponent. By contrast in extracts (17) and (18) “But” is used to
preface a challenge to the opponent’s prior assertion. In each
instance, “But” functions as a disagreement preface, indexing right
at the beginning of the turn that the speaker is about to produce an
oppositional move. In fact, in example (18), Madame Danzard cuts off
her daughter’s response with the words: “There are no buts involved
here” (line 223), thereby displaying that she interprets Isabelle’s
turn initiation as signalling disagreement.
Another type of preface that is recurrently used to begin
oppositional turns in my data consists of repetition of part of the
talk that is being opposed, as in the following three extracts:
example (19): Raisin III
27 BENEATHA Wasn't it you who taught me to despise any
28 man who would do that. Do what he's going
29 to do.
30 MAMA Yes - I taught you that. Me and your daddy.
31 But I thought I taught you something else
32 too... I thought I taught you to love him.
> 33 BENEATHA Love him? There is nothing left to love.
example (20): Home
250 MARY JANE I was your daughter and you didn't care
251 where I ended up.
252 OLIVIA That's ridiculous. You didn't care where you
253 ended up.
254 MARY JANE Oh right, of course, you're Miss Innocent
255 again, Ma.
> 256 OLIVIA Oh, I'm Miss Innocent? You make one mistake
257 after another for 20 years and you never
258 took responsibility for one second! You
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259 brought babies into this world that you
260 could barely feed 'cause that husband a
261 yours couldn't hold down a job.
example (21): My sister 3
41 MADAME DANZARD (She eats with a certain relish.) Wait
42 till the Blanchards come to dinner. I'll
43 have her make her rabbit paté. Won’t that
44 surprise them! The best cook we’ve had in
45 years.
46 ISABELLE Oh I don’t know – Marie wasn’t so bad.
> 47 MADAME DANZARD Marie? Please. The way she cooked a pot au
48 feu – ahhh - It still makes me shudder.
49 ISABELLE You exaggerate, Maman.
> 50 MADAME DANZARD Exaggerate? I'm being kind. Marie would
51 have murdered a veal like this.
Partial repetition of prior talk picks out a particular element of
the opponent’s preceding talk to be focused on. Other conversational
activities in which partial repetition occurs include disagreements
with prior speakers’ self-deprecations (Pomerantz 1984: 83-84) and
other-repair initiation (Schegloff et al. 1977). In these contexts,
as well as in oppositional moves, it is used to locate a trouble
source in someone else’s talk.
However, the instances of partial repetition that occur at the
beginning of oppositional moves in my data differ from the partial
repeats in other activities in several important aspects. As
Schegloff et al. (1977) have shown, other-initiated repair exhibits
two characteristic features. Firstly, the discovery of an error is
typically modulated through the use of markers of uncertainty. The
term singled out for revision is produced with rising intonation,
displaying uncertainty and requesting that the prior speaker assist
in clarifying what is formulated as a problem. Secondly, locating
the trouble source is frequently the only activity performed in the
turn. This is illustrated by the following example from Schegloff et
al. (1977: 377):
example (22) GTS1: II:2:54
Ken: ‘E likes that waider over there.
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> Al: Wait-er?
Ken: Waitress, sorry.
Al: ‘At’s bedder,
In this extract, the activities of locating the trouble and
providing a remedy are separated into distinct turns performed by
distinct individuals. Although Al points to something problematic in
Ken’s talk, Ken is allowed to do the correction himself. By
restricting the activity in his turn to locating the error, Al
proposes that Ken has the competence to repair it himself, and
provides him with an opportunity to do so in the following turn.50
By contrast, if the partial repeat is used as a disagreement
preface, as in the preceding extracts, rather than standing alone in
a turn, the partial repeats are characteristically immediately
followed by further talk which explicitly opposes what the prior
speaker has said.51 In extract (19), subsequent to the partial
repeat, Beneatha issues an assertion which openly challenges Mama’s
prior assumption that Beneatha should love her brother; in example
(20), Olivia issues a series of accusatory claims, which portray
Mary Jane’s behaviour as irresponsible; and in extract (21),
directly following the partial repeats, Madame Danzard issues
assertions which directly counter Isabelle’s prior statements.
Another aspect in which the partial repeats in my data differ
from those in other-initiated repair is in terms of the intonation
patterns used. In contrast to the instances of partial repetition
discussed by Schegloff et al.(1977), in the extracts above, the
discovery of a trouble source is not modulated with markers of
uncertainty such as a tentative, rising intonation. Instead,
disputants employ contours that not only focus on a particular
aspect of the prior speaker’s talk as constituting a repairable but
also call into question that speaker’s competence. The sequential
placement of the oppositional turns within the context of
disagreement suggests that the partial repeats are spoken with a
falling-rising contour (Gunter 1974: 61), which closely resembles
the intonation patterns of the opposition prefaces in children’s
disputes discussed by M. H. Goodwin (1990), in which a subsequent
speaker repeats part of prior speaker’s talk. Following Ladd (1980:
150), Goodwin argues that this intonation contour may be used to
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contradict or question the prior speaker’s assumptions. In addition,
she claims that the use of such an intonation contour enables the
speaker both to display a particular affective reaction, such as
offence or incredulity, at what the other has just said and to
caricature the opponents by portraying their actions as ridiculous
or inappropriate.52 Hence, in prefacing their turns with a partial
repeat produced with such intonation structures the disputants not
only signal that disagreement is going to follow but also actively
challenge what the prior speaker has just said.53
As the preceding discussion shows, rather than tone down
disagreement in order to (re)establish consent, the mothers and
daughters in my data utilise the preferred/dispreferred turn shape
to highlight disagreement. The absence of reluctance markers in
oppositional turns is then one way of interactionally accomplishing
a heated dispute. By the same token, the exchange of unmitigated
disagreements is a contextualisation cue (Gumperz 1982), framing
(Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) the ongoing interaction as an
aggravated conflict episode.
As mentioned above, once a dispute is in progress, the
participants are expected to oppose each other and defend their
respective positions. This change in expectations may be displayed
in a structural preference for disagreement. This orientation
towards disagreement may also be revealed in the way disputants
respond to non-disagreeing turns. The following extracts from Avenue
exemplify how the dispute frame affects participants’ expectations
and interpretations of utterances.
The following episode occurs after Mother has told Olga that
she has bought a fortune gum which said: “Every dog has its day,”
and claimed that this is a happy omen. Olga’s initial reaction is
scepticism and incredulity but then she gives up and acquiesces to
Mother’s interpretation of the situation:
example (23): Avenue
253 MOTHER My day is coming. I mean it has to according
254 to my fortune.
255 OLGA But what if somebody else got the fortune?
256 It would be theirs.
257 MOTHER Yeah, cause they bought the gum. So what's
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258 new about that?
259 OLGA (Disgusted; weary.) Never mind.
> 260 MOTHER Go on, you started something, explain it.
261 OLGA Let's forget it.
> 262 MOTHER You're always backing down on things.
263 OLGA Let's forget it, the gum, the fortunes, the
264 stars, tea-leaves.
Mother has just told Olga about the fortune gum and what it said.
When Olga does not show any interest in (let alone enthusiasm about)
her mother’s revelation, but instead expresses her scepticism about
the applicability of the saying to human beings, Mother defends her
position by pointing to the figurative meaning of the saying, and an
argument ensues about the validity/meaning of the fortune. In lines
253-254, Mother once more puts forward her interpretation of the
fortune, stating: “My day is coming. I mean it has to according to
my fortune.” But Olga opposes her again, arguing that the fact that
Mother got this particular fortune is pure coincidence (lines 255-
256). In the subsequent turn, while she concedes that Olga is right
(“Yeah, cause they bought the gum.” line 257), Mother challenges the
relevance of her claim, arguing that what she said is not newsworthy
(“So what's new about that?” line 257), and, thus, beside the point.
However, instead of defending her objection, in line 259, Olga
signals her withdrawal from the argument by saying: “Never mind.”
When Mother realises that Olga is about to retreat from her
involvement in the quarrel, she tries to bring her back to it by
prompting her to account for her prior objection (“Go on, you
started something, explain it.” line 260). But Olga refuses to
elaborate on her utterance, and suggests that they let the matter
rest: “Let’s forget it” (line 261). In the sequential context of a
dispute, Mother expects Olga to produce a disagreement and, hence,
does not accept her sudden capitulation. Apparently, she assumes
that Olga’s concession is not sincere. As a result, not only does
she refuse to accept her concession but she also criticises her for
not defending her opinion, claiming that she is “always backing down
on things” (line 262). But her attempt to draw Olga back into the
argument fails. Instead of contesting her mother’s allegation, Olga
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reasserts her prior utterance (“Let’s forget it. ...” lines 263-
264).
A few lines later in the same conversation a similar instance
occurs: in the context of the ongoing dispute, Mother apparently
expects Olga to defend herself against her attacks. Hence, as her
reactions reveal, she does not interpret her sudden (if qualified)
agreements as sincere concessions but rather as sarcastic remarks.
example (24): Avenue
411 OLGA I won't sit at the table with that slob!
412 MOTHER (Rises, crosses back to bureau to put perfume
413 spray back.) Just because you mess around
414 with your food, you find time to pick at
415 everyone's faults. You got nothing good to
416 say for nobody, nothing good to say for
417 yourself.
418 OLGA Guess not.
> 419 MOTHER Even when you agree with me, I can just
420 strangle your scrawny neck. Something about
421 your manner I never liked. You better change
422 your ways.
423 OLGA It's going to be hard for me to adjust to
424 him.
425 MOTHER You better or else you can just get out and
426 get your own place. You go out and work and
427 learn what it is to get money. (Crosses to
428 kitchen table, takes out a gaudy ribbon from
429 pocketbook.) This is pretty, but too bad you
430 can't wear it, cause your hair's not set.
431 (Puts ribbon back in pocketbook.)
432 OLGA Ribbons are for dogs.
433 MOTHER (Sits down, looks in face mirror to recheck
434 eyes.) You mean dogs that win contests.
435 You're funny, you are and so stupid.
Sometimes
436 I think I got more sense than you and I
437 hardly been educated.
438 OLGA Maybe you have.
> 439 MOTHER There you go agreeing with me again.
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Prior to this extract, Mother and Olga have been arguing about
whether Olga has to get dressed up because Mother has invited her
new boyfriend for dinner. In line 411, Olga refuses to have dinner
with the man in question at all (“I won't sit at the table with that
slob!” line 411). Apart from constituting yet another rejection of
her mother’s request to prepare for their guest, her utterance
expresses criticism of Mother, by presenting her as someone who is
having a relationship with a “slob.” In the following turn, Mother
responds to this attack with a series of counter-accusations,
arguing that Olga is quarrelsome simply because she is unhappy with
herself: “Just because you mess around with your food, you find time
to pick at everyone's faults. You got nothing good to say for
nobody, nothing good to say for yourself.” (lines 413-417).54 Instead
of defending herself against Mother’s imputations, in the subsequent
turn, Olga issues a downgraded agreement, replying “Guess not.”
(line 418). But rather that accepting her daughter’s concession as
an offer to terminate the dispute, Mother’s subsequent turn reveals
that she does not receive Olga’s reply as an appropriate response to
her prior turn. Her meta-communicative statement: “Even when you
agree with me, I can just strangle your scrawny neck.” (lines 419-
420), which explicitly remarks on the communicative function of
Olga’s activity, indicates that she has not anticipated agreement
and is not prepared to accept her daughter’s consent. In the course
of the following turns, the topic of the argument gradually shifts
from Olga’s attitude to her looks and then to her intellect. In
lines 435-437, Mother first attacks Olga, characterising her as
“funny” (presumably in the sense of odd) and “so stupid,” and then
claims that despite her inferior education, apparently she “has got
more sense” than Olga. Again, instead of contradicting her mother’s
attributions, Olga issues a downgraded agreement (“Maybe you have.”
line 438). And again, Mother’s subsequent turn reveals that she
apparently does not hear Olga’s reply as an appropriate response to
her prior turn. As in lines 419-420, her meta-communicative
utterance: “There you go agreeing with me again” (line 439) displays
that she is reluctant to accept her daughter’s consent. Mother’s
reactions to Olga’s concessions in the two preceding fragments
clearly show that in the context of an already established
controversy, the participants in my data expect each other to
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disagree. Apart from the design of disagreements as preferred
actions, this orientation towards dissent is evidenced by the
disputants’ reluctance to accept sudden agreements as sincere
concessions.55 To quote Levinson (1992: 79):
the structural properties of specific activities set up
strong expectations. Because there are strict constraints on
contributions to any particular activity, there are
corresponding strong expectations about the functions that
any utterance at a certain point in the proceedings can be
fulfilling.
Thus in the middle of a heated dispute, in which participants are
expected to produce disagreements and defend their positions, sudden
agreements are not taken to indicate sincere concession and are not
accepted as appropriate contributions.
To summarise the main points of my discussion, I have presented
claims being made about the status of disagreement in ordinary
conversation. Following Goffman (1967), recent work in
sociolinguistics has proposed that certain universal principles of
face-saving or polite behaviour underlie human communication, and
that interactants show a concern for the avoidance of open discord.
Correspondingly, within the analytical framework of CA, (with the
exception of certain sequence types) disagreement as a response to a
prior assessment is generally viewed as a disaffiliative action
which may be destructive of social solidarity, and which thus
emerges as a structurally dispreferred turn. The underlying
principle of this preference organisation is that, since
disagreement is an action that may create conflict, it is not to be
expressed, or when expressed, it is mitigated.
However, the data presented here provide evidence of an
orientation toward an alternative conversational mode. In contrast
to the stereotype of face-saving, agreement-oriented interaction
(especially among women), in the mother-daughter interactions
portrayed in the plays under analysis, conflict is not at all
uncommon. Rather than organising their talk so as to display
deference to each other, the women in my data frequently seek
opportunities to display and realign the social organisation of the
moment through mutual opposition. Moreover, the oppositional turns
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in my data are not structured so as to minimise opposition.
Disagreements are not delayed sequentially by means of hesitation,
nor are they pushed back in the construction of turns through the
use of initial agreement tokens. In fact, rather than mitigate their
disagreement through the use of reluctance markers, the women in my
data emphasise the oppositional character of their turns by
prefacing their utterances with various dissent markers.
From a structural standpoint, the mother-daughter disputes
under analysis are characterised by suspending the preference for
agreement order of ordinary conversation. In terms of the
interpersonal level of interaction, they are framed by suspending
the politeness caveats of friendly interaction suggested by Brown &
Levinson (1987) and Leech (1983). Rather than display an orientation
towards agreement and consent, participants exhibit an orientation
to the expectation of disagreement and “impoliteness” (Culpeper
1996, Mills 2003: 121-164), “rudeness” (Kienpointner 1997; Tracy &
Tracy 1998) or “verbal aggression” (Infante & Wigley 1986).
As the preceding discussion has shown, like all speech
activities, heated disputes are governed by specific structural
principles, obligations and expectations, which participants orient
to (cf. also Antaki 1994; Eisenberg & Garvey 1981; Mack & Snyder
1973).56 In contrast to friendly interaction or factual discussions,
aggravated arguments are characterised by an orientation toward the
expectation of disagreement, and this noticeably affects
participants’ production and interpretation of talk.
Participants require a sense of ‘what we are doing here’ in
order to construct appropriate turns in talk. As they interact, they
establish some common ground as to what it is they are doing. The
speech activity in which participants are engaged is usually not
overtly labelled. Speakers rarely state “we’re having an argument”
by producing “formulations” (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970). Instead, they
use contextualisation cues (Gumperz 1982) to coordinate the speech
activity. That is to say, their definitions of the ongoing
interaction are displayed by their behaviour and are thus available
to researchers as well. As the preceding discussion shows,
unmodulated disagreement functions are such a contextualisation cue
for both participants and analysts, framing the ensuing talk as a
heated dispute. In other words, the construction of disagreeing
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responses displays to both conversationalists and analysts what kind
of speech activity or activity type the participants are engaged in:
apparently, the very absence of markers of mitigation represents a
means by which the participants in my data foreground their
opposition and intensify their conflict thereby contextualising
their exchange as an aggravated dispute. However, the use of
aggravated disagreements is not the only way in which the ongoing
talk is framed as confrontational. In the following section, I will
look at another structural means by which the speakers in my data
accomplish aggravated argument, namely the use of interruptions.
162
You have not converted a man because you have silenced
him. (John Morely) 
6.3.2 (Competitive) turn-taking patterns
In the preceding section, I focused on the function of preference
caveats in the accomplishment of aggravated oppositional
turns/disputes. I showed that the verbal conflict sequences in my
corpus are characterised by a change in the preference organisation,
and that participants display an orientation towards the structural
preference for disagreement in the construction of argumentative
turns. This context-specific preference structure thus provides a
conversational resource by means of which participants can frame
(Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) or contextualise (Gumperz 1982) an
ongoing activity as a heated dispute.
In this section I will examine another structural feature of
the argument sequences in my corpus. I will show that in addition to
the departure from the standard preference organisation, the mother-
daughter disputes in my data are characterised by a change in the
standard turn-taking mechanisms as described by Sacks et al. (1974).
In their seminal paper on the organisation of turn-taking in
conversation, Sacks et al. (1974) stated that in ordinary
conversation, “overwhelmingly one party talks at a time” (705),
speaker change is coordinated around “transition-relevance places”
(i.e. possible completion points of the talk that occupies the
current turn), and that “transitions (from one turn to a next) with
no gap and no overlap are common. Together with transitions
characterized by slight gap or slight overlap they make up the vast
majority or transitions” (708).
By contrast, in the mother-daughter disputes in my corpus,
speakers can frequently be seen to start up on a turn at talk at
points which are not identifiable as transition relevance places.
Oppositional turns are regularly done in the sequential form of what
is commonly referred to as “interruption:” disputants start up at
non-transition places, i.e. in “interjacent” (Jefferson 1986)
positions, to do argumentative actions. This suggests that the
activity of cutting one’s opponent short is somehow related to the
accomplishment of aggravated opposition and, as a consequence, to
the escalation of arguments. It is this relationship between cutting
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in on another’s talk with a counter and the aggravation of
opposition that will be at the centre of this section.
The relationship between interruption and conflict escalation
has been noted before in the literature. For instance, in his
analysis of the notorious Bush-Rather encounter on U.S. TV,57
Schegloff (1988-1989) remarks on how the confrontational trajectory
of the encounter seems often to be marked precisely by the
interruptive verbal behaviour of the antagonists. Likewise, in his
analysis of the televised 1992 vice presidential debate between Vice
President Dan Quayle, Senator Al Gore and retired Admiral James
Stockdale, Bilmes (1999) notes that the exchanges were “sharp and
confrontational, with frequent overlap” (215). A related point is
made by Greatbatch (1992) in his study of the management of
disagreements between antagonists in panel interview broadcasts. He
states that one of the ways in which interviewees commonly escalate
their disputes is by producing their talk interruptively, thereby
intensifying disagreement. Similarly, in a study of TV-discussions,
Gruber (1996, 1998) observes that in dispute phases of talk,
discussants regularly produce disagreements immediately when
propositions in the current speaker’s turn occur which they find
easy to counter, i.e. at what he calls “disagreement relevance
points.” In their analysis of a contentious TV debate, Kallmeyer &
Schmitt (1996) also note a rather competitive turn-taking pattern,
characterised by the frequent occurrence of simultaneous talk,
interjections and interruptions. Also, Hutchby (1992; 1996a)
observes that in argument sequences in call-in radio shows,
argumentative actions such as challenges, rebuttals and ripostes are
frequently done in the form of interruptions. Harris (1989) notes
that in courtroom interaction, “interruptions tend to cluster in
portions of the data where hostility is evident” (148). Similarly,
Kotthoff (1993a) states that in discussions between university
students and lecturers, overlapping talk and interruption can occur
if tension is heightened. Recurrence of simultaneous speech and
interruptions has also been observed in Mexican parliamentary
discourse (Carbó 1992) and conflict talk between labour and
management (O’Donnel 1990).58
This connection between cutting in on another’s talk and
dispute escalation may be grounded in the fact that interruptions
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are at heart incursive actions. Both analysts and laypersons make a
distinction between normal turn exchange and interruption, and
consider interruptions as untoward and offensive, i.e. as
interferences with another’s speaking rights. As James & Clarke
(1993) note, the “the word ‘interruption’, both in ordinary usage
and in the usage of most researchers, has a negative connotation,
implying violation of another’s right to speak” (237). In Talbot’s
(1992) words, “interruptions are appropriations of a right to speak.
In interrupting a speaker claims a turn” (458). Technically
speaking, to interrupt is to start a turn at talk in a place that is
not a transitional-relevance place, i.e. to start to speak while
someone else is speaking and before that speaker’s turn has reached
a projectable completion point.
Moreover, interrupting challenges the right of a current
speaker to take her turn to such a completion point. According to
West (1984: 55), “an interruptive speaker is engaged in violation of
the current speaker’s right to be engaged in speaking.”59 Jefferson
(1983: 6) describes the nature of this violation as “starting up ‘in
the midst of’ another’s turn at talk, not letting the other finish.”
Interruptions therefore tend to be viewed as rude and disrespectful
acts, indicative of indifference, aggressiveness or hostility
towards the victimised speaker and/or the issues, values, and
perspectives embodied within what was being said.
Concomitantly, interruptions have been assumed to be attempts
at exerting control over both the discourse – of the turn and/or
topic – and its participants by pressuring the current speaker to
relinquish her turn, and thus control of the ongoing talk. Thus,
interruptions have been claimed to be involved with the
establishment or maintenance of power in interaction, particularly
in what are taken to be asymmetrical encounters such as those
between lay and professional persons (Davis 1988; West 1984), or,
more generally, between men and women (West 1979; West & Zimmerman
1977, 1983; Zimmerman & West 1975). For instance, West & Zimmerman
have claimed that men interrupt women more frequently than the other
way round, and this is linked to a more general claim that men
occupy a position of power vis-à-vis women. Interruptive behaviour
is equated with dominance, as interruptions are considered “a way of
doing power in face-to-face interaction” (1983: 111). Interruptions
165
are viewed not just as a reflection of asymmetrical relations of
power (e.g. between women and men), but as enactments of these
asymmetrical relations. As Watts (1995: 51) puts it: “interruptive
behaviour is indicative of an attempt by one member to exercise
power over another.”60
The activity of interrupting, then, appears to have both a
sequential and an interpersonal dimension: It is offensive both on
the structural level of turn-taking and on the interpersonal level
of interaction. This dual function is the basis for Brown &
Levinson’s (1987) classification of interruptions as both positive
and negative face threatening acts. Inasmuch as they restrict a
speaker’s freedom of action (i.e. the possibility of speaking
uninhibited), they are threats to the speaker’s negative face; since
in the case of oppositional interruptions the speaker’s opinion is
disregarded, they are also threats to the speaker’s positive face.
Therefore, it is argued, interruptions “intrinsically threaten both
negative and positive face” (67).61
To summarise so far, interruption is commonly distinguished
from normal turn taking. It is negatively evaluated, and
conversationalists, it is assumed, will generally avoid doing it. It
would seem, then, that interruption is by definition not only a
structurally disruptive, but also an intrusive, even hostile
activity, implying (attempted) violation of the interrupted party’s
speaking rights. As the following paragraphs will show, however,
this is an oversimplified view.
While at one point, all overlapping speech was thought of as
interruptive (e.g. Wiens et al. 1965), researchers have known for
some time that not all overlaps constitute violations of another’s
speaking rights. For example, “backchannel” utterances (Yngve 1970;
S. Duncan 1974), which are not aimed at taking the floor or
disturbing the flow of the original speaker’s talk, are not
considered interruptive. In addition, at least since the paper by
Sacks et al. on turn-taking (1974), analysts have differentiated
between overlap and interruption on structural grounds. Mid-
utterance overlaps are distinguished from those occurring at a point
where the end of the utterance is projectable. Only the former are
regarded as interruptive. As Schegloff (1987: 85) puts is,
“‘interruption’ is ... reserved (roughly) for starts by a second
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speaker while another is speaking and is not near a possible
completion.”
Attempts at formalising this distinction and operationalising
the concept of “interruption”, however, (e.g. West & Zimmerman 1977,
1983; Ferguson 1977; Roger et al. 1988) have been widely criticised,
in particular, for treating interruptions as a “sub-class of speech
overlap” (Drummond (1989: 150).62 In the operationalist approach,
technical definitions of interruption build the basis for the
categorisation of instances of overlapping speech as ‘interruptive.’
However, as Bennett (1981) points out, overlap and interruption
are categories of logically different types. While overlap is a
descriptive term referring to the observable coincidence in time of
contributions by two speakers, interruption is an interpretive
category, reflecting speakers’ interpretations of “prevailing rights
and obligations” in the interaction. Hence, the question of whether
an overlap is an interruption, i.e. an obstructive device, is not
merely a matter of determining its relation to some structural
feature of talk. Researchers also have to take into account the
participants’ own displayed orientation to the interruptive (i.e.
invasive) character of particular overlaps.63 As Drummond (1989: 152)
suggests, “there may be no stable message form that fits the label
‘interruption’” (original emphasis). Besides, even if all
interruptions were of a certain formal type, this would not mean
that any specific instance of that type would be perceived or
treated as interruptive by participants.
In fact, discourse analytic research has shown that
participants’ reasons for finding a piece of talk interruptive are
by no means entirely based on considerations of formatting. Speakers
that are overlapped in mid-utterance may not feel interrupted in any
substantial way if, for example, they think that they have already
got their point across. On the other hand, participants may claim
that they have been interrupted, even if the overlapping talk is not
sequentially disruptive, i.e. if it occurs at what might well be
taken for a speaker-transition point. This suggests that the
speaker’s right to an unimpeded turn and the listener’s obligation
to ensure this right is not the only code around which conversation
is organised. Instead, it appears that conversationalists make turn-
taking decisions based upon a variety of factors, including their
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own and other’s rights, obligations, and wants as well as contextual
requirements.
For instance, Jefferson (1983, 1984, 1986) notes that there are
various conditions (some of which will be discussed in more detail
below) under which the production of overlapping talk is systematic
and warranted, and therefore not interruptive in a violative sense.
Similarly, Murray (1985) finds that members perceive an instance of
overlap as a more or less severe violation of a speaker’s
“completion right” based on a wide range of factors, including
distributive justice in allocation of speech (i.e. how long/often
the interrupted party has spoken), the number of points made in a
speaking turn, and special rights to be heard (e.g. following a
question, or an attack).64 Thus, he concludes that “simultaneous
speech is neither necessary nor sufficient for the recognition of
‘interruption’ by interlocutors. ... There are no absolute
syntactical or acoustical criteria for recognizing an occurrence of
‘interruption’ available either to those involved in a speech event
nor to analysts” (31).
In addition, contrary to the postulate that one of the basic
rules of conversation in our society is that “not more than one
party should speak at a time” (Sacks 1992, vol. 1: 633) and
occurrences of more than one speaker at a time tend to be brief, it
has been observed that particularly in interactions involving more
than three people, even in relatively formal speech events,
frequently more than one party talks at a time – and not necessarily
briefly (cf. Dunne & Ng 1994; Edelsky 1981).65
Moreover, some overlaps may convey rapport, cooperation, or
camaraderie with the overlapped speaker rather than hostility and
intention to control the conversation (cf. Bennett 1981; Coates
1989, 1996; Edelsky 1981; Ervin-Tripp 1979, Herman 1995: 113;
Kennedy & Camden 1983; Tannen 1981, 1983, 1984, 1994; Watts 1991;
Yule 1996: 74). Such cooperative overlaps have been found to occur
primarily in the context of friendly conversation between colleagues
and friends, and appear to be prompted by - and indicate - the
overlapping speaker’s enthusiastic interest and active involvement
in the discourse. 66
For instance, in her analysis of a dinner table conversation
among friends, Tannen (1981, 1983, 1984, 1994) describes what she
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calls speakers’ “high involvement style,” which is characterised by
abrupt changes of topic, a high speech rate, fast speaker changes,
and a high rate of cooperative overlaps and repetitions with the
prior speaker’s utterances.67 She proposes that the participants in
this exchange try to establish or maintain a positive relation to
each other, which is expressed by means of these features: “rapid
rate of speech, overlap, and latching of utterances are devices by
which some speakers show solidarity, enthusiasm, and interest in
other’s talk. The resulting fast pace greases the conversational
wheels when speakers share expectations about use of these devices”
(1984: 77).
Coates (1989, 1991, 1994, 1996) reports similar results in her
analysis of “gossip” and friendship talk among female friends. She
distinguishes several types of simultaneous speech, which the model
of turn-taking put forward by Sacks et al. (1974), cannot account
for. She observes that in all-female conversation, talk is viewed as
a collaborative enterprise, which is displayed by the recurrence of
overlapping talk and shared turns, or “conversational duets” (Falk
1980). Rather then fighting for the floor, women engaged in single-
sex talk with friends are sharing the floor, and this sharing
signals intimacy. According to Coates, these marked turn-taking
strategies accomplish and consolidate friendship by expressing
positive politeness.
In terms of Jefferson’s (1984, 1986) categorisation of
overlapping talk, most of Coates’s and Tannen’s examples of
overlapping speech classify as “recognitional onsets,” i.e.
instances where a recipient recognises what the current speaker
wants to say and starts her own turn prior to a transition relevance
place. The overlapping speakers always express the same view of the
topic under discussion as overlapped speakers. In addition, the
overlapped speakers do not seem to interpret incursions as floor-
competitive. The result is a shared or collaborative floor (Edelsky
1981; Coates 1989, 1991, 1994, 1996), characterised by more-than-
one-at-a-time rather than one-at-a-time. Apparently, in these
conversational exchanges, overlapping speech serves to indicate that
participants share the same background knowledge and appreciate what
the other is talking about thus signalling interpersonal involvement
and rapport.
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As the preceding discussion has shown, interruptions may take
various forms, originate from a variety of sources and serve a
variety of purposes. Hence, a priori interpretations of turn-
incursive overlaps as unequivocal signs of hostility, power, control
or dominance are unsustainable. Speakers who produce utterances that
on the purely sequential level interrupt another’s speech may on the
interpersonal level be performing either affiliative or
disaffiliative actions. In the face of the multiple triggers for and
functions of interruption, several researchers have looked for ways
to distinguish between different types of interruptions.
For instance, Goldberg (1990) differentiates between
interruptions that are “relationally neutral” and those which are
“power-oriented” or “rapport-oriented” on the basis of the presumed
motivations of their producers. Power- and rapport-oriented
interruptions are further distinguished based on the coherent-
cohesive ties between the interrupting and interrupted utterance.
Relationally neutral interruptions, address the immediate needs
of the communicative situation. They typically initiate a side, or
repair sequence or they may address an external event that requires
immediate attention before the conversation can continue. Once
completed, the discourse is returned to its pre-interruption state,
thereby permitting the interrupted speaker to continue where she
left off.68 They are not intentionally face-threatening, nor do they
appear to be intended to wrest control of the discourse from the
interrupted speaker.
Power-type interruptions, on the other hand, are designed to
wrest the discourse from the speaker by gaining control of the
conversational process and/or content, thereby threatening the
current speaker’s negative face. They are generally heard as rude,
impolite, intrusive and inappropriate, conveying the interrupter’s
antipathy, aggression, hostility, dislike etc. towards the
interrupted speaker and/or the talk at hand, and are treated as acts
of conflict, competition, or as indicators of lack of involvement.
In addition, they tend to be off-topic, or to re-introduce topics,
and contain few (if any) coherent-cohesive ties with the interrupted
utterance. They typically involve topic change attempts accomplished
by questions, requests or assertions whose propositional content is
unrelated to the specific topic at hand.
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By contrast, rapport-type interruptions strive to bolster the
interrupted speaker’s positive face. They are generally understood
as expressions of empathy, affection, solidarity, interest, concern
etc., and are viewed as acts of collaboration and cooperation. They
stay on-topic, encourage and contribute to the development of the
speaker’s talk by inserting (typically short) informative or
evaluative comments or by requesting the speaker to supply such
remarks. The interrupter’s contribution is hearable as a cooperative
gesture sharing the speaker’s wants regarding the success of the
speaker’s initiated topics, issues or goals. The participants
jointly develop a common topic, displaying as they do so their joint
enthusiasm for, involvement with, or understanding of the other and
the issues or goals at hand.69
Goldberg concedes, however, that there is no clear-cut
distinction between power-type and rapport-type interruptions.70 An
interruption that is considered as display of power in one case may
be interpreted as a display of rapport in another. Also, the
interrupter’s intention and the interrupted speaker’s perception (as
displayed in her reaction to the interruption) may fail to coincide.
In addition to the above, Goldberg identifies competitive
interruptions. These exhibit features of both power- and rapport-
type interruptions: like rapport interruptions they stay on topic;
like power-type interruptions they transgress the speaker’s negative
face wants by virtue of cutting in on her turn. Competitive
interruptions, Goldberg suggests, typically occur in stretches of
talk in which “each party strives to get the other to acknowledge
her own particular beliefs, accomplishments or experiences in some
sense “superior” to those of the other” (896).
Hutchby (1992, 1996a) also differentiates between interruptions
that are legitimate actions by virtue of their immediate
interactional relevance, such as conveying better or additional
information, warnings and extraordinary noticings, on the one hand,
and cooperative and “confrontational” or “hostile” interruptions on
the other. Similar to Goldberg, he sees interruptions as having both
a sequential dimension, which refers to the degree to which an
interrupting turn is incursive with respect to the ongoing talk, and
an interpersonal, or, as he calls it, “moral” dimension, which
focuses on the kind of activity an interruption is being used to do
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in the local interactional context, i.e. a cooperative/affiliative/
supportive versus a confrontational/disaffiliative/hostile action.
Turns which are interruptive in the sequential sense are not
necessarily (perceived as) interruptive in the moral sense.
Consider, for instance the following passage from ordinary
conversation, quoted from Hutchby (1992: 346, 1996a: 78):
example (1)
1 Nancy: He’s just a re:al sweet GU:y. .h .t
2 [.hhh
3 Emma: [WONderful.
4 Nancy: So: we were  [sitting in
5 Emma: [YER LIFE is CHANG  [ing
6 Nancy: [EEYE::AH
Although Emma’s turn in line 5 is clearly interruptive in the
sequential sense, as she starts up well before Nancy’s utterance has
reached a possible completion point, it is not (treated as)
interruptive in the moral sense. In fact, it is an affiliative
action, expressing her pleasure at the fact that Nancy has found a
new boyfriend. And Nancy’s unhesitating and enthusiastic response in
line 6 displays her recognition of the utterance’s affiliative
character.
There are, however, instances where the sequential and moral
aspects of interruption coalesce, as, for instance, when an incoming
speaker starts up at a non-transition relevance place to do an
argumentative move, resulting in a confrontational or hostile
interruption, as in the following extract from a call-in radio show
quoted by Hutchby (1992: 349):
example (2)
1 Caller: .hh But I expect tuh get a lot mo:re.
2 Host: So?
3 Caller: .h Now the point is there is a
4 limi  [t to (  )-
> 5 Host: [What’s that got tuh do- what’s
6 that got tuh do with telethons though.
7 Caller: hh Because telethons yesterda:y (0.6)
8 e::rm wuz appealing tuh people, (.) to:
9 send in fo:r various things.
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In this fragment, the host starts in on a turn in a sequentially
interruptive position, i.e. at a place where the current speaker is
clearly embarked on a turn(-component) which is not finished, and
thus not transition ready. In addition, he is starting up in this
interjacent position to do an argumentative interactional move,
cutting off the caller’s utterance “Now the point is there is a
limit ...” to do a challenge, “What’s that got tuh do ... with
telethons though.”
Hutchby’s hostile interruptions as well as Goldberg’s power-
type and competitive interruptions respectively resemble the
instances of interruptions in my corpus. Consider, for example, the
following three extracts:
example (3): Neaptide II, 3
33 JOYCE I saw a solicitor about you.
37 CLAIRE But Mum, I already have a solicitor.
38 JOYCE I know that, don't I?  This one specialised
39 in custody, you should have got one who knew
40 all about it in the first place.
41 CLAIRE (Through clenched teeth.) I have got one who
42 deals with custody.
43 JOYCE Yes, normal custody. Not one who deals with...
44 you know... special circumstances.
45 CLAIRE (Firmly). It's too late now Mum.
46 JOYCE (Sighs). I just wish...
> 47 CLAIRE (Cutting her off). It's no good bloody
48 wishing, is it? Please get on with it.
49 JOYCE The solicitor I saw was a specialist in...
> 50 CLAIRE In special custody cases. Yes, you said that.
51 JOYCE And on top of that, she was one of your lot
52 as well.
example (4): My mother said I, 4
17 MARGARET You can get pregnant the first time, you know.
18 JACKIE Thanks for telling me now.
19 MARGARET Well if you'd come to me and said—
> 20 JACKIE Well I did say I wanted to have a talk with
21 you, actually, and you said “Tell me while we
22 go round the garden centre,” don't you
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23 remember? (Slight pause.) Anyway, you can't
24 scare me, because I'm on the pill, OK?
25 MARGARET Since when?
26 JACKIE Since before Neil and I went away at half
27 term. You knew that because you've been
28 reading my diary.
29 MARGARET (Momentarily caught.) Well I've no idea, you
30 might be on drugs, anything! (Collects
31 herself.) I know I'm going to sound like an
32 old fuddy duddy,... but... (Stuck.) It's a
33 serious step you've taken, you've no idea—
> 34 JACKIE It was no big deal. It was a relief to get it
35 over with. I cried afterwards. Then I laughed.
36 I expect it's better with someone you're in
37 love with.
38 MARGARET You could have waited.
example (5): My mother I, 7
1 DORIS I'll be glad when they put an end to clothes
2 rationing. These sheets are quite threadbare
3 in the middle. (Sound of light aircraft
4 going overhead. Doris studies the sky.)
R.A.F.
5 from the base at Padgate.
6 MARGARET They're B29s, not Lancasters!
7 DORIS I'll be glad when they're gone.
8 (Disdain.) Americans.
9 MARGARET Mother! Without them we couldn't have won
the—
> 10 DORIS Are you going to help me fold this sheet, or
11 are you just going to stand there all
12 afternoon identifying aircraft!
13 MARGARET (Staring at the sky.) Maybe one of them's
Ken.
14 DORIS (They hold the sheet by the corners and tug.)
15 I don't see how it can be, if he's calling in
16 half an hour.
In each of these fragments, the incoming speaker (Claire in example
(3), Jackie in example (4), and Doris in example (5)) starts up in a
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sequentially interruptive position to perform an oppositional
activity. In extract (3), Claire cuts her mother short twice. In
line 47, she cuts off Joyce’s utterance “I just wish ...” to do a
challenge, “It’s not good bloody wishing, is it?”; In line 50,
Claire begins her turn in a position that Jefferson’s (1984, 1986)
has classified as recognitional onset. That is, she recognises what
Joyce wants to say (“The solicitor I saw was a specialist in ...”
line 49) and starts her own turn before her mother’s utterance has
reached a possible completion point. In contrast to the instances of
recognitional onset in Jefferson’s data, however, Claire’s turn
appears to signal impatience and/or irritation rather than
enthusiasm and/or interest in what her mother is saying. Firstly,
she has already made clear that she considers her mother’s
endeavours futile: “It’s too late now, Mum” (line 45). Furthermore,
her utterance implies that Joyce is providing redundant information
(“In special custody cases. Yes, you said that.”) and, therefore, is
irrelevant. Similarly, in extract (4), Jackie interrupts her mother
twice in mid-utterance, and both times, she uses the sequential form
of interruption to produce a counter to what Margaret has just said
(“Well I did say ...” in line 20, and “It was no big deal” in line
34). Finally, in extract (5), Doris cuts off her daughter’s
assertion: “Without them we couldn’t have won the-” with a rebuke:
“Are you going to help me fold this sheet, or are you just going to
stand there all afternoon identifying aircraft!” (lines 10-12). In
contrast to the interruptions in extracts (3) and (4), Doris’s turn
is not even related to the content of her daughter’s prior
utterance. It is an attempt at changing the topic and does not
contain any coherent-cohesive ties with the interrupted utterance.
Hence, it qualifies as a power-type interruption in the sense of
Goldberg (1990). Moreover, the increased loudness signals emotional
involvement and probably irritation and contributes to the
antagonistic character of Doris’ interruption.71
These extracts show how, in the context of a dispute,
disagreement and interruption can work together, in the sense that
participants can be seen to reinforce opposition by invading the
interlocutor’s conversational floor-space, trying to cut her short –
in a word, by interrupting her with an argumentative action. The
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very organisation of turn-taking in these fragments contributes to
our hearing of these stretches of talk as aggravated arguments.72
The confrontational character of the interruptions in my data
is even more obvious in the following two passages:
example (6): ’night Mother
1425 MAMA Ricky isn't through yet. You don't know how
1426 he'll turn out!
1427 JESSIE (Going back to the kitchen.) Yes I do and so
1428 did Cecil. Ricky is the two of us together
1429 for all time in too small a space. And we're
1430 tearing each other apart, like always,
1431 inside that boy, and if you don't see it,
1432 then you're just blind.
1433 MAMA Give him time, Jess.
1434 JESSIE Oh, he'll have plenty of that. Five years
1435 for forgery, ten years for armed assault...
> 1436 MAMA (Furious.) Stop that! ((...))
example (7): Neaptide I, 2
239 CLAIRE Did you ever enrol for those brass rubbing
240 classes, Mum?
241 JOYCE Oh, that's just typical of you, stick your
242 lead in the sand, hear no evil, see no
243 evil, but (She stops herself.) I tell you
244 this much: a social worker had never so much
245 as put a finger on the doorbell until...
> 246 CLAIRE (Harshly). Mum, leave it out, please.
247 JOYCE It's all very well you saying, “Mum,
248 please,” but that won't solve anything.
In these fragments, the sequential form of interruption is used to
package meta-communicative imperatives, which demand that the other
stops pursuing her line of arguing. These turns then are not only
incursive in a sequential sense, but also explicitly challenge the
recipient’s speaking rights, and this combination of interruption
and “inhibiting moves” (Linell 1990) reinforces the aggressive
nature of these contributions.73 Moreover, both the escalated volume
(example 6) and the angry, irritated tone of voice of the
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interrupters signal negative emotional involvement and contribute to
the confrontational character of these turns (cf. French & Local
1986). In sum, in these extracts, the interrupters not only obstruct
the opponent’s flow of speech, but also emphasise the invasive
nature of their activity, thereby reinforcing opposition.
By contrast, speakers can expressly orient to the potential
hostility of an interjacently positioned turn by formulating what
they are doing as ‘interrupting,’ and thereby prospectively
neutralise the negative implications which may attach to the
production of such an interruptive bid for turn-space. For instance,
a speaker starting to talk in the midst of another’s ongoing turn
may use a component such as “Can I just interrupt you” in order to
exhibit an orientation to the possibility that this move may be
negatively evaluated by the other, and to display that no offence is
intended. Consider the following example from Hutchby (1992: 348;
1996a: 79):
example (8)
1 Caller: I’m actually phoning in: support of the
2 stu:dents, .hh and also be[cus I::
3 Host: [Wuh e-ca- can
4 I just interrupt you, wu- [were] w- were=
5 Caller:        [Yes]
6 Host: =you actually on the demonstration yesterday?
The host starts up a question in a sequentially incursive position
(line 3), but immediately interposes a request for permission to
interrupt: “can I just interrupt you.” And the caller, a moment
later, acknowledges the host’s displayed orientation to the
interruptiveness of his turn and consents to his taking the floor
with “Yes” (line 5).
Requesting permission to interrupt, as in this fragment, is one
way of exhibiting an orientation to the other’s speaking rights (and
their potential violation by the incoming speaker). Other ways in
which interactants can “do interrupting” (Bilmes 1997) is by
incorporating an apology for one’s incursive turn-start into the
interruption such as “Sorry to interrupt, but...,” or by explicitly
distancing oneself from the potentially offensive nature of the
interjacent onset, e.g. “I hate to interrupt, but...”
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Interactants, then, may exhibit that they recognise that they
are interfering with another’s utterance, and that they may be
committing a violation of speaking rights in so doing. As we have
seen, by incorporating some special work which constitutes a display
of interruptiveness, speakers can neutralise, or at least tone down,
the negative implications of their activity. By contrast, in the
mother-daughter dispute sequences in my data, speakers who produce
sequentially incursive acts, rather than mitigating the disruptive
nature of their activity, stress the obstructive quality of their
contribution, by explicitly challenging the recipient’s completion
right, as illustrated in extracts (6) and (7), and thereby
contribute to the escalation of the dispute.
In my corpus there are numerous other examples of disputants
aggressively inhibiting an opponent’s talk by using the sequential
form of interruption to package an overt completion-right challenge.
Consider, for instance, the following two extracts:
example (9): Raisin
20 RUTH Fresh - just fresh as salt, this girl!
21 BENEATHA (Drily.) Well- if the salt loses its savor—
> 22 MAMA Now that will do. I just ain't going to have
23 you 'round here reciting the scriptures in
24 vain- you hear me?
example (10): Tell me
308 MOTHER One more word and up to your room.
309 DAUGHTER But...
310 MOTHER Another word, and up you go.
311 DAUGHTER But Mom...
> 312 MOTHER Alright, that's it. That is it. I've heard
313 enough. It might be a good idea, young lady,
314 if you went up to your room.
In each case here, the incoming speaker interrupts another’s ongoing
speech with a meta-communicative remark that aims at terminating the
other’s utterance, thereby stressing, rather than moderating,
antagonism. The obstructive character of these activities is
clearest in extract (10), where the mother cuts of her daughter’s
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turn before she can make a point, thus severely violating the girl’s
completion right (cf. Murray 1985).74
As this discussion shows, focusing on what it is that a speaker
is doing with an interruption in the local context of the
interaction provides further insights into how the impression of
confrontation in the above dispute sequences is accomplished by the
participants.75 This does not capture the complete picture, however,
as it neglects a vital aspect of the interaction. To gain a full
understanding of how the sense of altercation in the mother-daughter
dispute-sequences under analysis is interactively achieved with the
aid of interruptions, in addition to looking at how interruption
gets done by incoming speakers, we also have to examine how
interrupted speakers react to being cut short.
This view is also advocated by several other researchers. For
instance, Hutchby (1992: 344) argues that we have to “take into
account, the participants’ own displayed orientation to the
‘interruptiveness’ of particular overlaps – as evidences, for
instance, by the ways overlapped speakers might show (tacitly or
overtly) that they are treating another’s bit for the floor-space as
illegitimate.” And Bilmes (1997: 511-512) insists that in order for
an event to count as an interruption “there must be some ... signal
of violation by one of the participants though it need not be verbal
or explicit;” that is to say, the event “must be displayed and
handled as violative within the interaction” (original emphasis).
As the careful word choice in these quotations indicates,
participants’ ways of exhibiting their evaluation of an instance of
incursive overlap may be more or less clear-cut, ranging from
tacit/non-verbal to overt/explicit perception displays. Therefore,
we have to look for as much evidence as possible in the
participants’ overall behaviour for their interpretations of events
in the local context of the interaction. As Watts (1991: 92) states,
“although participants rarely accuse one another openly of
interrupting, various features of the interaction in which the
interruption has occurred can be interpreted as revealing that this
is how the interrupted, possibly also the interrupter, has perceived
the event.” It is these potentially revealing features of the
interaction that will be the focus of the subsequent paragraphs.
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In the following spate of talk, the dispute between mother and
daughter seems to become progressively more aggravated. From line
264 onwards, there is an extended sequence of overlapping turns, and
this stretch of overlapping talk appears to mark an increasing
degree of antagonism between the disputants, as each tries to “out
talk” - even “out shout” - the other to drive the argument home. In
the following, I want to examine how the ways in which participants
both do interruption and react to being interrupted play a crucial
part in framing this spate of talk as a heated dispute.
example (11): Home
257 OLIVIA You make one mistake after another for 20
258 years and you never took responsibility
for
259 one second! You brought babies into this
260 world that you could barely feed 'cause
261 that husband a yours couldn't hold down a
262 job.
263 MARY JANE That's such a lie! How could you say that?
> 264 OLIVIA (Overlapping.) Oh, keep your voice down.
> 265 MARY JANE (Overlapping.) He got laid off that time,
266 Ma! Laid off!
267 OLIVIA (Jumps up and shuts the windows.)
> 268 (Overlapping.) You don't have to broadcast
269 it to the world.
> 270 MARY JANE (Overlapping.) And we woulda paid back
271 every penny of that money but Daddy said
272 it was okay not to. Okay not to! You hear
273 me, Ma?
> 274 OLIVIA (Overlapping.) The whole neighborhood can
275 hear you!
> 276 MARY JANE (Overlapping.) So don't you ever bring
that
277 up again!
> 278 OLIVIA (Overlapping.) You should be ashamed of
279 that fresh mouth of yours.
280 MARY JANE That's all you care about, isn't it? What
281 the neighbors think and where the
282 neighbors are moving to.
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This extract contains a relatively long series of successive
sequentially interruptive turns that are used to package
oppositional actions (lines 264-279). And we can see how each
disputant employs these interruptions in an attempt to either pursue
her own line of arguing in face of continuing resistance, as in Mary
Jane’s case, or to close the other down and terminate the dispute
sequence, as in Olivia’s case.
Prior to this fragment, Mary Jane and her mother have been
arguing about whether Olivia has been taking enough interest in her
daughter’s life. Mary Jane has repeatedly accused her mother of
neglecting her, while Olivia has persistently denied her daughter’s
allegations. At the beginning of this sequence, Olivia issues a
series of accusatory claims, which portray Mary Jane’s behaviour as
irresponsible (lines 257-262), thus shifting the blame back to her.
In the following turn, Mary Jane disputes the truth of her mother’s
prior claim, maintaining that what Olivia has just said is a lie
(“That’s such a lie!” line 263). Subsequently, she issues a blame-
implicative question (“How could you say that?”), which construes
Olivia’s prior utterance as an offence and obliges her to account
for her claim in the subsequent turn.76 But before she can finish her
turn, in line 264, Olivia interrupts her with a meta-communicative
directive, telling her to “keep [her] voice down.” Mary Jane’s
reaction to this takes a particular form: she apparently refuses to
cede the floor once her mother’s interruption is under way. In other
words, as Olivia interrupts her, she responds by carrying on with
the overlapped utterance. In lines 265-266, she elaborates on her
initial opposition, by producing a counter to Olivia’s allegation
that her husband “couldn’t hold down a job” (line 261), shouting:
“He got laid off that time, Ma! Laid off!” In addition, rather than
comply with her mother’s demand, she even increases the volume. The
interruptive placement combined with the raised voice and self-
repetition signals negative emotional involvement and aggravates
opposition even further. In line 268, Olivia interrupts her again
with a challenge that mirrors her own prior interruptive challenge:
she issues another meta-communicative remark that expresses
disapproval of Mary Jane’s verbal demeanour and implicitly demands
that she lower her voice: “You don't have to broadcast it to the
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world.” This exchange of largely monological, interruptively placed
oppositional turns continues through the end of the excerpt.
To sum up, in this fragment, there are several instances where
the current speaker is interrupted before she is ready to stop
talking. On each occasion, the interrupted speaker chooses to
continue her own line of talk at the same time as the interrupter at
a higher volume and/or pitch. The fact that neither disputant pulls
back leads to extended simultaneous oppositional talk, which lends
this stretch of conversation its confrontational nature.
The disputants’ discursive behaviour in the above sequence
markedly contrasts with the behaviour of conversationalists in
friendly conversations. In non-confrontational interactional
environments, it is usually the case that speakers who are
interrupted quickly drop out of competition for the floor (Jefferson
1986; Jefferson & Schegloff 1975). For instance, in the following
extract, the interjacently overlapped speaker readily cedes the
floor soon after the onset of overlap.
example (12): (quoted from Hutchby 1996a: 82)
1 Zoe: an’ he sorta scares me, h
2 Amy: Have you seen ‘im?
3 Zoe: .hhh We:ll I(m) I’ve met ‘im,
4 Amy: .hhhh Well uh actually:   [when she’s-
> 5 Zoe: [an’ the way the:y
6 pla:y. Oh:-
7 (.)
8 Amy: Serious huh?
9 Zoe: .h Yah,
The speaker who is overlapped, rather than attempting to finish her
utterance, abandons what she is saying in mid-phrase. Dropping out
of competition for the floor like this is one routine way in which
participants orient to the minimisation of overlap in ordinary
conversation (Jefferson & Schegloff 1975; Sacks et al 1974; some
other techniques are discussed in Schegloff 1987).
By contrast, in the extract from Home, this basic
characteristic of overlap in conversation, i.e. its brevity, is
noticeably absent. Rather than display a concern to minimise overlap
and show willingness to cede the floor, we find mother and daughter
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mutually “talking over” one another in a simultaneous attempt to
drive home their respective points.
Moreover, although the overlapping speaker mentions something
slightly disjunctive from what the current speaker seems about to
say, in extract (12), the overlapped speaker does not overtly
sanction her co-participant for engaging in an illegitimate
activity. Indeed, once the speaker has dropped out, she subsequently
comments on the other’s utterance with a short remark (“Serious
huh?” line 8), which prompts the overlapping speaker to resume the
floor and elaborate on her utterance.
By way of contrast, in the example from Home above, the
speakers’ continuing mutual competition for the floor in tandem with
the production of unmitigated oppositional turns and an increase in
volume signals negative emotional involvement and displays their
orientation to the argumentative nature of their current
interactivity.
Similar instances (and effects) of handling interruptions in
this way have been observed in conflict sequences in institutional
contexts. For instance, Hutchby (1992; 1996a: 84) finds that in
argument sequences on talk radio, refusal to cede the floor to an
overlapping speaker highlights the combative nature of interruptions
and thus contributes to the framing of a strip of conversation as
“confrontation talk.” And in an analysis of televised political
debates, Bilmes (1997) finds various “being-interrupted displays”
(519), i.e. verbal and non-verbal displays of annoyance, of
determination to hold the floor, of being obstructed, on the part of
interrupted speakers. These include, for instance, the “act of
continuing to talk in overlap” in tandem with a show of insistence
and/or annoyance, involving, for example, “facial expressions,
gestures, grammatical devices, repetition, and raised voice” (520,
my emphasis).
This is exactly what we have observed in example (12): Instead
of displaying an orientation to the minimisation of overlap, both
speakers continue to talk in overlap, with self-repetition and
increased volume (“Laid off!” in line 266 and “Ok not to!” line 272)
conveying anger and exasperation. In addition, this extract
illustrates another technique for “doing being interrupted” Bilmes
mentions, namely “ignoring what the interrupter has said, thereby
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treating the interruptive utterance as illegitimate, null, and void”
(521). As we have seen, up to line 280, rather than address her
mother’s repeated interruptive meta-communicative remarks, Mary Jane
simply continues with her line of arguing. By ignoring Olivia’s
interjections, she construes them as out-of-place actions.
The upshot of this is that the spate of talk in example 11 is
argumentative not only in terms of its content (and preference
structure), but also in terms of its turn-taking structure.
Apparently, talking interruptively and reacting to another’s talk as
interruptive contributes to the framing, or contextualisation, of a
sequence of talk as a dispute.
So far I have shown how the interplay of interruption and
aggravated opposition accounts for the sense of antagonism in the
mother-daughter disputes in my corpus. In the following, I will
focus on the use of particular forms of interruption as devices for
exacerbating opposition in these dispute sequences. The first device
I will look at involves the use of interruption to block the
development of the opponent’s line of argument.
For example, in the extract from Avenue below, we find Olga
cutting in on Mother’s turn in a particular sequential position,
which Jefferson (1986) has referred to as “post-continuation”:
example (13): Avenue
307 OLGA How dare you read my personal property?
308 MOTHER (Angry, scared, she has gone too far.) I wanted
309 to see what you write. Sometimes I see you
310 writing, so I wanted to see what it was. Just a
311 bunch of junk. You'd think you'd write something
312 good, like them confession stuff. I read a story
313 the other day about this girl, just out of high
314 school and she got mixed up with a bunch of
315 college men and—
> 316 OLGA I never look in your drawers!
317 MOTHER If you did, you'd find nothing silly like that.
After having answered Olga’s accusatory question (“I wanted to see
what you write.” lines 308-309), Mother embarks on a lengthy
explanation of her behaviour, which then changes into derogatory
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comments on her daughter’s writing (“Just a bunch of junk.” line
311) and eventually develops into a report of another story she has
recently read (lines 312-315). In line 316, Olga produces a
sequentially interruptive turn, shifting the talk back to the
original topic, namely her mother’s transgression: “I never look in
your drawers!” In addition to the sequentially incursive placement,
the escalated volume her voice signals emotional agitation and
reinforces her challenge.
As mentioned above, Olga interrupts her mother in a sequential
location, which has been identified by Jefferson (1986) in her work
on the systematics of overlapping talk as a standard position for
the onset of turn-incursive overlap, namely “post continuation
onset.” In line 317, to quote Jefferson’s (1986: 159) description,
Olga starts to speak “just after the current speaker [i.e. Mother]
has produced a clear indication of going on, following a possible
completion.” As Jefferson (1986: 160) remarks, post continuation
seems “a reasonable enough place to ‘interrupt’. For example, if
what has been - adequately, and syntactically possibly completely –
said so far is something to which a recipient wants to respond, and
now it looks like the speaker is at least continuing and perhaps
moving on to other matters, then one might want to get in now, while
the initial matter is still relevant, even if it means
interrupting.” Accordingly, post-continuation is a systematic and
warranted place for overlapping talk and the incoming speaker thus
may not be perceived as violating the other’s speaking
rights/performing an illegitimate/offensive action. Jefferson (1986:
159-160) gives the following two examples to illustrate this type of
interjacent onset:
example (14)
1 Amy: All thetu stuff Maryou:? requires a
2 lo:tta spa:ce. Ah me [a:n ih .hhh
> 3 Marylou: [Specially if
4 yer gonna have it open fuh the public,
example (15)
1 Emma: cz you see she wz: depending on: hhim
2 takin’er in tuh the L.A. deeple s:-
3 depot Sundee so [‘e siz
> 4 Lottie: [Ah:’ll take’er in:
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In these sample passages, the second speakers’ turns are
interruptive in that they begin one or two syllables into what is
clearly a continuation on the current speaker’s part, following the
completion of a sentence or phrase. However, these sequentially
interruptive turns both package supportive actions. In extract (14),
Marylou produces an agreement with Amy’s prior assertion, and in
extract (15), Lottie’s overlapping turn is an offer of help with the
trouble encountered by Emma’s daughter in getting to “the L.A. depot
Sundee.” Thus, in these extracts we again find overlaps which are
interruptive in the sequential sense (i.e. they are to some degree
incursive), but do not appear to be interruptive on the
interpersonal level of interaction.
By contrast, in extract (13), Olga employs post-continuation
interruption to do an argumentative action. In line 316, Olga uses
this sequential form to challenge the account Mother provided at the
beginning of her turn, but from which her line of talk seems to be
moving away. As described above, following an explanation for her
having read Olga’s writing, Mother goes on to talk about a story she
has recently read, thereby shifting the talk away from the issues of
her transgression. But the attempted topic-shift is blocked by Olga
as she butts in with an interruption that effectively prevents this
possible digression to preserve her mother’s behaviour as the topic
of talk.77
The following sample passage provides a slightly different
example of a disputant argumentatively interrupting her opponent in
post-continuation position. Olivia interrupts a clear continuation
on Mary Jane’s part to cut off her line of talk, having identified
an arguable action which, by virtue of Mary Jane possibly moving on
to some other issue, might be about to lose its relevance:
example (16): Home
243 MARY JANE You were always like this. Always like
244 this. I was 19 years old and you coulda
245 stopped me from going to California with
246 Jimbo to begin with and my life woulda—
> 247 OLIVIA Nobody coulda stopped you.
248 MARY JANE You didn't even try! I was your daughter
249 and you didn't care where I ended up.
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Prior to this extract, Olivia has informed her daughter that she has
made arrangements to sell her house. At the beginning of this
fragment, Mary Jane attacks her mother with a series of accusations.
The extreme formulation “always” (line 243) serves to both intensify
and legitimise her criticism, by construing Olivia’s behaviour as a
recurring offence rather than a single instance. Moreover, self-
repetition (“Always like this.” lines 243-244) stresses Mary Jane’s
position and thus reinforces her criticism. In the remainder of her
turn, Mary Jane elaborates on her blame, by citing a concrete
example of Olivia’s perceived failures as evidence for her claim
(lines 244-246). But before she can finish her turn, Olivia
interrupts her with an outright denial: “Nobody coulda stopped you”
(line 247). In the subsequent turn, Mary Jane counter-opposes her
with another accusatory claim: “You didn't even try!” (line 248).
Her raised voice signals high emotional involvement and further
escalates the dispute. In the remainder of her turn, Mary Jane
expands on her accusation, claiming: “I was your daughter and you
didn't care where I ended up” (lines 248-249).
The confrontational nature of the interruptions in extracts
(13) and (16) is further emphasised by the fact that the amount of
talk that goes by following a possible completion point in the
current speaker’s turn before the opponent’s interruption is
substantially more than in examples (14) and (15). In extract (16),
Mary Jane completes a sentence in lines 245-246 with “with Jimbo.”
It is only after she has produced seven more complete words that
Olivia comes in with a counter. Example (13) is even more graphic in
this regard, as Olga does not interrupt Mother with her counter
(line 316) until she has embarked on a lengthy turn.
The argumentative and aggressive nature of the post-
continuation interruptions in my data can thus be put down to two
basic characteristics. Firstly, they differ from Jefferson’s
examples in terms of the amount of talk that the interrupter lets
pass by before making her bid for the floor. The resulting ‘deep
incision’ into another’s turn lends these instances a greater sense
of interruptiveness and contributes to the sense of intensity of
these dispute sequences. In addition, the opponent interrupts a
continuation by the other in order to obstruct the line of talk, to
respond to an arguable action which the continuation puts in
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possible danger of losing its local contextual relevance. By this
means, disputants are able to maintain the relevance of contentious
points, and thereby to sustain the ongoing argument sequence.
As the above discussion suggests, in heated phases of dispute,
participants have to place their counter as early as possible after
the occurrence of an arguable action on the opponent’s turn in order
to preserve the relevance of their contribution. This accounts for
the sense of quick pace and the relatively high frequency of
interruptions in my data.
There is an additional explanation for the frequent recurrence
of interruptions in the disputes under analysis. Olivia’s
interruption in the preceding extract relates to an observation by
Murray (1985), as I already noted above. Murray finds that members’
evaluation of an instance of overlap is based on a range of factors.
He proposes, for instance, that special rights to be heard, e.g.
following an attack, override completion rights, and may thus
warrant an interruption of the attacked speaker’s part. Murray’s
findings are concordant with Bilmes’ (1988: 167) observation that
following accusations – and, by extrapolation, attributions, there
is an expectation of immediate, even interruptive, denial:
when A attributes some action or thought to B in B’s
presence, there is a preference for B to contradict A
interruptively or immediately following the turn in which the
attribution was produced. In other words, following
attributions on a recipient, there is a preference for
contradiction. (my emphasis; cf. also Garcia 1991: 821)78
From this perspective, Olivia’s interruptively placed denial in line
247, confrontational as it is, is both expectable and warranted
given Mary Jane’s preceding attack on her. This may, in part,
explain why it is not sanctioned as being out-of-place by Mary Jane
in her following turn - although her raised voice (“You didn't even
try!” line 248) may signal that she is angry about her mother’s
denial and/or her interruption.
In the following extract from My mother, we can see a similar
instance of a counter being interposed in a turn performing a
negative attribution:
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example (17): My mother I, 7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of the
131 valley!
132 MARGARET He's not.
133 DORIS He is.
134 MARGARET He's not, just parking.
135 DORIS Curious method of parking.
136 MARGARET That's typical, you think all Americans are
137 brash and wear loud check shirts and chew
138 gum and want to marry English girls. You're
139 just prej—...
> 140 DORIS Margaret, that's enough! (Pause.) After all,
141 he is going to marry an English girl.
The excerpt starts with Doris complaining to Margaret that her
American boyfriend is about to crush her flowers (lines 130-131).
This triggers a sequence of mutual contradictions with the two women
mutually negating each others’ assertions (lines 131-135). When
Margaret starts attacking her mother, and accuses her of being
prejudiced (lines 136-139), Doris cuts her off with an inhibiting
move, as discussed above (“Margaret, that's enough!” line 140). The
sequentially interruptive placement of her counter in combination
with the volume increase displays a negative affective reaction
(i.e. anger) at what Mary Jane has just said and aggravates
opposition.
The two preceding examples again show how argumentative
actions, such as accusations and denials, and the sequential form of
interruption collaborate in the local interactional accomplishment
of dispute phases of talk.
As mentioned above, interruptions are often thought to be
involved with the establishment or maintenance of power in
interaction. As West & Zimmerman (1977: 527) put it: “The use of
interruptions is in fact a control device, since the incursion ...
disorganizes the local construction of a topic.” As the following
examples will show, disputants can indeed exert a form of discursive
control through the use of a particular technique involving what
Jefferson (1981) has called “post-response-initiation” interruption.
As we will see, disputants may use post-response-initiation
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interruption as an arguing device to constrain the opponent’s
participation options.
Jefferson notes some uses of post-response-initiation
interruption as a way of following up a prior statement or question.
In particular, she observes that it seems to be used in dealing with
“unfavourable” responses on the part of recipients. Jefferson’s
central phenomenon is the “post-response pursuit of response”: a
device whereby speakers “attempt to elicit revision of a problematic
response by proposing, in effect, that the response did not occur
and response is due” (1981: i). The following extract from a
psychiatric interview is an example:
example (18) (quoted from Jefferson 1981: 10)
1 Dr. F: I understand (0.8) (    ) that you’re not
2 feeling very well.
3 Mary: Yea::h well that is   [the opinion   ]
> 4 Dr. F:   [Is that correc]t?
5 Mary: of Doctor Hollmann.
6 Dr. F: Uh [huh
7 Mary:    [But it isn’t mine.
This form of asking for a response after a response has been
initiated is, Jefferson (1981: 13) suggests, “an attempt to counter,
override, interrupt an unfavourable response-in-progress.” Mary’s
response is unfavourable because it is not the response the doctor
was after: he can interpret Mary’s “Yea::h well ...” (line 3) as
indicating an upcoming disagreement (as described in the preceding
section) with his description of her condition as “not feeling very
well,” i.e. as in a condition possibly to be readmitted to the
psychiatric hospital (cf. Bergmann 1992).
In a similar way, the participants in my data can be seen to
use this form of countering, or overriding a response-in-progress to
deal with unfavourable responses. This device provides a
conversational resource that can be used as a means of constraining
the options open to the opponent in formulating a response - in
particular a counter or a defence - to a preceding assertion or
challenge. Consider the following two sample passages:
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example (19): My sister 9
220 MADAME DANZARD What is the world coming to? I couldn't
221 believe my eyes.
222 ISABELLE But Maman-
> 223 MADAME DANZARD There are no buts involved here.
224 ISABELLE Maybe she didn't know, Maman.
225 MADAME DANZARD (Gathering up the cards.) Of course she
226 knew. She deliberately put it on and
227 wore it.
example (20): Stuck 6b
57 LULA But, see, sometimes, I still think about
58 doing something with my life, you know,
59 maybe even going to college—
60 MOM Oh no, you're too old to go to college now.
61 LULA People go—
> 62 MOM And you might not get in. No, you probably
63 wouldn't. Why torture yourself like that?
64 Life is disappointing enough.
65 LULA I could just go to San Francisco - maybe?
In both these extracts, the mother cuts into a response-in-progress
because she judges from what she has heard of the response so far
that it is somehow unacceptable. In example (19), Isabelle’s “But
Maman-” (line 222) signals that she is about to produce some kind of
disagreement with her mother’s prior utterance. This is not
acceptable for Madame Danzard, and in line 223, she cuts her off
before she has had the chance to make her point to explicitly
sanction her response as inappropriate: “There are no buts involved
here.” In reaction, Isabelle issues a mitigated version of her prior
objection (“Maybe she didn't know, Maman” line 224), which is then
again strongly contested by her mother in the next turn: “Of course
she knew. ...” In extract (20), Mom cuts into Lula’s statement that
she is thinking about going to college, arguing that she is “too
old” for that (line 60). However, her turn does not constitute an
interruption in the strict sense, since she starts up at a position
in Lula’s utterance that could well be taken as a possible point of
completion; rather, Mom’s disagreement seems to be produced
latchingly. Her next turn, however, is clearly both argumentative
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and sequentially interruptive: in line 62, she cuts off Lula’s
counter-in-progress to expand on her own preceding oppositional
turn, adding further reasons why she questions Lula’s plan to go to
college. Like Isabelle in the preceding extract, Lula’s reaction to
her mother’s interruption does not show any signs that she perceives
her activity as a breach of speaking rights. Indeed, in line 61, she
seems to ratify her mother’s objections, when she suggests that she
might go to San Francisco (instead of going to college).
In each of these sample passages, the mother cuts her daughter
short in mid-utterance, displaying – either explicitly, as in
extract 19, or implicitly by simply ignoring what the other is
saying, as in extract 20 - that the response she is about to give is
unacceptable. And in each case, instead of rejecting the mother’s
interruption as illegitimate, the interrupted speaker adjusts her
response to some degree.
As these fragments show, countering or overriding a response-
in-progress by means of an oppositional move packaged as an
interruption provides a conversational resource that disputants can
exploit to restrict the options available to the opponent for
developing a response that is perceived as unfavourable to the
interrupter’s position. In this way, interruptions-cum-challenges
(or, as we might call them, argumentative interruptions) can be
employed to exercise control over both the structure and content of
the ongoing interaction.
In the two preceding fragments, we have seen how disputants can
use interruption as a control device, by cutting into an
unacceptable response-in-progress in order to press for a (more)
acceptable response. This does not mean, however, that this control
manoeuvre is always effective. In the following extract from ‘night
Mother, for instance, Mama’s aggressive interruption of her
daughter’s response to her suggestion does not prompt Jessie to
abandon her stance:
example (21): ‘night Mother
720 MAMA Good time don't come looking for you, Jessie.
721 You could work some puzzles or put in a
722 garden or go to the store. Let's call a taxi
723 and go to the A&P!
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724 JESSIE I shopped you up for about two weeks already.
725 You're not going to need toilet paper till
726 Thanksgiving.
> 727 MAMA (Interrupting.) You're acting like some little
728 brat, Jessie. You're mad and everybody's
729 boring and you don't have anything to do and
730 you don't like me and you don't like going out
731 and you don't like staying in and you never
talk
732 on the phone and you don't watch TV and you're
733 miserable and it's your own sweet fault.
734 JESSIE And it's time I did something about it.
Prior to this exchange, Jessie has tried to explain to her mother
why she intends to kill herself. At the beginning of this sequence,
Mama tries to dissuade her from committing suicide, by telling her
that she has to take control of her life (lines 720-721) and
proposing several activities she could engage in to keep herself
busy and make her life more attractive (lines 721-722). She closes
her turn suggesting that they call a cab and go shopping in the
local supermarket (lines 722-723). In the following turn, however,
Jessie declines her mother’s suggestion - and thus also her attempts
at distracting her from her plan to put an end to her life -
claiming that she has already done the shopping and has even built
up an abundant supply of household items (lines 724-726). The stark
contrast between her remark on such trivial matters as the stock of
toilet paper she has bought (lines 725-726) and the preceding
discussion about the highly sensitive issue of her suicidal
intentions generates a clash of frames or scripts and thereby humour
(cf. Norrick 1986; Raskin 1985), more specifically gallows humour.
While at the content level of interaction Jessie’s utterance
provides Mama with information about the amount of toilet paper she
has at her disposal, at the interpersonal level her remark signals
that she is not willing to discuss her plan to commit suicide any
further. In addition, the humorous key suggests that she does not
take the conversation or her mother’s concerns seriously. This
prompts Mama to attack her, and to do so as quickly as possible.
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criticism. By formulating what Jessie is doing as “acting like some
little brat” (lines 727-728) she rejects her daughter’s behaviour as
inappropriate, offensive, immature and irresponsible.79 The
sequentially interruptive placement of her counter signals her
indignation and serves to further aggravate opposition. In the
remainder of her turn, Mama elaborates on her criticism, providing a
detailed description of her daughter’s misdemeanour (lines 728-733).
As in the two preceding extracts, Jessie does not sanction her
mother’s interruption as out-of-place talk, nor does she reject her
criticism or put up a defence. In fact, in line 734, she confirms
Mama’s assessment of the situation, and argues that it is time she
“did something about it.” In so doing, she implies that her plan to
kill herself is but a logical consequence of the situation Mama has
just described, and thereby uses Mama’s own argument against her.
In the extract from Avenue below, too, Mother cuts into her
daughter’s challenging response with a negative categorisation, and,
like Jessie in the preceding example, Olga insists on her critical
stance towards her mother’s boyfriend, thereby maintaining the
dispute sequence:
example (22): Avenue
160 MOTHER Try to look decent and neat. (Crosses to
161 bureau drawer, rummages around, takes out
162 pair of stockings.)
163 OLGA You think he looks so neat. One time he had
164 no buttons on the sleeves of his shirt.
165 One time the zipper on his fly was broken.
166 And one time there were wine stains—
167 MOTHER (Crosses R., sits in chair, starts to put
> 168 on stockings.) You're too nosy, that's what
169 you are. He needs a woman to fix everything
170 up for him.
171 OLGA His first wife ran out on him. Ha!
In line 163, Olga rejects her mother’s prior request to try to dress
up for the upcoming dinner with her (mother’s) boyfriend, by
disputing the assumption underlying Mother’s utterance that he is
worth the effort: “You think he looks so neat. ...” (lines 163). She
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produces a whole list of the man’s failures to substantiate her
claim, but in line 167, Mother cuts her off with a negative
categorisation (“You're too nosy, that's what you are.”), thereby
simultaneously challenging the validity of Olga’s prior activity as
well as her personality. As in the extract above, the interplay of
sequential interruptiveness and aggravated opposition contribute to
the aggressive nature of her contribution. But, instead of backing
down, in her subsequent turn, Olga keeps up her oppositional stance
- and thus also the argumentative nature of the sequence - and
counters her mother’s claim that her boyfriend “needs a woman to fix
everything up for him” (lines 169-170).
As the above discussion has shown, while disputants may draw on
post-response-initiation interruption to exercise control over the
ongoing talk, by cutting off an opponent’s undesirable response-in-
progress to push for a (more) satisfactory response, this control
manoeuvre is not always successful. Although the interrupted
speakers in the two preceding examples do not openly object to or
resist being interrupted, following the interruption they do not
back down from their oppositional position either. Rather than issue
some mitigated version of their earlier interrupted response (as in
extracts 20 and 21), the interruptees in extracts (22) and (23)
produce some kind of counter to what the interrupter has said in
their interjacently positioned turn, and thereby sustain the dispute
sequence.
To sum up so far, the ways in which conversationalists do
interruption as well as how they react to being interrupted play an
important part in the local interactional accomplishment of dispute
talk. For example, in my data, interrupters can be seen to stress
rather than mitigate the disruptive nature of their activity (e.g.
by explicitly challenging the recipient’s completion right), thereby
reinforcing the confrontational nature of their activity and
aggravating opposition. Moreover, disputants have a range of
interruption formats at their disposal which they can exploit as
devices for sustaining and exacerbating opposition. For instance, on
having identified an arguable action in the opponent’s talk,
speakers may use post-continuation interruption to block the
development of the opponent’s line of argument, in order to counter
that arguable action, which the continuation puts in possible danger
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of losing its local contextual relevance. This form of interruption
enables disputants to maintain the relevance of contentious points
and thereby sustain the ongoing argument sequence. Furthermore,
disputants may use post-response-initiation interruption as an
arguing device to constrain the opponent’s options for developing a
response that is perceived as unfavourable to the interrupter’s
position and thereby to exercise control over the course of the
ongoing interaction. In addition, rather than show an orientation to
the minimisation of overlapping talk, interrupted speakers may
refuse to cede the floor to an incoming speaker, while
simultaneously displaying insistence and/or annoyance (e.g. by means
of repetition and/or raised voice), thus emphasising the
antagonistic nature of the interaction.
As noted above, similar uses of and reactions to interruptions
have also been found in naturally occurring arguments, especially in
conflict sequences in institutional settings. Interestingly,
however, another way in which interactants can display that their
turn at talk has been improperly interrupted that has frequently
been noted in the literature on interruptions is noticeably absent
in my data. In the remainder of this section, I will consider a
possible explanation for the conspicuous absence of this type of
“being interrupted display” in my corpus.
In their studies of arguments on talk radio and televised
political debates, Hutchby (1992, 1996a), Bilmes (1997; 1999) and
Schegloff (1988/89) find that one way in which interrupted speakers
may exhibit that they perceive another’s turn-incursive bid for the
floor as inappropriate is by claiming that one has been interrupted,
has not been allowed to finish, or the like as in “Let me finish
this”; “... you keep interrupting”; “Would you stop interrupting
me”; etc. Consider, for instance, the following example from Hutchby
(1992: 354, 1996a: 78), in which a speaker responds to another’s
interruption by rebuking her for having made an illegitimate bid for
the floor:
example (23)
1 Caller: As you can imagine I wuz absolutely::
2 =livi [d(h)
3 Host: [Well did you- did you then ek-
4 explain that yoou- un:derstood. that,
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5 yihknow do:gs have the call of nature
6 just as er as people do:[:,.hh an’]they=
7 Caller:     [eYe:s,]
8 Host: =don’t have the same kind of control, and
9 so the [refore the- s-so]
10 Caller: [No::, but dogs ] can be
11 t [r a i : n e d,]
> 12 Host:   [m-I haven’t fi]nished so therefore
13 thee owner, .hhh er whether you train
14 them or not is not really, quite the
15 point, but the owner, being there has the
16 responsibility ...
Here, the host displays his negative evaluation of the caller’s
overlap by (1) explicitly rebuking her by announcing, as the caller
is speaking, that he “hasn’t finished” (line 12), and (2) resuming
his utterance at its cut-off point (“so therefore thee owner, ...”),
once the caller has stopped talking.
Another instance of a speaker’s formulation of some stretch of
overlapping talk as an interruption is illustrated in Talbot (1992).
Her analysis centres upon an occasion in which a husband accuses his
wife of interrupting him while he was recounting an event from their
recent holiday to friends. In saying “I wish you’d stop interrupting
me!” the husband clearly interprets what appear to be his wife’s
attempts at collaborative involvement in telling the story as
interruptions of his storytelling.
In each of these examples, the current speaker openly displays
a negative evaluation of another’s overlapping speech by explicitly
formulating the incoming speaker’s activity as an infringement on
their speaking rights. As mentioned above, this never happens in my
data. Although, as we have seen, disputants are frequently cut off
by an opponent with an argumentative action, and although
interruptees do show an orientation to the combative nature of such
interruptions-cum-counters, there is no instance in my data in which
an interrupted speaker complains that the opponent has performed an
illegitimate action in invading her turn-space.
There are several possible explanations for these different
findings. Firstly, as I already noted, the instances of interruption
claims discussed by Bilmes (1997; 1999), Hutchby’s (1992, 1996a),
Schegloff (1988/89) and Talbot (1992) are, at least in part,
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directed to an overhearing audience - the audience in front of the
TV or radio or the friend who is listening to the couple’s story.
For instance, adopting Goffman’s (1981) participant roles,
Gruber (2001: 1825) states that the discussants in TV talk-shows
produce their talk not only for an addressed recipient (i.e. their
immediate interlocutor), but also for some other unaddressed
ratified recipients (i.e. the other participants of the discussion)
as well as for an unratified recipient (i.e. the overhearing
audience). Bilmes (1999, 2001) assigns the audience an even more
central role in the ongoing interaction. He states that “[political
campaign] debates are talk for an audience” (2001: 160), and that
they are different from conversational arguments “in that the
objective is not to convince one’s interlocutor but to convince the
audience and thereby win votes” (1999: 216).80 The participants thus
extend beyond the physical presence of their interlocutor(s) to
include the overhearing (TV, radio and/or studio) audience as
addressee of their utterances. The audience is then both overhearer
and addressee to be persuaded about the superiority and/or
credibility of a position and the person putting forward that
position. As Bilmes (1999: 236, fn6) puts it, candidates in
political debates are “trying to favorably impress the audience and
to create an unfavourable impression of [their] opponent.”
This multi-directedness of talk has a crucial bearing on
participants’ actions in so far as they may orient not only to the
immediate addressee in producing and shaping their turns but also to
the unaddressed ratified participant(s) in the interaction (e.g. to
get supported by them and thus gain an advantage in the situation)
as well as to an overhearing audience (e.g. to impress them for
personal and/or political reasons).81 In fact, as research on talk in
institutional contexts has shown, the audience-directed nature of
the talk-in-interaction in these settings may give rise to the
‘strategic’ use of conversational resources such as, for example,
specific types of questions (Gruber 2001; Heritage 2002a) and
formulations (Atkinson & Drew 1979; Heritage 1985).
By the same token, speakers may use being-interrupted claims as
a device to present themselves in a good and others in a bad light:
by claiming that they have been illegitimately interrupted, speakers
are able to construe themselves as victim and the other as invader
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in an attempt to gain the overhearing audience’s support and or
sympathy.82
This relates to Goffman’s (1959) concept of “impression
management.” As noted above, Goffman adopts a dramaturgical
perspective to illustrate how social reality is formed through
interactions and performances. Interaction is viewed as a
“performance,” shaped by environment and audience, constructed to
provide others with “impressions” that are consonant with the
desired goals of the actor (17). Goffman is concerned with how
convincing the performance was to the audience. Our ability to carry
off a convincing performance, to make people believe that we are who
we say we are, we mean what we intend, and that the definition of
the situation is what we have claimed by implication, is the means
to our impressing ourselves and others. To portray a particular
identity and prevent embarrassment and disruption of our performance
in order to obtain particular outcomes in an interaction, we often
engage in what Goffman refers to as impression management. This
refers to the ways in which we supervise our own as well as others’
performances. For instance, if we say or do something unsuitable to
our performance, we may seek to redeem ourselves quickly by saying
or doing something to re-harmonise it. Similarly, interruptions and
contradictions are disruptive of an individual’s performance, and
may thus prompt the interruptee to employ different techniques of
impression management to re-establish order and restore her
identity.
To summarise so far, the use of overt claims of being
interrupted in the exchanges analysed by Bilmes (1997, 1999),
Hutchby (1992, 1996a), Schegloff (1988/89) and Talbot (1992) may
indicate the speaker’s orientation to an overhearing audience in an
attempt to get their support and/or sympathy. By contrast, in the
mainly dyadic mother-daughter disputes in my data, there is usually
no such audience the speakers might appeal to with such a claim (on
the character level that is), which may account for the absence of
this type of interruption display therein.
Another possible explanation of the lack of explicit being-
interrupted claims in my data draws on the notion of sequential
organisation of dispute sequences as a possible source of
interruption. As noted above, members’ evaluation of an instance of
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overlap is based on a range of factors. For instance, special rights
to be heard, e.g. following accusations, attributions and other
kinds of attacks, after which there is a preference for immediate
contradiction, override completion rights, and may thus warrant an
interruption on the addressee’s part. Against this background, both
the frequent occurrence of argumentative interruptions and the lack
of complaints about such interruptions in my data might, at least in
part, originate from the fact that the interactivity of disputing
consists to a large extent in the exchange of these very kinds of
activities.83 This suggests that once a dispute frame has been
established, participants are expected to disagree and to do so
emphatically and quickly.
As we have seen, in the above examples of mother-daughter
disputes, turn-incursive overlaps are common. Disagreement is
regularly placed immediately at or shortly after a point in the
opponent’s turn, where an arguable action has been identified/is
projectable. The recurrence of such argumentative interruptions
indicates that during heated phases of dispute, when the current
speaker has produced what can be construed as an arguable action,
opponents do not/cannot wait for a possible completion point to
occur.
In my data the opponents produce an oppositional turn as soon
as they recognise an arguable point in the current speaker’s
utterance. Apparently, in heated phases of dispute, the need to
contradict as soon as possible is more important than adhering to
the one-at-a-time rule, and overrides completion rights.84 This
expectation of instant disagreement results in the temporary
departure form the standard turn-taking structure and quick pace
that characterise the conflict episodes in my corpus.
In addition, in contrast to the argumentative exchanges in
institutional settings discussed above, the participants in my data
do not show an orientation towards the potential illegitimacy of
incursively placed disagreements. If we assume that participants
display in their responses to each other (and the analyst) what are
allowable contributions in the activity type (Levinson 1992) at
hand, this lack of interruption and being-interrupted displays in my
data suggests that interruptions are a constitutive element of
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heated phases of disputes between mothers and daughters (and
presumably between intimates in general).85
To conclude, besides a change in the preference organisation,
the mother-daughter disputes in my data are characterised by a
departure from the standard turn-taking mechanisms. The disputants
frequently start up on a turn at talk at points which are not
identifiable as possible completion points. While sequentially
interruptive turns may display rapport on the interpersonal level of
interaction, the interruptions in my data are always used to package
argumentative actions. As we have seen, interruption is a means of
intensifying opposition: disputants can stress their disagreements
by initiating them in the midst of, rather than at the possible
completion of the opponent’s turn. This turn-incursive positioning
reinforces disagreements in that it involves the deliberate
interruption of a turn in progress.
Interrupting is thus one interactional resource by which
participants may accomplish aggravated opposition. Apparently, apart
from exchanging unmitigated disagreements, participants make the
ongoing talk recognisable (both to each other and observes) as a
heated dispute by packaging these disagreements in the sequential
form of interruptions, placing them immediately at or shortly after
a point in the opponent’s turn at which an arguable action has been
identified. This requires that the disputants monitor closely what
the opponent is saying. Apparently, dispute talk is a highly
structured activity progressing through the finely tuned
coordination of opposing turns. Another aspect of this detailed
sequencing of oppositional turns will be the focus of the next
section.
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6.3.3 (High degree of) formal cohesion
So far, I have focused on the function of unmodulated disagreements
and interruptions in the accomplishment of aggravated forms of
verbal conflict. I have shown that heated phases of verbal conflict
are characterised by a change in both preference organisation and
the organisation of turn-taking. I have demonstrated that
unmitigated disagreements and the interruptive placement of
oppositional turns are practical resources with which participants
may frame (Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) or contextualise (Gumperz
1982) a current interaction as an adversarial argument.
In this section, I will focus on another structural device,
which disputants can utilise in building aggravated oppositional
moves, and thus in making the ongoing talk recognisable (both to
each other and the analyst alike) as an aggravated argument. I will
show that heated disputes display a noticeably high degree of formal
cohesion between successive utterances: references to the opponent’s
as well as the speaker’s own prior turns are explicitly marked by a
number of cohesive devices, namely structural and word repetition.
Close analysis of the mother-daughter disputes in my corpus
reveals that in producing subsequent argumentative moves, disputants
regularly tie not only to the type of action the opponent’s prior
utterance performs but also to various (structural and lexical)
features it exhibits. In the following, I will demonstrate how the
disputants in my data construct counters to the opponent’s preceding
talk by exploiting and manipulating that very talk. This technique
of building an oppositional move from the materials supplied by the
talk it opposes I will label ‘contrastive mirroring.’
In the literature on discourse and pragmatics, the surface
linguistic form of utterances (i.e. their syntactical and lexical
format) has often been distinguished from the actions they embody
(i.e. their communicative function or illocutionary force), and the
sequencing of utterances in conversation has been argued to occur
primarily on the level of action. For instance, Labov & Fanshel
(1977: 25) maintain that “sequencing rules do not appear to be
related to words, sentences, and other linguistic forms, but rather
form the connections between abstract actions such as requests,
compliments, challenges, and defenses.”86 As M. H. Goodwin & C.
Goodwin (1987) and M. H. Goodwin (1990) have pointed out, one
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consequence of this position is that sequential and discourse
phenomena like speech acts are treated as distinct and separable
from the phonological, syntactic, and semantic phenomena
traditionally analysed by linguists. There is however, ample
evidence that approaching sequencing exclusively from the
perspective of speech acts fails to see much of the work
participants in conversation are doing. As Sacks’s (1992) work on
tying techniques has demonstrated, much of the interconnection
between turns in everyday conversation is achieved through
systematic syntactic operations. His observations shed light on a
range of phenomena that are fundamental to the use of language in
dispute sequences. As the following discussion will show, such tying
procedures are essential to the (sequential) organisation of
conversational argument.
As mentioned above, in producing subsequent oppositional moves,
disputants can frequently be seen to link their contribution not
only to the type of action contained in the opponent’s prior
utterance but also to a range of features involved in its
construction. Consider the following example:
example (1): Home
243 MARY JANE You were always like this. Always like
this.
244 I was 19 years old and you coulda stopped
245 me from going to California with Jimbo to
246 begin with and my life woulda—
> 247 OLIVIA Nobody coulda stopped you.
248 MARY JANE You didn't even try! I was your daughter
249 and you didn't care where I ended up.
> 250 OLIVIA That's ridiculous. You didn't care where
251 you ended up.
A closer look at Olivia’s oppositional turns in relation to Mary
Jane’s preceding talk reveals that they are not only closely tied to
the particulars of what her daughter has just said, repeating many
of the exact words she used, but that they in fact constitute
systematic modifications of May Jane’s prior contributions. In line
247, the skeleton of the previous utterance is retained, and only
the pronouns are changed so that Mary Jane’s accusation “you coulda
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stopped me” is transformed to the denial “Nobody coulda stopped
you.” Similarly, in lines 250-251, both the structure as well as the
wording of Mary Jane’s turn-final utterance is taken over, and the
pronouns are adapted to reverse the agent of the alleged action, and
thus the participant framework. In building her oppositional moves,
Olivia makes precisely those modifications that are necessary to
transform her daughter’s talk into a counter to that very talk. Mary
Jane’s own words then are almost literally used against her.
The way in which the lexical format of Mary Jane’s utterances
is mirrored in Olivia’s counters relates to a point Atkinson (1984)
made about the effectiveness of symmetry in contrastive devices in
his work on rhetoric in public speech-making. In speeches, contrasts
occur regularly as strategies to elicit the audience’s applause (cf.
also Heritage & Greatbatch 1986). Atkinson (1984: 395) shows that
“for a contrast to work effectively in eliciting an immediate or
early audience response, the second part should closely resemble the
first in the details of its construction and duration.” By the same
token, the symmetry between the sets of lexical items in which the
critical contrast between Olga’s claims “you coulda stopped me” and
“you didn’t care where I ended up” on the one hand and her mother’s
counters “Nobody coulda stopped you” and “You didn’t care where you
ended up” on the other is framed gives that contrast maximum
salience, and thus emphasises and aggravates opposition.
This extract clearly shows that if we confine analysis of
oppositional moves to such aspects as the types of speech acts they
perform, their propositional content, or the presuppositions they
embody, we miss a crucial aspect of the organisation of
argumentative exchanges.87 As we have seen, Olivia’s replies are
particularly effective responses to what Mary Jane has just said by
virtue of the way in which they exploit that very talk to build an
aggravated counter to it.
Similar phenomena have been noted in studies of non-scripted
conflict talk. For instance, M.H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987) and M.
H. Goodwin (1990: 177ff) describe various types of “format tying” in
African American working-class children’s disputes. Such linking
devices have also been shown to be characteristic of role-played
white middle-class children’s disputes (Brenneis & Lein 1977; Lein &
Brenneis 1978), and arguments of part-Hawaiian children (Boggs 1978:
204
329). While these findings are limited to children’s arguments,
corresponding phenomena have also been observed in adults’ disputes,
both in informal conversation (Coulter 1990; Knoblauch 1991, 1995)
as well as in (semi-)institutional contexts such as TV-debates
(Gruber 1996a, 1998),88 arguments on talk radio (Hutchby 1996a),
mediation hearings (Spranz-Fogasy 1986) and controversial
discussions between university lecturers and students (Kotthoff
1990, 1993a). The kinds of tying techniques observed in the
literature on conversational argument vary considerably in the ways
they make use of prior talk to shape a counter. Therefore, instead
of giving a detailed overview of the different types of techniques
that have been observed by other conflict researchers, in the
following, I will refer to the relevant findings in the literature
at the appropriate places in my analysis.
As mentioned above, contrastive mirroring can take various
different forms. The following extracts provide examples of one of
the simplest ways of establishing a close cohesive link to the
opponent’s previous utterance, namely, reversing the polarity of the
opponent’s preceding utterance (from positive to negative or vice
versa). Consider the following extract from My sister:
example (2): My sister 12
15 MADAME DANZARD I want you to wear it Friday when we
16 go to the Flintons'.
17 ISABELLE But it won't be ready in—
> 18 MADAME DANZARD (Interrupting.) It will be ready. She
19 hardly has anything to do.
In line 18, Madame Danzard sharply contradicts her daughter’s prior
claim. She constructs her counter simply by deleting the negation in
Isabelle’s utterance. As a result, Madame Danzard’s turn-initial
utterance consists of almost the same words as Isabelle’s (with the
exception of the contrastive discourse marker and the negation).89 By
means of repeating both the syntactic structure and the wording of
her daughter’s utterance, she is able to establish a close cohesive
link to Isabelle’s prior turn while at the same time stressing
opposition at the content level by means of negation. Moreover,
alter-repetition signals interpersonal involvement (Tannen 1984,
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1989) and serves to aggravate opposition. Madame Danzard further
emphasises the confrontational character of her disagreement by
packaging her response in the sequential form of an interruption.
Conversely, in the two sample passages below, the speakers
build their counters simply by negating the opponent’s prior
assertion.90
example (3): ‘night Mother
2216 MAMA You said you wanted to do my nails.
2217 JESSIE (Taking a small step backward.) I can't.
2218 It's too late.
> 2219 MAMA It's not too late!
example (4): Stuck 2
37 LULA It's not mine.
38 MOM It will be!
> 39 LULA It will not!
The practice of polarity reversal is a very efficient technique,
since it allows the speakers to express maximal contrast while
making only minimal changes. In addition, in the extracts above, the
parallel structure of the ensuing counter in tandem with the
increase in volume signals interpersonal involvement (Tannen 1984,
1989) and serves to aggravate opposition.
Besides reversing the polarity of the opponent’s preceding
utterance within a following oppositional move, the prior speaker’s
talk can also be transformed simply by means of verbatim repetition
example (5): Home
293 OLIVIA I can't believe you're doing this to me.
> 294 MARY JANE I can't believe you're doing this to me. I
295 guess my plans don't matter. Do they? The
296 failure daughter comes home but that's just
297 not good enough for you, I guess.
298 OLIVIA Just shut up. Shut up.
> 299 MARY JANE You shut up. You just shut up forever. How
300 about that? (She rushes into the bedroom.)
301 I'm so sick of this.
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In line 294, Mary Jane constructs a counter to what Olivia has said
in the preceding turn by using the exact words Olivia herself has
just used.91 It is important to note, however, that although the
syntactical structure and the words in both turns are the same, Mary
Jane’s action is a reciprocal one, not an identical one. Due to the
change in speakers (and, thus, the participant framework), features
of the opposing utterances, such as who is referred to by the
pronouns in them, change: In line 293, “I” and “me” refer to Olivia,
while “you” refers to Mary Jane. By contrast in line 294, it is the
other way around. In other words, the agent and the recipient of the
action are switched. By maintaining the linguistic form of her
mother’s utterance (presumably with contrastive stress), Mary Jane
reverses the participant framework created by Olivia’s prior
contribution, thus establishing a very close cohesive link between
the two utterances at both the structural and word level of the
interaction, while at the same time highlighting opposition at the
content level.92
The dispute escalates in lines 298-299, when the women tell
each other to “shut up.” Mary Jane’s turn in line 299 exemplifies a
more complex type of contrastive mirroring than the one just
discussed. Similar to line 294, she builds her counter by repeating
her mother’s prior utterance. But in contrast to her own prior turn,
here, by prefacing her repeat with the pronoun “You” (presumably
with emphatic stress to signal the reversal, as with contrastive
stress in previous turns), she creates a new utterance that includes
Olivia’s prior talk as a built-in component, while simultaneously
reversing the agent of the proposed activity.93
Incorporating (a part of) the prior speaker’s utterance is a
frequent way of taking the words of the opponent and using them
against her in a reciprocal action. Consider the following sample
passage, in which Olivia reuses both the structure and wording of
Mary Jane’s turn-initial complaint as the scaffolding of her
counter-complaint:94
example (6): Home
62 MARY JANE You'd think you'd be a little happier to
63 hear me talk like this. Here I am coming
64 home after all this time and looking for a
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65 nice husband.
> 66 OLIVIA You think you'd be a little more concerned
67 with someone else once in a while—
In this example, Olivia employs contrastive mirroring to shape a
counter-complaint to her daughter’s prior complaint. By contrast, in
the extract from Neaptide below, Joyce recycles a part of her
daughter’s prior assertion and incorporates it in her counter-
assertion.
example (7): Neaptide II, 3
229 CLAIRE If there's one thing I've learnt from you it's
230 stand my ground and fight.
> 231 JOYCE And if there's one thing I didn't teach it was
232 to sink.
As the three preceding examples have illustrated, disputants
frequently employ the practice of incorporating the opponent’s talk
in building a reciprocal action. However, this technique can also be
used to build various types of counters. For instance, in the
following extract from Home, Olivia transforms her daughter’s
accusation into a challenge to her competence. This is achieved by
taking up the formulaic expression “turning my life upside down”
from Mary Jane’s utterance, reformulating it and prefacing it with
an assertion. As a result of this operation, Mary Jane’s utterance
is incorporated in her mother’s counter:
example (8): Home
283 MARY JANE That's all you care about, isn't it? What
284 the neighbors think and where the neighbors
285 are moving to. This is my second chance.
286 I don't know where I'm gonna go now. You're
287 turning my life upside down.
> 288 OLIVIA You don't have any idea what it means to
289 have your life turned upside down.
Mary Jane’s accusation is thus converted into a challenge to her
ability to make the claim she is making.
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Another way of transforming the opponent’s preceding talk to
shape a counter is by means of what Halliday & Hasan (1976: 146)
call “substitution.” In using this technique, the speaker builds her
oppositional turn by repeating the opponent’s prior utterance but
replacing one item therein with another having a similar structural
function.95 By preserving the sentence frame while substituting a
specific element, the speaker makes use of the opponent’s utterance
to focus on a difference. This practice is illustrated by the
following two examples:
example (9): Tell me
143 DAUGHTER There's something in the corner of my room!
> 144 MOTHER (Absolutely exasperated.) There is nothing
145 in the corner of your room!
146 DAUGHTER Mama, there's something in the corner of my
147 room, and I'm scared.
> 148 MOTHER There's nothing in the corner of your room,
149 do you hear? Absolutely nothing. There's
150 nothing to be frightened of. Now I've had
151 just about enough, young lady, now you go to
152 sleep!
In this extract from Tell me, the mother opposes her daughter’s
claims by repeating the child’s utterances, while substituting the
absolute “nothing” for the pronoun “something.” By this means, she
establishes a close link both at the level of structure and wording,
while stressing disagreement at the level of content. Aggravation is
also signalled by the paralinguistic features of her turn. In lines
(144-145) the volume of her utterance and the exasperated tone of
voice indicate high emotional involvement and intensify opposition.
In addition, the repetition of the extreme case formulation “There’s
nothing” in combination with the intensifier “absolutely” (line 149)
and the raised voice further emphasises disagreement.
In the sample passage below, Mama builds her counter to
Jessie’s prior attribution by repeating her daughter’s turn-final
utterance while substituting the utterance-final comparative clause.
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example (10) ‘night Mother
1082 MAMA What did you talk about?
1083 JESSIE We talked about why black socks are warmer
1084 than blue socks. Is that something to go
1085 tell Mother? You were just jealous because
1086 I'd rather talk to him than wash the dishes
1087 with you.
> 1088 MAMA I was jealous because you'd rather talk to
1089 him than anything!
Mama’s oppositional turn in lines 1088-1089 maintains a structure
parallel to that of Jessie’s prior turn-final utterance with two
major exceptions: firstly, the change of pronouns and verb form,
reversing the agents of the respective actions, and secondly, the
replacement of the phrase “wash the dishes with you” with the
extreme formulation “anything.” As in the preceding example, the
escalated volume of her utterance signals emotional agitation and
intensifies opposition.96
In the mother-daughter disputes under analysis, contrastive
mirroring is frequently accomplished by means of substitution. The
structural and lexical repetition involved in contrastive mirroring
frames the substituted term so that it becomes accentuated as a
noticeable element. Contrastive mirroring and substitution thus act
in concert in the construction of oppositional moves, with the
parallel structure and wording of two opposing moves provided by
contrastive mirroring lending particular salience to the replacement
term in the subsequent utterance, thus highlighting opposition.97
In addition to reiterating the prior speaker’s utterance and
replacing a specific element, disputants can tie an oppositional
move to the other’s preceding utterance by means of repeating only a
part of the talk being opposed. For instance, as discussed above,
partial repetition of the prior speaker’s talk may be used as a
preface to begin oppositional turns, as illustrated by the following
four sample passages from my corpus:
example (11): Raisin III
33 MAMA I thought I taught you to love him.
> 34 BENEATHA Love him? There is nothing left to love.
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example (12): Home
206 MARY JANE I just can't believe this. There's no
207 reason for this.
> 208 OLIVIA No reason? Tell my friends that.
example (13): My sister 14
37 ISABELLE Maman- wait.
> 38 MADAME DANZARD Wait? What for?
example (14): Tell me
443 DAUGHTER Mom, it's not that bad.
> 444 MOTHER Not that bad!
Since I have already examined the use of partial repeats in
prefacing oppositional moves, I will not look at this phenomenon in
detail here, except to note that as an argumentative technique, it
achieves several things. Firstly, partial repetition enables the
speaker to focus opposition on a particular element of the other’s
preceding talk. In addition, by virtue of the aggravated nature of
its intonation contour, it allows the speaker to display a
particular (commonly negative) affective reaction to what the other
has just said and to caricature the opponent by portraying her
action as ridiculous or inappropriate. Finally, by signalling an
oppositional stance right at the beginning of the turn, and thereby
framing the ensuing talk as a counter, partial repetition provides
the speaker with a very broad scope of action, permitting her to add
all kinds of follow-up moves subsequent to the disagreement preface
such as, for instance counter-assertions as in extract (11),
directives as in extract (12), or demands for explanation as in
extract (13).98
Besides using partial repeats in utterance-initial position to
preface oppositional turns, disputants may also repeat a specific
expression in the opponent’s previous utterance and incorporate it
as a built-in component in their counter. As we have seen, in the
case of polarity reversal, verbatim repetition, incorporating and
substitution, disputants typically repeat the whole utterance they
disagree with, making only minimal alterations, such as changing the
polarity or the personal pronouns of the turn they refer to. By
contrast, in the following type of contrastive mirroring, which I
211
will call refocusing, speakers repeat only a rhetorically important
word or phrase of the utterance they disagree with. Consider the
following two extracts from my data:
example (15): Neaptide II, 3
37 CLAIRE But Mum, I already have a solicitor.
38 JOYCE I know that, don't I? This one specialised in
39 custody, you should have got one who knew all
40 about it in the first place.
41 CLAIRE (Through clenched teeth.) I have got one who
42 deals with custody.
> 43 JOYCE Yes, normal custody. Not one who deals with...
44 you know... special circumstances.
Prior to this sequence, Joyce has informed Claire that she has
consulted a solicitor about her daughter’s marriage problems (line
33). In line 37, Claire challenges her, arguing that she already has
a solicitor, but Joyce dismisses her objection, claiming that the
one she consulted is an expert on custody (lines 38-40). When Claire
objects that her solicitor in fact deals with custody, Joyce opposes
her again in the following turn. Firstly, she qualifies Claire’s
claim by picking up the term “custody” and modifying it with the
adjective “normal.” She then goes on to elaborate on her opposition
by re-using the phrase “who deals with” but negating it and
replacing “custody” with “special circumstances.” By this means, she
is able to establish a close structural link between the two
contingent utterances while producing a pronounced contrast
regarding their propositional content. Through maintaining part of
the formulation of Claire’s preceding contribution while specifying
the point of reference, Joyce exploits her daughter’s utterance to
focus on a difference in content, while at the same time challenging
the relevance of her argument.
Similarly, in the segment from ‘night Mother below, Mama shapes
her counter-assertion by repeating and reinterpreting an important
point in Jessie’s preceding argument:
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example (16): ‘night Mother
1407 MAMA Ricky is too much like Cecil.
1408 JESSIE He's not. Ricky is as much like me as it's
1409 possible for any human to be. We even wear the
1410 same size pants. These are his, I think.
> 1411 MAMA That's just the same size. That's not you're
1412 the same person.
In line 1408, Jessie contradicts Mama’s prior assertion that her son
Ricky closely resembles his father, and subsequently produces a
counter-assertion, claiming that, in fact, Ricky resembles her more
than anyone else. She then issues a series of supportive assertions,
citing the fact that she and her son take the same size trousers as
evidence for her claim (lines 1409-1410). In the following turn,
Mama counters her daughter’s assertion by using her own words
against her. While she does not dispute Jessie’s claim, she weakens
her argument by repeating the phrase “the same size,” but toning it
down with the particle “just” (line 1411). Subsequently, she expands
on her opposition by denying the relevance of Jessie’s claim to the
issue at hand. She issues a negative declarative, repeating the
structure “the same X,” but substituting “person” for “pants” (lines
1411-1412). Word repetition allows her to tie her utterance to
Jessie’s prior contribution, while focussing on a difference in
content.
The preceding two extracts show the step-by-step construction
of a counter via word repetition. By way of verbal shadowing,
oppositional moves are tied together and the resources of the
opponent’s preceding turn are exploited to construct a counter. An
important point in the opponent’s argument is picked up and re-
evaluated to advance the speaker’s own point. Verbal shadowing is
used to establish a close link between subsequent turns at the level
of wording, while creating a marked contrast at the level of
content.99 In addition, retaining the opponent’s formulation while
specifying the point of reference, allows the speaker to accentuate
a difference in content and simultaneously to challenge the
relevance of the opponent’s prior argument.
As we have seen, contrastive mirroring (in all its various
forms) is a very potent rhetorical device that disputants may use to
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turn the opponent’s prior claim against itself by means of
exploiting the lexical and structural choices the other made in
formulating her argument. Moreover, the preceding discussion has
shown that rather than being independent from the speech actions
they perform, the cohesive techniques that occur in the dispute
sequences under analysis play an essential part in the construction
of argumentative moves. Although it is possible to escalate an
argument with a subsequent action that is structurally unrelated to
the utterance it opposes (for instance by issuing a threat),100 the
oppositional moves in the preceding extracts constitute aggravated
disagreements with what the other has just said by virtue of
exploiting that very talk and transforming it to their advantage.
What they achieve is essentially turning the opponent’s claim
against her. In fact, there is a close interplay between the
activity of sharply disagreeing with a preceding move and escalating
a dispute on the one hand and the structural features of the
utterance that accomplishes this activity on the other. In sum then,
contrastive mirroring provides an interactional resource that can be
employed by participants to emphasise dissent, signal interpersonal
involvement and, thus, to aggravate a dispute.101
Different types of contrastive mirroring can also be combined
in a single argumentative exchange. To illustrate this technique let
us look again at some of the examples discussed above:
example (17): Raisin III
27 BENEATHA Wasn't it you who taught me to despise any
28 man who would do that. Do what he's going
29 to do.
> 30 MAMA Yes - I taught you that. Me and your
daddy.
31 But I thought I taught you something else
32 too... I thought I taught you to love him.
> 33 BENEATHA Love him? There is nothing left to love.
> 34 MAMA There is always something left to love.
35 And if you ain't learned that, you ain't
36 learned nothing.
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example (18): Home
288 MARY JANE You're turning my life upside down.
> 289 OLIVIA You don't have any idea what it means to
290 have your life turned upside down.
291 MARY JANE That's ridiculous. That's so utterly
292 ridiculous.
293 OLIVIA I can't believe you're doing this to me.
> 294 MARY JANE I can't believe you're doing this to me. I
295 guess my plans don't matter. Do they? The
296 failure daughter comes home but that's
just
297 not good enough for you, I guess.
298 OLIVIA Just shut up. Shut up.
> 299 MARY JANE You shut up. You just shut up forever. How
300 about that? (She rushes into the bedroom.)
301 I'm so sick of this.
In these sample passages, a variety of argumentative actions, i.e.
counter-assertions (extract (17), lines 30, 33, 34), competence
challenges (extract (18), line 289-290), counter-accusations
(extract (18), line 294), and return-directives (extract (18), line
299), are organised into a dispute sequence through various
techniques of contrastive mirroring, i.e. refocusing (extract (17),
lines 30-32, partial repetition (extract (17), line 33),
substitution (extract (17), line 34, verbatim repetition (extract
(18), line 294), and incorporation (extract (18), lines 289-290,
399). These extracts clearly demonstrate the constitutive power of
the cohesive procedures discussed above, and the crucial part such
mirroring techniques play in the emergent, sequential construction
and organisation of conversational arguments.
If we conceptualised what happens in these exchanges simply as
sequences of speech acts, we would neglect the immense potential of
the surface linguistic structure of the talk in these extracts to
provide for the sequencing of oppositional moves, and thus miss a
crucial aspect of the interaction. As we have seen, in producing
subsequent oppositional talk, disputants closely attend to and
exploit the structural details of preceding utterances.
Consequently, in order to capture the complexities of argumentative
interaction, analysts, too, must attend to the structural details of
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the talk it involves. As M. H. Goodwin & Goodwin (1987: 226) have so
eloquently put it:
Trying to describe how participants in conversation move from
one utterance to another without close attention to the
details of their talk is like trying to describe the work
that a musician does while ignoring the music being played.
The ways in which the participants in my data jointly produce and
maintain dispute sequences by making use of the immediately
preceding talk to build a counter to that very talk display a close
structural similarity to the procedures involved in such speech
activities as “sounding,” “verbal duelling” or “ritual insults”
(Abrahams 1970; Dundes et al. 1972; Edwards & Sienkewicz 1990; Fox
1977;  Gossen 1976; Katriel 1985;  Kochman 1968, 1970, 1972, 1981,
1983; Kotthoff 1992b, 1995; Labov 1972a,b, 1974; Mitchell-Kernan
1972; Tolosana 1978). In these activity types, in order to build an
appropriate response, the recipient of an initial ritual insult
(i.e. an insult about the target recipient known not to be literally
true)102 must use the scene described in the prior speaker’s talk to
produce a second description which turns the initial insult on its
head and is even more outrageous. As Goffman (1971) has noted, “the
structure of these devices establishes a move that is designed to
serve as a comparison base for another’s effort, his object being to
exceed the prior effort in elegance or wit” (179).103  A successful
return insult leaves the other party with nothing more to say and is
typically responded to with laughter (Labov 1972a: 325). In other
words, in ritual-insult sequences, the point is not to negate or
contradict a prior statement but to take a feature of the prior
speaker’s talk and build upon it in a subsequent move. So far,
ritual insults have only been shown to occur in children’s
interaction. However, as the preceding discussion indicates, they do
not constitute an activity type that is completely different from
other, less ritualised exchanges. As we have seen, the mother-
daughter argument sequences discussed above display a close
structural resemblance to the ritual insults described in the
literature, through the ways in which participants in both speech
activities use the resources of prior talk to construct return
actions.104 Like the ritualised exchanges discussed in the literature
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on children’s disagreement sequences, mother-daughter disputes
involve a range of formalised procedures which participants
habitually employ in the construction and sequencing of subsequent
oppositional moves.
Argumentative talk is frequently evaluated negatively and
viewed as being “disorderly” (cf. Briggs 1996) conversation or
disruptive type of interaction.105 The above discussion, however, has
demonstrated the orderliness with which disputes are conducted. As
we have seen, the mother-daughter disputes under analysis are
accomplished through a process of very elaborate coordination
between the opposing parties. In fact, as the preceding analysis
shows, the more aggravated opposition is at the content level, the
more finely tuned the disagreeing moves are to those of the
adversary both at the structural and the lexical level of
interaction. This delicate adjustment requires that the participants
closely follow what the other is saying at a range of linguistic
levels. That is to say, while at the content level of interaction,
opposition is stressed and reinforced, at the structural level of
talk, there is strong formal cooperation in these sequences of
conflict talk. In other words, the mother-daughter disputes in my
corpus are both highly confrontational and cooperative at the same
time.106 From this perspective, conversational argument resembles a
martial arts fight, in which the antagonists mutually attack each
other, while at the same time following some kind of arguing
choreography.107
In the preceding paragraphs, I have examined various ways in
which disputants build aggravated oppositional moves from the
materials supplied by the opponent’s preceding talk. As we have
seen, contrastive mirroring is a very potent rhetorical device that
disputants can use to turn the opponent’s prior claim against itself
by means of exploiting the lexical and structural choices the other
made in formulating her argument. The various types of contrastive
mirroring are dialogical dispute devices in that they always relate
locally to the opponent’s preceding utterance, and therefore -
despite the pronounced contrast they establish between participants’
positions - display cooperativeness on the structural plane of
interaction.108
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By contrast, another practice of building oppositional moves
that recurs in my data does not relate to the opponent’s preceding
utterance but to a prior utterance of the current speaker herself.
As Pomerantz (1975: 24) has noted, “in a disagreement the disagreed
with party has the option in next turn of reasserting or reaffirming
his prior position.” An oppositional move following a previous
action may thus prompt the prior speaker to recycle her initial
action. This is exactly what can be observed in the mother-daughter
disputes in my corpus: In heated phases of arguments, disputants
frequently construct subsequent argumentative moves by simply
repeating their own utterance more or less verbatim several times.
While contrastive mirroring mainly serves to intensify the
opposition between the disputants’ positions, this practice of
‘standing pat’ is a monological arguing device, which primarily
serves to reinforce the speaker’s own point of view, and typically
adds no new substantial information to the interaction.
This procedure of recycling one’s own prior utterance has also
been described in studies of naturally occurring disputes, where it
has generally been referred to as “insisting” – a term that I will
adopt in the following. For instance, Eisenberg & Garvey (1981) find
that in children’s disputes, “speakers may repeat an utterance
(exactly or by paraphrasing it without increasing or decreasing
directness) or reinforce it with a simple Yes or No” (159).
Similarly, in a study of controversial TV debates, Gruber (1998:
490-491) notes that speakers frequently repeat their own utterance
verbatim (or nearly verbatim) several times, in order to stress and
underscore their own point of view.109 In fact, Spranz-Fogasy (1986:
81) notes that in his corpus of mediation hearings, the emphatic and
repeated insistence on a formerly held position was the most
frequent reaction to opposition. The examples below illustrate some
of the instances of this argumentative device in my data.
In the following extract from Avenue, despite her mother’s
threat in lines 516-517, Olga repeats her prior insult word by word
(line 518). Self-repetition and the raised voice signal high
emotional involvement, and together with the sing-sang tone of voice
serve to aggravate opposition. The dispute sequence culminates in
Mother carrying out her threat, punishing Olga with a slap.
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example (19): Avenue
514 OLGA (Crosses C. to prepare for "slap.") Too cheap
515 to buy protection!
516 MOTHER Take that back, don't let me hear you say that
517 again.
> 518 OLGA Too cheap to buy pro-tec-tion!
519 MOTHER (Rises, crosses U. The slap is deliberate, a
520 punishment, not in anger.) You deserve worse
521 than that. (Sits.)
In the sample passage below, Olga employs self-repetition to
reinforce her prior refusal to comply with her mother’s request:
example (20): Avenue
260 MOTHER Go on, you started something, explain it.
261 OLGA Let's forget it.
262 MOTHER You're always backing down on things.
> 263 OLGA Let's forget it, the gum, the fortunes, the
264 stars, tea-leaves.
265 MOTHER Hey, I ain't never gone to no tea-leave reader.
266 OLGA That's encouraging.
Olga refuses to comply with her mother’s demand to elaborate on a
preceding utterance by saying “Let’s forget it” (line 261). When
Mother challenges her, claiming that she is “always backing down of
things,” instead of contesting her mother’s allegation, Olga simply
repeats her own prior utterance (line 263). Following the self-
repeat, however, she elaborates on her directive, listing the issues
she does not want to go into (“the gum, the fortunes, the stars,
tea-leaves.”).110 In contrast to the preceding example, here, by
listing the topics she would rather not talk about, Olga provides
her mother with something to zero in on in her following counter. In
the subsequent turn, Mother picks out the term “tea-leaves” in
Olga’s prior utterance to focus on, challenging the assumption
underlying Olga’s utterance that she has had someone read tea leaves
for her: “Hey, I ain’t never gone to no tea-leave reader.” (line
265). Olga responds with the sarcastic remark: “That’s encouraging.”
(line 266), implying that, in fact, she still disapproves of her
mother’s esoteric beliefs.
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In the two preceding extracts from Avenue, following
opposition, Olga repeats her complete prior utterance verbatim. By
contrast, the following sample passage illustrates a slightly
different technique of aggravating opposition. In the face of her
daughter’s suicide announcement, Mama issues a series of
oppositional turns, each of which is built around an element of her
own prior contribution. That is to say, rather than exactly repeat
everything she said in her preceding turn, she constructs her
counters by picking up a central phrase of her previous utterance
and using it as a scaffolding to shape her next move.111
example (21): ‘night Mother
351 MAMA (In panic.) You can't use my towels! They're my
352 towels. I've had them for a long time. I like
353 my towels.
354 JESSIE I asked you if you wanted that swimming towel
355 and you said you didn't.
> 356 MAMA And you can't use your father's gun, either.
> 357 It's mine now, too. And you can't do it in my
358 house.
359 JESSIE Oh, come on.
> 360 MAMA No. You can't do it. I won't let you. The house
361 is in my name.
Prior to this exchange, Jessie has asked her mother to give her some
old towels. When Mama finds out that Jessie needs the towels because
she wants to commit suicide, she withdraws her consent to give them
to her, claiming that they belong to her, that she has had them for
a long time and does not want to part with them (lines 351-353). In
response, Jessie objects that Mama already agreed to let her have
the swimming towel (lines 354-355). In the following turn, rather
than address her daughter’s objection, Mama builds her turn by
picking up a formulation of her own prior contribution and
transforming it to construct a new utterance. She prefaces her turn
with the coordinate conjunction “and,” signalling that she is about
to produce a continuation of her prior talk. Subsequently, she
repeats the phrase “You can't use my towels” of her own preceding
turn, replacing “my towels” with “your father’s gun” (line 356).
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Moreover, following a supportive assertion, she closes her turn by
again repeating her turn-initial utterance, this time substituting
“use your father’s gun” with “do it in my house” (lines 357-358). By
means of multiple self-repeats she is able to emphasise and
underscore her negative stance, while avoiding attending to her
daughter’s arguments. Following Jessie’s prompt in line 359 (“Oh
come on!), Mama, repeats her own prior utterance once again: “You
can’t do it.” This time, she prefaces her self-repeat with the
negative polarity marker “No,” signalling right at the beginning of
her turn that disagreement is going to follow, and thereby
reinforces opposition.
In the mother-daughter disputes in my corpus, insisting via
self-repetition is regularly done by both participants in
alternating order. Following opposition, one of the disputants
reasserts her own prior claim, subsequently, the opponent recycles
her preceding utterance, and then the first speaker repeats her
prior utterance again.
This tendency was already noted by Sacks in one of his lectures
on conversation back in the early seventies. Sacks observed that “a
facet of competition in conversation is that parties do mutual skip-
connecting” (1992, vol.2: 350). In skip-connecting, a speaker
produces an utterance that is not related to the directly preceding
utterance, but to some utterance prior to it, characteristically to
her own last utterance. Participants in conversational arguments can
thus proceed by taking speaking turns, each engaged in skipping the
(other’s) last turn and tying to her own prior (i.e. the last-but-
one) turn. In this way, argumentative sequences often amount to the
mere exchange of never-changing oppositional utterances; the
conversation becomes circular and the conflict escalates.112 Consider
the following extract from Stuck, in which the participants fall
into a pattern of mutual skip-connecting and get caught in an
interaction cycle:
example (22): Stuck 6b
121 LULA Mom, I am going to leave someday.
122 MOM You wouldn't do that.
> 123 LULA I might!
> 124 MOM You wouldn't.
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> 125 LULA I might, I might, so you die? It's not my fault.
126 It's not like anyone would miss you. You've
127 been useless for the last ten years anyway, so
128 I don't care. I can do anything!
The sequence starts with Lula announcing that she intends to leave
home someday (line 121). When her mother opposes her, claiming that
she “wouldn’t do that” (line 122), Lula digs in her heels and
reasserts her prior claim: “I might!” (line 123). The increase in
volume signals interpersonal involvement and emphasises opposition.
In return, rather than offer a reason for her scepticism, Mama
simply repeats (an abbreviated version of) her own prior utterance:
“You wouldn’t.” (line 124). The dispute escalates when Lula recycles
her preceding utterance once more (“I might, I might,” line 125),
and subsequently starts insulting her mother, and declares that she
does not care if she dies (lines 126-128). Self-repetition across a
series of turns and turn-internally alongside the increase in volume
displays high emotional involvement and aggravates opposition.
So far, we have looked at contrastive mirroring and insisting
as two separate activities. However, as the following extract from
My mother shows, these two disputation techniques may also co-occur
in a single argumentative exchange:
example (23): My mother I, 7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of the
131 valley!
132 MARGARET He's not.
> 133 DORIS He is.
> 134 MARGARET He's not, just parking.
135 DORIS Curious method of parking.
136 MARGARET That's typical, you think all Americans are
137 brash and wear loud check shirts and chew
138 gum and want to marry English girls. You're
139 just prej—...
140 DORIS Margaret, that's enough! (Pause.) After
> 141 all, he is going to marry an English girl.
142 MARGARET Oh Mother, don't look at me like that with
143 your lips pressed together. (exits.)
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The sequence starts with Doris claiming that her daughter’s
boyfriend is crushing her flowers with his car: “He’s reversing
straight into my lily of the valley!” (lines 130-131). In the
following turn, Margaret opposes her, constructing her counter by
negating her mother’s prior assertion: “He’s not.” (line 132). But
Doris insists on her initial claim and repeats (part of) her prior
assertion: “He is.” (line 133). While she is skip-connecting to her
own preceding utterance, she is also reversing the polarity of her
daughter’s prior utterance from negative to positive) at the same
time. Thus, her counter incorporates insisting and contrastive
mirroring as two complementing cohesive devices. By the same token,
at line 134, Margaret retaliates by recycling her own preceding
utterance, and thus simultaneously reversing the polarity of her
mother’s preceding assertion: “He’s not.” In the initial phase of
this argument sequence, the disputants proceed by means of tying
subsequent oppositional moves both to the structural details of
their own prior utterances as well as those of the opponent’s
preceding utterance. The interplay of various tying techniques
accomplishes a number of things. Firstly, my means of contrastive
mirroring via reversal of polarity, coherence between subsequent
oppositional turns is established at the structural level of
interaction, while a disagreement is emphasised at the content level
of interaction. In addition, self-repetition serves to reinforce the
speakers’ respective positions and signals interpersonal
involvement. Moreover, aggravation is signalled by the short turn
length of the oppositional moves.113
Up to this point in the interaction, both disputants have
insisted on their respective positions, simply repeating their prior
utterances, without putting forward alternative views the other
might agree with and without accounting for their oppositional
stance. In other words, they are going around in circles without
approaching a (re)solution. This exchange is an instance of what
Piaget (1926: 66) has called “primitive argument,” i.e. opposition
between assertions. In this type of conflict talk, reasons for
extended disagreement need not be stated. Rather, the disagreement
sequence progresses by the simple, mutual recycling of opposing
turns (i.e. “He is.” – “He’s not.”  - “He is.” – “He’s not.”).114
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Subsequent to the self repeat, however, Margaret elaborates on
her counter, putting forward an alternative interpretation of her
boyfriend’s activity (“just parking”). By this means, she provides
new material for Doris to construct a new counter. In line 135, she
builds her oppositional turn by picking up the word (“parking”) in
her daughter’s prior utterance and incorporating it in her
utterance: “Curious method of parking.” The resulting sarcastic
remark displays that she does not agree with Margaret’s assessment
of what her boyfriend is doing. When, in the next turn, Margaret
accuses her of being prejudiced against Americans (lines 136-139),
Doris again opposes her by turning her own words against her. She
initiates her turn with a terminating move, cautioning Margaret not
to pursue her line of action: “Margaret, that’s enough!” (line 140).
The interruptive placement of her turn in tandem with the increase
in volume signals high involvement and aggravates opposition.
Subsequently, Doris issues an assertion, claiming that, in view of
the fact that Margaret’s American boyfriend does indeed want to
marry her, the attitude Margaret has just attributed to her would
indeed be justified. She builds her utterance by picking up the
phrase “marry an English girl” from her daughter’s preceding turn
and uses it for her own side: “After all, he is going to marry an
English girl” (lines 140-141). The dispute sequence terminates with
Margaret leaving the scene exasperated, after making a negative
remark about her mother’s disapproving look.
As this extract shows, contrastive mirroring and insisting work
hand in hand, with the similarity of structure between successive
utterances generated by cohesive devices such as self- and other-
repetition providing for the smooth progression and orderly
organisation of the dispute, while at the same time emphasising
opposition and thus exacerbating the dispute. This interplay of
mutual skip-connecting and contrastive mirroring is also clearly
visible in the following sample passage from Tell me:
example (9): Tell me
143 DAUGHTER There's something in the corner of my room!
> 144 MOTHER (Absolutely exasperated.) There is nothing
145 in the corner of your room!
> 146 DAUGHTER Mama, there's something in the corner of my
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147 room, and I'm scared.
> 148 MOTHER There's nothing in the corner of your room,
149 do you hear? Absolutely nothing. There's
150 nothing to be frightened of. Now I've had
151 just about enough, young lady, now you go to
152 sleep!
As this example has already been discussed above, I will not look at
it in detail here, except to note that it clearly illustrates the
cyclical or spiralling process of dispute, proceeding via the give-
and-take of equivalent moves, which are interconnected in multiple
ways, namely on the structural level of interaction through the use
of various tying techniques as well as and on the speech act level
through the use of reciprocal types of actions.
The process which is operating in this exchange was identified
by Bateson (1935, 1958, 1972, 1979) as “symmetrical schismogenesis.”
By this process, the divergence between two individuals
progressively increases as they respond to each other in identical,
mutually alienating ways.115
To conclude, in this section I have shown that the mother-
daughter disputes in my data display a large number of cohesive
devices between subsequent turns. Connections to former turns of the
opponent and/or the current speaker are established and explicitly
marked via recurrence of words, phrases, or whole utterances. The
use of such cohesive ties between successive turns is yet another
means by which speakers can be seen to intensify their argument. On
the one hand, by means of various types of contrastive mirroring,
disputants exploit the lexical and syntactic structure of the
opponent’s prior talk as a resource for shaping a counter to that
very talk. In this way, a pronounced contrast is set up between the
opponents’ positions on the content level of interaction, while at
the same a close link is created on the formal plane. On the other
hand, disputants can proceed by means of skip-connecting, i.e.
repeating (a part of) their own prior utterances, thus reinforcing
their own positions.
Although the present data were drawn from fictional mother-
daughter disputes in plays, the practices of building oppositional
moves displayed therein are by no means restricted to constructed
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argumentative exchanges. As pointed out above, research on naturally
occurring conflict sequences in a range of interactional contexts
has reported similar phenomena in aggravated phases of conflict.
These findings indicate that the sequential phenomena described
above serve to contextualise a spate of talk as a heated dispute.
Moreover, the above discussion clearly shows that while
argument has frequently been evaluated negatively and viewed as a
disruptive and disorderly type of talk, when this activity is
examined in detail, it turns out that it is in fact accomplished
through a process of very intricate coordination between the parties
who are opposing each other. As we have seen, conversational
argument is a communicative accomplishment jointly constituted by
the participants through carefully orchestrated oppositional moves.
Describing argumentative discourse in terms of speech actions and
restricting analysis to the sequencing of those actions neglects a
vital aspect of the interaction, namely the significance of the
surface structure of the talk for sequential organisation. As this
section has shown, the consideration of aspects of the detailed
sequencing of the speakers provides essential insight into how
conversationalists in general, and mothers and daughters in
particular, ‘do disputing.’ Disputes turn out to be characterisable
as “sequentially organized, moving utterance by utterance, in which,
primarily, persons are engaged in producing talk that connects to
prior talk” (Sacks 1992, vol.2: 353).
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6.4 Conclusion
Taken together, the features described in the preceding sections
allow a characterisation of the verbal conflicts in my data on the
structural plane of interaction: firstly, the mother-daughter
disputes under analysis are characterised by suspending the
preference for agreement order of ordinary conversation.
Disagreements no longer show any features of dispreferred seconds as
described in the CA-literature. They are not delayed sequentially by
means of hesitation, nor are they pushed back in the construction of
turns through the use of initial agreement tokens. On the contrary,
instead of mitigating their disagreement through the use of
reluctance markers, the women in my data emphasise the oppositional
character of their turns by prefacing their utterances with various
dissent markers. That is to say, in the construction of
argumentative turns participants display an orientation towards the
structural preference for disagreement. This context-specific
preference structure provides one conversational resource by means
of which participants can frame (Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) or
contextualise (Gumperz 1982) an ongoing (inter)activity as a heated
dispute.
Secondly, in addition to the departure from the standard
preference organisation, the mother-daughter disputes in my data are
characterised by a change in the standard turn-taking mechanisms as
described by Sacks et al. (1974). (Attempted) speaker changes do not
occur at transition relevance places but at disagreement relevance
points. That is, opponents produce disagreements immediately when
propositions, etc. in the current speakers turn occur which they do
not agree with.
By initiating their oppositional turns in the midst of, rather
than at the possible completion of the opponent’s turn, disputants
can stress disagreement. This turn-incursive positioning reinforces
disagreements in that it involves the deliberate interruption of a
turn in progress. Interrupting is thus another structural means by
which the speakers in my data accomplish aggravated
opposition/argument. Thus, apart from exchanging unmitigated
disagreements, participants make the ongoing talk recognisable (both
to each other and observers) as a fervent dispute by packaging these
disagreements in the sequential form of interruptions, placing them
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immediately at or shortly after a point in the opponent’s turn at
which an arguable action has been identified.
Thirdly, the mother-daughter disputes in my corpus display a
noticeably high degree of formal cohesion between successive turns.
Links to the opponent’s as well as the current speaker’s own prior
turns are established and explicitly marked via recurrence of words,
phrases, or whole utterances. The use of such cohesive ties between
successive turns is yet another structural device which the speakers
in my data utilise in building aggravated oppositional moves and
thereby making the ongoing talk recognisable (to one another and
analysts alike) as a fierce altercation. On the one hand, by means
of various types of contrastive mirroring, disputants exploit the
lexical and syntactic structure of the opponent’s prior talk as a
resource for shaping a counter to that very talk. In this way, a
pronounced contrast is set up between the opponents’ positions on
the content level of interaction, while at the same a close link is
created on the on the structural level of interaction. On the other
hand, disputants can proceed by means of skip-connecting, i.e.
repeating (a part of) their own prior utterances, thus reinforcing
their own positions.
To sum up, the mother-daughter disputes in my corpus are
distinguished by the following structural features: (1) a change in
preference organisation with disagreements being the structurally
unmarked and hence preferred reactions to an opponent’s turn; (2) a
change in turn-taking organisation with an increased number of
competitive overlaps and simultaneous stretches of talk; and (3) and
the frequent use of formal cohesive ties between turns of opponents
or the same speaker. This structural organisation of conflict
sequences has been labelled the “dissent organisation” of talk by
Gruber (1998: 476). He argues that the dissent organisation provides
analysts with a “rank scale” of emotional involvement in conflict
episodes: if only one of the three discursive features occurs in a
stretch of talk “we can speak of a ‘mildly’ emotional conflict
episode, whereas if all three occur we have a ‘full-blown’ emotional
conflict” (477).116 That is to say, the combination of preference for
disagreement, high frequency of interruptions and recurrent
reformulations of previous turns contextualise high emotional
involvement. On this view, the mother-daughter conflicts under
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analysis are distinguished by their sequential organisation as
emotionally charged disputes.
This impression is corroborated by the occurrence of para-
linguistic and prosodic features such as volume increase, tone of
voice, contrastive stress and noticeable emphatic intonation
contours, which also signal high emotional involvement and convey
the oppositional character of turns and their level of intensity.117
Like any verbal (inter)activity, dispute is a product of
interactive, interpretative work on the part of the interlocutors.
Conflict, opposition and involvement are emergent social phenomena,
which are made mutually noticeable by participants through their
communicative behaviour, i.e. they are contextualised by the
respective conversational features. Aspects of conversational
structure such as preference and turn-taking organisation and formal
cohesion are interactional resources which conversationalists can
draw on to establish and display the kind of (inter) activity they
are engaged in, their interpersonal alignment (i.e. footing), their
stance towards the current topic of talk, and their degree of
involvement in the discourse. In other words, these sequential
phenomena can serve to frame or contextualise a current interaction
as an adversarial argument.
While the mutual expression of opposition in successive turns
at talk is a distinguishing feature of verbal conflict, the
occurrence of consecutive oppositional moves does not provide any
information about how a conflict is enacted by the participants,
i.e. about the interactionally displayed degree of emotional
involvement of the opponents and the intensity of the conflict. This
is where the sequential organisation of talk comes into play.
Structural features of conflict talk allow us to differentiate
between mitigated and aggravated forms of verbal conflict, between
mild controversies and confrontational arguments, and, thus, to
identify the mother-daughter arguments under analysis as fervent
disputes.
In the previous sections, I have focussed on the structural
level of talk in order to identify the sequential features that give
the mother-daughter interaction in my data the (aggravated)
character it so manifestly has for the participants. In the
following sections, I will look at the speech act level of talk in
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order to examine what kinds of actions are employed by the
disputants in my data and how these speech actions contribute to the
adversarial character of the interaction.
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Notes for chapter 6:
1 For an overview of discourse and conversation analytic research into conflict talk
cf. Brenneis (1988b), Grimshaw (1990b), Kakavá (2001), Leung (2004), and Schwitalla
(2001).
2 What actions get treated as arguables depends to a considerable extend on the
interactants’ relational history. As Wiemann (1985: 96) points out, the history of
interaction plays a major role in the management of conversations and will have an
impact on how participants interpret and respond to another’s behaviour. The same
idea is expressed by Hinde (1979), who maintains that “a relationship is a series
of interactions between two individuals occurring over time, each interaction being
relatively limited in duration but affected by past interactions and affecting
future ones” (Hinde 1979, quoted in Hartup 1992: 189). This is illustrated by the
following extract from Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet I, 1, in which, as a result
of the ritualised hostile relationship between the Capulets and Montagues,
Benvolio’s presumably well-meant attempt to stop the fight between Abraham and
Sampson (lines 5-6) is treated by Tybalt as an arguable action (lines 8-9) and
retrospectively forms the starting point for their ensuing fight.
example: Romeo and Juliet I, 1
1 Abraham: You lie
2 Sampson: Draw if you be men, Gregory, remember thy
3 washing blow.
4 (They fight.)
5 Benvolio: Part fools,
6 Put up your swords, you know not what you do.
7 (Enter Tybalt.)
8 Tybalt: What art thou drawn among these heartless hinds?
9 Turn thee Benvolio, look upon thy death.
10 Benvolio: I do but keep the peace, put up thy sword,
11 Or manage it to part these men with me.
12 Tybalt: What drawn and talk of peace? I hate the word,
13 As I hate hell, all Montagues and thee:
14 Have at thee coward.
15 (They fight.)
3 Likewise, Eisenberg & Garvey (1981:150-151) argue: “Opposition was chosen as the
defining criterion for an adversative episode because of its powerful influence on
the ensuing interaction. The rationale for this analytical approach is that any
partner’s move can be unnoticed, ignored, or accepted.” For similar views cf.
Maynard (1985: 8), Goodwin (1983: 665), and Hutchby (1996a: 23).
4 As the following analyses will show, however, the oppositional moves do not have
to be consecutive in a narrow sense to constitute a conflict episode.
5 Garvey & Shantz (1992) distinguish four dimensions of variation in conflict talk:
orientation (i.e. serious vs. playful), format (i.e.  non-ritualised vs.
ritualised), frame (i.e. real vs. pretend), and mode (i.e. mitigated vs.
aggravated).
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6 To quote Garvey (1984: 129): “not only squabbles and quarrels but also the most
highly valued accomplishments of logical argumentation depend on verbally expressed
opposition” (cf. also Garvey & Shantz 1992; Kakavá 2001; Millar et al. 1984;
Vuchinich 1987, 1990).
7 In addition, a third party may be involved in terminating the conflict. As this
study focuses primarily on dyadic conversations, however, the “dominant-third party
intervention format” identified by Vuchinich (1990: 134) is not relevant to the
analysis and will therefore not be discussed in more detail.
8 For similar distinctions of conflict-termination types cf. Deutsch (1973), Levya &
Furth (1986); Pikowsky (1993: 77f); Stein et al. (1997). Early on Simmel
(1908/1955: 110-123) distinguished between various ways terminating conflict,
including “victory-defeat,” “compromise” and “(re)conciliation.”
9 Although the daughter’s submission is not explicitly described, her compliance can
be assumed from the fact that following the mother’s final directive no further
opposition occurs.
10 The form of oppositional moves in the mother-data disputes under analysis will be
the focus of Ch. 7.
11 The submissive party may not actually agree with the other’s position but for
some reason (e.g. for the sake of peace and quiet) still accept that person’s
superiority on the issue in question for the time being. To quote Samuel Butler:
“He that complies against his will, is of the same opinion still.” Thus,
termination of a verbal conflict episode by means of submission amounts to a
settlement of the dispute rather than a resolution, and the unresolved conflict
might continue to smoulder and is likely to flare up at an appropriate future time.
12 Vuchinich (1990) proposes an analogy between concession and self-repair
(Schegloff et al. 1977): While corrections or concessions that are imposed by
others imply loss of face, when these moves are self-initiated face loss is
minimised.
13 In the course of the argument, the women switch to other topics, in line 157,
however, they return to the original issue of Olga’s attire.
14 Some clear instances of this resurfacing of the same issue are illustrated and
discussed in detail in Ch. 7.5.
15 As Vuchinich (1990) demonstrates, withdrawal may be clearly set up or justified
in advance or occur rather abruptly. For an examination of interactional features
typically preceding unilateral walkouts from argumentative talk cf. Dersely &
Wooton (2001).
16 Since this study is a qualitative rather than quantitative research, I will not
provide a counting of the number of occurrences of each termination format.
17 Due to the negative evaluation of arguing, work on conflict talk has been largely
concerned with the examination of how conflicts can be resolved rather than with
how they might be sustained (cf. for instance Billings 1979; Bloor & Horobin 1975;
Borisoff & Victor 1998; Deutsch 1973a, b; Eder 1990; Eisenberg & Garvey 1981;
Garcia 1990; Garvey 1984; Jandt 1973; Knudson et al. 1980; Nothdurft 1995, 1996;
Schwitalla 1987). Instead of viewing arguing as an activity to be pursued for its
own sake, conflict researchers have tended to consider it something to be remedied
and moved past as quickly as possible so that harmony can be restored. For a
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critique of this view cf. Maynard (1985a); Genishi & di Paolo (1982); C. Goodwin &
M. H. Goodwin (1990); M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987); among others.
18 As we will see more clearly later on, rather than take opportunities for de-
escalating and ending the dispute, the participants in my data design their actions
so as to emphasise sustain opposition.
19 This is one of the features that distinguish the argumentative exchanges in my
data from the resolution oriented type of conflict talk that has traditionally been
labelled “argumentation”: Kotthoff (1984, 1989) states that “In Argumentationen
geht es immer um die Aushandlung eines ‚gemeinsamen Nenners’. Es muss ein
strittiger Punkt vorliegen, den beide Seiten im Gespräch zu einer für beide
akzeptablen Entscheidung führen wollen. Zu diesem Zweck versuchen sie, ihre
Positionen zu erklären, zu stützen, zu untermauern” (1984: 92-93). Likewise, van
Eemeren et al. (1992) view argumentation as the “externalization of a social
problem-solving process,” “a procedure whereby two or more individuals try to
arrive at an ‘agreement’” (12). They concede, however, that their model of
argumentation (i.e. “critical discussion”) as “the systematic exchanges of
resolution-oriented argumentative moves” (16) is an idealised activity type, i.e. a
normative model of argumentative discourse.
20 As Eggins & Slade (1997: 64) argue, “conversation is always a struggle over
power.”
21 Tannen (2001, 2003) also writes: “Discourse in the family can be seen as a
struggle for power ... but it is also – and equally - a struggle for connection.
Indeed, the family is a prime example – perhaps the prime example – of the nexus of
needs for both power and connection in human relationships” (2003: 180). According
to Tannen, this “paradox of connection and control” (2001: 212), is most obvious in
the mother–daughter relationship - “an intensified form of all close relationships”
(2001: 214).
22 A long-standing assumption of developmental psychology is that maturation is a
process of separation and individuation, whereby initially the child is attached to
the mother (as the typical primary caregiver), but gradually acquires independence
and the capability of making her own decisions (cf. Mahler et al. 1975; and the
theory of individuation (Grotevant & Cooper 1986; Youniss & Smollar 1985). The
parent-child relationship, and in particular the mother-daughter relationship, is
inherently characterised by the conflicting needs of distance and closeness, and
control and autonomy. The mother’s attempts to control her daughter’s behaviour
clash with the daughter’s claims for autonomy. This clash of needs gives rise to
frequent and intense conflicts, especially (but not only) during adolescence. Adult
women are said often to suffer extremely ambivalent relationships with their
mothers, due to unresolved conflicts over the need for autonomy and separation (cf.
Browder 1989; Chodorow 1978; Flax 1981; Friday 1977; Henwood 1993; Henwood &
Coughlan 1993; Magrab 1979; Rich 1976; Wodak 1984).
23 For a similar distinction cf. also M. H. Goodwin (1983); Gruber (1996a, 1998,
2001); Hutchby (1996a,b); Kakavá (1993a,b); Kotthoff (1993a); Mc Laughlin et al.
(1983); Muntigl & Turnbull (1998).
24 I will return to what is meant by “first possible completion” of a turn in the
next section.
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25 Cf. the discussions of insertion sequences (Schegloff 1972), side sequences
(Jefferson 1972), and repair sequences (Schegloff et al. 1977), among others.
26 For detailed discussion cf. Atkinson & Drew (1979: 53-56); Bilmes (1988); Boyle
(2000); Levinson (1983: 332-345); Heritage (1984: 264-280); Hutchby & Wooffitt
(1998: 43-47); among others.
27 To quote Sacks (1992, vol. 2: 414): “Questioners can of course prefer a ‘no’ as
well as a ‘yes’, e.g. ‘You don’t want that lamb chop, do you?’ where the questioner
has designed a question that says he’s looking for a ‘no’” answer.”
28 It must be noted, however, that sequence types do not necessarily have the same
preference for all instances of the type. For example, while it is generally
assumed that ‘offers’ prefer ‘acceptances’ and disprefer ‘declines,’ some offers
such as, for instance, initial offers of second helpings of dessert may well (e.g.
for reasons of etiquette) prefer declines, or prefer them at first. Moreover, some
offers may be made only ‘pro forma,’ i.e. with the understanding that they will be
declined. For instance, Clarke (1996) calls attention to the fact that some
communicative acts, such as “ostensible invitations” (387), are performed only for
politeness’ sake, i.e. are not to be taken seriously, and prefer declines.
29 As already pointed out, the terms “preferred/dispreferred” are not intended to
refer to motivational commitments of speakers but to structural properties of turns
and sequences. Accepting an invitation is the preferred response, and declining the
dispreferred, whatever the actual desires of the speaker.  The fact that most
speakers will have refused an absolutely undesired invitation with appropriate
delay and expressions of regret at a competing engagement rather than by producing
an outright and unmitigated rejection exemplifies the distinction between a
personal desire to choose a particular course of action (e.g. to decline an
invitation) and the institutionalised preferences bearing on that choice (e.g. to
construct that decline as a dispreferred action).
30 Schegloff (1988) talks of two distinct uses of preference in CA: A “structure-
based” usage, which treats preference as a property of sequence types, and a
“practice-based” usage, which treats it as a property of the participants’ ways of
doing or enacting a responsive activity.
31 This view is shared by Garcia (1991), who states that “for accusations, denials
are the preferred response because the absence or delay of a denial may be
interpreted as an admission of/evidence of guilt” (821). However, Dersely & Wootton
(2000) suggest that the preference that operates in complaint sequences is more
complex. In a study of complaint sequences in naturally occurring disputes in a
variety of settings, they found two different kinds of denials: (1) outright or
“didn’t do it” denials, which were performed overtly and without delay, in the
manner of preferred actions, and comprised only about 5 percent of all replies to
complaint, and (2) “not at fault” denials, which were regularly delayed. They show
that while the delay of “didn’t do it” denials can imply that the complainee was in
some way involved, the delay of “not at fault” denials does not create a basis for
participants to infer that the complainee accepts blame or guilt for the complained
of action. Through “not at fault” denials the complainee implicitly acknowledges
some element of truth in the complaint, while rejecting any culpability for the
action on question. According to Dersely and Wootton, these findings call into
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question whether there is a simple preference for denial in complaint sequences.
For more detailed discussion of accusation and complaint sequences cf. below.
32 Similarly, Schegloff (1988) describes Sacks’ original concept of preference as
follows: “Whether a question [for instance] prefers a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ response is a
matter if its speaker’s construction of it ... the preference is built into the
sequence and is not a matter of the respondent’s construction of the response. If
the question is built to prefer a ‘yes,’ then a ‘no’ is a dispreferred response,
even if delivered without delay and in turn initial position, and vice versa”
(453).
33 For a discussion of contradictions in confrontational situations see below.
34 Schegloff (1988) shows that bearers of bad news, instead of telling the bad
information themselves, often tend to provide clues in order to bring recipients
themselves to be the first ones to say it. In these cases, recipients often proffer
guesses, which then are accepted or rejected, depending on their correctness.
Schegloff observes that some of the rejections of wrong guesses are done as
preferreds, while others are done as dispreferreds. He shows that rejections of
guesses of bad news are conveyed in preferred format when the actual news is not as
bad as the guess, i.e. when guesses are too strong. On the other hand, when the
actual news is worse than the guess, i.e. when the guess is too weak, rejection is
done as a dispreferred response, leading recipients to proffer stronger guesses.
Thus, conversationalists can be seen to exploit the preferred/dispreferred turn
shape (i.e. reluctance markers) in different ways to gear recipients’ guesses in
the right direction.
35 Heritage (1984: 268) chooses an even more straightforward formulation: “Plainly
issues of ‘face’ (Goffman 1955; Brown & Levinson 1978) are closely associated with
our maintenance of the relevant forms and observances.”
36 For similar findings in Israeli speech cf. also Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (1984).
37 To quote Kakavá (2002: 1563): “This antagonistic type of discourse
represents an interactional practice in which participants engage to
match their wits, compete for ideas, yet do not necessarily resolve their
differences. While agreement can enhance solidarity and present speakers
as supportive and like-minded, in intimate contexts, Greek participants
were cooperative by agreeing to disagree.”
38 The relationship between cultural norms and the use and evaluation of
disagreement and argument is also discussed by Johnstone (1986, 1989); Kochman
(1981); Kotthoff (1989, 1990, 1992b, 1995); Modan (1994); Tannen (1990, 1998).
39 For instance, in a study of preschool girls’ disputes, Sheldon (1996) describes
what she labels “double-voice discourse,” a female conflict management strategy,
“which has an overlay of mitigation, effectively softening the force of dispute
utterances rather than escalating discord” (58). Similar claims have been made
about adult female dispute behaviour. For instance, based on an analysis of TV
discussions and interviews, Trömel-Plötz (1992) claims that even within the context
of argument, women talk without being confrontational and without disqualifying the
opponent and/or her utterances (1996: 372). Similarly, in her studies of TV
discussions as well as discussions between university students and lecturers,
Kotthoff (1984, 1989, 1991, 1992a,b, 1993c) observes that in argumentative
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sequences, women generally use a more cooperative speech style and orient towards
consent, whereas the men use a more confrontational speech style and orient towards
dissent. She finds that men tend to confront their co-participants with unmitigated
positions. They defend their positions more vehemently, do not show an orientation
towards consent and emphasise opposition. By contrast women formulate their
positions more openly, frequently express their understanding of the other’s
position, show an orientation towards consent and emphasise consent. She concludes
that men seem to be more interested in pushing through their position, while women
appear to be more interested in finding a solution that is acceptable for both
parties.
40 The variation of disagreement in conflict sequences of talk on a dimension of
mitigation and aggravation has also been noted by Garvey & Shantz (1992); Messmer
(2003); Vuchinich (1987, 1990). To quote Sheldon (1993): “each conflict has the
potential of being aggravated and escalated or of being mitigated and resolved”
(86).
41 Likewise Hasan (2001) states that if a quarrel occurs in the course of an
informal conversation, “this quarrel is indicative of a con/textual shift: that is
to say, at that textual point where the quarrel ‘happens’, there occurs a shift in
the text’s design. ... whatever the generic/registral requirements of that previous
discourse, they must be at least suspended, if not totally abandoned. At the same
time, by virtue of the dialectic of context and text, there is a shift in the
context as well, in the sense that the interactants are no longer engaged in the
activity which they were performing previously: they are fighting, not doing
whatever they were doing before. Their mutual relation too is now different: they
are antagonists, having suspended/abandoned their previous personae, whatever those
might have been, and so on. ... speakers use their language differently from how
they were using it before: they have done a register/genre switch ... in other
words the con/text has been reclassified” (29-30, original emphasis).
42 For similar distinctions between more or less aggravated, emotionally loaded
forms or modes of conflict interaction cf. Apeltauer (1978); Fill (1989); Gruber
(1996); Hundsnurscher (1993); Knoblauch (1991, 1995); Messmer (2003); O’Rourke
(2001); Rehbock (1987); Schank (1987); Schwittala (1987); Spiegel (1995). Commonly,
those forms which are more factual, and resolution oriented are called
argumentation or discussion, whereas the more emotionally loaded forms are usually
referred to as disputes or quarrels (i.e. Streit).
43 Correspondingly, Messmer (2003) finds that in  mitigated forms of conflict
management such as “Konfliktepisoden” and “Sachkonflikte” there is a structural
preference for agreement whereas in more aggravated and emotionally loaded forms of
conflict interaction such as “Beziehungskonflikte” and “Machtkonflikte” there is a
structural preference for disagreement.
44 These findings provide empirical counter evidence to Gruber’s (1998, 2001)
speculation that the use of unmitigated disagreements as a method of
contextualising disputes may be limited to interaction between non-intimates.
45 Correspondingly, Norrick (1991) shows that in parent-child interaction there is a
structural preference for parental correction of children’s errors, typically in
the immediately following turn, suspending the preference for self-correction in
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ordinary conversation as discussed by Schegloff et al. (1977). He suggests that
aside from such factors as the asymmetry in language ability in favour of adults,
as well as their goal of improving their children’s language behaviour, which seem
to minimise the potential face threat of unmodulated corrections and thus affect
the organisation of corrective sequences, the family setting, might be conducive to
the use of unmitigated corrections. Also, in a study of instructional talk between
parents and children, Thornborrow (2002) points out that parents frequently produce
unmitigated contradictions. She states that “in parent-child interaction, the force
of a direct contradiction of the child’s answer ... is mitigated in this context by
the close family relationships between the participants” (113).
46 For a detailed analysis of conflict sequences between friends in which
disagreements are mitigated in various ways throughout the conversation to tone
down their oppositional character and avoid contradicting the other speaker’s
utterance head-on. cf. (Drew 1992: 505) and Hutchby (1996a: 27).
47 This phenomenon has also been observed by M. H. Goodwin (1990: 145) and M. H.
Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987: 207) in black children’s disputes, where it is referred
to as “opposition preface.” Gruber (1996, 1998), too, discusses the turn-initial
use of “No” and “(Oh) yes” as “disagreement markers” in dispute phases of talk in
TV discussions. He notes that disagreement markers can either serve to further
aggravate an unmitigated disagreement, as in extracts (12) and (13), or they may
turn any utterance into an expression of disagreement with a previous utterance, as
in fragment (14). Furthermore, in a study of disagreement types in mediation talk,
Spranz-Fogasy (1986) describes a similar device, which he calls “Reklamation.” In
his data this oppositional move was most frequently realised through the negative
particle “No” (“Nein”) and its positive counterpart “Yes” (“Doch”). It signals that
the speaker does not agree with some aspect of the opponent’s prior utterance. Both
Gruber and Spranz-Fogasy note that expressions of opposite polarity may either
initiate a disagreeing turn or stand alone as minimal (disagreeing) responses.
48 For similar discussions of “but” cf. also Bell (1998); Foolen (1991); and Fraser
(1990, 1998).
49 Gruber (1996a, 1998) also discusses the use of “but” as a disagreement marker in
dispute phases of talk in TV discussions.
50 For further analysis of the organisation of repair in conversation cf. Schegloff
et al. (1977).
51 Pomerantz (1984: 83-84) found the same pattern in disagreements with prior
speakers’ self-deprecations, and indeed, as M. H. Goodwin (1990: 319) points out,
in these cases, prior speakers would not be expected to modify their initial
position themselves.
52 In addition, in a study in institutional talk, Schwitalla (1997: 128-130) states
that imitating an interlocutor’s prior utterance (i.e. “Nachäffen”) often expresses
a derogatory attitude and may serve as a means of establishing an asymmetric
relationship.
53 For a similar reading of other-repetition followed by a question mark in literary
discourse cf. Person (1999: 88-94).
54 For a detailed discussion of counter-attacks as responses to complaints cf.
below.
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55 This finding concurs with Günthner’s (1992) and Kotthoff’s (1993a) observation
that in the course of an argument, sudden unmitigated agreement is usually not
understood (or accepted) by the opponent as a concession. Participants cannot
simply give up their position and ‘change sides.’ Rather, the consent with the
opponent’s position has to be accounted for, otherwise the opponent may claim
inconsistency (“but you said...”).
56 As Mack & Snyder (1973) point out, conflict relations represent “a shift in the
governing norms and expectations. ... the conflict process is subject to its own
rules” (37). Similarly, Eisenberg & Garvey (1981:169) observe that “adversative
episodes have their own rules and routines which guide the performance of
participants.” As an example of the power of such governing obligations and
expectations Bilmes (1993: 395) reports a discussion he overheard in which academic
A made an analytical point and academic B offered a contrasting analysis. When A
began to defend his point, B said, “I’m not going to argue with you.” A replied,
“You have to argue,” and B did.
57 What began as an interview given by then President Candidate George Bush to CBS
anchorman Dan Rather turned into what was widely viewed as a confrontation between
the two men.
58 Higher tolerance for overlaps and interruptions in the course of arguments has
also been reported for Greeks (Kakavá 1993a, quoted in Kakavá 2001) and Tzotzil
speakers (Haviland 1997). Moreover, studies that examine conflict interaction in a
range of settings report that the turn-taking rules are commonly violated in phases
of heated dispute (cf. Messmer 2003, Schank 1987).
59 A similar view of interruption is expressed by Lerner (1989).
60 Correspondingly, interruptions have traditionally been considered one of the most
reliable and objective indicators of such personal and relational attributes as
domineeringness and dominance in interaction. Dominance/domineeringness scores have
frequently been computed and assigned to an interactant based on the proportion of
interruptions (i.e. one-up moves) initiated by that person out of the total number
of interruptions found within a given exchange(cf. relational communication coding
schemes such as Millar & Rogers 1976, 1987, 1988; Rogers & Farace 1975; Rogers &
Millar 1988; Rogers-Millar & Millar 1979). As Octigan & Niederman (1979: 52)
observe, “an interruption or overlap is taken as a violation and a sign of
conversational dominance.” However, Rogers & Farace (1975) caution that while
domineeringness is positively correlated with an interactant’s total number of
interruptions (i.e. “talkovers”), dominance is not.
61 As Watts (1991: 92) puts it: “Not only does an interruption prevent the
participant from completing whatever social activity s/he has begun, but it also
implies that the interrupter considers that whatever s/he proceeds to do in some
sense has priority over what the interrupted was doing. It is thus a denial of
participant rights, on the one hand, and a negotiation of the validity of the
interrupted activity, on the other. It is also the assertion of dominance over the
interrupted and thus strong evidence of the exercise of power.” A similar view is
put forward by Goldberg (1990) in her discussion of power-oriented interruptions.
238
                                                                                                                                                        
62 For critique of the formalistic approach to interruption cf. also Beattie (1981,
1983); Murray (1985), Murray & Covelli (1988), and Hopper (1992: 120-137), Hutchby
(1992, 1996a), Talbot 1992, among others.
63 To quote Talbot (1992: 451), in order to determine what counts as an interruption
“attention to the occurrence of candidate interruptions [needs to] be coupled with
attention to discoursal indications of interactants’ perceptions of them as
interruptions” (original emphasis).
64 For similar observations, cf. Bennet (1981), Edelsky (1981), Hutchby (1992), and
Kotthoff (1992a, 1993b).
65 As these findings suggest, “one-at-a-time” is not a conversational universal.
Rather, the degree to which overlapping talk is acceptable varies by culture and
occasion. As Reisman (1974) shows, there is at least one speech community/community
of practice where naturally occurring simultaneous talk is frequent, expected, and
processed.
66 Sacks (1992, vo.1) notes that overlapping talk is a criterion of a lively
conversation and shows interpersonal involvement in the ongoing activity. He notes
that “it seems also to be specifically a criterion of a ‘lively conversation’ that
in its course persons talk severally at a time. ... And in that regard, if one
wants to show that one is involved in a conversation, then starting to talk while
others are talking will, on its occurrence, be specifically recognized as a means
of exhibiting such emotions” (643).
67 This conversational style is said to be typical of Jewish New Yorkers, and, as
Kakavá’s (1993a, b, 2002) studies suggest, presumably of Greeks, too.
68 Cf. Jefferson’s (1972) discussion of side sequences.
69 Chan (1992), too, codes interruptions as negative if they express disagreement,
raise an objection, or introduce a new topic. She codes interruptions as supportive
if they express agreement with the current speaker (e.g. “that’s good”), if they
make an effectively positive request for elaboration (e.g. “yes, what do you think
about that”), or if they complete the speaker’s thought. Likewise, Coates (1996:
222-223) argues that “where overlap involves repetition, especially lexical
repetition, then it is clearly marked as supportive”; and Herman (1995: 113)
states: “Overlaps ... may manifest sympathy or attentiveness, particularly when
they are characterized by other- rather than self-orientation.”
70 Cf. also Tannen (1983, 1984, 1987, 1993, 1994) on the relativity or polysemy of
interruptions and of linguistic strategies in general.
71 For further discussion of the interplay of prosodic aspects and sequential
placement of conversational contributions cf. French & Local’s (1986) study on
prosodic features and the management of interruptions.
72 The aggravating function of interruption has been noted earlier by Sacks in one
of his lectures. He notes that interruption can be used to show strong emotion and
that overlapping talk shows interpersonal involvement in the ongoing activity. He
states that “if, for example, you want to show that something somebody is saying
really angers you, the placing you utterance by starting while they’re still
talking seems to be more effective than waiting and placing it after they’ve
finished. Where placing it after they’ve finished is something we would talk about
as –‘keeping under control,’ ‘not really being bothered that much’, etc. And there
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are all sorts of ways of showing somebody that you’re doing that, also, e.g.
clenching the fists, tightening up, as the prior utterance is going on.
This is not to say that you can’t show that you’re angered by what somebody
says while allowing them to finish and then starting up, but one specific way of
doing that involves talking while they’re talking. In that regard, then, if you’re
going to do what is taken to be expressing anger, annoyance, great amusement, etc.
then the option of placing the beginning of your utterance in the course of theirs
constitutes on technique for showing that” (1992, vo.1: 642).
73 In terms of the initiative–response coding scheme by Linell and his co-workers
(cf. Linell et al. 1988; Linell 1990), such attempts at inhibiting talk from the
other, i.e. depriving her of opportunities to participate, constitute attempts at
exercising interactional dominance. Similarly, Rogers & Farace (1975: 229), in
their relational-control coding system, note the sequence-terminating potential of
such explicit framing moves, and view them as control manoeuvres.
74 It is interesting to note that in each of these fragments it is the mother who
assumes the right to restrict the daughter’s speaking rights, thereby implicitly
drawing on her superior social status to influence the daughter’s verbal behaviour
and thus the course of the interaction.
75 To switch to another analytical level, examining what is being done with an
interruption in the local context of the talk provides further insights into how
the sense of confrontation in constructed mother-daughter disputes is accomplished
by the playwright(s).
76 This argumentative technique will be discussed in detail below.
77 Hutchby (1992: 356-360, 1996a: 85-88) observed a similar use of post-continuation
interrupting as a strategy to “rein back” the development of another’s line of
argument in argument sequences on talk radio.
78 The structure of accusation-response sequences will be discussed in detail below.
80 Similarly, Heritage (1985: 99) argues that “talk that takes place in courtrooms
or news interviews is centrally produced for ‘overhearers’ -  either a judge and
jury who must decide a case or a news audience.” (On the sequential organisation
and audience design of news-interview discourse cf. also  Clayman 1988, 1992;
Clayman & Heritage 2002; Greatbatch 1988, 1992; Heritage 2001a; Heritage &
Greatbatch 1991.)
81 As Gruber’s (2001) analysis of controversial TV discussions reveals, “experienced
media speakers are not only concerned with the actual ongoing discussion and their
immediate interlocutors but also with designing their turns to create effects in
the overhearing audience and/or the unaddressed recipients” (1845). The multi-
directedness of talk in TV discussions and its possible effects on participants’
contributions is also discussed in Gruber et al. (1983); Kotthoff (1992a; 1993c);
and Linke (1985).
82 Bilmes (1999) also notes that speakers in political debates exhibit a strategic
regard for control of floor, i.e. the distribution and length of turns at talk.
83 For a detailed examination of the various types and formats of argumentative
actions occurring in the mother-daughter disputes under analysis see Ch. 7.
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84 In this sense, the interruptions in my data classify as recognitional onsets in
terms of Jefferson (1984, 1986): The next speaker starts up well before a
transition place has been reached but where (1) an item has been produced
sufficiently for recognition and response - i.e. counter - or (2) where an
understanding of at least the general thrust of the utterance has been achieved.
But in contrast to Jefferson’s data, neither do the overlapping turns perform a
supportive action nor does the incoming speaker appear to be attending to the
‘premature’ and turn-incursive character of her talk (e.g. by aborting or repeating
the response, or by producing turn-incursive laughter). Instead, the incursive
turns always perform an argumentative action, and the interrupters emphasise rather
than down-tone the disruptive nature of their talk.
85 Indeed, increase in volume and tempo, and a high frequency of mutual
interruptions and simultaneous speech have been identified as manifestations of
emotional involvement and indicators for ‘real’ conflict situations in elicited
arguments between mothers and daughters (Hofer et al. 1993: 17-18; Pikowsky 1992:
62) as well as naturally occurring disputes between couples (Spiegel 1995: 231-
232).
86 Likewise, Maynard (1985b: 213) distinguishes between “surface level”
characterisations of an utterance and deeper analysis of what that talk presumes
and presupposes.
87 For a similar view cf. M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987) and M. H. Goodwin
(1990).
88 Gruber (1998) notes that at the climax of conflict sequences, interactants use
specific argumentative devices to express an aggravated distance to their
opponent’s view while at the same time signalling that they stay very closely on
topic. He suggests calling this phenomenon “antagonistic cohesion” (491).
89 M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987) and M. H. Goodwin (1990) describe a similar
technique in black working-class children’s disputes, whereby a speaker constructs
a counter by way of deleting an element of another’s prior utterance. However, in
contrast to the extract above, in their data, the original utterance is typically
transformed into a reciprocal or return action, as illustrated by the following
example, quoted from M. H. Goodwin (1990: 180):
Chopper Don’t gimme that. I’m not talkin’ ta you.
> Tony I’m talkin’ ta y:ou!
90 This arguing technique has also been observed in role-played disputes between
white middle-class children (Brenneis & Lein 1977). Likewise, Boggs (1978) finds
that in part-Hawaiian children’s disputes “one way of contradicting is by
grammatically incorporating and negating another speaker’s clause” (332-333).
Similar procedures have been described in studies of adults’ arguments. For
instance, Coulter (1990) includes instances of negation in his discussion of
“contrastively-matched counters.” Koblauch (1991, 1995) identifies “negated
parallelism” as one techniques of accomplishing dissent in argumentative sequences
during German family dinner conversations. Spranz-Fogasy (1986) notes that the most
frequent type of disagreement in his corpus of mediation hearings, i.e.
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“Gegenbehauptung,” consists in an exact repetition of the interlocutor’s prior
utterance using negation markers. In a study of controversial TV-discussions,
Gruber (1996a, 1998) observes that opponents frequently repeat the whole turn they
disagree with and change only a minimal part (e.g. the polarity of the turn they
referred to). He calls this practice “minimal reformulation.”
91 This type of counter has been shown to be characteristic of arguments of part-
Hawaiian children (Boggs 1978: 329), among white middle-class children (Brenneis &
Lein 1977: 57; Lein & Brenneis 1978: 305), as well as among black working-class
children (M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin 1987: 218; M. H. Goodwin 1990: 179).
92 This extract constitutes a return and exchange sequence in the sense of Pomerantz
(1975: 26) and M. H. Goodwin (1990: 152), in which a move equivalent to the one
being opposed to is returned.
93 M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987: 218-219) and M. H. Goodwin (1990: 180) have
observed a similar technique in back working class children’s disputes, which they
have labelled “embedding.”
94 The various types of argumentative actions will be discussed in detail below.
95 This procedure will be discussed in detail below.
96 In a study of naturally occurring arguments between adults, Coulter (1990) notes
a similar argumentative technique, which he labels “contrastive matching,” which
consists in the rebuilding of declaratives (i.e. assertions, accusation, etc.) into
counters in adjacent turns. The resulting contrastively-matched counters include
“some turn-initial re-orderings, obligatory pronominal transformations and,
critically, one or more major transformations on a category-phase occurring in the
prior turn which alters it in the paired counter to its contrastive category” (195-
196). This technique allows speakers to produce a symmetrical utterance which
severs to rebut the prior speaker’s assertion’s point and simultaneously advance an
alternative position. This practice is illustrated by the following extract, quoted
from Coulter (1990: 183-184).
Prior to this sequence, in reaction to John and Sheila’s criticism of her late
rising, Mary has repeatedly claimed that she needs her rest.
14 John: For what?
15 Mary: What do I need my rest for? U-eerh ta
16 get my system going in the right way in
17 the right-
> 18 John: -I think ya need some exercise to get
19 your system going
20 Sheila: ‘f ya sleep eight hours you’re gonna
21 feel a lot more alive
22 Mary: Oh no not eight – I’ve never gotten
23 along on eight hours sleep
24 (1.5)
> 25 John: You-you’ve no-never gotten along very
26 well on twelve either.
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In line 14, John challenges Mary, demanding that she provide a reason for her
claim. When Mary supplies the requested explanation (lines 15-17), John challenges
her again, this time by means of a contrastively matched counter.
In line 15, the category “rest” in Mary’s assertion becomes “exercise” in John’s
counter-assertion (line 18). Similarly, a few turns later in the same conversation,
the phrase “on eight” in Mary’s assertion in line 23 becomes “on twelve” in John’s
counter in line 26.
97 M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987) and M. H. Goodwin (1990: 182) have also noted
the interplay between format tying and substitution in children’s arguments.
98 The different kinds of argumentative actions will be discussed in detail in Ch.
7.
99 In a study of lecturer-student discussions, Kotthoff (1990, 1993a) observes a
similar technique, whereby a speaker picks up a rhetorically important word of the
opponent’s previous utterance to build an aggravated oppositional move.  The
following example, quoted from Kotthoff (1993a: 202-203) illustrates this
“opposition format”:
1 N: ... if you buy there for example such a little
2 package of butter, and a and a roll, that then you
3 have to give nearly a mark [(although that)]
4 B: [That is] really VERY
5 cheap, for a [sandwich,]
> 6 N: [that is] cheap for a restaurant.
7 With a waitress. Okay? With with well with
> 8 service that you pay for. But that is not cheap
9 for a self-service restaurant, and most of all not
10 for one that actually is sponsored by the student
11 center, and should be sponsored, ...
In lines 4-5, B (a German lecturer) sharply contradicts N (a student), emphasising
the oppositional character of his disagreement by means of the interruptive
placement of his response. N qualifies B’s assertion in line 6, by repeating “that
is cheap,” while specifying the context to the contrary of what B meant. First she
agrees with B’s assertion, using the same word order. That is, she preserves the
sentence frame (“that is cheap”) but exploits it to focus on a difference (“for a
restaurant”). Subsequently, N elaborates on her opposition in line 8, re-using the
same phrase, but negating it (“that is not cheap for a self-service restaurant”).
Moreover, she intensifies the oppositional character of her disagreement by using
the turn-initial contrastive marker “but,” and by further expanding it in lines 9-
11 (“and most of all not for one that is sponsored by the student center”).
100 The escalation function of threats will be discussed in detail below.
101 For similar views on the aggravating function of tying techniques in argument
sequences cf. M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987), M. H. Goodwin (1990), Gruber
(1996a, 1998), Kotthoff (1990, 1993a) and Messmer (2003).
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102 As Labov (1972a: 153-154) has observed, attributes may include negatively
assessed values of age, weight, clothes, appearances, sexual behaviour, smell,
wealth, or food.
103 For instance, among the black migrant children and the Indian children observed
by Lein & Brenneis (1978: 302), “insults are repeated or improved on by each
succeeding speaker.”
104 For discussion of the affinity between ritual insults and opposition sequences
cf. also M. H. Goodwin (1990: 185-188) and M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987: 223-
225).
105 For instance, MacLaughlin (1984: 180) describes argument as a “troublesome”
conversational event.
106 For similar views on the relationship between confrontation and co-operation cf.
M. H. Goodwin (1982a); M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin (1987); M. H. Goodwin (1990);
Gruber (1998); Knoblauch (1991, 1995); Kotthoff (1993a); Messmer (2003).
107 In this view, the two conceptual metaphors ARGUMENT IS WAR and ARGUMENT IS DANCE
need not be mutually exclusive conceptualisations of the activity of arguing, as
proposed by C. Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 4-5).
108 For a distinction and detailed discussion of various kinds of cooperativeness
cf. Gruber (1996a, 1998).
109 By contrast, Coulter’s (1990) category of “reassertions” encompasses a much
broader spectrum of argumentative moves: Rather than consisting simply of repeat
formulations of prior assertions, “the notion refers to the recycling of a position
or thesis and not to the recycling of an utterance, although clearly some sterile
arguments can get generated by utterance-reassertions alone” (189). Likewise,
Apeltauer (1978: 257-269) and Franke (1983: 1-4) maintain that a speaker can insist
on a prior claim either by simply repeating the initial activity or by combining or
replacing it with more aggravated utterance formats or types of action, thereby
increasing the degree of bindingness of the original claim.
110 Jefferson (1990) has noted the occurrence of such lists in natural conversation.
They usually occur as three-part units, of which the third part may be used to
accomplish particular interactional work, such as topic-shifting and offence
avoidance. Messmer (2003: 230-232) has also observed such listings in sequences of
verbal conflict. He finds that the stringing together of utterances which refer to
negative characteristics or offensive behaviour on the part of the recipient, are
frequently used by disputants in doing and legitimising blaming. In contrast to the
three-part lists in Jefferson’s data, the lists in the conflict sequences examined
by Messmer, as well as in Olga’s turn in the example above, exceed the three-part
unit and, thus, are superogatory, with the additional item(s) serving to reinforce
the speaker’s claim.
111 The ensuing string of utterances bears a resemblance to the lists discussed
above. However, while the instances of listing described by Jefferson (1990) and
Messmer (2003) typically occupy a single turn, Mama’s list extends over a series of
turns.
112 The escalating function of mutual insisting has also been observed in studies of
naturally occurring conflict. Researcher have noted that insisting on both sides
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leads to “repetition” (Brenneis & Lein 1977: 56), “recycling” of positions (Goodwin
1990: 158) or “negative reaction cycles” (Spranz-Fogasy et al. 1993).
113 As Scott (2002: 308) has observed in a study of controversial TV-discussions, in
heated exchanges, turn length appears to be shorter than in non-disagreement talk
or in less intense disagreement sequences.
114 Piaget (1926: 65-72) differentiates between “primitive argument,” consisting in
extended recycling of positions, “quarrels,” i.e. types of dispute in which
divergence in position and actions is “accompanied by actions or promises of
actions” (66), and “genuine argument,” in which participants offer grounds for
supporting or objecting to an utterance. This differentiation has been adopted by
several conflict researchers, e.g. M. H. Goodwin (1982), (1990); Jacobs & Jackson
(1981); Jackson & Jacobs (1980).
115 Bateson delineated two general patterns of social relationship. In a symmetrical
relationship, the participants’ communicative behaviours mirror one another, such
as question and question, blaming and blaming, assertion and assertion. Symmetry
refers to “those forms of interactional sequences that could be described in terms
of competition, mutual emulation and so on” (Bateson 1979: 192). In a complementary
relationship, the participants’ behaviours are maximally different, but mutually
fit together, such as question and answer, giving and receiving, assertion and
submission. Bateson viewed these patterns as spiralling, or schismogenetic and
defined schismogenesis as “a process of differentiation in the norms of individuals
resulting from cumulative interaction between individuals” (Bateson 1958: 175). He
thought of symmetrical assertions of dominance as competitively spiralling:
Assertions by one party create stronger assertions by the other. Complementarity
was also thought to exhibit this progressive quality over time: One party becomes
increasingly dominant while the other becomes increasingly submissive.
116 Similarly, Kotthoff (1993a) and Spiegel (1995) identify the preference for
disagreement, recurrent overlapping and interruptions as manifestations of
emotional involvement in disputes, which can occur if tension is heightened.
117 The aggravating function of paralinguistic and prosodic features in conflict
sequences has also been noted in studies of nonscripted conflict talk (Apeltauer
1978; Gruber 1996a; Hartung 1996; Hundsnurscher 1993; Kakavá 2002; Kotthoff 1993a;
Laforest 2002; Schiffrin 1984; Schwitalla 1996; Spiegel 1995).
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Whenever I'm with my mother, I feel as though I have to
spend the whole time avoiding land mines. (Amy Tan, The
Kitchen God's Wife)
7 Argumentative speech act(ion)s in mother-daughter disputes
In chapter 6, I proposed that in order to uncover how the mother-
daughter disputes in my data are interactionally accomplished and
conducted by the participants, we need to pay attention to the
minutiae of talk-in-interaction. In particular, we need to analyse
the sequential organisation of episodes of conflict talk, the ways
in which oppositional moves are constructed, but also the types of
argumentative actions that characterise these conflict sequences.
In the preceding sections, I have concentrated on the
structural level of interaction, examining some of the discursive
resources available to participants to construct oppositional moves
in ways that emphasise rather than downplay their argumentative
nature. In the following, I will focus on the speech act level of
interaction to examine what kinds of actions are used by the
disputants in my data and how these speech actions contribute to the
confrontational character of the interaction. In the process, I will
investigate whether these argumentative resources are equally
available to both mothers and daughters, and how they can be
effectively employed by participants to seize control over various
aspects of the ongoing interaction.
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7.1. Second position in conflict talk
As described above, the principle sequential unit in an argument is
the (arguable) action-opposition sequence, in which actions that can
be construed as arguable are opposed by the recipient and thus
retrospectively become the initial point of a verbal conflict, with
the opposition itself subsequently open to being construed as
arguable. As we have seen, such dissent-turn sequences can emerge at
any point in an interaction, since even apparently innocuous, non-
argumentative utterances or actions can be responded to by others in
a way that makes them the starting point for stretches of conflict
talk.1 The upshot of this is that the oppositional response of one
participant to an initial move by another is the crucial element of
any conflict episode.2 As a result, there are consequential
differences between going first and going second with one’s view on
a potentially controversial issue, where going second implies having
the first opportunity for opposition.
Sacks (1992, vol. 2: 340-347) was the first to point out the
asymmetry between first and second position in arguments.3 He
suggested that those who get to go second are in stronger position
than those who go first, since they can argue with the prior party’s
position simply by taking it apart. While going first means having
to state one’s position (and, subsequently, developing a defence),
going second makes it possible to argue merely by challenging the
opponent’s position.
To conclude, an essential aspect of conflict sequences is the
asymmetry between going first and going second with respect to a
potentially arguable matter. This asymmetry operates at the level of
arguing for and against particular positions: while disputants in
first position are required to build a defence for their stance,
those in second position can choose if and when they will put
forward their own position, rather than simply attacking that of the
opponent. Thus, first and second positions entail different kinds of
argumentative resources, and in an important sense, disputants who
get to go second are in a more powerful position than those who go
first. In the course of the following sections, I will explore some
of the uses and consequences of such second position resources in
the mother-daughter disputes under analysis. More precisely, I will
examine what kinds of actions are prevalently employed by the
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disputants in my data to oppose one another and how these speech
actions and the ways in which they are constructed contribute to the
antagonistic character of the interaction. I will also investigate
if the interactional resources provided by these argumentative moves
are evenly accessible to both disputants, and how they can be
effectively utilised by participants to gain control of various
aspects of the ongoing interaction.
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Blaming mother is just a negative way of clinging
to her still. (Nancy Friday)
He who excuses himself, accuses himself.
(Gabriel Meurier) 
7.2 Accusations
One of the speech actions which the fictional disputants in my data
frequently use to oppose another is commonly referred to as
accusing, blaming, complaining, criticising, reprimanding, rebuking,
etc. With an accusation, complaint, reproach or a related action, a
speaker expresses dissatisfaction with or criticism of a preceding
or current action, an attitude or characteristic on the part of the
defendant, which she construes as inadequate in that it violates
some underlying social rule or norm, or fails to meet her
expectations and/or preferences, and for which she holds the
defendant responsible.4 In brief, accusations are speech actions that
construe the addressee as the agent of a blameworthy (i.e. arguable)
action.
Whereas some researchers seem to regard acts of disapproval,
complaints, criticism, accusations, reprimands etc. as distinct from
one another (e.g. Apeltauer 1978; Brown & Levinson 1987;
Hundsnurscher 1993) such communicative acts actually overlap.5 In
context, it is not easy (and might not be useful) to clearly
distinguish between them, as they are likely to appear in the same
slot and to elicit similar responses. This is reflected by numerous
studies in discourse and conversation analysis, which have addressed
the phenomenon being dealt with here variously as “accusation”
(Burton 1980; Garcia 1991), “blaming” (Pomerantz 1978),
“reproaching” (Hundsnurscher 1993), “complaint” (Dersley & Woottoon
2000; Drew & Holt 1988; Laforest 2002; Newell & Stutman 19889/90;
Sacks 1992), “complaining speech act” (Olshtain & Weinbach 1993),
“disapproval exchange” (d’Amico-Reisner 1983, 1986), and “Vorwurf”
(Apeltauer 1978; Frankenberg 1976, 1979; Günthner 2000; Gruber
1996a; Hundsnurscher 1993; Rehbein 1972).
Consequently, for the purpose of this study, I will consider
all communicative acts used to express disapproval of what is deemed
an unacceptable action, attitude, or characteristic on the part of
the opponent without attempting to draw a distinction between them
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and use the terms accusation, blaming, complaint, criticism, etc.,
synonymously.6
Accusations and corresponding communicative acts may not only
refer to actions that are already completed, as maintained by
Apeltauer (1977: 156ff), but also to actions that are in progress at
the moment of talk. This is illustrated by the following example
from My sister, in which Madame Danzard formulates Isabelle’s
current behaviour as a violation of some standard of conduct:
example (1): My sister 3
> 1 MADAME DANZARD Don't toy with your food, Isabelle.
2 It's so disagreeable. Always making
3 those little piles.
4 ISABELLE I'm not, Maman.
5 MADAME DANZARD You mean to tell me I don't see what
6 you're doing.
7 ISABELLE I'm not toying, Maman.
8 MADAME DANZARD (Coldly.) Very well, my dear, call it
9 what you will.
A similar view is expressed by Gruber (1996a: 197), who
distinguishes between “situational” and “extrasituational”
accusations: Situational accusations focus on violations of a norm
that the opponent has committed during the ongoing interaction and
which the speaker addresses immediately or after a short while. By
contrast, extrasituational accusations refer to breaches that were
committed outside the current interaction.
For instance, in the following extract from Alto, Florene first
accuses her daughter Wanda of having “deceived” her when pretending
that she wanted to go to the movies with her (lines 73-80). Then she
complains that during the film, Wanda only talked about her music
teacher’s view of it and did not show any interest in her mother’s
opinion (lines 83-86). Both accusations refer to incidents that took
place the night before.
example (2): Alto I,3
72 WANDA I don't see why you're mad at her.
73 FLORENE I'm not mad at her! I'm mad at you! You
> 74 deceived me, Wanda. Talked me into spending
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75 my hard earned ironing money to take you to
76 the picture show. And let me think you
77 wanted us to see it together so we could
78 have it to remember for a long time to
79 come, like we always have when we saw
80 picture shows.
81 WANDA I wanted us to see it.
82 FLORENE Hah! I might as well have stayed at home.
> 83 Once we got there all you did was talk
84 about Althea Lockwood and her interpre-
85 tation of it. You never once asked me my
86 opinion.
In addition, although accusations cannot focus on future actions,
they might refer to the defendant’s (supposed) intention of
performing a specific action as, for instance, in an utterance such
as “You can’t possible want to do that!” (cf. Günthner 2000: 78).
Moreover, accusations can aim at the defendant’s verbal as well
as his or her nonverbal behaviour, as illustrated by the following
extract from Home. When Olivia accuses her daughter of being
irresponsible (lines 256-261), Mary Jane turns the tables by
returning an accusation. Olivia’s blame becomes the basis of Mary
Jane’s return-complaint, in which she accuses her mother of lying
(line 262):
 example (3): Home
254 MARY JANE Oh right, of course, you're Miss Innocent
255 again, Ma.
> 256 OLIVIA Oh, I'm Miss Innocent? You make one
mistake
257 after another for 20 years and you never
258 took responsibility for one second! You
259 brought babies into this world that you
260 could barely feed 'cause that husband a
261 yours couldn't hold down a job.
> 262 MARY JANE That's such a lie! How could you say that?
Furthermore, accusations may not only express a discrepancy between
an expected and/or desired and a factual action, as suggested by
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some researchers (e.g. Frankenberg 1976: 51; Laforest 2002: 1596),
but they may also turn on the defendant’s character traits and/or
attitudes. In these cases, the accuser presumes that the accused is
responsible for the wrong attitude or character flaw and could
(have) behave(d) differently. This is illustrated by the following
extract from My mother, at the end of which Margaret accuses her
mother of being prejudiced against Americans (line 136-139).
example (4): My mother I, 7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of the
131 valley!
132 MARGARET He's not.
133 DORIS He is.
134 MARGARET He's not, just parking.
135 DORIS Curious method of parking.
> 136 MARGARET That's typical, you think all Americans are
137 brash and wear loud check shirts and chew
138 gum and want to marry English girls. You're
139 just prej-...
Additionally, as illustrated by the preceding examples, criticism
can be directly addressed to the person identified as the cause of
the problem, i.e. the individual held responsible for the behaviour
or attitude that is deemed inadequate. In these cases, the addressee
of the accusation and the accused are identical.7 However,
dissatisfaction may not only be expressed to the person whose
behaviour or attitude is considered unsatisfactory, but also to some
third party, who is not held responsible for the trouble.8 In these
cases, a speaker complains to a person about the conduct or attitude
of others,9 as in the following two extracts from Avenue.
In the example below, Mother is complaining to Olga about the
caretaker having sent her a summons:
example (5): Avenue
81 MOTHER (Comes back, holding two slips of paper.)
82 Nobody there, just these papers.
83 (Looking at them, lets out a shriek.)
84 Hey, they're summons! One is for spitting
85 in the hallway and the second one, let's
86 see (Reading slip.) for leaving garbage
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> 87 in the hall. Hey, that ain't fair, that was
88 last week.
89 OLGA (Shutting off radio.) He has a good memory.
90 MOTHER Damn him, that lousy old man.
After having read the note, Mother expresses her indignation at the
fact that one of them refers to an incident that happened the week
before: “Hey, that ain’t fair, that was last week.” (lines 87-88).
Her utterance construes the caretaker’s activity as contravening
some underlying standard regarding the amount of time after which it
is still acceptable (i.e. “fair”) to send someone a summons.
Similarly, in the following segment, Olga is complaining to her
mother about her current boyfriend’s table manners (lines 441-43).
This instance differs from the preceding example in that, although
Olga’s complaint does not identify Mother but her boyfriend as the
cause of the problem, it nevertheless implies criticism of Mother by
presenting her as someone who is going out with a person whose table
manners are unacceptable.
example (6): Avenue
440 OLGA After dinner we're going to sit around and
> 441 talk. He always folds his napkin up and puts
442 it in the saucer full of coffee. It looks all
443 soggy and I want to vomit.
> 444 MOTHER You're always getting sick.
445 OLGA Tell him not to put ashes on the table.
> 446 MOTHER You talk too much. Did anyone ever tell you
447 that?
448 OLGA Yes, you just did.
449 MOTHER Damn—
450 OLGA I don't talk much at all. If I had any nerve
451 I'd say what I think about him to his face.
In legitimising her claim, Olga uses a rhetorical device that
Pomerantz (1986) has identified as “extreme case formulations”
(ECFs). ECFs are descriptions or assessments that employ
semantically extreme expressions “every,” “all,” “none,” “best,”
“least,” “as good as it gets,” “always,” “perfectly,” “brand new,”
and “absolutely.” As Edwards (2000) demonstrates, ECFs do not adhere
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to any single logical formula or grammatical rule. Rather, they cut
across grammatical categories, including statements containing
extreme adjectives (e.g. “total,” “absolute”), all-quantifiers such
as “all,” “every,” “no,” “none” and related nouns like “everybody,”
“nothing,” adverbs (e.g. “always,” “never”), and phrases like “as
good as it gets” and “brand new” as well as superlative
constructions with optional expressions involving “ever.” Pomerantz
shows that one of the uses of ECFs in complaint sequences is “to
defend against or counter challenges to the legitimacy of
complaints, accusations, justifications, and defenses” (219).10
In the conversation preceding this sequence, Olga has
repeatedly expressed her disapproval of Mother’s new boyfriend,
claiming that his conduct is intolerable. However, so far, Mother,
who has consistently been taking her boyfriend’s part, has refuted
each of her complaints vehemently. In the extract above, Olga
launches yet another complaint. She describes a situation that is
representative of her mother’s lover’s objectionable behaviour. She
portrays the incident in such a way as to make Mother see her
boyfriend’s fault. In lines 440-442, Olga describes the
circumstances (“After dinner we’re going to sit around and talk.”)
and activity (“He always folds his napkin up and puts it in the
saucer full of coffee.”) that constitute the boyfriend’s offence.
The adverb “always” is a proportional measure describing the
frequency of occurrence of the reported misconduct. To be precise,
it specifies that the frequency with which the complained of action
occurs is the maximum possible. The extreme formulation “always” (as
opposed to a less extreme description, such as, for instance, “once
in a while”) is a device that formulates the boyfriend’s putting his
napkin in the saucer as a recurrent pattern rather than a single or
random occurrence. As Pomerantz (1986) points out, this is an
important difference in so far as regularly occurring cases should
be taken into consideration, whereas random cases may or ought to be
dismissed. Hence, in describing the boyfriend’s offence as an
“always” occurrence, Olga suggests that it should not be dismissed
as minor. That is to say, she employs an ECF in portraying the
situation in question as a legitimate complainable.
Pomerantz (1986) maintains that speakers tend to use ECFs when
they anticipate or expect the interlocutor to undermine their claims
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and when they are in adversarial situations. Thus, in describing the
offence in question with an ECF, Olga can be seen to display an
orientation to the argumentative sequential context in which she
produces her complaint and to the related expectation that her
mother will counter her complaint.
Indeed, in the following turn, Mother challenges the legitimacy
of her daughter’s complaint against her boyfriend by claiming that
she is “always getting sick” (line 444). Similar to Olga in the
preceding turn, she uses the extreme formulation “always” to
legitimise her return complaint.11 By formulating Olga’s nausea as a
mannerism rather than a reaction triggered by her boyfriend’s table
manners, she both undermines the basis for her daughter’s complaint
and legitimises her own criticism. Olga responds with a directive
demanding Mother to tell her boyfriend “not to put ashes on the
table” (line 445). Again, Mother opposes her with an accusation. By
rebuking her for talking “too much” (line 446), she formulates
Olga’s verbal behaviour as violating an interactional norm and thus
manages to avoid complying with her daughter’s demand. This extract
illustrates how accusations can be exploited by participants as a
discursive resource to build opposition in conversational disputes.
In addition, it shows that ECFs are rhetorical devices that
disputants can employ in defending against prospected challenges to
the legitimacy of complaints.12
The vast majority of expressions of criticism in my corpus are
addressed directly to the person identified as the cause of the
problem rather than to some third party. This can be explained with
reference to the argumentative context in which the utterances are
produced. As discussed above, in the course of a dispute,
participants show an orientation to the expectation of opposition.
The fact that the disputants frequently accuse each other indicates
their orientation towards finding fault with the opponent as an
effective means of constructing oppositional moves.
This corresponds with the findings of linguistic studies of
naturally occurring conflict talk. For instance, M. H. Goodwin
(1982, 1990) observes that a frequent argumentative action in
preadolescent children’s disputes involves “categorising what prior
speaker has just said as a culturally defined offence” (1990: 154).
Such negative categorisations include phrases such as talking
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“trash” (i.e. talking in what the recipient considers an
inappropriate manner), “showing off,” “acting smart”, “having smart
answers,” “telling stories” or lying. Similarly, several researchers
have shown that accusations and related activities are routinely
used in naturally occurring arguments between adults (Apeltauer
1978; Drew & Holt 1988; Frankenberg 1976, 1979; Garcia 1991; Gruber
1996a; Laforest 2002; Messmer 2003).
In addition, the high frequency of accusations in my data may
be related to the fact that I am looking at (portrayals of) mother-
daughter disputes. Blaming someone is one way of reminding them that
there are certain standards of conduct which are not to be
transgressed and of giving expression to our expectations. Since in
close relationships, establishing and negotiating shared norms of
behaviour is a central issue, the people, who provide us with the
most opportunities to evaluate their conduct, and who most
frequently evaluate ours, are those closest to us. Consequently,
accusations, complaints, criticism, etc. are common activities in
conversations between people who are on intimate terms.13
Furthermore, as Boxer (2002: 50) points out, speech behaviours
such as direct complaining and “disapproval exchanges” (d’Amico-
Reisner 1986) – which frequently initiate conflict sequences
(Frankenberg 1979; Gruber 1996a) - occur most often “where the
relationship has already been established and where the disapproval
has less chance of hindering the relationship.”
Moreover, as Tannen (2002, Ch. 7) maintains in her study of
family conversation, the mother-daughter relationship is an
intensified form of all close relationships, and communication
between mothers and daughters is frequently characterised by mutual
criticism (cf. also Augenstein 1998; Browder 1989; Hofer et al.
1990a, 1991, 1993; and Wodak 1984).
As linguistic research has shown, accusations generally involve
(1) a reference to the relevant activity, attitude, or
characteristic; (2) a negative evaluation of that action, attitude,
or trait based on the perceived violation of some underlying norm or
the speaker’s preferences and/or expectations; (3) the attribution
of responsibility for the relevant action, attitude, or
characteristic and its consequences to the accused; and (4) a
request to the defendant to remedy the perceived failure, for
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instance, by offering a remedy or an explanation of their
behaviour.14
In the context of the ongoing interaction, however, some of
these aspects are often not made explicit. For instance, the
attribution of responsibility is frequently implicit by way of
direct address. Similarly, the negative evaluation of the activity
in question may be unspoken as, for example, in accusations that are
realised by statements that merely allude to the relevant behaviour
or attitude without explicitly mentioning it or the norm that it has
violated, and without explicitly calling into question the
defendant.15 Such complaints typically take the form of an assertive
utterance with no evaluation or second person markers, as in the
following extract from Avenue:
example (7): Avenue
> 638 OLGA (Looking at her hand.) I have a wart on my
639 hand.
640 MOTHER (Goes to sit beside her again, examines it,
641 touches her hand gently; soothingly.)
642 Warts are from playing with frogs.
> 643 OLGA (Pulling her hand away.) It's from the cold.
644 I know it is.
> 645 MOTHER (Becoming angry.) Why you complaining now,
646 after all these years!
647 OLGA (Softly, it's painful to talk about her
648 misery.) I guess it's because ... well, we'll
649 be leaving and now I see how we've been living
650 and it's sickening.
651 MOTHER (Agreeing sadly.) Everything about this place
652 was sickening.
Olga remarks that she has a wart on her hand (lines 638-639), and
opposes Mother’s following claim that “Warts are from playing with
frogs” (line 642), with a counter-assertion (cf. below), maintaining
that “It’s from the cold” (line 643). Although Olga does not
explicitly express criticism, Mother apparently interprets her
activity as a complaint, which is displayed by her response, “Why
you complaining now, after all these years!” (lines 645-446).16 Her
utterance explicitly formulates Olga’s activity as complaining.
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Moreover, the increase in volume signalled by the exclamation mark
signals her indignation. In response, Olga backs down, attempting to
explain her behaviour. She attributes her conduct to the fact that
now that she and Mother are going to start a new life she has become
aware that they have been living in appalling conditions (lines 648-
650).
As indicated above, accusations and corresponding activities
entail a request to the defendant to remedy their perceived
violation, for instance, by producing an account for their behaviour
or by offering an apology. From a sequential perspective, an
accusation is the first pair part of an adjacency pair and thus
makes specific second pair parts conditionally relevant. As Sacks
(1992, vol.2: 47) has pointed out, “doing a complaint” sets up a
sequence, locating both the sorts of actions that appropriately
follow and who should do them. Goffman (1971: 124ff) views
accusation sequences as “remedial interchanges”: The interactor who
has violated a rule or norm, is expected to produce a remedial
activity. The function of remedial work is to change the meaning
that otherwise might be attributed to the relevant activity (i.e.
the “worst possible reading” of the act) with the aim of changing
what could be considered offensive into what can be considered
acceptable. Hence, from a structural point of view, by issuing an
accusation, the speaker limits the addressee’s freedom of action
forcing her to respond in a certain way.
With regard to the interpersonal plane of interaction,
accusations and related acts represent FTAs as defined by Brown &
Levinson (1987: 65). In fact, they figure among those FTAs that
threaten both the hearer’s positive and negative face. Firstly, they
threaten the hearer’s positive face wants by indicating (at least
potentially) the speaker’s dissatisfaction with/negative evaluation
of the addressee’s behaviour, personal characteristics, beliefs or
values. As a result, accusations put the defendant in a position to
either accept a loss of face and offer an apology (i.e. an admission
of fault), or to attempt to save face by means of accounting for the
activity in question or refuting the accusation. In addition, they
present a threat to the addressee’s negative face by impeding her
freedom of action: Through projecting some future act of the hearer,
they put some pressure on her to produce the required activity.
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Therefore, accusations provide a conversational resource available
to speakers that may be exploited to exercise interactional power
over others at the micro-level of interaction by constraining their
freedom of action, and thus to exercise power over others.
In the following, I will look at the patterns by which
accusations are realised in my data and analyse their structural and
lexical aspects of these accusation formats. In addition, I will
explore the interplay of conflict and power by examining how the
disputants employ accusations as an interactional resource both to
counter the opponent’s prior activities and to attempt to exert
control over their subsequent actions.
As the preceding examples have already indicated, expressions
of disapproval can be packaged in various ways. For instance, in my
corpus, they are frequently formatted as interrogatives.17 One
syntactic construction that the participants in the fictional
mother-daughter disputes recurrently use for the packaging of
accusations are question formats with “Why,” as the following two
extracts illustrate:
example (8): Home
226 OLIVIA Life is too hard here.
227 MARY JANE It's hard everywhere. It's harder out
228 there. Where do you even think we're
229 gonna go? I don't know where on earth you
230 think we're gonna go.
231 OLIVIA I don't know.
232 MARY JANE You don't know. Great. Well, you should
233 think of someplace to go. You can't sell
234 this house without some idea of where you
235 plan on ending up. Even I know that.
236 OLIVIA Tennessee.
> 237 MARY JANE So you decided. Why do you always keep
238 secrets? You always just sit with your
239 mouth closed and nobody ever knows what
240 you're thinking.
241 OLIVIA I don't have to tell you everything.
Prior to this exchange, Olivia has told her daughter that she
intends to sell her house and move away. Mary Jane strongly
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disapproves of Olivia’s plans. She discards her mother’s reason for
wanting to move away (“It's hard everywhere. It's harder out there.”
lines 227-228) and adds a challenge demanding her to provide further
information about where she wants to move (lines 228-230). Her
indignation is signalled by the use of “even” and “on earth.” When
Olivia apparently is not able to name a destination (line 231), Mary
Jane opposes her again claiming that her plans do not make sense if
she does not know where she wants to move (lines 232-235). The
partial repeat (“You don't know.”) as well as her use of sarcasm
(“Great.”) indicates right at the beginning of her turn that
opposition is going to follow. When Olivia eventually discloses that
she wants to move to Tennessee, Mary Jane challenges her by accusing
her of collusiveness (“Why do you always keep secrets?” lines 237-
238). Her criticism is formulated as an interrogative starting with
the question word “Why”. By designing her utterance in this way,
Mary Jane requests that Olivia account for her perceived
misconduct.18 Moreover, her use of the extreme formulation “always”
construes Olivia’s behaviour as a non-unique violation and thus
serves to legitimise her accusation. Consequently, as an
argumentative strategy, Mary Jane’s utterance accomplishes a number
of things: Firstly, it presupposes a violation in Olivia’s part,
namely that she keeps secrets from her daughter. In order to save
face, Olivia is forced to justify her behaviour. Secondly, by means
of the interrogative format with “Why”, it makes an account
conditionally relevant and obliges Olivia to provide an explanation
for her behaviour, thus limiting her freedom of action. Therefore,
her utterance presents a control manoeuvre, i.e. an attempt at
exercising power. Mary Jane’s blame implicative question is followed
by another accusation in the form of a declarative statement, in
which she underpins her initial complaint by describing Olivia’s
behaviour in more detail (“You always just sit with your mouth
closed and nobody ever knows what you're thinking.” lines 238-240).
Instead of offering an explanation for her behaviour, Olivia rejects
her daughter’s blame by disputing the validity of the norm which
builds the basis of Mary Jane’s negative evaluation of her conduct,
namely that a mother is obliged to share her thoughts with her
daughter (“I don't have to tell you everything.” line 241). Her
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response displays her interpretation of Mary Jane’s prior utterance
as an accusation.
In the following extract from Neaptide, Claire also uses this
format:
example (9): Neaptide
175 CLAIRE Mum, you were always saying don't get married
176 like you did at nineteen and regret it.
177 JOYCE
178 I might have said don't get married at sixteen,
179 but I didn't, say don't get married at all or
180 fornicate or emigrate or crack up or go the
181 other way or whatever. My God, I wanted three
182 daughters like the Brontës and I ended up with
183 a family fit for a Channel Four documentary.
184 Regrets, me? It's you lot that should have
185 regrets.
186 CLAIRE I give up.
187 JOYCE Now you know how I feel - I gave up a long time
188 ago.
> 189 CLAIRE Why do you have to criticise me all the time?
190 JOYCE Me? Criticise? Just what do I criticise you
191 about?
192 (Enter JEAN behind JOYCE.)
193 CLAIRE Hi, Jean.
194 JOYCE Personal cleanliness is the last thing I'd
195 criticise you for - you can tell that by your
196 fingernails - spotless.
In line 189, Claire is challenging her mother by issuing a blame
implicative question: “Why do you have to criticise me all the
time?” Her utterance presupposes that Joyce habitually criticises
her daughter and thus portrays her behaviour as offensive. The ECF
with “all the time” formulates Joyce’s behaviour as a recurrent
violation and thereby legitimises Claire’s accusation. In addition,
by using an interrogative format with “Why” she obliges Joyce to
offer an account for her behaviour and thus tries to constrain her
freedom of action. Thus, her utterance presents an attempt at
exercising power. However, Claire’s control manoeuvre is
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unsuccessful. Instead of providing the requested account, Joyce
challenges her daughter’s accusation in the next turn. She begins
her turn by repeating a part of Claire’s prior utterance (“Me?
Criticise?” line 190) producing it with rising intonation. As
discussed above, in disagreement sequences, (partial) repetition of
the interlocutor’s prior talk is frequently used as a preface to
begin oppositional turns. It announces right at the beginning of the
turn that disagreement is going to follow. Moreover, as I noted
earlier, repetition of the talk that is being opposed allows the
speaker to convey a particular affective reaction to what the other
has just said. By prefacing her turn with a partial repetition of
her daughter’s utterance, Joyce displays incredulity at what Claire
has just said, and thus portrays her activity as inappropriate.
Moreover, the disagreement preface is directly followed by further
talk, which explicitly opposes what Claire has said: Subsequent to
the repeat, Joyce issues a return question, demanding that Claire
provide evidence for her prior claim: “Just what do I criticise you
about?” (lines 190-191).19 However, rather than awaiting Claire’s
response, Joyce immediately expands on her challenge to Claire’s
complaint by providing an example that counters her daughter’s claim
(“Personal cleanliness is the last thing I'd criticise you for”
lines 194-196). Her reaction displays her understanding of Claire’s
interrogative as a complaint rather than a request for information.
As we have seen, the “Why”-questions in the preceding examples
are noticeably oriented to by the disputants as expressions of
reproach. Their accusatory function is displayed by a number of
features that indicate how the utterances are being used in the
ongoing interaction. For instance, the interrogatives with “Why” are
characterised by the use of adverbs of frequency such as “always”
and “all the time.” These extreme formulations construe the
complained-of activity as a recurrent violation rather than a single
instance, and thus serve to legitimise the accusations. Moreover,
they display a particular affective reaction (e.g. indignation,
irritation, frustration or annoyance) at the opponent’s behaviour
and thus serve to aggravate opposition. In addition, the negative
connotation of verb phrases such as “keep secrets” and “criticise”
attribute a pejorative quality to the actions in question and thus
add to the accusatory character of the utterances. Furthermore, the
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sequential placement of the interrogatives within the context of an
argument contributes to their contextualisation as accusations.
These lexical and sequential features are meta-pragmatic signs that
indicate that, although at the denotative level they ask for the
reason for the other’s behaviour, the interrogatives are to be
interpreted as accusations, i.e. as requests for justification
rather than requests for information: They function as
contextualisation cues which frame the “Why”-questions as
accusations. This is echoed by the addressees’ responses, which
reflect their interpretation of the interrogatives as challenges.
Another interrogative construction that is recurrently used in
my corpus to package accusations is questions with “How.” This
format is illustrated by the following two extracts from Avenue:
example (10): Avenue
476 OLGA (Confronting her.) I'd rather be alone than
477 settle for him.
478 MOTHER You're a fool! If you were in my position,
479 (Crosses D. L. for drink.) you'd have to.
480 (Pours a drink, and swallows slowly.)
481 Sometimes I get cravings, like sometimes it's
482 for sour cream and pickles. (Faces away from
483 Olga.)
484 OLGA (Stunned.) Pregnant?
485 MOTHER (Proud.) Yeah. (Toasts with drink.)
> 486 OLGA (Sitting back down on high-riser.) How can
487 you do this to me? I'm all grown up and
488 you're going to walk, around with a big
belly.
489 You disgust me.
490 MOTHER (Crosses U. C. and then qoes to sit beside
491 Olga, who is on high-riser.) Now it's no
492 disgust. I'm a woman and there's no disgust
493 in what I've done.
Prior to this sequence, Olga and her mother have been arguing about
Mother’s current love affair. Towards the end of the dispute, Mother
insinuates that she is expecting a baby. When she confirms her
daughter’s inference that she is pregnant, Olga challenges her with
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a blame implicative question with “How” (“How can you do this to
me?” lines 486-487) expressing both shock and indignation at
Mother’s pregnancy. In the remainder of her turn, she elaborates on
her accusation claiming that her mother’s condition is inappropriate
for her age (“I'm all grown up and you're going to walk, around with
a big belly.” lines 487-489), and then concludes her turn with an
explicit expression of contempt: “You disgust me.” (line 489). In
the following turn, however, Mother rejects Olga’s depreciation
(“Now it’s no disgust.” lines 491-492) and then goes on to support
her stance by denying the negative quality that Olga has attributed
to her behaviour (“I'm a woman and there's no disgust in what I've
done.” lines 492-493).
In the following sequence, too, Olga’s accusation takes the
form of an interrogative with “How”:
example (11): Avenue
> 306 OLGA (Putting papers inside notebook.) How dare
307 you read my personal property?
308 MOTHER (Angry, scared, she has gone too far.) I
309 wanted to see what you write. Sometimes I see
310 you writing, so I wanted to see what it was.
In the section preceding this extract, Olga was desperately trying
to get back her personal notes, which Mother was reading without her
permission, and the two women ended up chasing each other round the
kitchen table. After having recaptured her papers, Olga challenges
Mother with the accusatory question: “How dare you read my personal
property?” (lines 306-307). This formulation presupposes that Mother
has violated a norm by looking through her daughter’s personal
things. In particular, the modal auxiliary “dare” construes Mother’s
activity as an offence. In fact, the interrogative construction “How
dare” + second person pronoun is a formulaic expression which is
customarily employed by conversationalists to package accusations.
In addition, by using an interrogative format with “How,” Olga
forces Mother to provide an account for her action in the subsequent
turn, and thus tries to constrain her freedom of action. Therefore,
Olga’s utterance presents a control manoeuvre. In the next turn,
Mother provides the required response and justifies her behaviour by
claiming that she meant no harm looking through Olga’s documents,
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and was reading her papers merely out of curiosity: “I wanted to see
what you write.” (lines 308-309). Her defensive response reveals her
interpretation of Olga’s utterance as an accusation rather than a
request for information.20
The interrogatives with “How” in the two preceding extracts are
perceptibly oriented to by the disputants as expressions of
criticism. They exhibit certain cues, which indicate that they are
being used as accusations in the ongoing exchanges. For instance,
the modal auxiliaries “can” and “dare” construe the activities in
question as offensive and thus indicate that the utterances are to
be interpreted as challenges rather than requests for information.
Moreover, the expression of contempt at the end of Olga’s turn in
example (10) (“You disgust me.” line 489) frames her preceding
interrogative as an accusation. Furthermore, the sequential
placement of the interrogatives within the context of a dispute
contributes to their contextualisation as accusations. This is
reflected by Mother’s responses, which display her interpretation of
Olga’s interrogatives as criticism rather than requests for
information. The examples above - as well as other instance of this
question format which occurred in my data, such as Mary Jane’s
utterance “How could you say that?” in extract (3) - suggest that in
the context of an argument, interrogative constructions that take
the form “How” + modal auxiliary “dare”/”can”/”could” + second
person pronoun serve as a conventionalised format for accusations
and are generally oriented to as such by conversationalists in the
production and interpretation of utterances.21
The syntactic construction that is most frequently used in my
data to package accusations is declarative statements, in which the
speaker explicitly mentions the activity or attitude that
constitutes a violation and attributes a negative quality to it. For
example, in the following extract from Home, Mary Jane repeatedly
opposes her mother with such accusatory claims:
example (12): Home
237 OLIVIA Tennessee.
238 MARY JANE So you decided. Why do you always keep
> 239 secrets? You always just sit with your
240 mouth closed and nobody ever knows what
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241 you're thinking.
242 OLIVIA I don't have to tell you everything.
> 243 MARY JANE You were always like this. Always like
244 this. I was 19 years old and you coulda
245 stopped me from going to California with
246 Jimbo to begin with and my life woulda—
247 OLIVIA Nobody coulda stopped you.
> 248 MARY JANE You didn't even try! I was your daughter
249 and you didn't care where I ended up.
250 OLIVIA That's ridiculous. You didn't care where
251 you ended up.
As described above, prior to this sequence, Olivia has told her
daughter that she is planning to sell her house and move to some
other place. When, at Mary Jane’s urging, she discloses that she
wants to move to Tennessee (line 237), her daughter challenges her
with a blame implicative question (“Why do you always keep secrets?”
lines 238-239). This is followed by an accusatory claim, in which
Mary Jane reinforces her initial accusation by giving a detailed
description of Olivia’s problematic behaviour: “You always just sit
with your mouth closed and nobody ever knows what you're thinking.”
(lines 239-241). As noted above, her criticism is aggravated by the
use of extreme formulations. The repeated use of the adverb “always”
portrays Olivia’s behaviour as a non-unique violation and thus
functions to legitimise Mary Jane’s blames. Likewise, the phrase
“nobody ever knows” construes Olivia’s conduct as both typical and
frustrating not only for Mary Jane, but also for others. Olivia
rejects her daughter’s blames by disputing the legitimacy of her
accusations. While she does not deny that she keeps her plans to
herself, she justifies her behaviour by arguing with the validity of
the norm which builds the basis of Mary Jane’s negative judgment of
her conduct by disputing that she is obliged to share everything
with her daughter: “I don't have to tell you everything.” (line
242). Her response signals her interpretation of Mary Jane’s prior
utterance as an accusation. Mary Jane does not accept Olivia’s
justification and opposes her with another accusation: “You were
always like this. Always like this.” (lines 243-244). As in her
initial complaint, the extreme formulation “always” serves to both
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intensify and legitimise her criticism by construing Olivia’s
behaviour as a non-unique offence rather than a single instance.
Moreover, self-repetition stresses and underscores Mary Jane’s
position without relating to Olivia’s prior turn at all and thus
aggravates the disagreement.22 In the remainder of her turn, Mary
Jane elaborates on her blame by referring to a concrete example of
Olivia’s perceived failures (lines 244-246). Olivia interrupts her
with an outright denial (“Nobody coulda stopped you.” line 247) and
the initial accusation sequence evolves into a full-blown argument.23
In the subsequent turn, Mary Jane counter-opposes her mother with
another accusatory claim: “You didn't even try!” (line 248). The
increase in volume signals high emotional involvement and further
escalates the dispute. In the remainder of her turn, Mary Jane
expands on her accusation adding another accusation in the form of a
declarative statement: “I was your daughter and you didn't care
where I ended up.” (lines 248-249). Olivia again opposes this in the
following turn, and the argument continues. This extract illustrates
how accusations can be used as a discursive resource to aggravate
disagreement and initiate a dispute.
Conversely, the example below shows how the use of accusations
can escalate a dispute that is already in progress. Margaret’s
argument with her mother about whether her American boyfriend is
about to drive into Doris’s flower-bed with his car culminates in
Margaret accusing her mother of being prejudiced.
example (13): My mother I, 7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of the
131 valley!
132 MARGARET He's not.
133 DORIS He is.
134 MARGARET He's not, just parking.
135 DORIS Curious method of parking.
> 136 MARGARET That's typical, you think all Americans are
137 brash and wear loud check shirts and chew
138 gum and want to marry English girls. You're
139 just prej-...
140 DORIS Margaret, that's enough! (Pause.) After all,
141 he is going to marry an English girl.
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The sequence starts with Doris complaining to Margaret that her
American boyfriend is about to crush her flowers (lines 130-131).
When Margaret opposes her with a contradiction (line 132), a
conflict sequence ensues with the two women mutually negating each
others’ assertions. The dispute escalates when Margaret opposes her
mother with an accusatory claim (lines 136-139). The adverb
“typical” construes Doris’s behaviour as characteristic and the cut-
off declarative: “You’re just prej-...” attributes a negative
quality to her attitude. However, instead of providing a
justification, Doris cuts her off (“Margaret, that's enough!” line
140) and then uses her argument against her by pointing out that at
least one of the assumptions that she has attributed to her mother
and evaluated as prejudice is in fact correct: “After all, he is
going to marry an English girl.” (lines 140-141). Doris builds her
counter by employing the technique of contrastive mirroring. As
discussed earlier, by this means, she establishes coherence at the
structural level, while setting up a marked contrast at the content
level of interaction. Moreover, the interruptive placement of her
turn and the raised voice signal emotional agitation and reinforce
opposition.
As the subsequent extracts illustrate, accusations in my corpus
are also formulated as imperatives. Apart from declarative
statements, this syntactic construction is most frequently used in
my data to package criticism. By using this format, the speaker both
expresses her disapproval of the other’s conduct and explicitly
demands that she change her behaviour. Accordingly, such utterances
constitute attempts to constrain the addressee’s freedom of action,
and thus present control manoeuvres (i.e. attempts to exercise
power), as the following extract from Alto illustrates:
example (14): Alto II, 1
37 WANDA (Bounds across the floor to look out the door.)
38 FLORENE Careful, Wanda. Remember these shaky floors.
39 WANDA (Becoming panicky.) We’re not nailed down to
40 anything, are we? Aunt Ola Belle’s always
41 saying how a strong gust of wind will blow us
42 off these building blocks.
43 FLORENE (Trying to hide her fear of their precarious
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44 predicament, which has now dawned on her.)
45 Now Wanda calm down.
46 WANDA (Frantically grabs a large envelope from the
47 top of the radio and clutches it to her chest.)
48 FLORENE (Points to the envelope.) What is that?
49 (More lightning and thunder. WANDA'S hysteria
50 mounts.)
51 WANDA None of your business.
> 52 FLORENE Don't you sass me even if it is coming a
53 tornado.
54 WANDA I want my Daddy.
55 FLORENE Maybe we ought not to wait for him.
Florene and Wanda are waiting for King, Florene’s husband and
Wanda’s father. Outside a fierce thunder storm is raging,
threatening to blow away their house. Both women are frightened and
the atmosphere is tense. The extract starts with Wanda trying to
look out the door to see whether her father has arrived (line 37).
Florene cautions her to be careful (line 38), and when she starts
panicking, tells her to calm down (line 45). When Wanda grabs an
envelope that has been lying around, Florene issues a request for
information regarding its content: “What is that?” (line 48). Wanda
challenges Florene’s question by invoking a precondition for a valid
request for information, namely that the recipient of the question
has no objection to revealing the requested information to the
speaker (cf. Burton 1980: 152). With an assertion that expresses her
unwillingness to tell Florene what is in the envelope (“None of your
business.” line 51), Wanda denies this precondition. Florence
counter-opposes Wanda’s challenge with a negative meta-communicative
imperative (“Don’t you sass me,” line 52), which rejects Wanda’s
prior activity as unacceptable. By designing her utterance like
this, she accomplishes several things. Firstly, she challenges the
appropriateness of Wanda’s prior activity implying that Wanda has
contravened some standard of conduct for daughters, which does not
permit them to talk back to their mothers. In addition, she demands
Wanda not to exhibit similar behaviour in the future. By trying to
regulate Wanda’s behaviour, Florene attempts to constrain her
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daughter’s freedom of action. Hence, her utterance presents an
attempt to exercise power.
Likewise, in the following extract from Home, Olivia’s
criticism of her daughter is packaged as an imperative:
example (15): Home
346 MARY JANE As soon as you called me and ASKED me to
347 come here I started thinking about all
348 kinds of things and it started looking up
349 again. Coming back kind of washed away all
350 my mistakes. I can't explain it but it
did.
351 It did.
> 352 OLIVIA Don't be silly.
353 MARY JANE I'm not being silly.
354 OLIVIA Well you're not making any sense. I hope
355 you don't go around talking to people like
356 this.
The sequence starts with Mary Jane describing what she felt when her
mother asked her to return home after her failed marriage and what
her home coming means to her (lines 346-351). In the following turn,
Olivia opposes her with a negative imperative (“Don't be silly.”
line 352) by which she construes Mary Jane’s prior activity as
violating some underlying norm and demands that she change her
behaviour. By censuring Mary Jane’s behaviour Olivia limits her
daughter’s freedom of action. Consequently, her utterance presents
control manoeuvre. Mary Jane rejects her mother’s criticism denying
the assumption that she is “being silly” (line 353). However, Olivia
insists on her prior position and produces a counter-claim (cf.
below) maintaining that Mary Jane is “not making any sense” (line
354).
It is noteworthy that she uses the marker “Well” at the
beginning of her turn. One of the communicative functions identified
for “Well” as a discourse marker is to preface utterances which
reject, cancel, disagree with or in some other way oppose (some
aspect of) the foregoing discourse unit (cf. Aijmer 2002; Biber et
al. 1999; Lakoff 1987; Norrick 2001; Owen 1983; Pomerantz 1984;
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Sacks 1992; Schiffrin 1987; Svartvik 1980; Wooton 1981b). Moreover,
as this example shows, “Well” can also indicate that, despite an
intervening utterance (such as Mary Jane’s denial), the speaker has
not changed her mind about the subject under discussion and that the
other person’s argument has failed.24 In designing her turn in this
way, Olivia acknowledges her daughter’s prior refutation, while
maintaining her disapproval of Mary Jane’s behaviour by signalling
that she has not changed her stance as a result of her denial. In
addition, in the remainder of her turn she maintains her portrayal
of Mary Jane’s communicative behaviour as inappropriate by appealing
to her not to talk to people “like this” (line 356).
Another way in which criticism is often packaged in my data is
by exclaiming a term of address. While, in contrast to the
accusation formats describe above, the blameworthy action is not
explicitly identified, in using this format a speaker can be seen to
express disapproval of the other’s immediately preceding action.25 I
will therefore label this format ‘blame-implicative address.’
Consider as an example the following extract from ‘night Mother:
example (16) ‘night Mother
336 JESSIE Dead is everybody and everything I ever
337 knew, gone. Dead is dead quiet.
338 MAMA It's a sin. You'll go to hell.
339 Jessie Uh-huh.
340 MAMA You will!
341 JESSIE Jesus was a suicide, if you ask me.
342 MAMA You'll go to hell just for saying that.
343 Jessie!
344 JESSIE (With genuine surprise.) I didn't know I
345 thought that.
> 346 MAMA Jessie!
Prior to this fragment, Mama has repeatedly - but unsuccessfully -
tried to dissuade Jessie from carrying out her plan to commit
suicide that night. In line 338, she launches another attempt,
claiming that suicide is a sin, and that, therefore, Jessie will “go
to hell” if she kills herself. However, Jessie does no seem to be
too impressed, let alone scared, by this prospect. The
acknowledgement token in line 339 signals that she does not take
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Mama’s note of caution very seriously. When Mama reinforces her
prior assertion, by repeating it with raised voice (line 340),
Jessie responds by stating that, in her view, “Jesus was a suicide”
(line 341). In the following turn, Mama expresses her shock at what
her daughter has just said, claiming that comparing Jesus’ death to
suicide is a bad enough sin to condemn her to hell: “You'll go to
hell just for saying that” (line 342). She reinforces her claim by
terminating her turn with the exclamation “Jessie!” (line 343). The
raised voice in combination with the kin term signals high emotional
involvement and serves to emphasise her request.26 However, in the
following turn, rather than trying to take the edge off what she
said, Jessie issues a statement that indicates that she is
pleasantly surprised by her realisation (lines 344-345). Mama, taken
aback and upset, can but reply with “Jessie!” (line 346), presumably
in a reproachful tone of voice. The exclamation of the address term
is clearly a reaction to what Jessie has just said. It expresses
Mama’s disfavour with her daughter’s utterance and portrays her
behaviour as inappropriate and objectionable. The vocative thus
functions as a blame-implicative address.
The following extract from Home displays a similar use of an
address term as an argumentative device:
example (17): Home
189 OLIVIA She said, "Mrs. Dunn. It's a dream come
190 true for me to have your house. I wouldn't
191 do a thing to it." I was so flattered.
192 MARY JANE What?
193 OLIVIA So they're coming to take a look around.
> 194 MARY JANE Mother.
195 OLIVIA Well, I never said I was happy here.
Prior to this fragment, Olivia has told Mary Jane that she recently
met the daughter of one of the neighbours, who is looking for a
house. At the beginning of this extract, she describes the young
woman’s enthusiastic response to her offer, listing several details
which the girl remembered about the house and reporting that she
said it was “a dream come true” for her to have the house and that
she “wouldn't do a thing to it” (lines 1990-191). Olivia closes her
turn by recounting that she was “so flattered” (line 191) at what
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the girl said, thus suggesting that she took her words at face value
and feels inclined to sell her the house. In line 192, Mary Jane
reacts to her mother’s report by issuing the question word “What?”
presumably with emphatic rising intonation. The interjection
indicates Mary Jane’s emotional alignment towards her mother’s
account. More precisely, it displays incredulity and shock at what
her mother has just told her and thus construes her action as
unexpected, inappropriate and accountable. Though on the surface it
appears to be a request for clarification, it is really a pseudo-
clarification question, which conveys disapproval or disbelief.27
Instead of addressing her daughter’s affective reaction, in the
following turn, Olivia goes on to finish her account by announcing
that the young woman and her future husband are “coming to take a
look around” (line 193). In line 194, Mary Jane responds to Olivia’s
story simply by saying “Mother,” presumably in a reproachful tone of
voice. Like her previous interjection, the exclamation “Mother”
signals incredulity and shock at what her mother has just told her
and portrays her behaviour as objectionable. It indicates that she
disapproves of Olivia’s plan to sell her house and, hence,
represents an implicit accusation. Olivia’s reaction reveals that
she perceives her daughter’s action as an expression of criticism.
She apparently feels that an explanation is called for and produces
an account for her wanting to sell the house. As we will see below,
this is one of the prototypical responses to accusations.
The accusatory character of address terms in my data is even
more graphic in the following sample passage, where Mama adds an
accusatory question immediately after she has issued a blame-
implicative address (lines 1956-1957):
example (18): ‘night Mother
1953 MAMA I can't just sit here and say O.K., kill
1954 yourself if you want to.
1955 JESSIE Sure you can. You just did. Say it again.
> 1956 MAMA (Really startled.) Jessie! (Quiet horror.)
1957 How dare you! (Furious.) How dare you!
As noted above, in the interaction preceding this extract, Mama has
tried repeatedly to persuade Jessie against killing herself. In line
1953, she explains her behaviour by claiming that Jessie cannot
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expect her to accept that she is planning to kill herself without a
word of protest, let alone explicitly encourage her to do so (lines
1953-1954). But her claim is opposed by Jessie in the following turn
(line 1955). Jessie constructs her turn-initial move by picking up
the verb phrase of Mama’s prior negative declarative statement (“I
can’t”) and producing it with the opposite polarity (“you can”). In
addition, she prefaces the contradiction with the emphatic adverb
“Sure” and in so doing intensifies disagreement. Subsequently, she
adds an assertion supporting her position, pointing out that Mama
has just produced exactly the utterance she claims she cannot make
(“You just did”). She concludes her turn with a directive, telling
her mother to repeat her prior statement (“Say it again.”). Mama’s
subsequent response reveals that she is completely taken aback by
her daughter’s reasoning. She begins her turn by exclaiming her
daughter’s first name (“Jessie!” line 1956), presumably in a
reproachful tone of voice. The interjection signals incredulity and
shock at what her daughter has just said and portrays her action as
both unexpected and inappropriate. Her response indicates that she
strongly disapproves of Jessie’s behaviour and, hence, has an
accusatory character. This interpretation of her turn-initial
utterance is corroborated by the subsequent moves. Following the
blame-implicative address, Mama produces the formulaic interrogative
construction “How dare you!”, which expresses indignation at
Jessie’s prior utterance and construes Jessie’s preceding activity
as an offence. As discussed above, the interrogative construction
“How” + modal auxiliary “dare” + second person pronoun is a
conventionalised format for accusations and is generally oriented to
as such by conversationalists in the production and interpretation
of utterances. In addition, the increase in volume signals a
negative affective reaction (i.e. horror and fury, as indicated by
the stage direction) at what Jessie has just said and thus
aggravates opposition. Moreover, the subsequent repetition of the
accusatory question signals high emotional involvement and
intensifies opposition.
In the preceding paragraphs, I have shown that the participants
in my corpus frequently oppose each other by means of accusations. I
have demonstrated that these communicative actions are variously
packaged as interrogatives with “Why” and “How” + “can”/”could”/
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”dare,” declarative statements, imperatives, and exclamations of
address terms and are used by mothers as well as daughters.
Moreover, I have shown that the accusation formats display a number
of lexical and sequential features which signal to participants (and
analysts) that they are to be interpreted as accusations. For
instance, they frequently involve evaluative and negatively connoted
expressions (e.g. “keep secrets”, “criticise”, “sass”, “silly”), by
which the accuser attributes a pejorative quality to the activity in
question, and which thus contribute to the contextualisation of an
utterance as an accusation. Furthermore, they often contain
expressions which indicate particular affective reactions (e.g.
irritation, indignation or annoyance) at the other’s behaviour (e.g.
“on earth”) and thus serve to intensify disagreement. In addition,
they frequently include extreme formulations such as “always,”
“never,” “all the time,” “typical,” “all,” which the speaker uses to
dramatise her point. These hyperbolic expressions are usually
realised by adverbs of frequency, which construe the complained-of
activity as a non-unique violation (rather than a single instance)
and thus serve to legitimise the accusations. As discussed above,
such exaggerations typically raise the emotional temperature of an
argument and escalate the dispute. Additionally, the sequential
placement of the utterances within an argumentative context, in
which participants orient to the expectation of opposition,
contributes to their contextualisation as accusations. These lexical
and sequential features are meta-pragmatic signs that indicate to
participants (as well as analysts) that the utterances are to be
interpreted as accusations rather than requests for information or
innocent remarks. In other words, they function as contextualisation
cues, which frame the utterances as accusations and thus as
oppositional moves. This is reflected by the addressees’ responses,
which reveal their understanding of the prior utterances as doing
criticising rather than some other activity.
Apart from illustrating how accusations can be used as arguing
techniques by participants to maintain and initiate dispute
sequences, I have shown that conflict and power are closely related
in that disputants can employ accusations as a conversational
resource not only to oppose the other party’s preceding activity -
and thereby resist being controlled themselves - but also to
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exercise influence over the opponent’s subsequent actions – and thus
exerting control over them.
To summarise this section so far, I have examined the internal
structure of accusations. I have looked at various formats that are
employed in the mother–daughter disputes in my corpus to package
accusations and thereby oppose the other party. I have shown that
these formulations display certain features which signal to
participants as well as analysts that the utterances are being used
as accusations. Moreover, I have shown how accusations can be
employed by disputants as a conversational resource both to express
opposition and to control the opponent’s actions, i.e. to exercise
discursive power. However, as the above examples have already
indicated, accusations may also be successfully challenged and/or
resisted by the defendant. It is this last point that I will focus
on in the remainder if this chapter. By looking at the ways in which
participants respond to accusations, I will explore the interface of
conflict and power by examining how discursive power is negotiated
in the local context of the ongoing disputes.
As noted earlier, from a sequential point of view, accusations
are first pair parts of adjacency pairs and thus make specific
second pair parts conditionally relevant. Linguistic and
sociological research has shown that a variety of action types can
serve as responses to accusations. Among these are remedies or
offers of remedies, justifications, excuses, apologies, denials,
counter-complaints, and others (cf. Atkinson & Drew 1979; Bilmes
1988; Burton 1980; Dersley & Wootoon 2000; Frankenberg 1976, 1979;
Garcia 1991; Gruber 1996a; Günthner 2000; Laforest 2002; Messmer
2003; Sacks 1992, vol. 2; Schegloff 1988; Scott & Lyman 1968).
For instance, several researchers have claimed that accusations
obligate the defendant to produce an account of some sort.28
According to Scott & Lyman (1968), “accounts” are responses to
accusations which are produced “to explain untoward behavior and
bridge the gap between actions and expectations” (46).29 They can be
subdivided into “justifications” and “excuses” (47).30
Justifications are accounts in which the defendant (implicitly)
accepts responsibility for the act in question, but denies the
pejorative quality associated with it by the accuser. She can do so
by denying the claimed damage, the blamelessness of the person
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affected by the act in question, the legitimacy of the accusation,
bad intentions, or the validity of the norm that builds the basis of
the negative evaluation. Thus, justifications imply a certain kind
of concessionary stance towards the accuser. However, defendants
usually do not overtly agree that the accuser is right. Rather the
concession is embedded within the defensive action that forms the
principal activity of the response.31 This is illustrated by the
following extract from Avenue, in which Mother responds to her
daughter’s accusation with a justification:
example (19): Avenue
306 OLGA (Putting papers inside notebook.)
307 How dare you read my personal property?
308 MOTHER (Angry, scared, she has gone too far.)
> 309 I wanted to see what you write. Sometimes
310 I see you writing, so I wanted to see what
311 it was. Just a bunch of junk. You'd think
312 you'd write something good, like them
313 confession stuff. I read a story the
314 other day about this girl, just out of
315 high school and she got mixed up with a
316 bunch of college men and-
317 OLGA I never look in your drawers!
318 MOTHER If you did, you'd find nothing silly like
319 that.
As described above, Mother has read her daughter’s personal notes
without asking for permission. After having recaptured her papers,
Olga issues an accusatory question: “How dare you read my personal
property?” (line 307). In response to Olga’s accusation, Mother
offers a justification, explaining that she did not have any bad
intentions when looking through Olga’s documents, but was reading
her papers merely out of interest: “I wanted to see what you write.”
(line 309). By producing a justification, Mother implicitly agrees
that some relevant action on her part has taken place (i.e. that she
has read her daughter’s personal property), but she disputes the
negative characterisation of that action offered by Olga. In
addition, she immediately launches a counter-attack by following her
justification with a negative evaluation of Olga’s writing (“Just a
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bunch of junk.” line 311). Hence, although she at first provides the
requested account, by subsequently dismissing Olga’s prose as
“junk”, she construes her offence as a mere bagatelle thus
undermining Olga’s complaint. Moreover, the use of the negatively
co-notated expression “junk” intensifies opposition and escalates
the dispute. Olga’s subsequent turn displays that she does not
accept her mother’s response as an adequate explanation for her
offensive behaviour. She produces another accusation claiming that
she would never invade her mother’s privacy in the way her mother
invaded hers (I never look in your drawers! line 317). By
contrasting Mother’s behaviour with her own she implies that Mother
could and should have behaved differently. Through expressing an
inconsistency between how she expected her to act and Mother’s
actual behaviour she portrays Mother’s activity as inappropriate.
Aggravation is signalled by the interruptive placement of her turn
as well as an increase in volume. As a result, the dispute continues
for another series of turns. To conclude, in response to her
daughter’s accusation, Mother at first provides the requested
justification. Hence, Olga – at least temporarily - succeeds in
controlling her mother’s next action. However, by immediately
following her justification with a counter-attack, in which she
denigrates Olga’s writing, Mother refutes her daughter’s negative
evaluation of her behaviour and thus retrospectively undermines the
impact of her accusation. As this extract shows, in order to capture
the workings of power in conversation, it is necessary to look at
longer stretches of talk, since the trajectories of control
manoeuvres frequently span more than a sequence of turns.
In contrast to justifications, excuses are accounts in which
the defendant (implicitly) admits that the act in question is bad,
wrong, or inappropriate but denies full responsibility by providing
grounds through which the complained-of action can be understood as
excusable. Through the provision of these grounds, the accused
disclaims that she was at fault with regard to the action in
question, for instance, by arguing that the shortcoming is
explainable with reference to extrinsic circumstances that are
beyond her control, insufficient information, other people’s action
or inaction, etc. That is, in producing an excuse, defendants
implicitly concede that the accuser is in some sense right. However,
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rather than admitting guilt, they construct a turn that is designed
to deny that the fault is theirs and deflect any blame for the
trouble onto other sources.32 This is exemplified by the following
extract from Perfect days:
example (20): Perfect days I, 2
20 SADIE You never said thankyou for your birthday
21 card.
22 BARBS Thankyou. (She flaps it open and shut to
23 air the cassio-tone happy birthday and
24 puts it back down on the coffee table.)
25 SADIE Zat all you got?
26 BARBS No, there’s all these.
27 SADIE You’ve never opened them.
> 28 BARBS I haven’t had a bloody chance.
29 SADIE Did Davie send you one?
On Barbs’ thirty-ninth birthday, her mother Sadie drops by to
congratulate her. The sequence starts with Sadie remarking that
Barbs has not said thank you for her birthday card yet (lines 20-
21). Her observation is of a negative event, i.e. something that was
expected, but did not happen. More precisely, she formulates a
failure on Barbs’ part. By this means, Sadie is ‘doing’ a complaint.
In addition, her use of the extreme formulation “never” serves to
intensify Barb’s failure and thus aggravates opposition. In
response, Barbs says “Thankyou” (line 22), and thus – at least to
all appearance - remedies her failure. Her response displays her
understanding of Sadie’s utterance as a complaint.
A couple of turns later, Sadie notes that Barb has not opened
her birthday cards yet (line 27). Again, her remark formulates a
failure on her daughter’s part, and hence constitutes a complaint.
As in her initial complaint, the absolute “never” serves to
emphasise Barb’s failure and thereby intensifies opposition. In
response to this second complaint, Barbs produces an excuse: “I
haven’t had a bloody chance.” (line 28). In so ding, Barb implicitly
concedes that she has failed to open the cards but denies full
responsibility for her failure by referring to the fact that she did
not have an opportunity to do so. Again, her response displays her
interpretation of Sadie’s preceding utterance as an expression of
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disapproval. Moreover, the use of the curse “bloody” signals her
irritation at her mother’s repeated criticism.
This extract illustrates a conversational practice that is
regularly used to ‘do complaining.’ If speakers report a state of
affairs when it is redundant to do so – such as the fact that Barbs
has not said “Thank you” or that she has not yet opened her birthday
cards -, by the very obviousness of the state of affairs it reports,
their remark invites an account of it.33 This stating of redundant
information has been labelled “fishing” by Pomerantz (1980) and
“noticing” by Schegloff (1988). In the example above, we can see how
noticing can be used as a method for blame-giving: Sadie’s noticing
that Barbs has not said “Thank you” for her card formulates Barb’s
behaviour as a failure and prompts her to produce a remedy (line 3).
Similarly, Sadie’s noticing that her daughter has not opened her
cards yet construes Barb’s behaviour as problematic and unleashes
the excuse: “I haven’t had a bloody chance” (line 9).34
A little later in the same conversation, Sadie reissues her
complaint (lines 55-57):
example (21): Perfect days I, 2
55 SADIE Not much point in sending you a card, you
56 don’t even bother to open them. I suppose I
57 should be flattered you opened mine...
> 58 BARBS Mum, you sent yours three days early with do
59 not open till the 29th all over it. These just
60 arrived today, presumably after I left for
61 work, because I do have to work, you know,
62 being the boss means you are in earlier not
63 later, OK?  But I will certainly open them
64 right now, ((...))
This indicates that Sadie has not heard her daughter’s excuse in
response to her prior complaint as adequate (or that her behaviour
is part of a pattern of nagging that is characteristic of her
interaction with Barbs). In any case, her mother’s repeated
complaint prompts Barbs to produce another, more elaborate excuse,
in which she accounts for her behaviour by giving a detailed
explanation of why she has not opened the cards yet (line 58-63).
While she implicitly admits that she has not opened the cards, she
denies that the fault was hers by providing grounds which make her
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omission excusable. She claims that her inaction arose out of
circumstances that are beyond her control, namely the fact that she
has to be at work on time and therefore had to leave for work before
the cards arrived. The question tag “OK?” (line 63) following her
explanation signals Barb’s exasperation at her mother’s repeated
criticism. Nevertheless, her prior account having been rejected as a
satisfactory response to Sadie’s complaint, she adds a different
type of response and offers to remedy the complained of failure by
opening the cards (line 64).
Apart from accounts, accusations can also be followed by
apologies. By producing an apology, the defendant admits that she is
guilty of an offence and thereby asserts her acknowledgment of the
rule or norm that has been violated.35 Apologies are often realised
by ritualised formulas expressing regret and/or an admission of
guilt such as “(I’m) sorry,” as in the following extract from Home:
example (22): Home
48 MARY JANE God, that was a lifetime ago. I wonder if
49 anybody else remembers that but me.
50 OLIVIA People don't think about things like that.
51 MARY JANE I don't know. They might.
52 OLIVIA People learn to move on.
53 MARY JANE What? Are you picking on me already? I
54 didn't come three thousand miles to get
55 picked on.
> 56 OLIVIA Oh, sorry. I didn't realize I was picking on
57 anybody. I thought I was just sitting in my
58 living room minding my own business.
59 MARY JANE You'd think you'd be a little happier to
60 hear me talk like this. ((...))
The sequence starts with Mary Jane reminiscing about her youth and
wondering if she is the only person thinking about their childhood.
Her mother opposes her with generalising statements (“People don't
think about things like that.” line 50; “People learn to move on.”
line 52). By referring to a standard of conduct, which contrasts
with Mary Jane’s behaviour, Olivia construes Mary Jane’s behaviour
as deviant. As a reaction, Mary Jane challenges her with a meta-
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communicative utterance (“What? Are you picking on me already?” line
53) thus revealing her interpretation of Olivia’s remarks as
expressing disapproval. This prompts Olivia to produce an apology
(“Oh, sorry.” line 56), which she follows with a justification
(lines 56-58).
Olivia’s turn displays a number of interesting features that
bear closer examination. What is particularly striking about her
response is that although she says “sorry”, her utterance does not
sound apologetic. In the following, I will examine which aspects of
her utterance contribute to this impression of inconsistency.
Firstly, the particle “Oh” at the beginning of her turn marks a
“change of state” proposal (Heritage 1984, 2002b) in response to
Mary Jane’s utterance, indicating that Mary Jane’s challenge has
occasioned a marked shift of awareness on Olivia’s part.36 In
signalling a change of state with the production of “Oh” at the
beginning of her response, Olivia conveys that prior to Mary Jane’s
challenge she was unaware of having been “picking on” her daughter,
and only now realises that Mary Jane has heard her utterances as
expressions of criticism. In other words, by prefacing her turn with
“Oh,” she indicates that she was ignorant of the adversative
character of her utterances and thereby claims innocence. In
addition, by signalling a change of state of awareness, she displays
her own interpretation of her utterances as innocuous remarks and
thus construes Mary Jane’s accusation, in which she formulates them
as offensive, as both unexpected and inappropriate.
Nonetheless, the apology token “sorry” following the “Oh”-
preface not only displays her understanding of Mary Jane’s utterance
as an accusation but also represents a conventionalised admission of
fault.37 Up to this point, then, Olivia’s utterance seems to indicate
that she has realised that Mary Jane has interpreted her prior
remarks as criticism and now tries to remedy the trouble by offering
an apology expressing her regret. However, the remainder of her
utterance gives her response yet a new turn.
Subsequent to the apology token, Olivia produces a
justification in which she denies the negative quality that Mary
Jane has associated with her remarks. She claims that she was not
aware of criticising her daughter (“I didn't realize I was picking
on anybody.” lines 56-57) and offers an alternative assessment of
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her behaviour (“I thought I was just sitting in my living room
minding my own business.” lines 57-58). In other words, subsequent
to a formula that conventionally expresses an admission of fault,
she produces an utterance in which she denies being at fault and
thus undermines her prior apology.
To sum up the analysis so far, Olivia’s response to Mary Jane’s
challenge consists of three components: firstly, an “Oh”-preface,
which indicates a change of state of awareness and thereby claims
her innocence; secondly, an apology token, which conventionally
expresses admission of fault; and thirdly, a justification, which
again claims her innocence and thus denies that she is at fault.
This juxtaposition of mutually exclusive propositions explains the
peculiar effect of Olivia’s utterance. Apparently, by prefacing her
apology with a change-of-state token that claims her innocence and
following it with a justification that also insists on her
blamelessness she cancels out the apology because she does not
acknowledge having done anything wrong. Moreover, the sequential
placement of her utterance in the context of an argument, which (as
discussed above) is governed by the participants’ orientation to the
expectation of dissent, contributes to the contextualisation of her
activity as a rejection rather than a concession.
However, whether or not Mary Jane treats Olivia’s reply as an
adequate response to her accusation is displayed in her subsequent
conduct. Rather than produce a turn that signals her acceptance of
Olivia’s apology as a satisfying response to her complaint and
thereby terminate the disagreement sequence, Mary Jane issues
another blame, formulating Olivia’s behaviour as inadequate (“You'd
think you'd be a little happier to hear me talk like this.” lines
59-60), and the argument continues. Her oppositional response
indicates that she has not accepted Olivia’s utterance as a
satisfactory response to her complaint.
This extract shows how “Oh”-prefacing of responses to
accusations can be exploited by disputants as an argumentative
device to deny blame and intensify disagreement. By prefacing her
response to Mary Jane’s accusatory question with the change-of-state
token “Oh,” Olivia claims her innocence while at the same time
construing Mary Jane’s activity as unexpected and out of place, thus
aggravating disagreement.
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It is worth noting that Olga’s “Oh, sorry.” is the only
occurrence of apology in my data, and, as the preceding discussion
has shown, it is rendered ineffective in the remainder of her turn.
This paucity of admissions of fault reflects the participants’
orientation to the expectation of disagreement in the context of an
argument.
In spite of the peculiarities of Olivia’s response to her
daughter’s accusation, this example illustrates that apologies can
occur in combination with justifications. This finding stands in
contradiction to Günthner’s (2002: 82, fn. 23) assertion that
explicit apologies only co-occur with excuses but not with
justifications. There are several possible explanations for this
discrepancy. Firstly, it might be due to the fact that Günthner’s
findings are based on a study of accusations in ordinary German
conversation, while my corpus is composed of fictional dispute
sequences. Secondly, one might argue that the divergent findings
result from the fact that, as we have seen, Olivia’s response
apparently is not interpreted by its recipient as an apology in the
sense of an admission of fault. However, based on our communicative
experience, we can readily imagine an exchange, both in English and
in German, in which a similar response to an accusation, consisting
of an apology + justification such as “I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to
hurt your feelings.” or “Tut mir Leid. Ich wollte dich nicht
verletzen.” is oriented to by conversationalists as an adequate
response. Consequently, in contrast to Günthner, I suggest that
apologies can be combined with excuses as well as justifications.
As noted earlier, while accusations make an appropriate
response conditionally relevant, there is no typical second pair
part. As Sacks (1992, vol. 2) has pointed out, the sequence that a
complaint initiates is ambivalent, since although a complaint in
some way controls what happens next, it does not fully control what
is going to follow. “So that if you want is, e.g. for the other
person to apologize, a complaint does not guarantee that you will
get that” (48). Apart from justifications, excuses, (offers of)
remedies and apologies, subsequent to an accusation, the defendant
can also produce a denial, insisting that the activity in question
did not take place or that she has not committed it.38
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Denials usually take the form of a negative declarative
statement, in which the proposition of the prior statement is
negated with a “not,” as in “I’m not difficult.” They can also be
realised by a declarative sentence, in which the truth of the
preceding claim is denied, as in “That’s not true.” or “That’s a
lie.” Denials are often prefaced with a disagreement token such as
“No” - or, if the preceding claim takes a negative form, “Yes” -,
which indicates right at the beginning of the turn, that opposition
is going to follow, and they can be followed by an alternative
claim, as in (“Never. That's your imagination.”)
For instance, in the following extract from My sister, Isabelle
rejects her mother’s accusation with a denial, claiming that the
negative characteristic attributed to her by Madame Danzard is not
true.
example (23): My sister 12
1 MADAME DANZARD What did I tell you? It's perfect.
2 ISABELLE Yes Maman. (After a pause.) Do you
3 really think so?
4 MADAME DANZARD Of course I think so. You're always so
5 difficult when it comes to clothes.
> 6 ISABELLE I'm not difficult. (Looking down at
7 the dress.) I just didn't like it.
8 MADAME DANZARD Well you see - you were wrong.
Isabelle is trying on a dress that her mother has just bought for
her and that needs adjustments. When she expresses doubts about
whether the dress really suits her (“Do you really think so?” lines
2-3), her mother accuses her of being problematic with respect to
clothes (“You're always so difficult when it comes to clothes.”
lines 4-5). Her use of the adjective “difficult” explicitly states
her negative evaluation of Isabelle’s conduct. In addition, the
impact of her criticism is intensified by the use of an ECF. As I
noted earlier, the adverb “always” construes Isabelle’s “being
difficult” as characteristic behaviour rather than a single instance
and thus serves both to aggravate and to legitimise Madame Danzard’s
accusation. Isabelle opposes her with an outright denial (“I'm not
difficult.” line 6) refuting her mother’s negative representation of
her behaviour. In the remainder of her turn she offers an
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alternative interpretation of her conduct: “I just didn't like it.”
(line 7). In response to her daughter’s denial Madame Danzard, says:
“Well you see - you were wrong” (line 8). As noted earlier, the use
of “Well” at the beginning of a turn in disagreement sequences can
indicate that, despite the other party’s intervening utterance, the
speaker has not changed her mind about the subject under discussion
and that the other person’s argument has failed. In prefacing her
turn with “Well,” Madame Danzard acknowledges her daughter’s prior
denial, while maintaining a critical stance on Isabelle’s behaviour.
This is reinforced by the assertion that, however her behaviour is
labelled, Isabelle was “wrong.”
In my data, denial is the most frequent response to
accusations. It is commonly produced immediately following the
accusation without any mitigating techniques as in the example
above. The high rate of unmitigated denials can be explained with
reference to a structural peculiarity of accusations that has been
pointed out by several conversation analysts.
Studies in conversation analysis have shown that accusations
operate contrary to the preference for agreement, as discussed
above, which would lead to an admission of guilt as the preferred
response. Drawing on the concept of “relevant absence” (i.e. the
phenomenon that the absence of a certain conversational token
provides an interactional resource for conversationalists which they
can draw on to make inferences), conversation analysts have argued
that after accusations denials are the preferred response because
the absence or delay of a denial is experienced as a relevant
absence and is commonly interpreted as an admission of guilt (cf.
Atkinson & Drew 1979; Bilmes 1988; Garcia 1991). As a result,
denials tend to be placed interruptively or immediately following
the turn in which the accusation was produced, without delay,
accounts, or other mitigating techniques. The upshot of this is that
from a sequential point of view, accusations make disagreement
relevant and thus provide an interactional environment for the
emergence of argument sequences.39
In addition to the high frequency of denials in response to
accusations, the participants’ orientation to this sequential
peculiarity of accusations is also reflected by the fact that both
the justifications and excuses in my data are designed to downplay
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their concessionary aspect and highlight their defensive function.
As we have seen, although they produce some form of account, the
defendants do not overtly agree that the accuser is right, nor do
they indicate an acceptance of blame by delaying their response. On
the contrary, far from admitting guilt, they construct a turn that
is designed to deny that the fault is theirs and shift any blame for
the expressed trouble onto other sources. That is to say, even in
those cases in which the defendants do not respond to an accusation
with an outright denial, their turns are constructed in a way that
minimises agreement and emphasises disagreement with the prior
speaker’s activity. Furthermore, the aforementioned lack of
apologies in my corpus displays the participants’ orientation to the
expectation of disagreement in response to accusations.
Moreover, as described earlier, by producing an accusation, a
speaker treats another’s activity, attitude or characteristic as an
arguable, thereby setting up an opposition and constituting the
complained-of activity, attitude or characteristic as the initial
part of a verbal conflict. Consequently, if the defendant issues a
denial in response to an accusation, thus producing a counter-
opposition, an argument is under way.
Furthermore, denials constitute an aggravated form of
opposition, putting the accuser in a position of either backing
down, which is face threatening, or defending her position and
repeating the accusation. If the accuser maintains her stance and
reissues the accusation, the disagreement sequence continues for
another adjacency pair because the second accusation again invites
disagreement. Therefore, accusations are structurally predisposed to
initiate or maintain an argument.
The potential of accusations to initiate dispute is illustrated
in the following extract from My sister:
example (24): My sister, 9
22 ISABELLE One, two, three ... begin. Maman- that
23 is not fair.
24 MADAME DANZARD What's not fair?
25 ISABELLE You started at two.
> 26 MADAME DANZARD I did not. I absolutely did not.
27 However, if you insist, we'll start
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28 again.
29 ISABELLE One ... two ... three ... start.
30 MADAME DANZARD (Inspecting her cards.) I don't have
31 anything to start with.
32 ISABELLE You always do that. Start first.
> 33 MADAME DANZARD Never. That's your imagination.
34 ISABELLE (Shrieking.) I saw you.
35 MADAME DANZARD Quiet, Isabelle. (Looking at her cards)
36 This is absurd. I can't move a thing.
In this extract, Madame Danzard and her daughter Isabelle are
playing cards. When Isabelle accuses her mother of being unfair
(lines 22-23) and having started too early (line 25), Madame Danzard
rejects her blame denying that she was cheating: “I did not. I
absolutely did not.” (line 26). Her self-repetition in combination
with the intensifier “absolutely” displays her indignation at
Isabelle’s allegation and aggravates opposition. However, subsequent
to her denial, she offers a compromise proposing to restart the
game, thus resolving the disagreement sequence – for the time being.
However, a few lines later, when Madame Danzard claims that she
does not have an appropriate card to start the game with, Isabelle
opposes her with another accusation: “You always do that.” (line
32). The ECF with “always” construes Madame Danzard’s activity as
typical and serves to legitimise both Isabelle’s accusation and her
subsequent demand on her mother to start. As in the first instance,
Madame Danzard rejects her daughter’s accusation with a denial
insisting that the violation Isabelle has attributed to her is just
her imagination (line 33). The extreme adverb “never” establishes a
pronounced contrast to “always” in Isabelle’s prior utterance and
thus intensifies disagreement. In response to her mother’s denial,
Isabelle can either give in (which would be face-threatening) or
defend her position. When Isabelle maintains her stance and reissues
her blame, the disagreement sequence evolves into an argument:
Isabelle counter-opposes her mother’s denial insisting that she saw
her cheat (line 34). Her tone of voice (“Shrieking.”) indicates her
indignation at her mother’s denial and escalates the dispute.
Instead of addressing her daughter’s renewed blame, Madame Danzard
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terminates the argument by issuing an imperative telling Isabelle to
be quiet (line 35).
In addition to refuting an accusation with a denial, an accused
person can also oppose an accusation by producing a counter- or
return-accusation.40 In contrast to denials, return-accusations are
not concerned with the truth value validity of the accuser’s claim.
Hence, the accusation is responded to with a reciprocal action (i.e.
a counter-accusation), rather than with an action which tries to
disprove the accuser’s assertion (i.e. a denial). Counter-
accusations bring about a reversal of the participants’
interactional roles: By returning an accusation, the original
defendant turns the tables and becomes the accuser. This is
illustrated in the following two extracts from Home:
example (25): Home
62 MARY JANE You'd think you'd be a little happier to
63 hear me talk like this. Here I am coming
64 home after all this time and looking for a
65 nice husband.
> 66 OLIVIA You think you'd be a little more concerned
67 with someone else once in a while—
68 MARY JANE I am.
As illustrated above, prior to this extract, Mary Jane and Olivia
were having an argument. The sequence starts with Mary Jane
producing a complaint in which she formulates Olivia’s conduct as
inadequate unacceptable: “You'd think you'd be a little happier to
hear me talk like this.” (lines 62-63). In return, Olivia issues a
counter-complaint construing Mary Jane’s behaviour as unacceptable:
“You think you'd be a little more concerned with someone else once
in a while—” (lines 66-67). Her return-complaint prompts a denial
from Mary Jane in the subsequent turn, in which she claims that the
failure which her mother attributes to her, namely that she is not
concerned with anybody else, is not true. The interruptive placement
of her denial indicates interpersonal involvement and serves to
aggravate disagreement.
Likewise, in the following passage, Mary Jane opposes her
mother’s accusation with a counter-accusation:
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example (26): Home
293 OLIVIA I can't believe you're doing this to me.
> 294 MARY JANE I can't believe you're doing this to me.
295 I guess my plans don't matter. Do they?
296 The failure daughter comes home but that's
297 just not good enough for you, I guess.
298 OLIVIA Just shut up. Shut up.
299 MARY JANE You shut up. You just shut up forever.
300 How about that? (She rushes into the
301 bedroom.) I'm so sick of this.
Prior to this extract, Mary Jane and Olivia were having a fierce
dispute in the course of which they repeatedly accused, challenged
and shouted at each other. The sequence starts with Olivia producing
an accusation in which she formulates Mary Jane’s behaviour towards
her as offensive: “I can't believe you're doing this to me.” (line
293). Mary Jane counters her with a return-accusation: “I can't
believe you're doing this to me.” (line 294). In the remainder of
her turn, she expands on her criticism insinuating that her mother
does not show any consideration for her (“I guess my plans don't
matter. Do they?” line 295) and that she does not appreciate her
homecoming (“The failure daughter comes home but that's just not
good enough for you, I guess.” lines 296-297). Instead of addressing
the content of Mary Jane’s counter-accusation, Olivia - presumably
for lack of a better argument - issues a meta-communicative
imperative telling Mary Jane to “shut up” (line 298). The aggravated
directive as well as the self-repetition signal interpersonal
involvement and escalate the dispute. Mary Jane counters her with a
reciprocal aggravated directive (line 299) and then terminates the
argument by leaving the room.41
As argumentative devices, counter-accusations achieve at least
two things: By returning an accusation in response to an accusation,
the defendant avoids giving an account for the violation that is
presupposed by the accuser and at the same time launches a counter
attack reversing the original participant roles and thus obliging
the original accuser to produce an adequate response. In the
subsequent turn, the original accuser can either back down (which is
face-threatening), and thus terminate the conflict, or produce
290
another counter, thereby maintaining the dispute. As a result,
accusation/counter-accusation sequences regularly establish
interaction cycles, in which the opponents continuously accuse each
other of having committed an offence, without addressing the
substance of each other’s claims, thereby escalating the dispute
while preventing conflict resolution at the content level of
interaction.42
In addition, the disputants in the two preceding extracts build
their counters by means of contrastive mirroring, i.e. they reuse
the materials just provided by the other’s preceding accusation to
shape a counter to it. In example (25), Olivia builds her return-
accusation by incorporating Mary Jane’s preceding formulation: “You
think you'd be a little more concerned.” Similarly, in example (26),
Mary Jane constructs her counter-accusation by repeating the exact
wording of Olivia’s prior turn: “I can't believe you're doing this
to me.” Likewise, in line 301, she integrates Olivia’s prior
formulation in her counter to her mother’s meta-communicative
imperative “You shut up. You just shut up forever.” By this means,
the opposing moves are tied together at the word level, while at the
content level of interaction, dissent is stressed and reinforced.
In this section, I have looked at the ways in which the
participants in the fictional mother-daughter disputes in my corpus
use accusations as a communicative practice of building opposition
and thus initiate or maintain verbal conflict. I have shown that
accusations and related actions have a special function in dispute
sequences: They are retroactive because they assume a violation (an
action on the part of the accused, which is somehow defective), and
thus constitute oppositional moves. They are also proactive, as they
are first-pair parts of adjacency pairs and have been shown by
conversation analysts to project opposition (denial); hence they are
predestined to initiate and maintain dispute sequences.43
Furthermore, I have examined how accusations can be employed by
speakers as an interactional resource to exert a degree of
discursive power by placing constraints on the discourse options
available to the recipient. Moreover, by looking at the ways in
which the defendants respond to accusations, I have investigated how
disputants can challenge the opponent’s control manoeuvres and even
exploit them to launch a counter-attack, thus maintaining and
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escalating disagreement. Finally, I have shown that, since power has
to do with controlling versus being controlled, we can examine how
relations of power are negotiated at a micro-level of interaction by
looking at the interplay of control manoeuvres and opposition
strategies in (fictional) episodes of conflict talk.
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What you cannot enforce, do not command. (Sophocles) 
7.3 Directives
Opposition in the fictional mother-daughter disputes under analysis
is also frequently expressed by a type of discursive activity that
is traditionally labelled directive or request (for action).
Directives are generally defined as attempts to get the addressee to
do or refrain from doing something.44 To quote Fraser (1975: 192),
they express “the speaker’s desire for the hearer to bring about the
state of affairs expressed in the proposition.” Directives are used
to elicit goods or services from the listener, or to regulate her
behaviour and/or attitudes.45 The use of directives as argumentative
techniques has also been observed in previous studies of conflict
interaction both between children and between adults (e.g. Apeltauer
1978; Brenneis & Lein 1977; Garvey & Shantz 1992; M. H. Goodwin
1988; Gruber 1996a).
Various researchers in discourse and conversation analysis have
pointed out the ways that directives are a potentially powerful
interactive resource available to speakers. From a sequential
standpoint, directives are first pair parts of adjacency pairs and
thus make specific second pair parts conditionally relevant. More
precisely, as research in conversational analysis has shown,
following directives compliance is the structurally preferred
response (cf. Levinson 1983: 308, 336). Furthermore, Labov & Fanshel
(1977) argue that the conditional relevance of what follows after a
directive is much greater than that of other speech actions such as,
for instance, assertions. Hence, with a directive a speaker
constrains the addressee’s freedom of action by forcing her to
respond under certain conditions. This is reflected by numerous
studies on power, dominance and control in conversational
interaction, in which directives have been discussed as forms of
“(social) control acts” (Ervin-Tripp 1982, 1977; Ervin-Tripp et al.
1984, 1990; Vine 2004), i.e. “moves in which there is a clear
intention to influence the activities of the partner” (Ervin-Tripp
1982: 29), “control manoeuvres toward one-up” (Rogers & Farace
1975), “persuasive talk” (Cook-Gumperz 1981), “strong initiatives”
(Linell et al. 1988), “controlling moves” (Linell 1990b), and
“control-claiming actions” (Thimm et al. 1994) and have been
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considered as attempts at exercising power over the interlocutor at
the micro-level of interaction.
With regard to the interpersonal aspect of interaction,
directives present a threat to the addressee’s negative face in the
sense of Brown & Levinson (1987). They are potentially destructive
to the autonomy of the listener: Directives predicate some future
activity of the addressee, and in so doing put some pressure on the
addressee to do (or refrain from doing) that activity. To sum up,
directives provide a conversational resource that speakers may use
to exercise control over others by forcing them to respond under
certain conditions, thus limiting their freedom of action.
Directives can take a variety of forms. They can be packaged as
imperatives, declarative statements or interrogatives, both negative
and positive. In my data, directives are typically produced without
delay, immediately following the opponent’s preceding utterance;
they can stand on their own in a turn or be accompanied by
additional argumentative devices. Instances of this type of
oppositional move device are illustrated in the following examples.
With a directive a speaker attempts to influence the
addressee’s (non-)verbal behaviour and/or attitudes. For instance,
in the following extract from Raisin, Beneatha calls on her mother
to “be on [her] side,” i.e. to show alignment with her position
rather than her brother’s:
example (1): Raisin, III
5 BENEATHA That is not a man. That is nothing but a
6 toothless rat.
7 MAMA Yes – death done come in this here house.
8 (She is nodding, slowly, reflectively.)
9 Done come walking in my house. On the lips
10 of my children. You, who supposed to be my
11 harvest. (To BENEATHA.) You - you mourning
12 your brother?
13 BENEATHA He's no brother of mine.
14 MAMA What you say?
15 BENEATHA I said that that individual in that room is
16 no brother of mine.
17 MAMA That's what I thought you said. You feeling
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18 like you better than he is today?
19 BENEATHA (Does not answer.)
20 MAMA Yes? What you tell him a minute ago? That he
21 wasn't a man? Yes? You give him up for me? You
22 done wrote his epitaph too - like the rest of
23 the world? Well, who gave you the privilege?
> 24 BENEATHA Be on my side for once! You saw what he just
25 did, Mama! You saw him down on his knees.
26 Wasn't it you who taught me to despise any man
27 who would do that. Do what he's going to do.
28 MAMA Yes - I taught you that. Me and your daddy.
29 But I thought I taught you something else
30 too ... I thought I taught you to love him.
After having learned that he has lost all the family’s money in a
business transaction, Beneatha’s brother, Walter, has broken down
and left the room. Mama and Beneatha stay behind and start arguing
about his conduct. The episode begins with Beneatha expressing her
contempt for Walter, denigrating him (“That is not a man. That is
nothing but a toothless rat.” lines 5-6) and distancing herself from
him (“He's no brother of mine.” lines 13, 15-16). In response, Mama
confronts her with a series of opposing questions, challenging her
right to judge her brother: “You feeling like you better than he is
today?” (lines 17-18); “Well, who gave you the privilege?” (line
23). In response, Beneatha issues a directive calling on Mama to
support her: “Be on my side for once!” (line 24). In the remainder
of her turn, she provides reasons to back her claim (lines 24-27).
As an argumentative technique, Beneatha’s directive accomplishes
several things: Firstly, it allows her to produce an adequate
response, which opposes her mother’s prior action(s) while avoiding
answering her challenging questions. Furthermore, it not only
presents an attempt to influence her mother’s attitude (and
behaviour as a reflection of that attitude) but also constitutes an
expression of criticism, since it conveys her dissatisfaction with
Mama’s stance (and resulting conduct). The adverb “for once” implies
that Mama frequently takes up an oppositional stance towards her
daughter and thus serves to legitimate Beneatha’s claim. Moreover,
295
as we have seen above, escalated volume signals high emotional
involvement and aggravates opposition.
Directives can also be used in an attempt to get the opponent
to perform or refrain from performing some action, as in the
following sequence from My mother, which follows the argument
between Doris and her daughter about whether Margaret’s boyfriend is
crushing Doris’ flowers with his car:
example (2): My mother I, 7
136 MARGARET That's typical, you think all Americans
137 are brash and wear loud check shirts and
138 chew gum and want to marry English girls.
139 You're just prej—...
140 DORIS Margaret, that's enough! (Pause.) After
141 all, he is going to marry an English girl.
> 142 MARGARET Oh Mother, don't look at me like that with
143 your lips pressed together. (Exits.)
At the beginning of this fragment, Margaret accuses her mother of
being prejudiced against Americans (lines 136-139). In the following
turn, Doris retaliates by turning her daughter’s own words against
her. She initiates her counter with a terminating move, cautioning
Margaret not to pursue her line of action any further: “Margaret,
that’s enough!” (line 140). Subsequently, Doris issues an assertion,
claiming that, in view of the fact that Margaret’s American
boyfriend does indeed want to marry her, the attitude Margaret has
just attributed to her would indeed be justified. She builds her
utterance by means of contrastive mirroring, picking up the phrase
“marry an English girl” from her daughter’s preceding turn and uses
it for her own side: “he is going to marry an English girl” (lines
140-141). Rather than disputing the content of her mother’s claim,
in the following turn, Margaret challenges Doris’ non-verbal
behaviour, i.e. her disapproving facial expression. She issues a
negative directive, telling Doris not to look at her “like that”
(lines 142-143) and then leaves the scene exasperated. This sequence
shows that directives are a communicative resource that disputants
can effectively employ to counter another’s prior activity without
disputing the truth of her claim.
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In the extract from My sister below, it is not the daughter but
the mother who uses this oppositional move:
example (3): My sister 3
> 1 MADAME DANZARD Don't toy with your food, Isabelle.
2 It's so disagreeable. Always making
3 those little piles.
4 ISABELLE I'm not, Maman.
5 MADAME DANZARD You mean to tell me I don't see what
6 you're doing.
7 ISABELLE I'm not toying, Maman.
8 MADAME DANZARD (Coldly.) Very well, my dear, call it
9 what you will.
Madame Danzard and Isabelle are sitting at the dining room table,
finishing the first course of lunch. In line 1, Madame Danzard
issues a negative imperative, telling Isabelle not to “toy with
[her] food,” thus treating her behaviour as an arguable action.
Subsequently, she adds an assertion supporting her claim (“It’s so
disagreeable. Always making those little piles.” lines 2-3). Madame
Danzard’s directive proposes the violation of a convention on
Isabelle’s part, portraying her behaviour as a breach of etiquette
and therefore functions as a rebuke. Moreover, her utterance
presents an attempt to exercise control over her daughter by trying
to stop her from carrying on with the behaviour that is deemed
inadequate. In addition, the intensifier “so” and the ECF with
“always” (line 2) heighten the oppositional character of the
utterance by implying that Isabelle’s misbehaviour is non-unique,
i.e. that her table manners are frequently inappropriate. As
discussed above, the construal of Isabelle’s conduct as both
unacceptable and recurrent (rather than an isolated case) serves to
legitimise Madame Danzard’s reproach. Isabelle counter-opposes her
mother’s criticism by arguing with the assumption that she is toying
with her food (“I’m not.” line 4), thus undermining the validity of
Madame Danzard’s directive. This is followed by a sequence of
disagreements centring round the question whether Isabelle’s
behaviour can be legitimately described as “toying” with her food or
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not (lines 5-9). Thus, the proposition that is expressed in Madame
Danzard’s directive has become the focus of argument.46
Directives can also be employed to regulate (an aspect of) the
opponent’s verbal behaviour. For instance, in the following extract
from Home, Olivia uses a meta-communicative directive to get her
daughter to lower her voice:
example (4): Home
257 OLIVIA You make one mistake after another for 20
258 years and you never took responsibility
259 for one second! You brought babies into
260 this world that you could barely feed
261 'cause that husband a yours couldn't hold
262 down a job.
263 MARY JANE That's such a lie! How could you say that?
> 264 OLIVIA (Overlapping.) Oh, keep your voice down.
265 MARY JANE (Overlapping.) He got laid off that time,
266 Ma! Laid off!
Prior to this fragment, Mary Jane and her mother have been arguing
about whether Olivia has been taking enough interest in her
daughter’s life. Mary Jane has repeatedly accused her mother of
neglecting her, while Olivia has persistently denied her daughter’s
allegations. At the beginning of this sequence, Olivia issues a
series of accusatory claims, which portray Mary Jane’s behaviour as
irresponsible (lines 257-262), thus shifting the blame back to her.
In the following turn, Mary Jane disputes the truth of her mother’s
prior claim, maintaining that what Olivia has just said is “such a
lie!” (line 263). Subsequently, she issues a blame-implicative
question (“How could you say that?” line 263), construing Olivia’s
prior claim as offensive and simultaneously obliging her to account
for it in the subsequent turn, as discussed above. But before she
can finish her turn, Olivia interrupts her with a meta-communicative
directive, telling her to “keep [her] voice down” (line 264).
However, instead of complying with her mother’s demand and lower her
voice, Mary Jane even raises her voice. She counters Olivia’s prior
allegation that her husband “couldn’t hold down a job” (line 262),
shouting: “He got laid off that time, Ma! Laid off!” (lines 265-
266). The interruptive placement of her utterance combined with an
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increase in volume and self-repetition signals negative emotional
involvement and exacerbates the dispute even further. As this
example shows, although directives provide a potentially powerful
discursive resource that disputants may exploit to exercise control
over various aspects of the ongoing interaction, they are not
necessarily always successful.
While in the preceding fragment, Olivia’s meta-communicative
directive challenges a prosodic aspect of her daughter’s prior
utterance, in the following extract from My sister, Madame Danzard
employs this arguing technique to contest the appropriateness of
Isabelle’s response to her initial question:
example (5): My sister, 14
1 MADAME DANZARD (Impatient.) Where is she?
2 ISABELLE How do I know?
> 3 MADAME DANZARD Don't answer me like that.
4 Go and find her.
Madame Danzard and Isabelle have just returned from shopping and are
annoyed that their maid is not turning up to help them put away the
purchases. The episode starts with Madame Danzard’s request for
information regarding the location of their maid: “Where is she?”
(line 1). Her utterance is challenged by Isabelle in the subsequent
turn, with respect to what it presumes. With her oppositional turn,
Isabelle invokes a rule of discourse, namely that a speaker who asks
a question about information supposes knowledge about this
information on the part of the recipient (cf. Labov & Fanshel 1977:
89; Burton 1980: 152). With a return question that asks for the
basis of her ability to know where the maid is (“How do I know?”
line 2), Isabelle suggests a lack of knowledge regarding the content
of her mother’s question, and thus challenges this assumption.
Madame Danzard counter-opposes Isabelle’s retort with a negative
meta-communicative imperative, telling her not to answer her “like
that” (line 3). As an argumentative device, this utterance achieves
several things. Firstly, as discussed above, by formulating
Isabelle’s prior activity as violating some underlying norm - more
precisely, by arguing with the appropriateness of Isabelle’s
response to her mother’s question - it functions as a rebuke.
Secondly, it aims at preventing Isabelle from answering her in a
similar way in the future, thus trying to constrain her freedom of
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action. In this sense, it is an attempt at exercising control over
Isabelle. Subsequently, she issues another imperative, which focuses
on Isabelle’s non-verbal behaviour, ordering her to “go and find”
the housemaid (line 4).
In the extract above, the mother uses a meta-communicative
directive to challenge the acceptability of her daughter’s preceding
answer. By contrast, in the fragment from Alto below, Florene
employs this argumentative device to challenge the appropriateness
of Wanda’s prior assertion.
example (6): Alto II,3
102 FLORENE ((...)) You don't even know yet what you want.
103 But you deserve a chance to find out.
104 WANDA I do! I do too know! You're the one who
105 doesn't know anything. You don't even know
106 how to love anybody! I bet you never loved
107 him!
> 108 FLORENE Don't you ever say that! Ever! I'll always
109 love him. There are some things you don't
110 understand, Wanda.
111 WANDA I understand everything, and I love him more!
Prior to this fragment, Wanda and her mother Florene have been
arguing about whether they should get on the bus to San Antonio to
meet Wanda’s father there. While Wanda has been eager to see her
father again and has urged her mother to get ready, Florene has
refused to go. At the beginning of this extract, Florene defends her
authoritative behaviour by claiming that Wanda is too young to make
any informed decisions (“You don't even know yet what you want.”
line 102) and should have “a chance to find out” (line 103). In the
subsequent turn, Wanda first disputes her mother’s claim (“I do! I
do too know!” line 105), and then retaliates by claiming that, in
fact, Florene is “the one who doesn't know anything,” not even “how
to love anybody!” (lines 104-106). She terminates her turn by
proposing that Florene does not love her husband (lines 106-107),
emphasising opposition with the extreme formulation “never.” Dissent
is further aggravated by means of self-repetition and an increase in
volume, signalling emotional involvement. In the next turn, Florene
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counters Wanda’s assertion with a negative meta-communicative
directive: “Don't you ever say that! Ever!” (line 109). Like Madame
Danzard’s directive, her utterance portrays Wanda’s utterance as
offensive and thus functions as a rebuke. In addition, it
constitutes a control manoeuvre, by forbidding Wanda to repeat what
she said, thus restricting her freedom of action. Self-repetition as
well as volume increase indicate a negative affective reaction (i.e.
anger) at what Wanda’s has said and intensify opposition.
Subsequently, Florene disputes Wanda’s turn-final claim, stating
that she will always love her husband (lines 108-109). The
contrastive use of the extreme adverb “always” as opposed to “never”
in Wanda’s utterance serves to reinforce disagreement. She
terminates her turn by reaffirming to her initial position, claiming
that due to her youth and inexperience Wanda is not in a position to
judge: “There are some things you don't understand, Wanda.” (lines
109-110). In the following turn, Wanda challenges her mother’s turn-
final claim: “I understand everything” (line 111). The extreme
formulation “everything” as opposed to the noun phrase “some things”
in Florene’s utterance emphasises disagreement. Subsequently, she
adds an assertion, claiming that she loves her father more than
Florene does. This last move allows her to counter her mother’s
prior claim (i.e. that she will always love her husband) without
disputing its truth.
In both of the preceding fragments, meta-communicative
imperatives are employed to challenge the appropriateness of the
opponent’s prior utterance; in the extracts below, this oppositional
move is used to completely inhibit the opponent’s talk.
example (7): My sister 9
29 ISABELLE One ... two ... three ... start.
30 MADAME DANZARD (Inspecting her cards.) I don't have
31 anything to start with.
32 ISABELLE You always do that. Start first.
33 MADAME DANZARD Never. That's your imagination.
34 ISABELLE (Shrieking.) I saw you.
> 35 MADAME DANZARD Quiet, Isabelle. (Looking at her cards)
36 This is absurd. I can't move a thing.
37 (Looks over at ISABELLE's cards.)
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38 ISABELLE (Sits pondering.) Where Maman?
Madame Danzard and Isabelle are playing cards. When Madame Danzard
claims that she cannot start the game because she does not have a
suitable card, Isabelle complains: “You always do that.” (line 32).
By means of the ECF, Isabelle portrays her mother’s activity as
typical and legitimises both her accusation and her subsequent
demand on her mother to “start first.” However, in line 33, Madame
Danzard rejects her daughter’s accusation as unjustified, by
claiming: “That’s your imagination.” The extreme adverb “never” sets
up a marked contrast to “always” in Isabelle’s prior utterance and
thus emphasises opposition. When Isabelle reissues her blame, the
disagreement sequence develops into an argument: Isabelle counter-
opposes her mother’s denial insisting that she saw her cheat (line
34). Her “shrieking” tone of voice indicates her indignation at her
mother’s denial and aggravates opposition. But instead of addressing
her daughter’s renewed blame, Madame Danzard issues a meta-
communicative imperative: “Quiet, Isabelle.” (line 35). Her response
displays that she is not willing to continue arguing with her
daughter and constitutes an attempt at closing down Isabelle and
terminating the dispute. Therefore, it presents a control manoeuvre
that operates on the structural as well as the content and
interpersonal level of interaction.47 Directly following the
directive, she reasserts her initial claim, remarking on her bad
cards (line 36). Her gaze at Isabelle’s cards (line 37) implies
that, in contrast to her, Isabelle is in a position to start. In
fact, in the next turn, Isabelle takes up her mother’s hint, asking
her to show her which card she can play (line 38).
In the preceding extract, the mother employs a meta-
communicative imperative to restrain her daughter’s speech.
Conversely, in the following fragment, it is the daughter who uses
this argumentative device to inhibit her mother’s talk.
example (8): Stuck 6b
134 MOM What's wrong with your life? Why do you have to
135 leave? Not good enough for you? Have a drink.
136 LULA I don't want one.
137 MOM
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138 LULA Not boring- not gonna end up like you.
139 MOM I gave birth to you for godsakes, birth, my
whole
140 fuckin' life over, for you, and you want to
leave
141 me to die, to rot, is that what you want?
> 142 LULA Just shut up! Just shut the fuck up and
143 forget I ever said anything! ((end of scene))
In the interaction preceding this exchange, Lula has suggested that
she might leave home some day, triggering an extended series of
disagreements. After several unsuccessful attempts at dissuading
Lula from her plans, Mom issues a series of challenging questions,
demanding that Lula account for her discontent and insinuating that
she is difficult to please (lines 134-135). She closes her turn with
a directive, offering Lula a drink. When Lula refuses, Mom
challenges her with a negative categorisation, exclaiming that she
is being “BORING” (line 137), presumably in a derogatory tone of
voice. But Lula rejects her mother’s deprecating characterisation of
her behaviour, claiming that rather than being boring she does not
want to be become like her mother. The formulation “not gonna end up
like you” expresses Lula’s disapproval of her mother’s alcohol
consumption and thus constitutes a derogatory remark. Indeed, Mom’s
response reveals that she interprets her daughter’s utterance as an
offence. She opposes Lula with a challenging question, claiming that
not only did she gave birth to Lula but also sacrificed her life for
her and that Lula has no right to abandon her now (lines 139-141).
Her use of expletives (“for godsakes,” “fuckin’”) as well as
negatively connotated words (“rot”) signals a negative affective
reaction at what Lula has said and aggravates opposition. By
formulating her counter as an interrogative, she is able to
challenge her daughter’s prior activity while simultaneously forcing
her to resume the floor and put up a defence for her position in the
next turn.48 Instead of providing the required response, however,
Lula issues a meta-communicative imperative, telling her mother to
“shut up” (line 142), thereby terminating the interaction. Self-
repetition, the use of the f-word and the increase in volume signal
high emotional involvement and exacerbate opposition.
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As the preceding examples have shown, in my data, directives
are realised by positive (e.g. “Be on my side for once,” “Quiet,”
“Shut up”) and negative formulations (e.g. “Don’t look at me like
that,” “Don't toy with your food,” “Don't answer me like that,”
“Don’t you ever say that”). They tend to be produced without delay,
immediately following the opponent’s preceding utterance. They can
stand on their own in a turn or in combination with other
oppositional moves. They are used to challenge various aspects of
the opponent’s (non-)verbal behaviour as well as her alignment with
the speaker or her position as displayed in that behaviour. As
argumentative devices, directives accomplish at least two functions.
Firstly, they treat the opponent’s prior activity as an arguable
action and thus achieve opposition. As we have seen, negative
directives in particular imply the violation of some norm or
expectation by the opponent and are therefore expressions of
criticism/dissatisfaction. Secondly, directives are attempts to
influence some aspect of the recipient’s future behaviour, thereby
limiting her freedom of action, and therefore represent control
manoeuvres. Thus, directives provide a discursive resource that
disputants can employ both to challenge the opponent’s prior action
and to exercise control over her following action.
Directives, like all speech actions, may vary in intensity. As
Labov & Fanshel (1977: 84-86) have shown, they may be formatted in a
straightforward or aggravated fashion, as imperatives (i.e. “(Don’t)
do X!”), or declaratives that state the speaker’s wants and needs
(i.e. “I (don’t) want you to do X.”). Alternatively, they may take
more softened or mitigated forms, as requests for information (i.e.
“Could you do X?”) or requests for permission (i.e. “Can I do/have
X?”).49 In addition to the selection of the verb in the directive, as
Ervin-Tripp (1982: 29-30) notes, that the “head act” (the principal
verb) may be accompanied by “supporting explanations, attention
getters, vocatives, and polite markers.” She further states that
social information about role, rank, distance, etc. can be
manifested “through nuancing by markers, such as saying please,
using slang, address forms, minimizers, conditionals, or past tense”
(33).
Several researchers have suggested that some form of
(a)symmetry is established through the alternative ways in which
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directives and their responses are formatted. As Mitchell-Kernan &
Kernan (1977: 201) have argued, “directives and reactions to them”
can be used “to define, reaffirm, challenge, manipulate, and
redefine status and rank.” Similarly, in a study of children’s use
of and responses to directives, M. H. Goodwin (1988) has shown that
in terms of both how directives are constructed and how they are
responded to, directives may be used to display symmetrical or
asymmetrical forms of relationships.50
Aggravated forms of directives have been analysed by a number
of researchers as displaying control vis-à-vis the recipient. Some
researchers have suggested that speakers use imperatives not mainly
to effect actual behaviour change but rather to test and make
assertions about relative positions among participants. For
instance, as Labov and Fanshel (1977: 78) have argued, one of the
preconditions for a valid request for action is that the speaker who
issues an imperative has the right to tell the addressee to perform
the requested action. Likewise, Searle (1969) suggests that an order
differs from a request in that the former has the additional
preparatory condition that the speaker must be in a position of
authority over the addressee. A similar view is expressed by
Apeltauer (1978: 90) and Gruber (1996a: 216), who both maintain that
one of the assumptions underlying a command is an asymmetrical
relationship with the speaker in the dominant position, which she
may draw on to reinforce her claim and gain compliance from the
addressee (cf. also Becker 1982, 1984; Ervin-Tripp 1982; M. H.
Goodwin 1988; Mitchell-Kernan & Kernan 1977). Thus, by packaging a
directive as an imperative, a speaker may assume a superior position
vis-à-vis the addressee, which authorises her to control the other’s
behaviour. Aggravated directives thus provide an interactional
resource with which speakers may attempt not only to regulate
others’ actions but also to define a position of relative
superiority over recipients. By contrast, mitigated directives such
as information and permission requests display deference towards the
addressee and permit options in the way in which the recipient
should respond.
In the following paragraphs, by looking at the form and
sequencing of directive-response sequences in my data, I will
examine how within mother-daughter dyads the social order of the
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moment is formulated, refuted, and reconstituted through (dispute)
talk, thus exploring the intersection of conflict and power
relations.
As the preceding examples indicate, in my data, directives – by
both mothers and daughters - predominantly take an aggravated
format, highlighting rather than downplaying their oppositional and
face-threatening character. This suggests that in mother-daughter
disputes, unmitigated directives provide a discursive resource that
is in principle equally available to both parties.
This is especially clear in the following extract from Home, in
which Olivia and Mary Jane oppose one another by means of reciprocal
meta-communicative imperatives, telling each other to “shut up”:
example (9): Home
293 OLIVIA I can't believe you're doing this to me.
294 MARY JANE I can't believe you're doing this to me.
295 I guess my plans don't matter. Do they?
296 The failure daughter comes home but that's
297 just not good enough for you, I guess.
> 298 OLIVIA Just shut up. Shut up.
> 299 MARY JANE You shut up. You just shut up forever.
300 How about that? (She rushes into the
301 bedroom.) I'm so sick of this.
As illustrated above, prior to this extract, Mary Jane and Olivia
were having a fierce dispute in the course of which they repeatedly
accused, challenged, interrupted and shouted at each other. In line
293, Olivia issues an accusation, in which she formulates Mary
Jane’s behaviour towards her as offensive: “I can't believe you're
doing this to me.” In the following turn, Mary Jane retaliates with
a contrastively mirroring return-accusation: “I can't believe you're
doing this to me.” (line 294). In the remainder of her turn, she
expands on her criticism insinuating that her mother does not show
any consideration for her (“I guess my plans don't matter. Do they?”
lines 295) and that she does not appreciate her homecoming (“The
failure daughter comes home but that's just not good enough for you,
I guess.” line 296-297). Instead of addressing the content of Mary
Jane’s counter-accusation, Olivia issues a meta-communicative
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imperative, telling Mary Jane to “shut up” (line 298). The
aggravated format of her directive as well as self-repetition signal
high emotional involvement and exacerbate opposition. In line 299,
Mary Jane retaliates with a reciprocal action. Similar to line 294,
she builds her counter by means of contrastive mirroring, repeating
her mother’s prior imperative verbatim, this time prefacing her
repeat with the pronoun “You” (presumably with emphatic stress) to
signal the reversal of the participant framework. The aggravated
format in combination with self- and other-repetition highlights and
reinforces opposition. Subsequently, Mary Jane withdraws from the
interaction, leaving the room and thereby terminates the dispute (at
least for the moment).
In the preceding extract, both the mother and the daughter
employ aggravated directives to oppose one another, thus emphasising
opposition and escalating the dispute. In this exchange then both
parties have equal access to the same argumentative resource(s), and
this is displayed in their equivalent construction of mutually
oppositional turns. Through the mutual exchange of control
manoeuvres in the form of aggravated directives, the disputants
jointly establish a symmetrical relationship in the local context on
the ongoing conflict interaction.
By contrast, in the following extract from Alto, Florene and
her daughter Wanda at first deploy dissimilar directive formats in
the beginning of the exchange, thereby mutually (re-)constructing an
asymmetrical, hierarchical relationship, and then gradually shift
towards a more egalitarian relationship:
example (10): Alto I,1
1 WANDA Now I'm going to ask one more thing. "Ouija,
2 how old will I live to be and what will I die
3 of?"
4 FLORENE (She jerks her fingers from the planchette.)
> 5 Wanda, don't you be asking about dying!
6 You're just a kid. Besides, we're not
7 supposed to know things like that.
8 WANDA I don't see why not. I want to find out if
> 9 it knows when people will die. Let me ask
10 about somebody old.
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> 11 FLORENE Now, Wanda, don't nose into such ghoulish
12 stuff.
> 13 WANDA Let me test it on Miz Hattie. We'll write
14 down what it says, and then when she does
15 die, we’ll know whether to believe it about
16 everything else.
17 FLORENE Well, it would be nice to have a dependable
18 source of advice. But Miz Hattie seems like
19  a good enough landlady so far, and I don't
20  want to think about her dying either. If she
21 died, this house would probably sell, and we'd
22 have to move again.
> 23 WANDA Let’s ask it anyway. I bet it knows.
24 FLORENE (Tentatively placing her fingers on the
25 planchette.) I just couldn't face another move
26 any time soon.
Wanda and her mother Florene are asking the Ouija board questions
about the future. The fragment starts with Wanda asking the board
about the time and cause of her death (lines 1-3). In the following
turn, Florene strongly opposes her daughter’s activity. She begins
her turn with a meta-communicative negative directive, reproaching
Wanda for asking the board about her death (line 5). The raised
voice indicates her indignation at Wanda’s question and emphasises
opposition. Her utterance construes Wanda’s activity as a violation
of some underlying social norm, which she makes explicit in the
remainder of her turn. Moreover, it aims at preventing Wanda from
restating her question, thus trying to limit her freedom of action.
In this sense, it is a control manoeuvre. In addition, as discussed
above, by designing her directive as an imperative, Florene assumes
a position of authority vis-à-vis Wanda, which permits her to
regulate her daughter’s behaviour. Directly following the directive,
she issues a series of assertions supporting her position, claiming
that people - especially “kids” - are not supposed to speculate on
matters of death (line 6-7). In so doing, she retrospectively
moderates the imposition of her turn-initial interdiction.51 However,
Wanda refutes her mother’s command, declaring that she is not
convinced by Florene’s explanation (“I don't see why not.” line 8),
and then goes on to give reasons for her initial question (“I want
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to find out if it knows when people will die.” lines 8-9). She
closes her turn with a permission directive asking Florene to let
her “ask about somebody old” (lines 9-10). As mentioned above,
permission requests display deference to the addressee. Thus,
although Wanda does not comply with her mother’s prior command, by
packaging her own directive in this way, Wanda ratifies Florene’s
superior position. In the next turn, Florene rejects her daughter’s
request with another negative imperative telling her not to “nose
into such ghoulish stuff” (lines 11-12). Again, the design of her
action implies that she can determine what is allowable and what is
not. Up to this point in the interaction, then, the asymmetrical
distribution of turn types between the participants in the episode
reflects their orientation to the unequal distribution of social
power and status. But Wanda does not give up. In the subsequent
turn, she issues another permission directive (“Let me test it on
Miz Hattie.” line 13), and then adds an assertion, pointing out the
possible benefits of the requested action for both her mother and
herself (lines 13-16). Indeed, at the beginning of her next turn,
Florene concedes that “it would be nice to have a dependable source
of advice” (lines 17-18). When she expresses her misgivings in the
remainder of her turn (lines 18-22), Wanda issues another directive,
prompting her to “ask it anyway” (lines 23). In contrast to
Florene’s prior commands and her own prior permission directives,
this directive is constructed as a suggestion for action. In line
with the inclusive pronoun “we,” which she employed in her prior
utterance, she uses the verb “let’s,” which includes both speaker
and hearer as potential agent to the action to be performed.52
According to M.H. Goodwin (1988), “let’s” signals a proposal rather
than a command or a request and as such neither shows special
deference towards the other party (as a request does) nor claims
about special rights of control over the other (as a command does).
Thus, through the way in which Wanda formats her directive at this
point in the interaction, she proposes a more symmetrical,
egalitarian relationship between her and Florene, than the more
asymmetrical, hierarchical relationship displayed in the first part
of the exchange. Indeed, in the following turn, Florene complies
with her daughter’s request, thus ratifying her definition of the
relationship (lines 24-26).
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In summary, in this fragment, the participants can be seen to
jointly (re-)construct and modify their relationship in the course
of their interaction through the differential ways in which
directives are formatted and responded to in the beginning and
towards the end of the exchange. At the start of the conversation, a
pattern of asymmetry in the formatting and usage of directives and
their responses develops in the interaction between the two women,
creating the positions of superior and inferior. Florene, who
assumes a position of authority in this phase of the talk, directly
opposes her daughter’s activities by issuing imperatives. Wanda, on
the other hand, ratifies her mother’s claim of superiority by using
a more mitigated utterance format, i.e. permission directives, and
thus collaborates in (re-)establishing a status differential in the
local context of the interaction. Initially, Florene’s superior
position in the dyad is displayed and confirmed through issuing
direct commands while receiving indirect requests. Towards the end
of the interaction, however, the women collaboratively work towards
a more balanced relationship. When Florene produces a mitigated
disagreement, expressing partial concession to her daughter’s
claims, Wanda issues an inclusive directive, thus assuming an equal
position with her mother. This in turn receives compliance from
Florene, who thus ratifies her daughter’s re-definition of the
relationship.
In the preceding extract, the daughter’s mitigated directives
eventually receive compliance. By contrast, in the following extract
from Avenue, Olga’s commands are ineffective:
example (11): Avenue
279 MOTHER (Looks around, spots the few papers in book
280 on table, takes them out, gets up, begins to
281 read.) Last night I dreamed I was on an island
282 and had my, let's see, this is a fancy word.
> 283 OLGA (Rising.) Give me that!
284 MOTHER (Continues to read.) Governess Tina watching
285 me (Olga tries to grab paper from her, as
286 chase begins around kitchen table.) and she
287 told me I was going to be a leader, maybe of
288 the world and a great piano player. (Throws
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289 that paper to her.) For three nights—
> 290 OLGA Give it to me, you—
291 MOTHER (Ignoring her, continuing.) For three nights
292 I have been having the same dream. I dreamed I
293 was at a fancy ball.
294 OLGA (Looks around. She is trying to think of a
295 way to get these papers back. She spots the
296 whiskey bottle.)
297 And all the men asked me to dance at the same
298 time—
299 OLGA (Crosses to bureau, takes whiskey bottle,
300 turns to Mother, threatens to spill it out.)
301 MOTHER (Goes over to her, grabs the bottle away from
302 her and gives her writing back to her.)
At the beginning of this fragment, Mother takes out Olga’s personal
notes and reads them without asking. In line 283, Olga opposes her
with an imperative, demanding that she give back the papers. Apart
from the aggravated format of her turn, the adversative character of
her utterance is highlighted by the increase in volume and her non-
verbal reaction. But Mother ignores her demand and goes on reading,
thus signalling her refusal to comply with her mother’s command, and
the two women end up chasing each other round the kitchen table,
with Olga reasserting her prior command (line 290) and Mother
ignoring her, continuing to read. In terms of Rogers & Farace’s
(1975) relational-control coding system, Mother’s reaction qualifies
as a “disconfirmation.” This move suggests an ignoring of other,
that is, not just a disagreement with what was said, but rather a
denial or negation of the other’s right even to attempt to define
the relationship (cf. also Bilmes (1997) on the potential functions
of ignoring). That is to say, in ignoring her daughter’s demand,
Mother not only rejects Olga’s attempt at controlling her behaviour,
but also challenges the assumption of superiority underlying her
imperatives. Thus, while the daughter obviously has access to
aggravated directives as a discursive resource, her imperatives
prove ineffective: Mother does not comply with her commands and
return the papers until she takes more radical measures and
threatens to spill out her whiskey (lines 299-302). This episode
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shows that although underlying social relations of power and status
do not necessarily determine the actions that are available to
speakers, they may well affect the kinds of responses they receive
as well as the outcomes of those actions in the ensuing talk.53
Moreover, the design and sequencing of directives and their
responses in this extract displays the participants’ joint
construction of social organisation in conflict interaction.
The interactional process of status or relationship negotiation
in and through dispute talk via the usage and formatting of
directives and their responses is even more obvious in the following
extract, in which Florene and Wanda both draw on meta-communicative
imperatives to accomplish opposition and both challenge each other’s
use of this very device:
example (12): Alto II, 4
17 HATTIE Ola Belle's always looking for an excuse to
18 kill one, ain't she? Well, I tell you, I think
19 it serves her right for living in sin. Them
20 blistered feet's just a foretaste of what's
21 coming when she goes to hell.
> 22 WANDA Shut up!
23 FLORENE Wanda, who do you think you're talking to?
> 24 WANDA Everybody. I want everybody to stop saying
25 mean things about Miz Lockwood.
26 ETHYL Oh, Honey, I didn't mean to be criticizing
29 her. I just wish I'd ever met such an exciting
30 man. I never knew one that was a bit of fun.
31 OLA BELLE He sure sounds like a barrel of laughs.
> 32 WANDA Shut your gossipin' old-lady mouths!
> 33 FLORENE Wanda, you bridle your tongue right now, and
34 apologize to everybody for being rude.
35 WANDA No! I will not!
36 FLORENE Wanda, you heard me.
37 WANDA I won't say something just because you want
38 me to. It is gossip, because Miz Lockwood
39 wouldn't act that way. And I won't take back
40 what I said.
((The argument terminates with Althea Lockwood
entering the stage.))
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Florene’s and Wanda’s landlady Hattie, their elderly neighbour
Ethyl, Florene’s sister Ola Belle and Florene are gossiping about
Wanda’s music teacher Althea Lockwood, who has recently been dumped
by her boy friend. In line 22, Wanda opposing Hattie’s utterance
(and presumably also the preceding gossip about Ms Lockwood) with an
aggravated meta-communicative directive, telling her (and presumably
the other women present) to “Shut up!” In the following turn,
Florene challenges her with an accusatory question (“Wanda, who do
you think you’re talking to?” line 23), implying that Wanda’s
activity is inadmissible on account of the addressees’ social
identities. As discussed above, one of the preconditions for a valid
directive is that the speaker who issues the imperative has the
right to tell the addressee to perform the requested action. By
implying that Wanda has addressed her imperative to people who are
in a superior position, Florene argues with this precondition, and
thus rejects Wanda’s utterance as inappropriate. Moreover, by means
of the interrogative syntax, she obliges Wanda to account for her
offensive behaviour in the next turn. However, Wanda treats
Florene’s interrogative as a genuine request for information. She
produces an answer (“Everybody.” line 26), and then reasserts her
prior claim, this time in the form of a declarative sentence: “I
want everybody to stop saying mean things about Miz Lockwood” (lines
24-25). The use of desire statements (Ervin Tripp 1982: 30) has been
argued to constitute a relatively aggravated way of formulating a
directive (Garvey 1975: 52, 60; Ervin Tripp 1976: 29) and has been
shown to be primarily directed downward to subordinates (Ervin-Tripp
1977: 166-167). Thus, by designing her utterance in this way, Wanda
assumes a position vis-à-vis the other women, which allows her to
censure their behaviour. And a few lines later, in reaction to
Ethyl’s account (lines 26-30) and Ola Belle’s comment on Ms
Lockwood’s former boy friend (line 31), Wanda recycles and escalates
her initial imperative (line 32). Her raised voice in combination
with the derogative phrase “gossipin' old-lady mouths” aggravates
opposition. This time, Florene opposes her with a meta-communicative
directive, commanding her to apologise to all those present “for
being rude” (lines 33-34). By construing Wanda’s activity as “rude”,
Florene’s utterance functions as an accusation. In addition, the
imperative argues for Florene’s position of authority that licenses
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her to regulate her daughter’s behaviour. Furthermore, by explicitly
obliging her to produce an apology, it constrains Wanda’s freedom of
action, and thus, presents an attempt at exercising control. Yet,
rather than produce the requested apology, Wanda rejects her
mother’s directive with an aggravated and unaccounted refusal (“No!
I will not!” line 35), thereby further escalating the dispute.
However, Florene insists on her prior command and issues a prompt
(Burton 1980), reinforcing her preceding directive and demanding
immediate compliance (“Wanda, you heard me” line 36). Again, Wanda
refuses to comply. She opposes her mother’s directives by
challenging the underlying assumption that Florene has the right to
tell her what to do, and that she is obliged to comply with
Florene’s commands: “I won't say something just because you want me
to.” (lines 37-38), and then explicitly rejects her mother’s
command: “I won’t take back what I said” (lines 39-40).
To sum up, in this example, the mother’s attempts at regulating
her daughter’s behaviour by means of imperatives are unsuccessful.
This shows that even though directives can be employed as a powerful
interactive resource, they are not necessarily always successful. It
also again illustrates that social order and status are actively
(re-)established through talk rather than being static social
categories. It demonstrates that being a less powerful participant
in terms of social status does not mean a speaker cannot resist
another’s control manoeuvres (e.g. by challenging and/or rejecting
their commands) or even turn the tables and take up a potentially
powerful discursive position in the local context of the interaction
(e.g. by issuing commands herself). In other words, this extract
clearly shows that power is not something fixed, not something a
speaker possesses but a dynamic relationship that has to be
constantly negotiated in the local context of the interaction. It
also demonstrates that the dynamics of power relationships is most
obvious in the open clash of power and resistance in the action of
the ongoing talk, i.e. in the interplay of control manoeuvres and
opposition moves in episodes of dispute.
To conclude, in this section, I have examined the argumentative
use of directives, that is, oppositional moves by which a speaker
attempts to get the addressee to do or refrain from doing something.
As the preceding analysis has shown, as argumentative devices,
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directives accomplish a range of functions, operating at various
levels of interaction. Firstly, they treat the opponent’s prior
activity as an arguable action and thus achieve opposition. They can
be used to challenge various aspects of the opponent’s (non-)verbal
behaviour as well as her alignment with the speaker or her position
as displayed therein. Furthermore, directives are attempts to
influence some aspect of the recipient’s future behaviour. From a
structural perspective, they make specific second pair parts
conditionally relevant, i.e. following a directive, compliance is
the structurally preferred response. In sum, directives have both a
retrospective function (challenging the opponent’s preceding
activity) and a prospective function (determining the opponent’s
subsequent action). At the interpersonal level of interaction,
directives pose a threat to the addressee’s negative face, as they
are potentially harmful to her autonomy. In demanding that the
addressee perform (or refrain from) performing some activity they
put some pressure on the addressee to comply. Thus, directives are
control manoeuvres, forcing the other to respond under certain
conditions. However, although directives present a potent
interactional resource that disputants may effectively exploit both
to express opposition and to exert control over the opponent’s
activities, the preceding analyses have shown that they may also be
successfully challenged and/or resisted. Moreover, we have seen that
the linguistic form of directives in my data ranges from
interrogatives to declaratives to imperatives, both negatively and
positively formulated. Their packaging contributes to their degree
of mitigation and aggravation, and displays the speaker’s perception
of her position vis-à-vis the recipient. Speakers may use specific
forms of directives not mainly to effect actual behaviour change but
rather to test and make assertions about relative positions among
participants. By packaging a directive as an imperative, a speaker
may assume a superior position in relation to the addressee, which
authorises her to control the other’s behaviour. Aggravated
directives thus provide an interactional resource with which
speakers may attempt not only to regulate others’ actions but also
to define a position of relative superiority over recipients. By
contrast, mitigated directives such as information and permission
requests display deference towards the addressee and permit options
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in the way in which the recipient should respond. By looking at the
form and sequencing of directive-response sequences I have examined
how within the mother-daughter dyad the social order of the moment
is formulated, refuted, and reconstituted in the course of the
ongoing conflict interaction, thus exploring the interplay of
conflict and power/control. As the preceding discussion has shown,
although directives are a discursive resource which is in principle
accessible to all speakers, whether they are employed successfully
still depends on contextual factors such as the participants’ social
roles and the related rights and obligations. That is to say, while
social relations of power do not automatically determine the actions
that speakers have at their disposal, they may still have an impact
on the effects of those actions in the subsequent talk. In addition,
the preceding analysis evidences (once more) that power is not a
static social category but a dynamic relationship that is constantly
negotiated in and through talk-in-interaction. It also shows that
the dynamics of power is most obvious in the open clash of control
manoeuvres and resistance in verbal conflict sequences. It
demonstrates that participants actively negotiate their
relationships in and through (conflict) talk, and, by the same
token, that dispute represents a fruitful site for the analysis of
the ways in which participants jointly (re-)construct and transform
social order and their status with respect to one another, for
instance through the formatting and sequencing of directives and
their responses.
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7.4 Demands for explanation
Another way in which disputants can challenge an opponent’s prior
activity is by questioning the opponent’s grounds for making the
claim she is making. This can be done by means of oppositional moves
that I will term ‘demands for explanation.’ Demands for explanation
are a class of utterances that question the basis for the prior
speaker’s claim and request that she provide a reason for it. In my
data, demands for explanation tend to be produced immediately
following the opponent’s prior turn or in overlap with it.54 They
typically have the syntactic form of an interrogative containing
question particles such as “When,” “What,” “Who,” “Why,” “Where” and
“How.”
In producing a demand for explanation, a speaker challenges an
opponent’s prior activity demanding that she provide a substantial
reason or evidence for his or her claim, while suggesting that she
cannot do so. This argumentative device can be employed to challenge
various kinds of activities on the part of an opponent. For
instance, in the following extract from My sister, Madame Danzard
counters her daughter’s preceding assertion by requesting her to
produce evidence for her claim that veal “ruins the complexion”:
example (1): My sister 3
23 MADAME DANZARD (Savouring the veal.) This veal is
24 delicious.
25 ISABELLE Of course, you love veal. (She looks at
26 her mother.)
27 MADAME DANZARD Don't you?
28 ISABELLE You know I don't. It's too heavy in the
29 middle of the day.
30 MADAME DANZARD Not the way she's prepared it. Light as
31 a feather.
32 ISABELLE I've heard it ruins the complexion.
> 33 MADAME DANZARD Where did you hear that?
34 ISABELLE I read it.
> 35 MADAME DANZARD (Scornfully.) Really. Where?
36 ISABELLE Somewhere. I don't remember.
37 MADAME DANZARD Certain days of the month, my dear, you
38 really are worse than others.
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Madame Danzard and her daughter Isabelle are having veal for lunch.
When Isabelle claims that veal is “too heavy in the middle of the
day” (lines 28-29), her mother contradicts her (lines 30-31) and an
argument ensues. In response to her mother’s disagreement, Isabelle
issues a counter-assertion, claiming that she has heard that veal
“ruins the complexion” (line 32). In the next turn, Madame Danzard
challenges her daughter’s assertion, requesting her to provide
evidence for her claim: “Where did you hear that?” (line 33). When
Isabelle replies that she read it (line 34), her mother challenges
her once more, demanding her to substantiate her claim (“Where?”
line 35). Madame Danzard initiates her turn with the acknowledgement
token “Really,” which is delivered in a scornful tone of voice (as
indicated by the stage directions). Moreover, it is immediately
followed by a demand for explanation. Both the intonation contour
and the sequential placement of the acknowledgement token suggest
that it expresses sarcasm rather than interest in or surprise at
what Isabelle has just said. Thus, the preface conveys Madame
Danzard’s critical stance towards her daughter’s assertion and
signals right at the beginning of the turn that disagreement is
going to follow. In the next turn, Isabelle responds to her mother’s
question with the evasive statement: “Somewhere. I don't remember.”
(line 36). Although she provides the required response, her reply
indicates that (as suggested by her mother’s recurrent demands for
evidence) she cannot, in fact, supply concrete proof of her prior
claim. In response, Madame Danzard issues an utterance that displays
her construal of Isabelle’s conduct as both irritating and
quarrelsome, by claiming that her daughter’s present behaviour is
particularly bad (line 37-38).
To recapitulate, as an argumentative move, Madame Danzard’s
demands for explanation accomplish two things: Firstly, they
challenge the validity of Isabelle’s previous utterances by
requesting evidence for her claims. Secondly, by means of the
interrogative structure, they oblige Isabelle to resume the floor
and offer an account for the relevance of her remark – which she
does in the respective subsequent turns (lines 34 and 36). This
floor-returning property is an important argumentative feature of
demands for explanation. By challenging the validity of Isabelle’s
assertions and forcing her to provide evidence for her claims,
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Madame Danzard successfully manages to control her daughter’s
activities. Thus, demands for explanation represent a powerful
argumentative resource that disputants can effectively employ to
exert control over the other’s next action, i.e. to exercise
discursive power.
The following extract from ‘night Mother illustrates another
format that is used in my data to realise demands for explanation:
example (2): ‘night Mother
695 JESSIE Mama, I know you used to ride the bus. Riding
696 the bus and it’s hot and bumpy and crowded and
697  too noisy and more than anything in the world
698 you want to get off and the only reason in the
699 world you don’t get off is it’s still 50 blocks
700 from where you’re going? Well, I can get off
701 right now if I want to, because even if I ride
702 50 more years and get off then, it’s the same
703 place when I step down to it. Whenever I feel
704 like it, I can get off. As soon as I’ve had
705 enough, it’s my stop. I’ve had enough.
706 MAMA You're feeling sorry for yourself!
707 JESSIE The plumber's helper is under the sink, too.
708 MAMA You're not having a good time! Whoever promised
709 you a good time? Do you think I've had a good
710 time?
711 JESSIE I think you're pretty happy, yeah. You have
712 things you like to do.
> 713 MAMA Like what?
714 JESSIE Like crochet.
715 MAMA I'll teach you to crochet.
716 JESSIE I can't do any of that nice work, Mama.
At the beginning of this sequence, Jessie tries to explain to her
mother why she has decided to kill herself (lines 695-705).
Following her daughter’s account, Mama says “You're feeling sorry
for yourself!” (line 706). With this turn she selectively formulates
the upshot of Jessie’s prior utterance thereby glossing her
daughter’s stance in a single sentence. This practice, termed
“formulating” by Garfinkel & Sacks (1970) and Heritage & Watson
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(1979, 1980), has been described by Heritage (1985: 100) as
“summarizing, glossing, or developing the gist of an informant’s
earlier statements.” While it is common in institutionalised,
audience-directed interaction such as courtroom interaction (cf.
Atkinson & Drew 1979), classroom interaction (cf. Edwards 1976),
news interviews (cf. Heritage 1985) and talk radio shows (cf.
Hutchby 1996a), it is relatively rare in ordinary conversation.55 In
the following paragraph, I will examine which functions this device
has in the preceding exchange.
According to Heritage & Watson (1979: 138), “the primary
business of formulations is to demonstrate understanding and,
presumptively, to have that understanding attended to and, as a
first preference, endorsed.” That is to say, by producing a
formulation, Mama both displays her interpretation of Jessie’s prior
utterance and invites her to confirm this interpretation in the
following turn. This sequential aspect of her formulation can be
explained by drawing on some observations by Labov & Fanshel (1977)
concerning “shared knowledge.” They have suggested that all
statements in a two-party conversation can be classified according
to the shared knowledge involved as A-events (known to speaker A,
but not to speaker B), B-events (known to speaker B, but not to
speaker A), AB-events (known to both speaker a and B), and D-events
(known to be disputable). A-events are those that typically concern
speaker A’s emotions, her daily experience in other contexts,
elements in his or her past biography, and so on. (By the same
token, B-events are those that have to do with speaker B’s emotions,
experience, biography, etc.) From this classification, they derive
the following rule of interpretation of discourse: “If A makes a
statement about B-events, then it is heard as a request for
confirmation” (100).
Accordingly, by making a statement about Jessie’s emotions,
Mama presents information that is originally and primarily known to
Jessie (i.e. a B-event). In so doing, Mama’s formulation invites
Jessie to confirm her understanding of her daughter’s preceding
utterance in the subsequent turn. Hence, as a communicative
strategy, Mama’s formulation accomplishes several things: Firstly,
in summarising the gist of Jessie’s prior talk, it displays Mama’s
interpretation of her daughter’s utterance and requests Jessie to
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validate this interpretation in the next turn. By this means, it
both maintains Jessie’s emotions as its topic and picks them out as
the focus for Jessie’s next turn. By requesting Jessie to confirm
her mother’s construal of her utterance in the subsequent turn,
Mama’s formulation serves to constrain her daughter’s freedom of
action. Therefore, it presents a control manoeuvre, i.e. an attempt
at exercising power at the structural level of interaction. In
addition, by summing up the gist of Jessie’s utterance and obliging
her to confirm that summary, Mama tries to impose her interpretation
on Jessie’s utterance, thus attempting to exert control over the
content of the ongoing talk. As a result, we can say that Mama’s
formulation represents a communicative resource with which she tries
to exercise a degree of discursive power at both the structural and
the content level of the ongoing interaction.
However, instead of confirming (or rejecting) her mother’s
formulation, Jessie tries to turn the conversation to the subject of
household utensils (line 707). But Mama does not let her change the
topic and begins her next turn with another formulation of her
daughter’s original utterance: “You're not having a good time!”
(line 708). By this means she maintains the issue of Jessie’s state
of mind as the focus of the ongoing conversation over one more turn
at talk, while simultaneously requesting Jessie to validate her
interpretation in the next turn. However, rather then waiting for
Jessie’s response, Mama immediately follows her formulation with an
interrogative: “Whoever promised you a good time?” (lines 708-709).
She presumes that her understanding of Jessie’s utterance, which is
conveyed by her formulation (namely, that Jessie is “not having a
good time”), is correct and goes on to challenge Jessie on the basis
of this presumption: By asking “Whoever promised you a good time?”,
Mama challenges her daughter by means of questioning a
presupposition that she proposes is implied in Jessie’s prior talk,
namely that she expected to have “a good time,” and demands her to
account for this presupposition. This second component of Mama’s
turn resembles an oppositional strategy that Gruber (2001) has
observed in TV discussions. He describes “implicit opposition
questions,” by means of which speakers “provide opponents with
unfavourable interpretations of their points of view and establish
an obligation for the opponent to make explicit his/her position
321
towards these interpretations” (1835). By using this argumentative
device, Mama presents Jessie with her understanding of Jessie’s
utterance as involving an unwarranted claim and obliges her to take
up a stance towards this understanding. Thus, Mama employs
formulations, which present her interpretation of Jessie’s prior
utterance, as argumentative moves to take issue with Jessie’s
preceding activity and, at the same time, force Jessie to attend to
Mama’s reconstruction of her position. However, once again, Mama
does not wait for Jessie to provide a response, but instead issues
another interrogative: “Do you think I've had a good time?” (lines
709-710). By this means, she explicitly requests that Jessie put
forward a position on the matter in question that can then be
criticised. This part of Mama’s turn thus functions as a second
position question (as described above) by which the opponent is
required to expand on or account for the challenged claim. If Jessie
answers Mama’s question by taking a stance on her mother’s emotional
state, Mama is then in a position to challenge that stance and
Jessie is forced to build a defence.
In fact, this is precisely what happens as the conversation
proceeds. In response to her mother’s question, Jessie offers her
view of Mama’s state of mind, asserting “I think you're pretty
happy, yeah. You have things you like to do.” (lines 711-712). This
allows Mama to oppose her daughter’s argument by demanding that she
provide evidence for her claim rather than by arguing for an
alternative position. In line 713, by saying “Like what?”, Mama
challenges Jessie’s assertion not by putting forward a counter-
position or openly disagreeing with it but by requesting her to
offer proof of her claim, which she does in the subsequent turn
(“Like crochet.” line 714). The sequence ends with Jessie rejecting
Mama’s subsequent offer to teach her to crochet (line 715) by
claiming that she “can’t do any of that nice work” (line 716).
In the two preceding examples, demands for explanation are used
to challenge the prior speaker’s utterance. As the following
fragment illustrates, disputants can also draw on this argumentative
device to counter an opponent’s non-verbal activity. In the extract
from ‘night Mother below, Mama first challenges Jessie’s cleaning
the gun by requesting her to provide an explanation for her
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behaviour (line 182), and then counters her response with another
demand for explanation (line 185):
example (3): ‘night Mother
165 JESSIE (Is cleaning the gun, pushing the cylinder out,
166 checking to see that the chambers and barrel
are
167 empty, then putting some oil on a small patch
of
168 cloth and pushing it through the barrel with
the
169 push rod that was in the box.)
170 MAMA (Goes to the kitchen and washes her hands, as
171 instructed, trying not to show her concern
about
172 the gun.) I shoulda got you to bring down that
173 milk can. Agnes Fletcher sold hers to somebody
174 with a flea market for forty dollars apiece.
175 JESSIE I’ll go back and get it in a minute. There’s a
176 wagon wheel up there too. There’s even a churn.
177 I’ll get it all if you want.
178 MAMA (Coming over now, taking over now.)
> 179 What are you doing?
180 JESSIE The barrel has to be clean, Mama. Old powder,
181 dust gets in it...
> 182 MAMA What for?
183 JESSIE I told you.
184 MAMA (Reaching for the gun.) And I told you, we
don't
185 get criminals out here.
186 JESSIE (Quickly pulling it to her.) And I told you...
187 (Then trying to be calm.) The gun is for me.
Prior to this exchange, Jessie has fetched her father’s old shotgun
from the attic, and is now cleaning it (lines 165-169). After a
brief intermediary sequence about some of the objects that are in
the attic (lines 170-177), Mama approaches Jessie with the
interrogative “What are you doing?” (line 179). While this turn
might be heard as a simple request for information, the above
sequence displays several features that go against such an
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interpretation. Firstly, as Burton (1980: 152) has pointed out, one
of the preconditions for an utterance to be heard as a valid request
for information is that the speaker who addresses an interrogative
to a hearer requesting her to provide a linguistic response
concerning a question X does not know X. Since Mama perfectly well
knows that Jessie is cleaning the gun, her question does not meet
this precondition. Rather it seems to serve as a challenge which
obliges Jessie to account for her activity in the subsequent turn.
In fact, Jessie responds by providing an explanation for her
cleaning the gun: “The barrel has to be clean, Mama. Old powder,
dust gets in it ...” (lines 180-181). Hence, instead of an innocuous
request for information, Mama’s turn can be treated as an
oppositional move by means of which she demands that Jessie provide
a reason for her activity in the subsequent turn.
In reaction to Jessie’s explanation, Mama issues another
interrogative: “What for?” (line 182). With this turn, she indicates
that she does not accept her daughter’s response as a satisfactory
explanation for her activity and at the same time forces her to
elaborate on her account and disclose her underlying motive for
cleaning the gun, thus trying to constrain Jessie’s freedom of
action. Accordingly, her utterance represents a control manoeuvre,
i.e. an attempt to exercise power. Moreover, the interruptive
placement of her turn serves to intensify opposition and to indicate
interpersonal involvement. In response to her mother’s repeated
demands for explanation, Jessie at first refers to a statement she
made earlier in the conversation, namely that she needs the gun for
protection against criminals: “I told you.” (line 183). When Mama
insists that there are no criminals around (lines 184-185), she
eventually discloses that she needs the gun for herself (line 187).
To sum up, by repeatedly questioning the reason for Jessie’s
activity and requesting her to provide an explanation for her
behaviour, Mama successfully manages to pressure her daughter into
revealing her real motivation for cleaning the gun, thereby
constraining Jessie’s freedom of action. In other words, she
effectively uses demands for explanation as an oppositional strategy
to control her daughter’s activities, i.e. to exercise discursive
power.
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In the extracts above, the disputants employ demands for
explanation as a discursive resource to challenge the prior
speaker’s assertion or non-verbal activity by requesting them to
provide a reason for their claim or behaviour. By contrast, in the
examples below, demands for explanation are used following
directives to query the opponent’s reason for making a request.
example (4): Alto I, 2
(The sound of a car stopping outside... A car
door slams.)
46 FLORENE (Looking out door.) Now I want you to
47 straighten up, Wanda. Somebody's coming to the
48 door. And she drives a convertible.
49 (ALTHEA LOCKWOOD enters porch area. She is a
50 pretty, dramatic woman in her late twenties.
51 She wears the apricot taffeta dress described
52 earlier by WANDA. FLORENE hurriedly tries to
53 tidy up things.)
54 WANDA (Keeps on writing.)
55 (ALTHEA knocks at their door.)
56 FLORENE (Calls.) Just a minute! Wanda, put your shoes
57 on.
> 58 WANDA What for? What's so hot about this old lady?
59 FLORENE (Swatting at her legs as she goes to the door)
60 You mind me, Wanda! (Opens door.) Hello, Miz
61 Lockwood. Come on in. I just finished your
62 ironing.
63 (WANDA’s jaw drops as she hears the name of
64 her music teacher and looks up to see her. She
65 would flee, but realizes it is too late. She
66 is scrambling to put on her shoes and
67 straighten her hair and clothes as ALTHEA
68 LOCKWOOD sweeps in.)
This episode begins with Florene addressing a directive to Wanda,
telling her to “straighten up” (lines 46-47). As discussed above,
directives are communicative activities that serve to get the
addressee to do (or stop doing) something. Following directives
compliance is the structurally preferred response. Therefore, by
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issuing a directive Florene impedes Wanda’s freedom of action by
obliging her to respond under certain conditions. Her directive thus
presents a control manoeuvre. The use of “desire statements” (Ervin
Tripp 1982: 30), has been argued to constitute a relatively
aggravated way of formulating a directive (Garvey 1975: 52, 60;
Ervin Tripp 1976: 29) and has been shown to be primarily directed
downward to subordinates (Ervin-Tripp 1977: 166-167). Thus, by
designing her utterance in this way, Florene proposes a superior
social status vis-à-vis Wanda, and vice versa, her daughter’s
inferior position with respect to her. Subsequently, however, she
adds a supporting assertion, which accounts for her request
(“Somebody is coming to the door. And she drives a convertible.”
lines 47-48) and thus moderates the imposition of her command.56
However, instead of providing the required response, Wanda ignores
Florene’s request and continues her prior activity (line 54), thus
signalling her refusal to comply with her mother’s directive.57 As a
reaction to Wanda’s disagreement-implicative silence, Florene makes
use of a more aggravated format, and issues an imperative specifying
her prior claim (lines 56-57).58 This is challenged by Wanda in the
subsequent turn with an interrogative that demands that Florene
provide a reason for her request (“What for? What’s so hot about
this old lady?” line 58). As an oppositional strategy, this turn
achieves several things: Firstly, it brings into play one of the
preconditions for valid requests for action, namely that a speaker
requesting an addressee to perform an action presumes that there is
a need to carry out this action (cf. Labov & Fanshel 1977: 78). By
producing a demand for explanation in the form of an interrogative,
Wanda questions the assumption that there is a need to perform the
requested action (i.e. to “straighten up” and “put on her shoes”),
thereby putting off her mother’s request. In addition, by
questioning the grounds for her mother’s directive, she obliges
Florene to take the floor again and provide a reason for her request
in the subsequent turn. Instead of producing the required
explanation, however, Florene reacts by swatting at Wanda’s legs and
exclaiming “You mind me, Wanda!” (line 60). Her response construes
Wanda’s activity as unacceptable, implying that she has contravened
some standard of conduct for daughters, which obliges them to comply
with their mothers’ requests. In addition, it indicates her
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indignation and expresses a threat (cf. below) to punish Wanda if
she does not obey. But although it enables her to counter her
daughter’s demand for explanation and thus resist being controlled,
in another sense, Florene’s threat proves ineffective: Wanda does
not comply with her mother’s request until she realises that the
visitor whom Florene was announcing is her music teacher. This
sequence shows that demands for explanation provide a communicative
resource that can be effectively employed by disputants to refuse to
comply with requests and, thus, to reject another’s control attempt.
In the following extract from My sister, Madame Danzard
challenges her daughter’s request by compelling her to provide a
reason for her claim.
example (5): My sister 14
35 MADAME DANZARD Maybe they're upstairs. I'm going up
36 there this minute.
37 ISABELLE Maman- wait.
> 38 MADAME DANZARD Wait? What for?
39 ISABELLE I don't think you should.
40 MADAME DANZARD This is my house. Of course I'm going
41 upstairs. Right now. (She starts up the
42 stairs.) You don't have to come if you
43 don't want to.
44 ISABELLE (Follows her slowly.)
Madame Danzard and her daughter Isabelle have just returned from
shopping. When their maids do not turn up to help them put away the
purchases, Madame Danzard wants to check whether they are upstairs
in their room (lines 35-36). When Isabelle asks her to wait (line
37) Madame Danzard challenges her request with a demand for
explanation (line 38). She begins her turn by repeating Olga’s prior
utterance (“Wait?”), producing it with rising intonation. As noted
earlier, (partial) repetition of the prior speaker’s talk is
frequently used as a preface to begin oppositional moves. It signals
right at the beginning of the turn that disagreement is going to
follow, and also conveys a particular affective reaction to what the
other has just said. By prefacing her turn with a repetition of her
daughter’s utterance, Madame Danzard displays her surprise at
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Isabelle’s request, portraying it as unexpected. Immediately
following the opposition preface, Madame Danzard produces another
interrogative, demanding that Isabelle provide a reason for her
request: “What for?” In response, Isabelle tells her mother that she
does not consider it a good idea to go the maids’ room (line 39).
However, Madame Danzard refutes her daughter’s objection, claiming
that, being the owner of the house, she has the right to go upstairs
(line 40-41).
As the two preceding examples have shown, demands for
explanation provide an argumentative resource that disputants can
employ to challenge the opponent’s request without explicitly
refusing to comply with it.59 This oppositional strategy makes it
possible for the speaker to challenge the validity of the opponent’s
directive by querying his or her reason making the request while
simultaneously obliging him or her to take the floor again and
provide an explanation for the challenged claim. In so doing,
demands for explanation enable the speaker to resist the opponent’s
prior control manoeuvre (i.e. request for action) and at the same
time to attempt to control the opponent’s next action.
By challenging the validity of Isabelle’s request and forcing
her to provide evidence for her claim, Madame Danzard successfully
manages to resist being controlled by her daughter’s directive while
simultaneously exerting control over Isabelle’s subsequent activity.
Thus, demands for explanation represent a powerful argumentative
resource that can be effectively employed by disputants both to
resist being constrained by the opponent’s control manoeuvres and to
exert control over their next activity by limiting their freedom of
action. This does not mean, however, that opponents are incapable of
offering resistance to a speaker’s demand for explanation. As the
preceding extract from Alto has shown, disputants can counter-oppose
the prior speaker’s demand for explanation, for instance, by means
of contesting the activity’s appropriateness or legitimacy. By
challenging the suitability of Wanda’s activity rather than
providing the required explanation, Florene rejects her daughter’s
demand for explanation and thereby resist being controlled.
In the preceding paragraphs, by looking at the sequential
aspects of directives and demands for explanation, I have examined
how demands for explanation can employed by disputants as a
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discursive resource both to oppose the interlocutor’s prior control
manoeuvre and to attempt to control her following activity, thus
exploring the intersection of conflict and power.
Demands for explanation can also be used to query the
interlocutor’s reason for failing to comply with the speaker’s prior
request, as the following extract from Tell me illustrates:
example (6): Tell me
285 DAUGHTER Can I?
286 MOTHER No.
> 287 DAUGHTER Why not?
288 MOTHER Because.
> 289 DAUGHTER Because why?
290 MOTHER Because you're only 12-years-old, that's why.
((dispute continues))
The sequence starts with the daughter producing an interrogative,
asking her mother for permission to join her friends in some free-
time activity (“Can I?” line 285). According to Ervin-Tripp (1977:
166-167), such “permission directives” are usually addressed upward
in rank. That means, by designing her activity in this way, the
daughter expresses deference thus showing an orientation to her
mother’s superior social status.60 In the next turn, Mother rejects
her daughter’s request with an outright refusal: “No.” (line 286).
Her turn, too, displays an orientation to the fact that she is in a
position of authority in relation to her daughter, which allows her
to refuse her daughter’s request without accounting for her
refutation. Up to this point in the interaction, then, both
participants can be seen to jointly (re-)produce an underlying power
differential in the ongoing talk. However, in the subsequent turn,
the daughter challenges her mother’s refusal by demanding that she
provide a reason for her negative response: “Why not?” (line 287).
In response, Mother offers an account for her rejection, albeit a
quite imprecise one: “Because.” (line 288). Again, her turn
indicates her orientation to her social role as a mother, which
authorises her to withhold or grant permission without being obliged
to account for her reactions. Yet, in the next turn, the daughter
challenges her again by saying “Because why?” (line 289). Her turn
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displays her construal of her mother’s response as unsatisfactory
and demands Mother to take the floor again and expand on her account
providing a more elaborate explanation for why she refuses to comply
with her daughter’s request. In fact, this is what Mother does in
the subsequent turn by saying “Because you're only 12-years-old,
that's why” (line 290).
Exchanges such as the above are highly formulaic for both
children and parents. 61 Arguments between parents and children
typically entail sequences such as C: “Why?” – P: “Because.” – C:
“Because why?” – P: “Because I’m your father/mother.” or “Because
you’re just n years old.” The preceding spate of talk thus portrays
the classical parent-child argument and characterises the
participants’ underlying social relationship, which is (re-)
constructed in and through conventionalised (and probably
ritualised) forms of conversational interaction.
In addition, this fragment clearly illustrates that power is a
multi-dimensional phenomenon: At on level, by virtue of her social
role, the mother is in a position of authority that allows her to
refuse her daughter’s request, i.e. to ensure her own freedom of
action while at the same time limiting her daughter’s freedom of
action. At another level, however, by employing demands for
explanation, which oblige her mother to account for her refusal, the
daughter constrains her mother’s freedom of action, i.e. exerts
discursive power over her. This demonstrates that relations of power
are constantly actively (re-)produced (or challenged) through talk
rather than being imposed by exterior social structures. However,
the example also shows that, although by using demands for
explanation the daughter exerting a degree of discursive power at
the structural level of interaction, whether her initial permission
directive ultimately gains the mother’s compliance still depends on
contextual factors such as the participants’ respective social roles
and the related rights and obligations.
As the preceding discussion has shown, demands for explanation
are argumentative moves that enable speakers to challenge the
opponent’s prior action without explicitly disagreeing with it, by
demanding that she provide an explanation or evidence for the
activity or claim in question. They can be used to challenge a
variety of activities such as assertions, accusations, directives,
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and refusals to comply with the speaker’s preceding request. Demands
for explanation are commonly realised by interrogatives containing
question words such as “Where did you hear that?”; “Like what?”;
“What for?”; “Why not?”; etc. This oppositional strategy enables the
speaker to challenge the validity of the opponent’s prior activity
by querying his or her reason for making the claim they are making
while simultaneously obliging her to resume floor and provide an
explanation for or proof of the challenged activity or claim.
This floor-returning property is a central argumentative
characteristic of demands for explanation when they stand on their
own in a turn. Like the freestanding relevance challenges discussed
above, these moves function as second position questions by which
the opponent is required to account for the challenged activity. By
obliging the opponent to offer a reason for their prior claim or
behaviour the speaker tries to limit the other’s freedom of action.
Thus, demands for explanation represent another powerful
argumentative resource that disputants can effectively employ to
exert control over the other’s next action, i.e. to exercise
discursive power at the structural level of interaction.
Moreover, with regard to the interpersonal plane of
interaction, demands for explanation that stand on their own in a
turn represent face-threatening acts that threaten both the hearer’s
positive and negative face. On the one hand, they threaten the
addressee’s positive face wants by questioning the legitimacy of her
prior activity. In addition, they present a threat to the
addressee’s negative face by impeding her freedom of action, since
they put the recipient in a position to account for the activity in
question. Therefore, freestanding demands for explanation provide an
argumentative resource available to speakers that thy may exploit to
exercise interactional power over others at the micro-level of
interaction by impeding their freedom of action.
Similar argumentative moves have been observed in non-scripted
conflict talk. For instance, in their study of role-played arguments
between children Brenneis & Lein (1977) describe “demands for
evidence” such as “Prove it.” or “How do you know?”, which are
requests for proof or evidence from the opponent for her preceding
argument. Similarly, Eisenberg & Garvey (1981) discuss “requests for
explanation” (e.g. “Why?”), which are used in children’s disputes to
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elicit a reason or justification for an opponent’s preceding action
or utterance. Muntigl & Turnbull (1998: 230) describe “challenges,”
by means of which a speaker “questions an addressee’s prior claim
and demands that addressee provide evidence for his/her claim, while
suggesting that the addressee cannot do so.” Bliesener (1984: 216)
observes oppositional moves like “Beleg-Fordern” and “Details-
Einklagen,” which are often used in response to accusations.
Finally, Spiegel (1995: 185-186) lists “Nachweisforderungen” as
types of argumentative activities that are frequently used in
naturally-occurring disputes to blockade the progress of the ongoing
sequence, for instance by refusing to produce a conditionally
relevant response to a preceding first pair part.
While the demands for explanation in the preceding extracts (as
well as the phenomena discussed in the above-mentioned studies) are
used to oppose the prior speaker’s activity without making a
specific claim, demands for explanation may also be employed to
preface further turn components that offer an alternative position.
This is exemplified by the following four extracts:
example (7): Avenue
136 MOTHER Now you fix up nice for tonight.
> 137 OLGA Why? I've met him before.
138 MOTHER
In this segment from Avenue, Mother and Olga are arguing about
whether Olga has to change her clothes just because Mother’s new
boyfriend is having dinner with them. The sequence starts with
Mother issuing a directive, telling Olga to “fix up nice” for dinner
(line 136). However, instead of complying, Olga challenges her
mother’s request in the next turn. She begins her response with an
interrogative (“Why?”) that obliges Mother to provide a reason for
her demand. In contrast to the preceding examples, however, here
“Why?” is a preface to a further component in Olga’s turn, which
offers an alternative claim. Following the demand for explanation,
Olga issues an assertion which challenges the grounds for Mother’s
request: by saying “I’ve met him before” (line 137), she brings into
play one of the preconditions for valid requests for action, namely
that a speaker requesting an addressee to perform an action presumes
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that there is a need to perform the action (cf. Labov & Fanshel
1977: 78). By claiming that she has met Mother’s boyfriend before,
Olga rejects this assumption thereby putting off her mother’s
request. Thus, while she does not directly refuse to comply with
Mother’s directive, she argues with Mother’s claim by obliging her
to provide a reason for her request and proposing an alternative
claim that functions to challenge Mother’s directive. In response,
Mother provides the required reason for her request (“This night is
special” line 138) and then renews her prior directive, specifying
what she wants Olga to wear.
In the following extract from Neaptide, Joyce challenges her
daughter’s accusation by first requesting Claire to provide evidence
for her claim and subsequently producing an assertion, opposing her
daughter’s complaint:
example (8): Neaptide I,2
190 CLAIRE Why do you have to criticise me all the time?
> 191 JOYCE Me? Criticise? Just what do I criticise you
193 about?
194 (Enter JEAN behind JOYCE.)
195 CLAIRE Hi, Jean.
196 JOYCE Personal cleanliness is the last thing I'd
197 criticise you for - you can tell that by your
198 fingernails - spotless. ((...))
The sequence starts with Claire accusing her mother of frequently
criticising her (line 190). As noted earlier, by using the extreme
formulation “all the time,” she formulates Joyce’s behaviour as a
recurrent violation rather than a random occurrence and thereby
legitimises her accusation. In addition, as discussed above, by
means of the interrogative format with “Why” her utterance obliges
Joyce to offer an account for her offensive behaviour. However,
instead of providing the requested account, Joyce challenges her
daughter’s accusation in the next turn. She initiates her turn with
a partial repeat in the form of an interrogative (“Me? Criticise?”
line 191), which announces that opposition is going to follow and
conveys a particular affective reaction to what Claire has just
said. By prefacing her turn with a repetition of her daughter’s
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utterance, Joyce displays her incredulity at what Claire has just
said and portrays her action as inappropriate. In addition, the
opposition preface is immediately followed by an interrogative,
demanding Claire to provide evidence for her claim (“Just what do I
criticise you about?” lines 191-192). But, rather than awaiting
Claire’s response, Joyce immediately expands on her challenge to
Claire’s complaint by producing an assertion that functions to
counter her daughter’s claim (“Personal cleanliness is the last
thing I'd criticise you for” lines 196-197). Like “Why?” in the
extract above, here the demand for explanation “Just what do I
criticise you about?” is used to initiate a turn that challenges the
grounds of the opponent’s prior claim. Following the demand for
evidence, Joyce puts forward a counter-claim that construes Claire’s
accusation as unfounded.
Similarly, in the extract from Tell me below, the daughter’s
demand for explanation prefaces an alternative claim that disagrees
with Mother’s assertion:
example (9): Tell me
440 MOTHER Oh, my God.
441 DAUGHTER I'm sorry I told you.
442 MOTHER Oh, my God.
443 DAUGHTER Mom, it's not that bad.
444 MOTHER Not that bad!
445 DAUGHTER No, it's not that bad. I'm not the only
446 one. It happens. It happens to lots of
447 girls.
448 MOTHER Not to my daughter!
449 DAUGHTER Look, I'm no different than anyone else.
450 It could happen to me, and it did. And
451 anyway, it's nothing so terrible. I'm 21
452 years old.
453 MOTHER She says it's nothing so terrible!
454 DAUGHTER It’s not, Mom, not anymore.
455 MOTHER It's a terrible thing. In the eyes of God
456 it's a terrible thing, and what will the
457 neighbors say? Nothing you or any other
458 smart young person says is going to make it
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459 alright.
> 460 DAUGHTER How do you know how God looks at things?
461 Maybe God has grown up, too.
462 MOTHER What about your father? This is going to
463 kill him.
Prior to this exchange, the daughter has told her mother that she is
pregnant. When Mother expresses shock at the news, the daughter
claims that “it's not that bad” (line 443). In line 444, the mother
responds by repeating a part of her daughter’s preceding utterance
(“Not that bad!” line 444), presumably with a falling-rising
contour. As discussed above, the use of partial repetition with such
an intonation contour signals disagreement and conveys a particular
affective reaction (e.g. offence, surprise, or incredulity) to what
the other has just said, portraying it as ridiculous or
inappropriate. Hence, by repeating a part of her daughter’s prior
utterance in this a way, Mother displays that she does not share her
daughter’s opinion on the matter at hand while at the same time
expressing disbelief and/or shock at what she has just said. In
addition, the raised voice signals high involvement and aggravates
opposition.
In reaction to her mother’s challenge, the daughter re-asserts
her initial position: She repeats her prior utterance and prefaces
it with a disagreement token, which serves to affirm her argument:
“No, it's not that bad.” (line 445). In the remainder of her turn,
she offers further support for her view, claiming that she is “not
the only one” who got pregnant and that “It happens to a lot of
girls.” (line 446-447). In the following turn, her mother opposes
her again by exclaiming “Not to my daughter!” (line 448). While she
implicitly concedes that a lot of girls might unintentionally get
pregnant, she claims that the fact that her daughter got pregnant is
nevertheless unacceptable. The increase in volume (indicated by the
exclamation mark) indicates high involvement and serves to aggravate
opposition. The daughter responds with a counter-opposition. She
begins her turn with a counter-assertion, claiming that she is “no
different than anyone else” (line 449) and that consequently there
was a natural probability of her getting pregnant (“It could happen
to me, and it did.” line 450). She closes her turn by asserting that
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considering her age “it's nothing so terrible!” (line 451-452). In
the following turn, the mother challenges her daughter’s utterance
by employing the same strategy as in line 444. By producing a
partial repeat of her daughter’s prior talk with a falling-rising
contour (“She says it's nothing so terrible!” line 453) she
expresses disbelief at her daughter’s utterance, thereby construing
it as inappropriate, while simultaneously displaying her negative
attitude towards her daughter’s position. Moreover, by prefacing the
partial repeat with the verb phrase “She says,” in which she refers
to her daughter with a third person singular pronoun, Mother seems
to conjure up an imaginary audience to which she addresses her
utterance and with which she aligns against her daughter. By this
means, she is able to both challenge her daughter’s utterance and
distance herself from her daughter by portraying her as a person who
produces such incredible talk. In response to her mother’s repeated
challenge, the daughter again re-asserts her position by insisting
“It’s not, Mom, not anymore” (line 454). Apparently, the term of
endearment “Mom” as well as the qualifier “not anymore” serve to
mitigate opposition, and thus to de-escalate the dispute. However,
in line 455, Mother opposes her daughter again, claiming “In the
eyes of God it’s a terrible thing.” This is challenged by her
daughter in the subsequent turn with a demand for explanation. In
saying “How do you know how God looks at things?” (line 460), the
daughter questions her mother’s competence to make the assertion she
is making, requesting her to provide evidence for her claim.
However, instead of waiting for Mother to respond, immediately
following the demand for explanation the daughter adds a counter
statement (“Maybe God has grown up, too.” line 461) rejecting
Mother’s claim as unfounded. In the subsequent turn, rather than
defend her prior position, Mother changes the focus of the talk to
the issue of how her husband is going to take the news (lines 462-
463).
Like the daughter in the preceding fragment, in the extract
from Alto below, Florene uses a demand for explanation in the form
of “How do you know?” to preface an assertion that explicitly
opposes Wanda’s prior claim.
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example (10): Alto I,3
13 FLORENE ((...)) I hope I'm taking enough clothes. I
14 wonder if I'll need an evening dress.
15 WANDA (Uncovers her head.) You're not going to a
16 night club!
> 17 FLORENE How do you know? There's no telling what we'll
18 do.
19 WANDA (Sits up.) Why can't I come, Mama?
Prior to this fragment, Florene and her daughter have been arguing
about whether Wanda can accompany her mother on her visit to her
husband. The sequence starts with Florene wondering whether to take
an evening dress on the trip (lines 13-14). When Wanda asserts that
her parents will not be going to a night club (lines 15-16), Florene
challenges Wanda’s grounds for her assertion in the next turn. In
asking: “How do you know?” (line 17), Florene queries her daughter’s
justification for making the claim she is making and requires her to
offer proof of her assertion. But, instead of waiting for Wanda to
respond, immediately following the demand for explanation she adds a
counter-assertion (“There’s no telling what we’ll do.” lines 17-18)
which explicitly opposes Wanda’s claim. In reaction to her mother’s
challenge, rather than defend her prior claim, Wanda changes the
focus of talk, asking Florene why she cannot accompany her (line
19).62
As the preceding discussion has shown, disputants can build
opposition by utilising a specific second position resource. Demands
for explanation such as “What for?”, “Like what?”, “Why not?”, “How
do you know?” and so on may be employed to challenge the prior
contribution by questioning the grounds or competence for making the
claim in question. They can be used to preface further turn
components that offer a counter to the opponent’s prior activity,
for instance by arguing that the claim in question is unfounded.
Moreover, they can be employed to challenge the opponent’s prior
activity without putting forward an alternative position, simply by
querying the opponent’s reason for doing or saying what she did or
said. The crucial aspect of these freestanding demands for evidence
is that, apart from questioning the reason for the other’s prior
activity, they require the opponent to provide an explanation for
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the challenged activity, while enabling the speaker to argue without
offering an alternative position of her own. By forcing the prior
speaker to resume the floor and present a reason for her action in
the subsequent turn, demands for explanation that stand on their own
in a turn limit the opponent’s freedom of action. Hence,
freestanding demands for explanation represent attempts at
exercising discursive power at the structural level of interaction.
Furthermore, with regard to the interpersonal plane of
interaction, demands for explanation that stand on their own
threaten both the hearer’s positive and negative face. Firstly, they
present a threat to the addressee’s positive face wants by
questioning the foundation of her prior contribution. In addition,
they threaten the addressee’s negative face by impeding her freedom
of action, since they put the recipient in a position to provide a
reason or evidence for the action or claim in question. Therefore,
freestanding demands for explanation provide a conversational
resource available to speakers that may be exploited to exercise
discursive power over others at several levels of the dispute-in-
interaction. However, this does not rule out that addressees can
offer resistance to a speaker’s demand for explanation. As we have
seen, recipients can retaliate, for example, by way of disputing the
appropriateness of the demand for explanation.
These findings have implications for the study of naturally
occurring conflict talk in so far as they reveal underlying
knowledge about the workings of argumentative exchanges. As the
preceding analyses have shown, the participants in my data do not
take an unqualified “No” for an adequate response; nor do they
accept an unjustified demand as sufficient grounds for compliance or
an unsubstantiated claim as a passable (counter-)argument. Rather,
the frequent use of demands for explanation shows that disputants
are expected to give an accounting for negative responses, to
justify demands and to substantiate claims – and conversationalists
can demand reasons for disagreement demands and claims. This
reflects a conversational norm that Shantz (98: 288) has formulated
as follows: “When you disagree, refuse, or contradict, you don’t
just say ‘no’ – you provide a reason.” The mother-daughter disputes
portrayed in the plays under analysis thus constitute “genuine
arguments” (Piaget 1955) or “prototypical arguments” (Jackson &
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Jacobs 1980: 254; 1981: 120), in which the participants mutually
elicit and offer grounds for supporting or objecting to an utterance
in successive turns at talk.
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Power is the most persuasive rhetoric.
(Friedrich von Schiller)
Force is all-conquering, but its victories
are short-lived. (Abraham Lincoln) 
7.5 Threats
In the penultimate section, I examined the argumentative use of
directives. In the following, I will look at a related activity that
recurrently occurs in my data, which I will label “threat.”63 In
issuing a threat, a speaker attempts to get the addressee to do, or
refrain from doing, something, by indicating that she will perform a
future action to the detriment of the addressee if the addressee
fails to heed the threat.64
Prior studies of conflict talk have found similar oppositional
moves. Brenneis & Lein (1977: 51) describe argumentative statements
in children’s disputes, which constitute a “promise of personal harm
to the opponent, those attached to him, or in general” such as, for
example, “I’ll kill you,” or “I’m going to tell the teacher on you.”
In a study of black working class children’s disputes, M. H. Goodwin
(1982: 78) observes threats such as “Get off or I’ll hit you with ma
thing!”, or “You better hop off you high horse,” which may be used
“in attempting to step up one’s commitment to a command, or in
answering a prior argumentative action.” Corresponding moves also
occur in Apeltauer’s (1978: 98-105) corpus of disputes between adult
speakers.
Like all the oppositional moves I have examined so far, threats
can take various forms. One construction that is frequently used in
my data to package threats is conditional sentences involving an “if
– then” relation. For instance, in the following extract from ‘night
Mother, Jessie announces that she will kill herself on the spot, if
Mama insists on calling her brother, Dawson:
example (1): 'night Mother
269 MAMA (Stands up, moves toward the phone.) Dawson
270 will put a stop to this. Yes he will.
271 He'll take the gun away.
> 272 JESSIE If you call him, I'll just have to do it
273 before he gets here. Soon as you hang up
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274 the phone, I'll just walk in the bedroom
275 and lock the door.
Threats can also take the form of condensed conditional sentences.
For example, in the extract from Tell me below, Mother repeatedly
threatens to send her daughter to her room if she says one more
word.
example (2): Tell me
303 MOTHER I don't want to hear another word.
304 I've heard all I want to hear.
305 DAUGHTER Gee whiz!
306 MOTHER All I want to hear.
307 DAUGHTER But Mom...
> 308 MOTHER One more word and up to your room.
309 DAUGHTER But...
> 310 MOTHER Another word, and up you go.
Mother’s utterances in lines 308 and 310 carry the conversational
implicature (Grice 1989) that if the girl does not stop arguing, if
she utters “one more word,” then she will be sent to her room as a
punishment. In the local context of disagreement, the “x and y”
construction expresses a conditional relationship between two
actions.65
In the preceding examples, the speakers specify the sanction
they intend to impose on the addressee in case of non-compliance.66
By contrast, in the following extract from My mother, Margaret
threatens her daughter, who has just told her that she has had sex
for the first time, by identifying the circumstances that might
provoke her to punish Jackie, while leaving unsaid precisely what
this punishment will consist of. Her threat is formulated as a
subordinate clause, describing the condition of sanctions; the
independent clause, which specifies the ensuing result, is omitted.
example (3): My mother I,4
41 MARGARET You could have waited.
42 JACKIE Why?
43 MARGARET I had to.
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44 JACKIE That's it, isn't it?
45 (Gets up and goes to the house.)
> 46 MARGARET If this affects your A-levels!
Apart from an “if (not) – then” relation, threats can also involve
an either-or relationship. For instance, in the extract from Avenue
below, Mama threatens to turn her daughter adrift, stating that
either Olga submits and “changes her ways” or she will have to
suffer the consequences and move out and earn her living.
example (4): Avenue
421 MOTHER Something about your manner I never liked.
422 You better change your ways.
423 OLGA It's going to be hard for me to adjust to
> 425 MOTHER him. You better or else you can just get out
426 and get your own place. You go out and work
427 and learn what it is to get money.
Labov & Fanshel (1977: 79) argue that the addition “You better” to a
request for action - as in “You better not say that!” - is a
mitigating expression, which functions in the same way as “please.”
By contrast, my data suggests that in the context of disagreement
the expression “You better” at the beginning of an utterance
indicates that a threat (or a warning) is about to be produced.
In addition, threats can be formulated as declarative
statements, which explicitly assert that the speaker will bring
about an undesirable consequence should the addressee not change her
course of action. Consider, for instance, the following extract from
Raisin. After Beneatha has ignored her prior reproach, Mama
threatens to slap her if she continues to talk about God in a
disrespectful way:
example (5): Raisin I,1
128 BENEATHA I get sick of hearing about God.
129 MAMA Beneatha!
130 BENEATHA I mean it! I'm just tired of hearing about
131 God all the time. What has He got to do
132 with anything? Does He pay tuition?
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> 133 MAMA You 'bout to get your fresh little jaw
134 slapped!
Threats can also take the form of imperatives, which state the
action the speaker wants the addressee to perform (or refrain from
performing), implying that the speaker will punish the addressee
should she not comply. This is illustrated in the extract from
Avenue below.
example (6): Avenue
317 OLGA I never look in your drawers!
318 MOTHER If you did, you'd find nothing silly like
319 that.
320 OLGA I'd find something like jelly!
> 321 MOTHER Watch that tongue, you hear me! It's getting
322 lazy like you, sleeping all day and thinking
323 of dirty things to say to your own mother!
Although Mother does not explicitly state that she will impose a
sanction on Olga, the meta-communicative imperative “Watch that
tongue” and related expressions are partly formulaic and are
conventionally used and interpreted as threats.67
Moreover, threats can be realised through formulaic expressions
such as “You mind me,” which customarily count as indicators for
threatening, especially in the context of an argument.68 This format
is exemplified in the following sequence from Alto:
 example (7): Alto I,2
57 FLORENE Wanda, put your shoes on.
58 WANDA What for? What's so hot about this old lady?
59 FLORENE (Swatting at her legs as she goes to the door)
> 60 You mind me, Wanda!
Finally, threats may be realised through a meta-communicative
statement which states that the addressee is about to overstep the
mark and that the speaker is not willing to resume the argument,
thus initiating the termination of the sequence.69 In my data, these
meta-comments are typically preceded by a discourse marker,
indicating right at the beginning of the turn a break in the ongoing
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conversation.70 In addition, the interruptive placement of these
utterances displays the speaker’s negative emotional alignment
towards what has been said, and thereby stresses antagonism. The
combination of boundary marker, terminating move and interruptive
placement indicates that the speaker is not willing to put up with
continuing opposition and is about to lose her patience. Consider
the following two examples:
example (8): Raisin
17 MAMA If you use the Lord's name just one more
18 time—
19 BENEATHA (A bit of a whine.) Oh, Mama—
20 RUTH Fresh - just fresh as salt, this girl!
21 BENEATHA (Drily.) Well - if the salt loses its savor—
> 22 MAMA Now that will do. I just ain't going to have
23 you 'round here reciting the scriptures in
24 vain - you hear me?
example (9): Tell me
308 MOTHER One more word and up to your room.
309 DAUGHTER But ...
310 MOTHER Another word, and up you go.
311 DAUGHTER But Mom ...
> 312 MOTHER Alright, that's it. That is it. I've heard
313 enough. It might be a good idea, young lady,
314 if you went up to your room.
As the two preceding examples show, this format is typically used
after a previous threat has been defied and marks an escalation of
the dispute. This type of threat appears to act as a boundary
marker, signalling that in case of continuing opposition the speaker
will adopt stronger measures (e.g. resort to violence or to her
superior status) to enforce compliance.71
From a sequential standpoint, threats are first pair parts of
adjacency pairs and thus make specific second pair parts
conditionally relevant. Compliance or submission is the structurally
preferred response to threats, as it is to directives. However, as
threats not only demand that the addressee perform (or refrain from
performing) some activity but also signal that the speaker will
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penalise the recipient for resistance, threats are the class of
speech activity with the highest degree of obligingness (cf.
Apeltauer 1978: 99, 104).
It is not surprising then that threats are among the activities
Brown & Levinson (1987: 65-66) list as intrinsically face-
threatening acts. Like directives, they pose a severe threat to the
addressee’s negative face, as they are potentially harmful to the
autonomy of the listener. As mentioned above, apart from demanding
that the addressee do (or refrain from doing) something, threats
indicate that the speaker will instigate sanctions against the
hearer should she not comply. In so doing, they put considerable
pressure on the listener to act in accordance with the speaker’s
demands. Thus, threats act to ensure the recipient’s compliance or
conformity. Hence, by issuing a threat, a speaker directly
constrains the addressee’s freedom of action by trying to influence
her future actions. For this reason, threats are control manoeuvres,
or “social control acts,” i.e. “moves in which there is a clear
intention to influence the activities of the partner” (Ervin-Tripp
1982: 29).
In the following, I will look at the sequential placement of
this type oppositional move. As threats are attempts at terminating
the sequence at hand, my main focus will be on the sequence
preceding the threat to find out what kinds of activities are
conducive to the occurrence of threats. I will also examine the
sequences following threats, in order to delineate the relational
implications of this type of oppositional move.
As we have seen, in case of disagreement, the party disagreed
with has the option in the next turn of reasserting or reaffirming
her prior action. That is to say, an oppositional move following a
previous action can lead prior speaker to insist on her initial
position, and thus mark the beginning of a dispute. According to
Apeltauer (1978: 257-269) and Franke (1983: 1-4), in insisting, a
speaker attempts to enforce a prior claim against the opponent’s
resistance. This can be done either by simply repeating the initial
activity or by combining or replacing it with more aggravated
utterance formats or types of action, thereby increasing the degree
of bindingness of the original claim.72
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This is exactly what happens in the extract from Alto below.
Following Wanda’s refusal to comply with her initial directive,
Florene at first insists by issuing a more aggravated utterance
format(lines 56-57) and then further reinforces her claim with a
threat in reaction to Wanda’s continued opposition (line 61). As
Tsui (1994: 129) maintains, “Mothers often resort to threats when
they fail to get compliance from their children,” attempting to get
them to do something. Correspondingly, in his study of insisting
moves in family conversation, Franke (1983: 219) describes threats
as one class of third moves in coercing sequences. In his corpus,
they are typically produced following another’s refusal to comply
with a speaker’s initial directive, in order to get the addressee to
give up resistance and comply with the speaker’s demand.
example (10): Alto I,2
44 FLORENE (Looking out door.) Now I want you to
45 straighten up, Wanda. Somebody's coming to the
46 door. And she drives a convertible.
47 (ALTHEA LOCKWOOD enters porch area. She
48 is a pretty, dramatic woman in her late
49 twenties. She wears the apricot taffeta
50 dress described earlier by WANDA.
51 FLORENE hurriedly tries to tidy up things.)
52 WANDA (Keeps on writing.)
53 (ALTHEA knocks at their door.)
54 FLORENE (Calls.) Just a minute! Wanda, put your shoes
55 on.
56 WANDA What for? What's so hot about this old lady?
57 FLORENE (Swatting at her legs as she goes to the door)
> 58 You mind me, Wanda! (Opens door.) Hello, Miz
59 Lockwood. Come on in. I just finished your
60 ironing.
61 (WANDA’s jaw drops as she hears the name of
62 her music teacher and looks up to see her. She
66 would flee, but realizes it is too late. She
67 is scrambling to put on her shoes and
68 straighten her hair and clothes as ALTHEA
69 LOCKWOOD sweeps in.)
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As discussed above, at the beginning of this sequence, Florene
addresses a directive to Wanda, telling her to “straighten up”
(lines 44-45). As mentioned above, desire statements constitute a
relatively aggravated way of formulating directives and are
primarily directed downward to subordinates. Thus, by designing her
utterance in this way, Florene proposes a superior social status
vis-à-vis Wanda. Subsequently, however, she moderates the imposition
of her command, by producing a supporting assertion, which accounts
for her request (lines 45-46). But instead of performing the
requested action, Wanda ignores Florene’s directive and continues
her prior activity (line 52), thus signalling her refusal to comply
with her mother’s command.73 In reaction to Wanda’s disagreement-
implicative silence, Florene produces a more aggravated directive
format and reinforces her prior command by issuing an imperative:
“Wanda, put your shoes on.” (lines 54-55). But instead of complying,
in the subsequent turn, Wanda challenges her mother’s command. She
issues a demand for explanation, questioning the assumption
underlying Florene’s imperative that there is a need to perform the
requested action and demanding that Florene provide a reason for her
command (“What for? What’s so hot about this old lady?” line 56).
However, instead of giving the required explanation, Florene swats
at Wanda’s legs, exclaiming “You mind me, Wanda!” (line 58). Her
reaction construes Wanda’s prior activity as unacceptable. Moreover,
the formulaic “You mind me!” functions as a threat, indicating that
Florene is going to punish Wanda if she does not obey. Hence, it
represents an attempt to exercise power over her daughter by
constraining her freedom of action. In stepping up the obligation to
comply, Florene’s threat serves to escalate disagreement. In
addition, the increase in volume signals high emotional involvement
and thereby emphasises opposition. However, although it enables her
to counter her daughter’s demand for explanation, i.e. to resist her
control manoeuvre, in another sense, Florene’s threat proves
ineffective: Wanda does not perform the requested action until she
realises that the visitor whom her mother was announcing is her
music teacher. To sum up, in this example, the mother’s attempts at
regulating her daughter’s behaviour by means of increasingly
aggravated utterance formats are unsuccessful. This shows that even
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though threats (and directives) can be employed as a powerful
interactive resource, they are not necessarily always successful.
In the preceding example, Florene resorts to a threat after her
preceding directives have failed to get compliance. Conversely, in
the following extract from Tell me, the mother employs this
argumentative device to reinforce her prior rejections of her
daughter’s permission request. In the face of continuing appeals by
the child, she produces increasingly aggravated threats in an
attempt to bring the protracted request sequence to an end:
example (11) Tell me
285 DAUGHTER Can I?
286 MOTHER No.
287 DAUGHTER Why not?
288 MOTHER Because.
289 DAUGHTER Because why?
290 MOTHER Because you're only 12-years-old, that's
291 why.
292 DAUGHTER Everybody else can.
293 MOTHER Well, you're not everyone else.
294 DAUGHTER Nancy can. Nancy's mother said she could.
295 MOTHER Well, I'm not Nancy's mother. If Nancy's
296 mother thinks Nancy's old enough, that's her
297 business. But I'm your mother, and I say
298 "no."
299 DAUGHTER (Wheedling.) Mom?
300 MOTHER No.
301 DAUGHTER Ah, Mom...
302 MOTHER I don't want to hear another word. I've
303 heard all I want to hear.
304 DAUGHTER Gee whiz!
305 MOTHER All I want to hear.
306 DAUGHTER But Mom...
> 307 MOTHER One more word and up to your room.
308 DAUGHTER But...
> 309 MOTHER Another word, and up you go.
310 DAUGHTER But Mom...
> 311 MOTHER Alright, that's it. That is it. I've heard
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312 enough. It might be a good idea, young lady,
313 if you went up to your room.
314 DAUGHTER That's not fair.
315 MOTHER Right this minute.
316 DAUGHTER Why can't I? Just tell me why?
317 MOTHER Because I said so.
318 DAUGHTER But all the other kids can, why can't I?
319 MOTHER Up to your room, and stay there until you've
320 learned not to argue with your mother.
321 DAUGHTER Everybody but me! What am I supposed to do?
322 And next time they won't even ask me because
323 they'll think I can't go. Because I can
324 never go anywhere.
325 MOTHER Up to your room.
326 DAUGHTER But...
327 MOTHER Up to bed, young lady.
329 DAUGHTER But I...
330 MOTHER Not another word. March. ((end of scene))
The sequence starts with a permission request by the daughter (“Can
I?” line 285), which her Mother rejects in the next turn with an
outright refusal (“No.” line 286). As Wootton (1981c) has shown,
parents use unmitigated stated refusals in an attempt to rapidly
terminate request sequences after an initial request: By selecting a
strong rejection form, they signal to the child that further appeal
will be fruitless. Accordingly, such non-delayed refusals tend to
generate relatively short subsequent appeal sequences. As discussed
in detail above, in this example, the mother’s rejection is followed
by an extended disagreement sequence in which the child’s continuing
oppositional moves oblige the mother to offer support for her
initial rejection. When the mother justifies her refusal by pointing
to her daughter’s age (“Because you're only 12-years-old, that's
why” lines 290-291.), the daughter changes tack and issues a
counter-claim,74 asserting that all her friends have their parents’
permission to go: “Everybody else can.” (line 292). The ECF with the
universal pronoun “everybody” serves to both counter her mother’s
refusal and legitimise her original request. But Mother counters by
saying: “Well, you're not everyone else.” (line 293). As discussed
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above, the discourse marker “Well” signals right at the beginning of
her utterance that what is coming next will be a disagreement. In
addition, it indicates that, despite her daughter’s intervening
action, Mother has not changed her mind about letting her join her
friends, i.e. that the girl’s argument has failed. In fact, as
Wootton (1981c) has shown, “Well” typically precedes parent’s
responses to their children’s requests when those responses reject
rather than grant the requests. Moreover, following the disagreement
preface, Mother goes on to build her counter by exploiting her
daughter’s utterance. She picks up her daughter’s formulation
(changing “everybody” to “everyone”) and uses it for her own side,
by claiming that it does not apply to the issue at hand. As
described above, in so doing, she establishes a strong link at the
level of wording, while stressing disagreement at the level of
content.
After her ECF has been refuted, the daughter changes tack
again, and instead of using a universal pronoun names a specific
person who got permission to go to support her claim: “Nancy can.
Nancy's mother said she could.” (line 294). Again, Mother uses her
own words against her. Following the disagreement preface “Well,”
she goes on to invalidate the girl’s argument by pointing out that
she is “not Nancy's mother” nor does she share her wide views (lines
295-298). When the daughter still does not give in, she issues a
series of meta-communicative statements, explicitly stating her
unwillingness to continue the argument: “I don't want to hear
another word. I've heard all I want to hear.” (lines 302-303). As
mentioned above, such desire statements constitute highly aggravated
directive formats and are primarily directed downward to
subordinates. Thus, through the way in which Mother construes her
utterance, she again brings into play her superior status, which
authorises her to control her daughter’s behaviour.75 When her
daughter expresses her indignation at her reaction with the
expletive “Gee whiz!” (line 304), the mother repeats her previous
ban on speaking (“All I want to hear.” line 305). Instead of
complying, the girl insists on her request and starts to produce a
counter-claim (cf. below): “But Mom...” (line 306). Before she can
finish her turn, however, the mother cuts her off with a threat. She
reinforces her prior commands, explicitly stating that the girl will
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be sent to her room should she not comply: “One more word and up to
your room.” (line 307). When the daughter nonetheless initiates
another counter-claim (“But...” line 308), she cuts her off again
with a repetition (or, more precisely, a reformulation) of her
previous threat (“Another word, and up you go.” line 309). The
interruptive placement of her turns signals high emotional
involvement (presumably exasperation) and intensifies opposition.
The combination of threats and confrontational interruptions serves
to escalate the dispute. Thus, when the girl still continues
pleading (“But Mom...” line 310), the mother carries out her
previous threats and sends her to her room. She initiates her turn
with the discourse marker “Alright,” and immediately adds a series
of meta-communicative remarks: “Alright, this is it. That is it.
I've heard enough.” (lines 311-312).
As an argumentative move, her utterance achieves several
things. Firstly, as mentioned above, the particle “Alright” acts as
a boundary marker, indicating a break in the ongoing conversation.76
More precisely, it signals her reluctance to discuss the issue
further and indicates that further appeal is not worthwhile. This is
reinforced by the meta-communicative statements following the
prefatory expression, which explicitly state that she is not willing
to resume the argument. In addition, the interruptive placement of
her utterance displays her negative emotional alignment towards what
has been said, and thereby stresses antagonism. The combination of
the boundary marker “Alright” with meta-comments and interruptive
placement signals that Mother is at the end of her tether, and that
she is prepared to resort to violence should the daughter continue
her course of action. Therefore, her utterance conveys a threat.77
Subsequently, she employs an additional termination technique,
issuing a directive, telling her daughter to go to her room (“It
might be a good idea, young lady, if you went up to your room.”
lines 312-313). Although her utterance is formulated as a suggestion
rather than a command, there are several cues that indicate that it
imposes a strong obligation on the daughter to comply. For one
thing, rather than softening the impact of her demand with an
endearment term, Mother addresses her daughter with “young lady.”
While Dunkling (1990: 9) lists social titles (e.g. “Lady” + first
name, “Lady” + last name, “my lady,” etc.) as well as honorifics
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(e.g. “sir” or “madam”) as terms of address which speakers can use
to indicate their intention of being polite, today, such terms are
widely used ironically.78 In various languages, address terms like
“young lady” or “(mein) Fräulein” are conventionally employed in the
context of reprimanding children.79 Thus, by adding the mock
honorific “young lady” at the end of her turn, the mother evokes an
interactional frame that is characterised by an asymmetrical
relationship with her in superior position.80 For another thing, the
daughter’s response, “That’s not fair” (line 314), displays her
construal of her mother’s utterance as constituting a command rather
than a suggestion, whose force is grounded in the mother’s superior
status.
To recap, in this example, in the face of continuing
opposition, the mother sequentially moves toward increasingly
aggravated forms of utterance design: she initially issues some
unmitigated denials (lines 286, 300) and, subsequent to continuing
demands for explanation, counter-claims and appeals on the girl’s
part, she moves to more negative formats, namely aggravated
directives (lines 302-303, 305) and increasingly aggravated threats
(lines 307, 309, 311-312), in an attempt to terminate the extended
dispute sequence. She finally enforces her will based on her higher
social status. Following continuing opposition on the part of her
daughter, in line 319, the mother reinforces her preceding
directives by issuing a condensed imperative (“Up to your room”),
which demands compliance. Moreover, by formatting her activity in
this way, she assumes a position of authority, which allows her to
exert control over her daughter’s behaviour. In the second part of
her turn, she construes her daughter’s behaviour as inappropriate by
explicitly pulling rank and referring to her superior social status
(“and stay there until you've learned not to argue with your
mother”), thus trying to terminate the dispute sequence by drawing
on her authority. And indeed, following a few last attempts at
resistance (lines 321-329), the daughter finally complies.
As we have seen so far, one of the sequential positions in
which threats in my data occur is following refusal to comply with a
previous directive. Furthermore, speakers can use threats after
continuing appeals despite preceding rejections, to signal that ‘No’
means ‘No’ and thus terminate the sequence. As the following extract
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from Raisin shows, threats may also be employed after a preceding
reproach has been ignored or defied.
example (12) Raisin I,1
1 BENEATHA (Comes in, brushing her hair and looking up to
2 the ceiling, where the sound of a vacuum
3 cleaner has started up.) What could be so
4 dirty on that woman's rugs that she has to
5 vacuum them every single day?
6 RUTH I wish certain young women 'round here who I
7 could name would take inspiration about
8 certain rugs in a certain apartment I could
9 also mention.
10 BENEATHA (Shrugging.) How much cleaning can a house
11 need, for Christ's sakes.
12 MAMA (Not liking the Lord's name used thus.)
13 Bennie!
14 RUTH Just listen to her- just listen!
15 BENEATHA Oh, God!
> 16 MAMA If you use the Lord's name just one more time—
17 BENEATHA (A bit of a whine.) Oh, Mama—
18 RUTH Fresh - just fresh as salt, this girl!
19 BENEATHA (Drily.) Well - if the salt loses its savor—
> 20 MAMA Now that will do. I just ain't going to have
21 you 'round here reciting the scriptures in
22 vain - you hear me?
23 BENEATHA How did I manage to get on everybody's wrong
24 side by just walking into a room?
25 RUTH If you weren’t so fresh—
26 BENEATHA Ruth, I’m twenty years old.
27 MAMA What time you be home from school today?
28 BENEATHA Kind of late. (With enthusiasm.) Madeline is
29 going to start my guitar lessons today.
At the beginning of this sequence, Beneatha and her sister-in-law
Ruth are quarrelling about Beneatha’s attitude towards domestic
work. In lines 6-9, Ruth counters her sister-in-law’s prior
depreciative remark on the neighbour’s scrupulous cleanliness with
an assertion implying that Beneatha might show more involvement with
353
regard to the household chores. In the following turn, Beneatha
literally shrugs off Ruth’s implicit accusation with the rhetorical
question: “How much cleaning can a house need” (line 10), implying
that both Ruth and the neighbour are overacting. The expletive, “for
Christ's sakes,” at the end of her turn, signals high emotional
involvement and serves to reinforce opposition. In the subsequent
turn, Mama responds to her daughter’s blasphemy by exclaiming
“Bennie!” (line 13). As discussed above, the interjection of the
vocative signals a negative affective reaction (presumably shock) at
what Beneatha has just said and portrays her behaviour as
objectionable. It indicates that Mama disapproves of her daughter’s
verbal behaviour and, hence, functions as a reproach. In addition,
it appears to function as an admonition, signalling that she does
not wish to hear Beneatha use any more expletives.81 Thus, the
exclamation of the vocative is both a reaction to what was said and
a cautionary signal. When Ruth chimes in with her mother-in-law, and
issues a meta-communicative imperative, expressing disfavour against
Beneatha’s verbal behaviour (“Just listen to her- just listen!” line
14),82 Beneatha exclaims “Oh, God!” (line 15). The interjection of
the expletive with the prefatory expression “Oh” signals a negative
emotional alignment (e.g. exasperation) at her interlocutors’
reactions.83 Moreover, the increase in volume signals high
involvement and emphasises opposition.
In response to her daughter’s repeated cursing despite her
prior reproach, Mama issues a threat, implying that she will
discipline Beneatha if she does not change her course of action: “If
you use the Lord’s name one more time—” (line 16). Before she can
specify what measure she intends to adopt should Beneatha not
comply, however, Beneatha interrupts her, interjecting “Oh Mama—” in
a whining tone of voice (line 17). Similar to her prior turn, the
combination of the vocative with the discourse particle “Oh” indexes
a negative affective reaction at what Mama has just said and
presumably implies that she is overreacting. Before Mama can
respond, in line 18, Ruth steps in once more, issuing a negative
evaluation of her sister-in-law’s conduct: “Fresh - just fresh as
salt, this girl!” Self-repetition and the increase in volume
indicate high involvement and aggravate opposition. In the following
turn, Beneatha parries Ruth’s challenge by taking up a part of the
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formulaic expression in her utterance and using it for her own side.
She initiates her retort with the discourse particle “Well,”
indicating right at the beginning of her turn that disagreement is
going to follow. Following the disagreement preface, she builds the
rest of her utterance by picking up the term “salt” from the
idiomatic expression used by Ruth and incorporates it in her
counter: “Well - if the salt loses its savor—” (line 19). As
discussed above, by this means, a close link between the two
opposing utterances is established at the word level, while dissent
is stressed at the content level. In addition, by parrying the fixed
expression used by Ruth with a quote from the bible, Beneatha not
only ties her counter to the prior activity at the word level but
also at the level of formulaicity, as it were. Before she can
elaborate on her counter, however, she is cut off by her mother. In
line 20, Mama initiates her turn with the discourse marker “Now,”
followed by the meta-communicative statement: “that will do.” By
designing her utterance in this way, Mama accomplishes several
things. Firstly, the prefatory expression “Now” points to Beneatha’s
prior resistance to her mother’s repeated reproaches (cf. Aijmer
2002: 90; Schiffrin 1987: 245), thus highlighting opposition.
Moreover, the combination of “Now” with a meta-comment acts as a
boundary marker, indicating a break between the prior discourse and
what is going to follow.84 In other words, it signals right at the
beginning of her turn that she is not prepared to let Beneatha
pursue her course of action, and intends to put an end to it. It
acts as an “affective intensifier” (Aijmer 2002: 95), emphasising
Mama’s negative emotional alignment towards what has been said and
thereby stressing antagonism. Finally, the interruptive placement of
her utterance indexes high involvement and aggravates opposition.
Subsequently, Mama adds another meta-communicative remark,
explicitly stating that she is not willing to put up with her
daughter’s cursing any longer: “I just ain't going to have you
'round here reciting the scriptures in vain - you hear me?” (lines
20-22). Although she does not openly state that she is going to
punish Beneatha should she not acquiesce, her utterance conveys a
threat, as it signals that she is about to lose her temper and that
Beneatha had better submit. Mama terminates her turn with the meta-
communicative remark “you hear me.” The sequential placement of this
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meta-comment following a threat alongside the question mark suggests
that it is produced with rising intonation and an increase in
volume, signalling high emotional involvement and aggravating
opposition. Accordingly, the appended meta-communicative remark
serves to reinforce the preceding threat, and thus to ensure
compliance.85 In response to her mother’s fierce reaction, Beneatha
issues a meta-communicative question: “How did I manage to get on
everybody's wrong side by just walking into a room?” (lines 23-24).
By formulating her utterance as an interrogative, she seems to
request that her interlocutors account for their fervent responses.
At the same time, the juxtaposition of the extreme formulation
“everybody” with the qualifier “just” portrays the women as
overreacting. Following another dissent-turn sequence between
Beneatha and Ruth (lines 25-26), Mama changes the focus of the
conversation by asking Beneatha when she will be home from school
(line 27). In so doing, she lays the ground for the termination of
the dispute sequence. And indeed, in the next turn, Beneatha
provides the requested information (lines 28-29). By mutually
accomplishing a topic change and ceasing to produce oppositional
turns, the two women collaborate in bringing the argument to a close
– at least for a moment.
The closing sequence of this extract is a classic case of a
stand-off: a topic change occurs and the participants change the
speech activity and drop the conflict form (i.e. they cease to
produce opposition turns). If a dispute sequence dissipates in this
way, however, the conflict between the parties is not resolved. That
is to say, while the dispute ends on the structural level, on the
content level the conflicting parties have not reached agreement or
a compromise. Rather the difference is put on hold for the time
being, with the participants moving on to other activities, with the
conflict “waiting in the wings.” Hence, it is to be expected that
once the contentious issue comes up again, the initial argument
sequence will be resumed.86
This is exactly what happens during the following course of the
conversation. Following a short downtime, the controversial subject
resurfaces, and the two women start opposing each other again. Again
Mama issues a threat after Beneatha has countered her prior
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reproaches. This time, however, the dispute sequence ends with Mama
adopting physical measures to enforce her will.
example (13) Raisin I,1
120 BENEATHA I am going to be a doctor and everybody
121 around here better understand that!
122 MAMA (Kindly.) 'Course you going to be a doctor,
123 honey, God willing.
124 BENEATHA (Drily.) God hasn't got a thing to do with
125 it.
126 MAMA Beneatha - that just wasn't necessary.
127 BENEATHA Well - neither is God. I get sick of hearing
128 about God.
129 MAMA Beneatha!
130 BENEATHA I mean it! I'm just tired of hearing about
131 God all the time. What has He got to do with
132 anything? Does He pay tuition?
> 133 MAMA You 'bout to get your fresh little jaw
134 slapped!
135 RUTH That's just what she needs, all right!
136 BENEATHA Why? Why can't I say what I want to around
137 here, like everybody else?
138 MAMA It don't sound nice for a young girl to say
139 things like that - you wasn't brought up
140 that way.
141 BENEATHA Mama, you don't understand. It's all a
142 matter of ideas, and God is just one idea I
143 don't accept. It's not important. I am not
144 going out and be immoral or commit crimes
145 because I don't believe in God. I don't
146 even think about it. It's just that I get
147 tired of Him getting credit for all the
148 things the human race achieves through its
149 own stubborn effort. There simply is no
150 blasted God - there is only man and it is
151 he who makes miracles!
152 MAMA (Absorbs this speech, studies her daughter
153 and rises slowly and crosses to BENEATHA
154 and slaps her powerfully across the face.
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155 After, there is only silence and the
156 daughter drops her eyes from her mother's
157 face, and MAMA is very tall before her.)
158 Now - you say after me, in my mother's
159 house there is still God.
160 BENETHA (There is a long pause and BENEATHA stares
161 at the floor wordlessly.)
162 MAMA (Repeats the phrase with precision and cool
163 emotion.) In my mother's house there is
164 still God.
165 BENEATHA In my mother's house there is still God.
166 MAMA There are some ideas we ain't going to have
167 in this house. Not as long as I am the head
168 of this family.
169 BENEATHA Yes, ma'am.
170 MAMA (Walks out of the room.)
At line 120, Beneatha announces that she wants to become a doctor.
In the following turn, Mama expresses her approval of her daughter’s
plans, emphasising her positive alignment by adding the endearment
term “honey” to her utterance. When she closes her turn with the
formulaic expression “God willing” (line 123), however, Beneatha
opposes her, asserting that God does not play a part in her
professional development (lines 124-125). In response, Mama issues a
meta-communicative comment, explicitly formulating Beneatha’s prior
utterance as inappropriate (line 126). Her utterance expresses her
disapproval of her daughter’s behaviour and thus acts as a reproach.
However, Beneatha insists on her position and counter-opposes Mama
by saying: “Well, neither is God” (line 127).
As mentioned above, the prefatory expression “Well” indicates
that opposition is going to follow, i.e. that in spite of her
mother’s intervening action Beneatha has not changed her mind about
the issue at hand. Moreover, following the disagreement preface,
Beneatha constructs her counter by making use of her mother’s
preceding utterance: She uses the structural skeleton of Mama’s
statement (i.e. X is not necessary) as a basis for her counter-claim
(i.e. neither is Y), thus exploiting Mama’s utterance to back up her
own position, namely that God is irrelevant. By this means, she
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establishes a strong link at the structural level, while emphasising
opposition at the level of content. Subsequently, she reinforces her
negative stance by stating: “I get sick of hearing about God” (lines
127-128). Mama reacts to her daughter’s irreverence by exclaiming
“Bennie!” (line 14). As discussed above, the interjection of the
vocative signals a negative affective reaction at what Beneatha has
just said and portrays her behaviour as highly objectionable. It
indicates that Mama disapproves of her daughter’s verbal behaviour
and, hence, acts as a reproach. In addition, the exclamation
functions as an admonition, signalling that Mama does not wish
Beneatha to continue her course of action. Thus, it is both a
reaction to what was said and a cautionary signal. But, despite the
forewarning, Beneatha insists on her position. She begins her turn
by exclaiming “I mean it!” (line 130), and immediately adds a
slightly modified version of her prior statement: “I'm just tired of
hearing about God all the time.” The increase in volume as well as
the ECF with “all the time” signals high emotional involvement and
emphasises opposition. Subsequently, she issues a series of
rhetorical questions, daring her mother to disprove her (lines 131-
12).
In reaction to Beneatha’s continuing disregard of her
reproaches, Mama issues a threat, stating that Beneatha is about to
overstep the mark and will have to suffer physical consequences for
pursuing her line of arguing: “You 'bout to get your fresh little
jaw slapped!” (lines 133-134). Here, too, the increase in volume
indicates high emotional involvement and aggravates opposition. At
line 136, Beneatha challenges her mother’s threat, demanding that
she account for her restrictive behaviour (“Why? Why can't I say
what I want to around here, like everybody else?”). Self-repetition
as well as the extreme formulation “everybody else” signal high
emotional involvement and reinforce her demand. And in fact, in the
following turn, Mama provides the requested explanation. However,
when she asserts that Beneatha’s parlance is not appropriate for a
“young girl” (lines 138-140), Beneatha discards her argument with a
challenge to her competence on the topic under discussion: “Mama,
you don’t understand.” (line 141).87 In the remainder of her turn,
she expands on her opposition explaining her stance on the subject
of God’s existence. Towards the end of her extended turn,
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aggravation is signalled by the use of the expletive “blasted” (line
150) and an increase in volume. Mama reacts with physical violence:
She carries out her preceding threat and slaps her daughter in the
face. Then she adds a meta-communicative imperative commanding
Beneatha to repeat her words and acknowledge God’s existence: “Now -
you say after me, in my mother’s house there is still God.” (lines
158-159). After an initial disagreement-implicative silence, Mama
insists on her demand and repeats her prior imperative, and,
eventually, Beneatha complies (lines 163-164). Subsequently, Mama
issues a summarising statement, in which she explicitly points to
her superior status as “the head of this family” (line 169), which
authorises her to determine which views are acceptable and which are
not to legitimise her behaviour. Beneatha responds with “Yes, ma’am”
(line 169). By adding a honorific after the agreement token, she not
only confirms her mother’s prior assertion but also her definition
of the relationship. As a result, the closing sequence of the
episode resembles exchanges that are typical of master-servant
interaction.88
In this spate of talk, both women can be shown to orient to
contextual features of the talk (i.e. the mother-daughter
relationship) thus mutually (re-)producing an asymmetrical power
relationships in the local, situated context of their talk. By
uttering reproaches and threats in an attempt to regulate her
daughter’s verbal behaviour, the mother assumes a position of
authority vis-à-vis her daughter. This is repeatedly challenged by
the daughter and the whole sequence consists in a negotiation of
this power relationship with Mother enforcing her will in the end
(by resorting to physical force and pulling rank). Thus, the dispute
represents a relationship-negotiation forum, in and through which
the women both achieve and negotiate their standing of the moment
vis-à-vis one another.
As the preceding examples have shown, threats provide a
conversational resource that disputants can utilise to insist on a
prior activity or position. For instance, they can be used to step
up one’s commitment to a previous command following refusal to
comply, to reinforce a preceding rejection of a request after
continued appeal, and to add force to a prior reproach after it has
been ignored or defied. In the following extract from ‘night Mother,
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Jessie employs a threat to reinforce her objection to Mama’s
intention of calling her brother Dawson:
example (14): ‘night Mother
262 MAMA Well, I'm calling Dawson right now. We'll see
263 what he has to say about this little stunt.
264 JESSIE Dawson doesn't have any more to do with this.
265 MAMA He's your brother.
266 JESSIE And that's all.
267 MAMA (Stands up, moves toward the phone.) Dawson
268 will put a stop to this. Yes he will. He'll
269 take the gun away.
> 270 JESSIE If you call him, I'll just have to do it
271 before he gets here. Soon as you hang up the
272 phone, I'll just walk in the bedroom and lock
273 the door.
274 MAMA You will not! This is crazy talk, Jessie!
275 JESSIE Dawson will get here just in time to help you
276 clean up. Go ahead, call him. Then call the
277 police. Then call the funeral home. Then call
278 Loretta and see if she'll do your nails.
279 MAMA (Goes directly to the telephone and starts to
280 dial,
281 JESSIE but Jessie is fast, coming up behind her and
282 taking the receiver out of her hand, putting
283 it back down. Jessie, firm and quiet.) I said
284 no. This is private. Dawson is not invited.
285 MAMA Just me.
Prior to this exchange, Jessie has revealed to Mama that she intends
to kill herself that night. After various unsuccessful attempts at
dissuading her daughter from her plan to commit suicide, Mama takes
a new approach and decides to call on her son, Dawson, to help her
bring Jessie to terms. The sequence starts with Mama announcing that
she is going to call Jessie’s brother to inform him about his
sister’s suicidal intentions (lines 262-263). Her use of the
dismissive formulation “little stunt” in reference to Jessie’s
behaviour indicates that Mama does not take her seriously. In the
following turn, Jessie opposes her with a counter-assertion,
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claiming that her brother has got nothing to do with her decision
(line 264). In line 265, Mama counter-opposes her by arguing that
Dawson is her brother. By referring to their blood relationship,
Mama implies that Jessie’s intention to commit suicide obviously
also concerns her brother. However, Jessie rejects her objection
simply by saying “And that’s all” (line 266). While she does not
deny her mother’s claim that Dawson is her brother, she disputes the
assumption expressed in Mama’s utterance that their relationship
necessarily implies that her decision to kill herself concerns him.
But Mama does not give in. She insists on calling her son, claiming
that he is going to hinder Jessie from committing suicide by taking
the gun away from her (lines 267-269). After her preceding attempts
at preventing Mama from calling her brother have failed, Jessie ups
the ante and issues a threat, claiming that she will kill herself at
once, if Mama does not comply (lines 270-273). Her threat differs
from the instances in the preceding examples in that the physical
consequences of the action she threatens to perform (i.e. suicide)
will be suffered by Jessie herself, but the emotional consequences
will be suffered by Mama. In line 274, Mama opposes her with an
outright contradiction (cf. below), negating Jessie’s prior
utterance: “You will not!” Immediately thereafter, she issues an
unfavourable comment (cf. below), categorising Jessie’s prior
utterance as “crazy talk.” In so doing, she construes her daughter’s
activity as unacceptable and thus refuses to comply with her demand
to abstain from calling her son. The increase in volume aggravates
opposition and turns up the emotional heat of the argument. In the
following turn, Jessie reinforces her preceding threat. By
illustrating the consequences Mama would have to face if she
insisted on calling her son, Jessie implies that she is going to
carry out her threat if Mama does not back down (lines 275-278).
When Mama nonetheless walks to the phone and starts to dial Dawson’s
number (lines 279-280), Jessie resorts to physical means to enforce
her demand, taking the receiver out of Mama’s hand and putting it
back down again. She issues a meta-communicative statement,
reformulating her oppositional stance: “I said no.” (lines 283-284),
and subsequently adds a series of assertions, reaffirming her
initial position: “This is private. Dawson is not invited.” (line
284). Mama responds by simply saying: “Just me.” (line 285). In
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formulating the gist of Jessie’s prior talk, she signals her
submission, and thus makes way for the termination of the dispute
sequence.
In the examples I have looked at so far, the speakers use
threats to reassert their previous claims and enforce compliance. By
contrast, in the following extracts from Avenue, Mother repeatedly
issues threats in reaction to her daughter’s offensive utterances:
example (15) Avenue
144 MOTHER (Starts applying eyebrow pencil and eyeliner.)
145 Look, do what I say. I do you favors. Who
146 bought you that damn piano? You think it costs
147 peanuts? It took me more than seven months to
148 get the money for that.
149 OLGA Yes, I know. Didn't you ever get tired and
150 sore from all that work?
151 MOTHER (Stops activity and looks angrily at her.)
152 I'm thinking of two ways to take what you just
> 153 said. And if it's the bad way I'm thinking to
154 be right, you're gonna get a bar of soap in
155 your mouth.
156 OLGA Can't I wear what I have on?
157 MOTHER (Looking at her, slowly.) All right.
Prior to this sequence, Mother and Olga have been arguing about
whether Olga has to change her clothes just because Mother’s new
boyfriend is supposed to be having dinner with them. After Olga has
repeatedly refused to comply with her mother’s request to dress up,
Mother renews her prior imperatives (“Look, do what I say.” line
145) and adds a supportive assertion providing reasons for her claim
(lines 145-148). Aggravation is signalled by her use of rhetorical
opposing questions and the expletive “damn.”89 Olga responds with a
partial agreement (“Yes, I know.” line 149), and then follows with a
negative interrogative: “Didn't you ever get tired and sore from all
that work?” (lines 149-150). As Heritage (2002) points out in his
study of news interviews, such types of interrogative are usually
not understood as questioning in the information seeking sense, but
are commonly treated as accomplishing assertions of opinion.90 More
precisely, negative interrogatives involve propositions that
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evaluate the interlocutor’s conduct in critical, negative or
problematic terms. He shows that recipients of negative
interrogatives usually respond to them in ways that deny their
status as questions in search of information. They often do this by
formulating their responses as in (dis)agreement with the speaker’s
negative interrogative. Furthermore, as noted earlier, Heritage
maintains that negative interrogatives are built to prefer “yes”
answers. By means of reversing the polarity of the interrogative,
they convey the speaker’s predisposition to a positive response; in
Bolinger’s (1957: 99) terms, they display a strong conduciveness for
a positive response. In other words, they can be employed to frame
negative or critical propositions while still inviting the
recipient’s assent. The combination of the two actions – asserting a
critical position, and following it with a highly conducive negative
interrogative – contributes to the argumentative character of this
type of activity. Negative interrogatives present a potentially
powerful opposition strategy. Since they are built to favour a
response from the interlocutor which is in agreement with the
negative evaluation of criticism (i.e. which clashes with the
interlocutor’s own prior statements or actions), these challenges
ultimately invite refutation. In fact, Mother’s response displays
her understanding of Olga’s activity as a potential offence rather
than a request for information. The “angry” look on her face (line
151) indicates that she is annoyed about what Olga has just said.
She begins her response with a meta-communicative statement,
remarking on the ambiguity of her daughter’s utterance: “I'm
thinking of two ways to take what you just said.” (lines 152-153).
Subsequently, she issues a conditional, threatening to punish Olga
if the content of her questions turns out to be hostile: “And if
it's the bad way I'm thinking to be right, you're gonna get a bar of
soap in your mouth.” (lines 153-155).
It is noteworthy that Mother’s threat differs from the previous
instances in the previous examples. While it is an expression of her
intention to inflict punishment on Olga, in contrast to the examples
of threats discussed so far, here the potentially impending sanction
is not dependent on whether Olga performs (or refrains from
performing) an action in the future, but on whether she has (or has
not) performed an action in the past. For this reason, rather than
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constituting an attempt at enforcing compliance with a prior claim,
Mother’s utterance functions as a reprimand, which construes Olga’s
previous activity as a potential offence and thus makes some kind of
remedial action (i.e. an account or apology) conditionally relevant.
In the following turn, Olga offers a permission request: “Can't I
wear what I have on?” (line 156). As an argumentative device, this
utterance achieves several things. As mentioned above, requests for
permission imply an asymmetrical relationship and are generally
addressed to social superiors.91 Accordingly, by using this format,
Olga expresses deference, thereby acknowledging that her mother is
in a superior position. Also, she succeeds in moving the topic of
talk away from the question of whether she intended to insult her
mother and therefore deserves to be punished towards the original
issue of her attire, and thus manages to deescalate the dispute
(while getting around offering an account or apology for her
presumed offence). Finally, as pointed out above, by formulating her
request as a reversed polarity negative interrogative she projects a
positive response and makes way for the termination of the conflict
sequence. And indeed, Mother collaborates in closing the argument
(or at least this round) by responding with an agreement: “All
right.” (line 157). Her acceptance of Olga’s concession offering
dismantles the oppositional discourse structure and so marks the
(temporary) termination of the conflict episode.
A few lines later in the same conversation, the women are at
each other again. Once more, Mother counters an affront to her
decency by means of a threat, this time in the form of a meta-
communicative imperative:
example (16): Avenue
306 OLGA (Putting papers inside notebook.) How dare
you
307 read my personal property?
308 MOTHER (Angry, scared, she has gone too far.) I
309 wanted to see what you write. Sometimes I see
310 you writing, so I wanted to see what it was.
311 Just a bunch of junk. You'd think you'd write
312 something good, like them confession stuff.
313 I read a story the other day about this girl,
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314 just out of high school and she got mixed up
315 with a bunch of college men and-
316 OLGA I never look in your drawers!
317 MOTHER If you did, you'd find nothing silly like
318 that.
319 OLGA I'd find something like jelly!
> 320 MOTHER Watch that tongue, you hear me! It's getting
321 lazy like you, sleeping all day and thinking
322 of dirty things to say to your own mother!
323 (Goes to table, gets cigarette out
pocketbook,
324 lights it, sits.)
325 OLGA You don’t love that pig, do you?
In this spate of talk, Olga and Mother are arguing about Mother
having read Olga’s personal notes without permission. After having
recaptured her papers, Olga challenges her mother with an accusatory
question: “How dare you read my personal property?” (lines 306-307).
As discussed above, her interrogative is designed to express outrage
rather than to elicit information, and also obliges Mother to
account for her transgression in the subsequent turn. And indeed, in
line 309, Mother provides the required explanation: “I wanted to see
what you write.” In the remainder of her turn, however, she changes
her course of action and issues an offence, disqualifying Olga’s
writing as “Just a bunch of junk” (line 311). Subsequently, she
starts to report a story she recently read (lines 313-315),
presumably in an attempt to shift the topic away from her having
nosed through her daughter’s personal writings. However, Olga
interrupts her description with another (implicit) accusation, thus
shifting the focus of the talk back to the issue of Mother’s
transgression. In asserting that she does not pry into her mother’s
things (“I never look in your drawers!” line 316) she implies that
Mother’s behaviour is unacceptable. The confrontational character of
her utterance is intensified by the extreme formulation “never” and
the volume increase, signalling high emotional involvement. In the
following turn, Mother dismisses Olga’s argument as irrelevant,
asserting that it does not matter whether she looks in her mother’s
drawers, since even if she did, she would “find nothing silly like
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that” (lines 317-318). Olga in turn counter-opposes her by claiming
that she would “find something like jelly” (line 319), implying that
jelly would be worse than silly. The sequential context of her
utterance suggests that with the expression “something like jelly”
she is referring to lubricant, and is thus insinuating that her
mother frequently has sexual intercourse. In so doing, as in the
previous example, Olga seems to suggest that Mother is a trollop.
Mother responds by issuing a threat in the form of a meta-
communicative imperative: “Watch that tongue, you hear me!” (line
320). Her reaction indicates that she interprets Olga’s prior
utterance as offensive and inappropriate. Although it does not
explicitly specify what sanction she would apply should Olga not
heed the threat, the formulaic expression indicates that Mother will
punish her if she does not comply. 92 It thus presents an attempt at
influencing Olga’s future behaviour, i.e. a control manoeuvre.
Moreover, by virtue of the imperative construction, Mother’s threat
evokes a power differential with herself in superior position, which
authorises her to censure her daughter’s behaviour (Labov & Fanshel
1977: 78).93 Directly following the threat, Mother adds the meta-
communicative remark “you hear me.” As discussed above, the
sequential placement of the meta-comment in combination with the
punctuation suggests that it is produced with rising intonation and
an increase in volume, signalling high emotional involvement and
thus aggravating opposition. Hence, the appended meta-communicative
remark serves to reinforce the preceding threat, and thus ensure
compliance. Mother’s interpretation of Olga’s prior utterance as an
insult becomes even more obvious in the remainder of her turn, in
which she refers to it as “thinking of dirty things to say to your
own mother!” (line 321-322). In this part of her turn, she indicates
that Olga’s conduct clashes with some preset standard of mother-
daughter interaction. In addition, she explicitly draws on her
social role as a mother to back up her position, presupposing that
by virtue of her superior status she has the right to censure her
daughter’s verbal behaviour. In sum, by employing a meta-
communicative imperative and calling on external contextual factors
to support her claim, Mother invokes a power differential with her
in superior position. In the following turn, rather than accounting
or apologising for what she said, Olga asks “You don’t love that
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pig, do you?” (line 325). In so doing, similar to the preceding
extract, she manages to move the topic of talk away from her own
prior utterance to her mother’s feelings for her current boyfriend,
and thus to deescalate the dispute for a moment while avoiding
submitting.
Some time later in the same conversation, however, the women
are arguing again, and Olga launches another attack at her mother’s
reputability. This time, she does not even make the effort of
camouflaging her insult, and the dispute quickly escalates when she
repeats her offence despite Mother’s threat.
example (17) Avenue
511 OLGA You know you're always feeling sorry for
512 everyone, but who's sorry for you?
513 MOTHER I wanted it. You hear me!
514 OLGA (Crosses C. to prepare for "slap.") Too cheap
515 to buy protection!
> 516 MOTHER Take that back, don't let me hear you say that
517 again.
518 OLGA Too cheap to buy pro-tec-tion!
519 MOTHER (Rises, crosses U. The slap is deliberate, a
520 punishment, not in anger.) You deserve worse
521 than that. (Sits.)
Mother has just told Olga that she has informed her boyfriend about
her pregnancy and expects him to propose to her that night. Olga
responds by saying: “You know you're always feeling sorry for
everyone, but who's sorry for you?” (lines 511-512). Her utterance
indicates that she does not share Mother’s conviction that her lover
is going to propose to her. Moreover, the second part of her turn
(“but who's sorry for you?”) implies that Mother is pitiable, and
thus calls into question Mother’s assessment of the situation. In
the subsequent turn, Mother strongly rejects this assumption,
claiming that she wanted to become pregnant: “I wanted it” (line
513). The following reinforcement: “You hear me!” and the raised
voice signal high emotional involvement and aggravate opposition. In
the subsequent turn, Olga opposes her with another insult. In
arguing that Mother is “Too cheap to buy protection!” (lines 514-
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515), she portrays her as both contemptible and stupid. This
argumentative strategy enables her to simultaneously degrade Mother
and reject the position expressed in her prior turn. In addition,
the volume increase signals high emotional involvement and
intensifies opposition. Moreover, as the stage directions indicate
(line 514), Olga obviously expects Mother to “slap” her. This
signals that she is well aware of the offensive character of her
utterance. In the subsequent turn, Mother issues a threat: “Take
that back, don't let me hear you say that again” (lines 516-517).
Her response construes Olga’s prior activity as an offence and
implies that she will be punished if she does not apologise or if
she continues her line of action. Furthermore, as discussed above,
in formulating her utterance as an imperative, Mother assumes a
position of authority, which allows her to regulate her daughter’s
verbal behaviour. Therefore, her utterance constitutes an attempt at
exercising control over Olga’s behaviour. However, despite her
mother’s threat, Olga insists on her position and produces a
verbatim repetition of her prior utterance: “Too cheap to buy pro-
tec-tion!” (line 518). The (presumably) provocative tone of voice
along with the raised voice and the chant-like way in which she
speaks reinforce the confrontational character of her utterance and
thus contribute to the escalation of the dispute. In reaction to her
daughter’s repeated insults, Mother carries out her previous threat
and slaps her. The “deliberate” (line 520) use of physical violence
as a means of opposition marks both the culmination and the end of
the dispute. Following the punishment of her daughter, Mother issues
an assertion, claiming that Olga “deserves worse than that” (line
521). By this means, she formulates Olga’s prior utterance as
offensive and legitimises her forceful reaction.
In the extract from My mother below, Margaret issues a threat
not so much to reinforce her own prior activity or to counter her
daughter’s argumentative action as to assert her position of
authority vis-à-vis Jackie.
example (18) My mother I,4
41 MARGARET You could have waited.
42 JACKIE Why?
43 MARGARET I had to.
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44 JACKIE That's it, isn't it? (Gets up and goes to the
45 house.)
> 46 MARGARET If this affects your A-levels!
47 JACKIE (Stops). What?
48 MARGARET (Silence. MARGARET has nothing to say.)
49 JACKIE I'm going to make a phone call. Phone Neil.
50 (Goes into the house.)
Just prior to this extract, Jackie has told her mother, Margaret,
that she has had sex for the first time. In line 41, Margaret
responds to her daughter’s revelation by saying, “You could have
waited,” presumably in a reproachful tone of voice, signalling
disapproval. In the following turn, Jackie issues a demand for
explanation (“Why?” line 42), requesting that her mother provide a
reason for her claim, as discussed above. In line 43, Margaret
offers the requested account, answering “I had to.” However, rather
than accepting her mother’s explanation, Jackie’s response reveals
that she does not consider Margaret’s reference to her own past a
legitimate reason to disapprove of her own behaviour: “That's it,
isn't it?” (line 44). Her rejection of Margaret’s argument becomes
even more obvious through her non-verbal reaction. Her abrupt
withdrawal from the conversation signals a negative affective
reaction (presumably anger) at what Margaret has said and aggravates
opposition. In addition, the fact the she simply leaves the
conversation without further explanation constitutes a challenge to
her mother. In reaction, Margaret issues a threat, implying that she
will discipline Jackie should her behaviour affect her school
performance: “If this affects your A-levels!” (line 46). In so
doing, she assumes a position of power that allows her both to
censure her daughter’s behaviour and to enforce her position by
adopting coercive measures. But instead of expressing submission, in
the following turn, Jackie dares her to finish her utterance, i.e.
to specify the sanction she would impose (“What?” line 47). By this
means, she challenges not only Margaret’s power to threaten her but
also the definition of the relationship she has put forward. This
shows that a speaker who performs a threat “has to rely on the
addressee’s fear of the undesirable consequence that he will bring
about to get the addressee to comply” (Tsui 1994: 129; cf. also Katz
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1977: 190). Margaret’s ensuing silence (line 48) signals that she
has nothing to counter with and thus constitutes a back-down.
Following her mother’s back-down implicative silence, Jessie
announces that she is going to call her boy friend. In issuing an
assertion rather than a permission request, she once again asserts
her autonomy.  This spate of talk again clearly demonstrates that
power is not something fixed a speaker possesses and can put to use
ad libidum but a dynamic relationship that has to be constantly
negotiated in the local context of the interaction. The mother’s
criticism and threat are challenged by the daughter as she
negotiates her social status with respect to her mother. This shows
once more that participants actively negotiate their relationship in
and through conflict talk, and that disputes are a profitable site
for the analysis of the ways in which participants jointly (re-)
produce and transform social order and their status vis-à-vis one
another.
To wrap up, in this section, I have examined the argumentative
use of threats, that is, conversational moves by which a speaker
attempts to get the addressee to do, or refrain from doing,
something, by indicating that she will perform a future action to
the detriment of the addressee if the addressee fails to heed the
threat. We have seen that threats can take various forms. They can
be realised through conditionals, declarative statements,
imperatives and formulaic expressions, as well as through meta-
communicative statements. Moreover, they can explicitly state that
the speaker intends to impose a sanction on the addressee should she
not heed the threat, or they can imply that non-compliance will
result in undesirable consequences. As the preceding analysis has
shown, threats simultaneously operate at various levels of
interaction. On the structural plane, they make specific second pair
parts conditionally relevant. As in the case of directives,
compliance or submission is the structurally preferred response
following threats. Furthermore, in projecting compliance – and thus
the end of mutual opposition - threats also have a high sequence-
terminating potential. Therefore, threats provide a conversational
resource that disputants may employ to determine both the opponent’s
subsequent activity and the subsequent course of the interaction. In
my corpus, threats are used to reinforce a prior claim following (1)
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refusal to comply with a prior directive; (2) continued appeals
despite previous rejections; (3) defiant behaviour in response to a
reproach; and (4) sustained opposition subsequent to objections.
They are also used in direct reaction to prior argumentative
actions, for instance, insults. In sum, threats have both a
prospective function (determining the opponent’s subsequent action)
and a retrospective function (challenging the opponent’s preceding
activity). At the interpersonal level of interaction, threats are
intrinsically face-threatening acts in the sense of Brown & Levinson
(1987). More precisely, they pose a severe threat to the addressee’s
negative face, as they are potentially harmful to her autonomy.
Threats not only demand that the addressee perform (or refrain from
performing) some activity but also indicate that the speaker will
instigate sanctions against her should she not comply, and in so
doing put considerable pressure on the addressee to act in
accordance with the speaker’s demands. For this reason, threats are
control manoeuvres, i.e. attempts at exercising power over the
interlocutor’s activities, since they potentially limit the
addressee’s freedom of action. With the exception of examples (1)
and (14), in which Jessie threatens to kill herself on the spot if
Mama insists on calling her brother, the threats in my data are
exclusively uttered by the mother. Moreover, they occur mainly in
those dyads in which the daughter is not yet of age and/or still
lives at home, and which are, as a result, characterised by an
asymmetrical relationship between the speakers based on emotional as
well as material dependence. In uttering a threat, the mother draws
on this underlying power differential (which enables her to bring
about undesirable consequence for the daughter) to enforce
compliance, thereby asserting her authority.94 This does not mean,
however, that daughters are incapable of offering resistance to
their mother’s threats. As we have seen, apart from challenging the
appropriateness or fairness of a prior threat and/or demanding that
the mother provide a justification for employing a coercive measure,
they can also counter a threat by calling into question the mother’s
power to threaten them. Consequently, a valid threat presumes that
the speaker has the (social, physical, mental, etc.) power as well
as the determination to enforce compliance. That is to say, a
speaker who performs a threat has to rely on the addressee’s fear of
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the sanctions announced in the threat and on the addressee’s
assumption that the speaker is both able and willing to realise
these sanctions. In addition, the preceding discussion evidences
(once more) that power is not a static social category but a dynamic
relationship that is constantly negotiated in and through talk-in-
interaction. It also shows that the dynamics of power is most
obvious in the open clash of control manoeuvres and resistance in
verbal conflict sequences. It demonstrates that participants
actively negotiate their relationship in and through conflict talk,
and, by the same token, that dispute represents a fruitful site for
the analysis of the ways in which participants jointly (re-)
construct and transform social order and their status with respect
to one another. The escalating quality of threats, potentially
leading up to violent non-verbal moves, contributes to the
characteristic affective and confrontational key of these disputes
sequences and distinguishes them from such types of conflict
management as negotiation, discussion and argumentation. Van Eemeren
et al. (1993: 28) claim that a “critical discussion,” i.e. a
normative model of ideal resolution-oriented argumentative
discourse, does not contain threats. According to them, threats are
unsuited to the resolution of disagreement, since a disagreement
cannot be resolved through strategies that end a discussion without
mutual consent. In my data, clearly, the interactional goal is not
conflict resolution. Instead the participants can be seen to
actively design their turns so as to aggravate opposition and
escalate the dispute at hand. That is to say, in the plays under
analysis, mother-daughter dispute is portrayed as an interaction- or
process-centred activity rather than a resolution-oriented activity.
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7.6 Relevance challenges
Another method by which speakers can challenge the opponent’s prior
activity is by questioning whether what the opponent has said is
actually relevant to the matter at hand. This can be done through
the use of what I will call “relevance challenges.” Relevance
challenges are a class of utterances which oppose the prior
speaker’s claim on the grounds of its relevance to the matter in
question. They tend to be produced without delay, immediately
following the opponent’s preceding utterance. Relevance challenges
vary widely in form. Some examples begin with the discourse marker
“So,” others are prefaced by phrases such as “I don’t care,” and “I
know.”
In producing a relevance challenge, a speaker asserts that the
previous utterance is not relevant to the dispute at hand.
Accordingly, relevance challenges present a threat to the
addressee’s positive face in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987:
66). In addition, claiming that the other’s statement is irrelevant
conveys a specific view of what is being argued about and what
constitutes an allowable contribution to that argument. In this
sense, relevance challenges are meta-argumentative acts that comment
on the opponent’s communicative activity in relation to the ongoing
dispute.95 Moreover, by questioning the relevance of an opponent’s
remark, speakers attempt to exert control over the content of the
ongoing dispute, i.e. to exercise a degree of discursive power.
Instances of this argumentative device are illustrated in the
following examples.
Prior to the extract from Avenue below, Mother and Olga have
been arguing about Mother’s new relationship.
example (1): Avenue
337 MOTHER He thinks you're a strange one. He says he
338 saw you on the street calling after a stray
339 dog that was running away from you. He said
340 he saw you walking and your goddam shadow
341 looked so funny.
342 OLGA (Turns on the radio and switches it fast
343 to different channels.)
344 MOTHER Hey, you're gonna break that radio, switching
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345 it fast like that. Someday I just might break
346 that radio myself. Don't want nothing in this
347 house reminding me of that bastard father of
348 yours. Now what was I saying? Oh. About your
349 shadow. I finished that, didn't I? Oh, he
350 says you're too quiet. You need someone to
351 liven you up.
352 OLGA I saw him livening some woman up on liquor
353 when I passed him on the street.
> 354 MOTHER So, men are men, whiskey and women go
355 together.
The sequence starts with Mother shifting the topic of talk to her
boyfriend’s opinion of Olga (lines 337-341). Her unmitigated report
of his denigrating remarks about Olga conveys both his and her own
disapproving view of her daughter. Her utterance creates an image of
Mother conspiring with her lover against Olga, talking about her in
a way that reduces her to an object of mockery. Moreover, the use of
the expletive “goddam” intensifies the deprecation. As a reaction,
Olga turns on the radio, thus signalling her withdrawal from the
conversation (lines 342-343). However, her action is opposed by
Mother, who claims that she is going to break the radio (lines 344-
345). Following this brief side sequence, in the remainder of her
turn, Mother returns to the original subject of her talk, namely her
lover’s demeaning comments on Olga (lines 348-351). This time, Olga
opposes her, claiming that she saw her boyfriend with another woman
(lines 352-353). She builds her counter by incorporating in her
formulation the phrase “to liven you up” from Mother’s preceding
utterance. As discussed above, the use of contrastive mirroring
permits her to establish a close link to her mother’s utterance at
the word level, while emphasising dissent on the content level of
interaction. In line 354, Mother responds with “So, men are men,
whiskey and women go together.”
“So” is a preface to a further component in Mother‘s turn,
which offers a counter to Olga’s claim. Following “So,” Mother
produces a series of clichés (“men are men, whiskey and women go
together.”), which construe her boyfriend’s conduct as standard male
behaviour, and thereby discards Olga’s assertion as irrelevant. In
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other words, Mother uses “So” to begin a turn involving a reason why
she considers Olga’s claim to be of no consequence for the ongoing
dispute.
In the following extract from Alto, Wanda and her mother are
arguing about whether they should get on the bus to San Antonio to
meet Wanda’s father there.
example (2): Alto II, 3
89 WANDA I'm getting you ready. (She tries to dress
90 FLORENE)
91 FLORENE I said we can't go.
92 WANDA He's meeting our bus in San Antonio.
93 FLORENE We won't be on it, Wanda.
94 WANDA It's what we've been waiting for. He wants us
95 to.
> 96 FLORENE I don't care what he wants! That's not enough
97 of a reason.
The sequence starts with Wanda trying to help her mother get dressed
(lines 89-90). When Florene insists that they cannot go (line 91),
Wanda counters her, asserting that her father will be expecting them
to be on the bus (line 92). Once more, her mother opposes her,
maintaining that they “won’t be on it” (line 93). When Wanda again
objects, arguing that her father wants them to go and meet him
(lines 94-95), Florene challenges her claim by saying: “I don't care
what he wants! That's not enough of a reason.” (lines 96-97).
Like “So” in the preceding extract, here the preface “I don’t
care” is used to initiate a turn conveying the grounds on which the
speaker dismisses the opponent’s prior claim as irrelevant to the
ongoing dispute. In the remainder of her turn, Florene offers a
reason why she considers Wanda’s argument to be of no consequence
for the discussion at hand: “That's not enough of a reason.” (lines
96-97).
To sum up so far, in the examples above, relevance challenges
such as “So” or “I don’t care” are used to deny the importance of
the other’s preceding action, arguing that it is irrelevant to the
discussion at hand. By contrast, another type of relevance challenge
denies the validity of what the other has just said by arguing that
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what the opponent is offering in her utterance is not newsworthy.96
Such moves can be realised by terms such as “I know” or “What’s new
about that?”
In the fragment below, Joyce informs Claire that she consulted
a solicitor about her daughter’s problems (line 33). When Claire
challenges her, claiming that she already has a solicitor (line 37),
Joyce dismisses her objection by arguing that she already knew what
her daughter has just told her: “I know that, don't I?” (line 37).
example (3): Neaptide II,3
33 JOYCE I saw a solicitor about you.
34 CLAIRE What for? To charge me with slander?
35 (A look from JOYCE is enough to make CLAIRE say:)
36 But Mum, I already have a solicitor.
> 37 JOYCE I know that, don't I? This one specialised in
38 custody, you should have got one who knew all
49 about it in the first place.
By responding with “I know,” Joyce disputes the relevance of
Claire’s claim by declaring that the information she is offering in
her utterance is not newsworthy. In the remainder of her turn, she
provides an explanation of why she considers the fact that Claire
already has a solicitor irrelevant (lines 37-40).
In the extract from Avenue below, Mother also challenges the
relevance of her daughter’s objection by calling its newsworthiness
into question:
example (4): Avenue
231 MOTHER Hey, one day I bought a piece of gum, the kind
232 that has the fortune in it and what do you
233 think it said?
234 OLGA (Shrugs and turns away.)
235 MOTHER Guess, go on, take a guess.
236 OLGA (Shrugs again.)
237 MOTHER I'll give you a hint. You'd like what it said,
238 Olga. (Silence, then looking directly into her
239 eyes, she says the big revelation.) It said
240 every dog has its day.
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241 OLGA (Stares at her.)
242 MOTHER Isn't that a good fortune?
243 OLGA If you're a dog it is.
244 MOTHER (Frustrated by Olga again.) They don't mean it
245 like that! It's just a saying, like birds of a
246 feather flock together. They don't mean birds,
247 they mean people. I mean figure it out, anyone
248 can, except you. First of all, why would they
249 write fortunes for birds and dogs, they ain't
250 human.
251 OLGA (Impatient.) Just what is your point?
252 MOTHER My day is coming. I mean it has to according to
253 my fortune.
254 OLGA But what if somebody else got the fortune? It
255 would be theirs.
256 MOTHER Yeah, cause they bought the gum. So what's new
> 257 about that?
259 OLGA (Disgusted; weary.) Never mind.
In the extract from Avenue below, Mother tells Olga that she bought
a fortune cookie, which said “every dog has its day” (lines 231-
240). When Olga does not express any enthusiasm about her mother’s
“big revelation” and simply “stares at her” without saying anything
(line 241), Mother produces a negative interrogative: “Isn't that a
good fortune?” (line 242). As Heritage (2002) has pointed out in a
study of news interviews, such types of interrogatives are built to
prefer ‘yes’ answers. By means of reversing the polarity of the
interrogative, they convey the speaker’s predisposition to a
positive response; in Bolinger’s (1957: 99) terms, they display a
strong “conduciveness” for a positive response. That is to say, by
formulating her turn as a reversed polarity negative interrogative
Mother projects a ‘yes’ from Olga.
However, instead of providing the “questioner-preferred” (Sacks
1992, vol. 2: 414) agreement, Olga expresses her scepticism about
the applicability of the saying to human beings (line 243). In
reaction to her daughter’s objection, Mother produces an extensive
turn, defending her position by pointing to the figurative meaning
of the saying (lines 244-250). Olga responds by saying: “Just what
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is your point?” (line 251). With this argumentative move, she
questions the relevance of Mother’s prior utterance to the matter at
hand and at the same time requires her to account for the importance
of her remark in the next turn. Her “impatient” tone of voice
intensifies the oppositional character of her utterance. In the next
turn, Mother provides the required explanation, summarising the
upshot of her utterance by saying “My day is coming. I mean it has
to according to my fortune.” (lines 252-253). In reaction, Olga
opposes her again, arguing that the fact that Mother got this
particular fortune is pure coincidence (lines 254-255). In the
subsequent turn, while she concedes that Olga is right (“Yeah, cause
they bought the gum.” line 256), Mother disputes the relevance of
Olga’s claim by arguing that what she said is not newsworthy (“So
what's new about that?” lines 256-257), and, thus, beside the point.
To recapitulate so far, as the preceding discussion has shown,
relevance challenges such as “So” or “I don’t care,” can be used to
argue for the irrelevance of the opponent’s prior contribution, when
their claim cannot be disputed. They can be used to initiate turns
offering reasons why the speaker considers the other’s preceding
statement to be of no consequence. In addition, relevance challenges
can be employed to deny the importance of what the opponent has just
said by arguing that it is not newsworthy, i.e. that she has
presented something the speaker already knew. Such moves can be
realised by phrases such as “I know” or “What's new about that?”,
which are extremely defying.
In her study of children’s arguments, M. H. Goodwin (1990) has
found that preadolescent children frequently use a similar
argumentative strategy, which she terms “disclaimer” and defines as
“an action that denies the relevance of a prior action rather than
disagreeing with it” (153, original emphasis). Similar phenomena
have also been observed in disputes between adults. For instance,
Muntigl & Turnbull (1998) describe “irrelevancy claims,” i.e. “a
type of disagreement by which a speaker asserts that the previous
claim is not relevant to the discussion at hand” (229).
Correspondingly, Kotthoff (1993a) states that aggravation in
disputes can be signalled by repeated tries to deny the relevance of
the interlocutor’s utterance for the discussed issue, and Spranz-
Fogasy (2002) notes that in argumentative stretches of talk,
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disputants frequently deny the relevance of interlocutors’ prior
contributions to the ongoing discussion.
While the relevance challenges in the examples above (as well
as the instances discussed by Goodwin and Muntigl & Turnbull)
contain reasons why the speaker considers the opponent’s prior claim
to be of no consequence, relevance challenges also oppose the prior
argument’s validity without making clear precisely on what grounds
its relevance is being challenged. Such moves may function purely as
second position moves (as described above) by which the opponent is
required to expand on or account for the challenged claim. This is
exemplified by the following extracts from Avenue.
Prior to the exchange below, Olga and Mother were having an
argument about Mother’s new boyfriend. The sequence starts with
Mother attempting to “make peace” with Olga by promising her that
she can take piano lessons after she has got married. In line 458,
Olga responds by saying “So”:
example (5): Avenue
455 MOTHER (Trying to make peace.) After the marriage,
456 there'll be some money for you to take piano
457 lessons.
> 458 OLGA So.
459 MOTHER You'd like that, wouldn't you?
460 OLGA If I took lessons, I might become too great.
As an argumentative move, Olga’s “So.” accomplishes two things:
Firstly, it challenges the relevance of Mother’s previous utterance
within the ongoing talk. Secondly, because it stands alone as a
complete turn, it requires Mother to resume the floor and account
for the relevance of her remark – which she does in the next turn
(line 459).97 This floor-returning property is an important
argumentative feature of the freestanding “So.” By challenging the
relevance of Mother’s utterance and obliging her to account for the
validity of what she has said, Olga successfully manages to impose
her view of what counts as an appropriate contribution to the
ongoing talk and to control her mother’s subsequent activity. Thus,
“So.” represents a powerful argumentative resource that disputants
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can effectively employ to exert control over the other’s next
action, i.e. to exercise discursive power.
As we have seen, in the cases above, “So” prefaces and other
relevance challenges are used to deny the importance or relevance of
the opponent’s prior claim, without disputing its truth. Immediately
following these prefaces, second speakers themselves go on to
provide grounds for the unimportance or irrelevance of the other’s
contribution. By contrast, the freestanding “So.” used by Olga in
preceding example sets up a different relationship between the
participants in which it is the first speaker rather than the second
who should, in a next turn, account for the validity of what she has
said. Consequently, when “So” stands on its own in a turn, it
challenges the opponent’s activity in both a more extensive and a
more confrontational sense than when it is used to preface some
following turn component because it enables the speaker to
simultaneously discard the other’s prior claim as irrelevant and
oblige her to provide an explanation for her remark in the
subsequent turn.
To sum up the discussion so far, since it forces the prior
speaker to resume the floor and offer an account for her claim, thus
limiting her freedom of action, the freestanding “So” represents a
control manoeuvre, i.e. an attempt at exercising discursive power at
the structural level of interaction. Moreover, with regard to the
interpersonal plane of interaction, relevance challenges that stand
on their own represent face-threatening acts that threaten both the
hearer’s positive and negative face. Firstly, they threaten the
addressee’s positive face wants by questioning the relevance of her
prior contribution. In addition, they present a threat to the
addressee’s negative face by impeding her freedom of action, since
they put the recipient in a position to account for the activity in
question. Therefore, freestanding relevance challenges provide an
argumentative resource available to speakers that may be exploited
to exercise interactional power over others at the micro-level of
interaction by constraining their freedom of action.
As we have seen, relevance challenges represent a powerful
discursive resource by which disputants can put opponents on the
defensive about what represents an appropriate contribution to the
ongoing argument. However, as the following two examples illustrate,
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they may themselves be challenged by the recipient in the subsequent
turn. In the extract from Avenue below, Olga’s “So.” is counter-
opposed by Mother in the following turn:
example (6): Avenue
572 OLGA My head hurts. I have a headache.
573 MOTHER Get rid of it.
574 OLGA (Finished setting table.) Leave me alone
575 already.
576 MOTHER I feel sorry for you.
> 577 OLGA (Goes back to high-riser.) So.
578 MOTHER So? Take that nasty word back. I don't like
579 it. It sounds sassy. And whatever you say to
580 me better be nice. You see, I read my
581 horoscope and nobody is supposed to say
582 anything bad about me, including using little
583 words.
The sequence starts with Olga complaining of a headache (line 572).
Rather than expressing commiseration with her daughter, for
instance, by comforting her or offering to get her an aspirin,
Mother tells her to “get rid of it” (line 573). As a reaction to her
mother’s unsympathetic response, Olga tells her to leave her alone
(574-575). When Mother says that she feels sorry for her (line 576),
Olga responds just by saying “So.” (line 577). By this means, she is
able to challenge the validity of Mother’s assertion, while at the
same time obliging her to resume the floor and account for the
relevance of her remark. In contrast to the preceding extract,
however, in this sequence, Mother responds to Olga’s relevance
challenge with a counter-challenge (lines 578-583). She begins her
turn by repeating Olga’s prior utterance (“So?”), producing it with
falling-rising intonation. As discussed above, (partial) repetition
of the interlocutor’s prior talk is frequently used as a preface to
begin oppositional turns. It announces right at the beginning of the
turn that disagreement is going to follow and conveys a particular
affective reaction to what the other has just said. By prefacing her
turn with a repetition of her daughter’s utterance, Mother displays
her indignation at Olga’s response, and thus portrays her activity
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as inappropriate and offensive. Moreover, the repeat is directly
followed by further “meta-communicative” talk, i.e. “talk about ways
of talking” (Tannen 2001: 9), which explicitly opposes what Olga has
said: immediately following the opposition preface, Mother produces
an unmitigated meta-communicative directive, which focuses on Olga’s
verbal behaviour, demanding Olga to “take back” what she said. In
addition, she explicitly comments on the offensive character of
Olga’s utterance by referring to it as “nasty” and claiming that “It
sounds sassy” (line 579). Finally, she demands Olga to change her
verbal behaviour and be polite (“And whatever you say to me better
be nice.” lines 579-580) rather than offending her by using “little
words” (line 583).
Similarly, in the extract from My sister below, Madame Danzard
counter-opposes her daughter’s relevance challenge rather than
accounting for the importance of her own prior claim:
example (7): My sister 9
127 MADAME DANZARD Have you turned up your three cards yet?
128 ISABELLE Not yet.
129 (She sneaks a card into her lap.)
130 MADAME DANZARD Well, I absolutely refuse to turn—
131 Isabelle! You cheated. I can't believe
132 my eyes.
133 ISABELLE I did not.
134 MADAME DANZARD You did. You moved that jack of hearts
135 onto the queen of diamonds.
> 136 ISABELLE And—?
137 MADAME DANZARD What do you mean - And? You know you
138 can't move red onto red. Move it back.
Madame Danzard and her daughter Isabelle are playing cards. In line
131, Madame Danzard accuses Isabelle of cheating. When Isabelle
rejects her mother’s blame (line 133), Madame Danzard insists on her
claim (“You did.”), and subsequently elaborates on her complaint by
offering a detailed description of Isabelle’s violation (lines 134-
135). In the following turn, Isabelle responds simply by saying
“And-?” (line 136). By means of this opposition strategy, she
disputes the relevance of her mother’s claim and simultaneously
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requires her to account for the importance of her remark in the next
turn. However, rather than producing a defence for her own claim,
Madame Danzard opposes Isabelle’s activity with a counter-challenge.
She initiates her response with a return question: “What do you mean
– And?” (line 137). While this might be heard as an innocuous
request for clarification initiating repair on Isabelle’s prior
utterance, Madame Danzard’s turn displays a number of features that
rule out such an interpretation. For instance, as Goodwin (1990:
147) has pointed out, speakers can produce an aggravated opposition
preface by preceding a partial repeat (cf. above) with a question
word such as “Who” or “What.” In the example above, Madame Danzard
employs a similar strategy: By repeating Isabelle’s prior utterance
(“And?”) and preceding this repeat with “What do you mean,” she
indicates right at the beginning of her turn that opposition is
going to follow. Moreover, as I noted earlier, repetition of the
talk that is being opposed allows the speaker to display a certain
affective reaction to what the other has just said. By beginning her
turn with a repetition of her daughter’s utterance, Madame Danzard
signals her irritation at Isabelle’s response, thereby portraying
her activity as inappropriate. In addition, the disagreement preface
is directly followed by a turn component that explicitly opposes
Isabelle’s action: Subsequent to the repeat, Madame Danzard produces
an assertion in support of her prior claim. By referring to the
rules of the card game and the fact that Isabelle is familiar with
them (“You know you can't move red onto red.” lines 137-138), she
legitimises her initial complaint and at the same time undermines
Isabelle’s preceding relevance challenge. This is followed by a
directive, with which she commands Isabelle to remedy her failure by
moving the card back (line 138).
To conclude, as the preceding discussion has shown, disputants
can build opposition by utilising a specific second position
resource. Relevance challenges such as “So,” “I don’t care,” “I
know” or “What's new about that?” may be employed to argue for the
irrelevance of the opponent’s prior contribution, when her claim
cannot be disputed. They can be used to initiate turns offering
reasons why the speaker considers what the opponent has just said to
be of no consequence, for instance, by arguing that it is not
newsworthy. Thus, relevance challenges represent a discursive
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resource by which disputants can put opponents on the defensive
about what constitutes an allowable contribution to the ongoing
dispute. Claiming that the other’s statement is irrelevant to the
matter at hand conveys a specific view of what is being argued about
and what counts as an acceptable contribution to that argument.
Hence, by challenging the relevance of an opponent’s remark,
speakers attempt to exert control over the content of the ongoing
dispute, i.e. to exercise a degree of discursive power. In other
words, relevance challenges provide a powerful argumentative
resource that can be effectively employed by disputants to take
control of the content level of the ongoing interaction. In
addition, relevance challenges such as “Just what is your point?”,
“So.” or “And?” may oppose the prior argument’s validity without
making explicit precisely on what grounds its relevance is being
challenged. The important characteristic of these argumentative
moves is that, in addition to questioning the validity of the
other’s prior claim, they require the opponent to defend their
claim, while enabling the speaker to argue without putting forward
an alternative view of their own. By forcing the prior speaker to
resume the floor and offer an account for their remark in the
subsequent turn, relevance challenges that stand on their own in a
turn limit the opponent’s freedom of action. Hence, freestanding
relevance challenges represent attempts at exercising discursive
power at the structural level of interaction. Furthermore, with
regard to the interpersonal plane of interaction, relevance
challenges that stand on their own represent face-threatening acts
that threaten both the hearer’s positive and negative face. Firstly,
they threaten the addressee’s positive face wants by questioning the
relevance of her prior contribution. In addition, they present a
threat to the addressee’s negative face by impeding her freedom of
action, since they put the recipient in a position to account for
the activity in question. Therefore, freestanding relevance
challenges provide a conversational resource that speakers have at
their disposal to exercise interactional power over others at
various levels of the dispute-in-interaction. This does not mean,
however, that recipients are incapable of offering resistance to an
opponent’s relevance challenge. As we have seen, disputants can
counter-oppose the prior speaker’s relevance challenge, for
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instance, by means of question repeats, which contest the activity’s
appropriateness or legitimacy.
These findings show that the relevance of conversational
contributions apparently plays an important part in the
accomplishment of arguments and can thus become the focus of
oppositional moves.
In the preceding sections, I have proposed a view of dispute as
a joint, co-constructed interactional product. That is to say,
participants cooperate in creating the (inter)activity of arguing.
In fact, although they are clearly engaged in oppositional talk, the
disputants in my data noticeably orient to the expectation to act in
accordance with Grice’s Cooperative Principle:98
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged. (1975: 45; cf. also
Grice 1989).
According to Grice, hearers will assume (within limits) that
speakers are acting in accordance with the Cooperative Principle,
and speakers will expect that hearers will make this assumption.
Taken by Grice to be a prerequisite for any form of rational, joint
interaction, the Cooperative Principle encompasses certain values
(i.e. sincerity, efficiency, relevance, and clarity) that give rise
to the Conversional Maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relation and Manner
(Grice 1989: 26-27). These maxims require that participants try to
make their contributions be true, efficient, relevant and clear; and
speakers can bee seen to orient to the expectation of sincerity,
informativeness, relevance and clarity in conflict talk just as in
friendly conversation. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the
relevance of conversational contributions obviously plays a vital
role in the accomplishment of disputes and can therefore become the
target of oppositional moves. In other words, any utterance must
have a point; otherwise its validity may be challenged.
Correspondingly, van Eemeren et al. (1993: 7-11) maintain that in an
ideal form of argumentative discourse Grice’s Conversational Maxim
of Relevance has to be acted upon: Contributions to “critical
discussions” must be relevant to the purpose of the interaction,
i.e. the resolution of disagreement. Similarly, Spranz-Fogasy (2002)
386
lists “significance” to the (purpose of the) interaction as a basic
requirement of contributions to argumentative discourse, which can
be disputed or claimed.
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It is not necessary to understand things in order to
argue about them.
(Caron de Beaumarchais)
7.7 Competence challenges
Another way in which the disputants in my data oppose the
interlocutor’s prior activity is by questioning her competence or
status. This can be done by means of an argumentative strategy that
I will call ‘competence challenge.’ Competence challenges are a
class of oppositional moves that call into question not simply (an
aspect of) the prior talk but the competence or status of the party
who produced that talk. More precisely, the person presenting an
argument is attacked instead of the argument itself. Speakers can
deny the opponent’s competence or status by referring to personal
qualities such as, for instance, age, profession, social role,
mental stability, etc.
Studies of naturally occurring arguments have observed similar
phenomena. For instance, Spiegel (1995: 202) lists “incompetence
claims” (“Inkompetenzerklärungen”) as a type of argumentative moves
in everyday arguments. Likewise Spranz-Fogasy (2002) remarks that
“denying competence” (“Kompetenz absprechen”) is a frequent activity
in conflict talk both in institutional and everyday contexts.
However, neither discusses concrete examples of this argumentative
strategy.
Competence adds force to arguments, whereas lack of competence
undermines them (cf. Spranz-Fogasy 2002). Therefore, by disputing an
opponent’s competence a speaker simultaneously challenges the
position put forward by the addressee in the prior activity, or even
in the whole exchange. Hence, competence challenges provide a
powerful argumentative resource that can be effectively employed to
challenge the opponent both on the interpersonal and the content
level of interaction. Competence challenges are thus classical
arguments ad hominem, i.e. attacks against the person. An ad hominem
is typically intended to undermine an argument or position that a
person endorses by challenging the arguer in some way (instead of
dealing with the person’s point).99 Competence challenges thus
initiate a change from the content level to the interpersonal level
of the interaction.
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Challenges to competence present a threat to the addressee’s
positive face in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987), since they
indicate that the speaker has a negative evaluation of some aspect
of the addressee’s personal characteristics. Consequently, following
a competence challenge, the recipient must either back down, and
lose face or prepare a defence against the other’s attack. By virtue
of limiting the addressee’s freedom of action, competence challenges
constitute control manoeuvres, i.e. attempts at exercising
discursive power in the local context of the interaction.
In addition, claiming that the other is incompetent to argue
conveys a specific view of which characteristics and skills mark a
competent disputant. In this sense, similar to relevance challenges,
competence challenges are meta-argumentative acts. But while the
former comment on the opponent’s communicative activity in relation
to the dispute in interaction, the latter evaluate the opponent’s
competence as a participant in the ongoing argument. Thus,
competence challenges represent a discursive resource that
disputants can exploit to put opponents on the defensive about what
might be called their ‘disputing competence.’
In my data, competence challenges are produced directly
following the opponent’s preceding utterance or subsequent to other
oppositional activities. They typically have the syntactic form of
declarative statements containing phrases such as “You don't know,”
“You don't understand,” or “You have no idea.” Instances of this
argumentative device and possible counter strategies are illustrated
in the following fragments.
In the extract from Home below, Olivia opposes her daughter’s
prior accusation by challenging her competence to make the claim she
is making:
example (1): Home
283 MARY JANE That's all you care about, isn't it? What
284 the neighbors think and where the neighbors
285 are moving to. This is my second chance. I
286 don't know where I'm gonna go now. You're
287 turning my life upside down.
> 288 OLIVIA You don't have any idea what it means to
289 have your life turned upside down.
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290 MARY JANE That's ridiculous. That's so utterly
291 ridiculous.
Prior to this fragment, Olivia and her daughter Mary Jane were
having a fierce argument about who is responsible for the failure of
Mary Jane’s marriage. The sequence starts with Mary challenging her
mother, claming that she only cares about “what the neighbours
think” and do (lines 283-285). Subsequently, she shifts the focus of
talk to her own current situation (“This is my second chance. I
don't know where I'm gonna go now.” lines 285-286) and then
concludes her turn with an accusation: “You’re turning my life
upside down.” (lines 286-287). In the next turn, Olivia responds by
saying “You don’t have any idea what it means to have your life
turned upside down.” (lines 288-289). With this argumentative move,
she denies Mary Jane’s competence to make the claim she is making
and thereby rejects her daughter’s utterance as baseless. Olivia
constructs her counter by means of contrastive mirroring. She makes
use of Mary Jane’s turn-final utterance “You’re turning my life
upside down.” and modifies it to her advantage. In so doing, she
produces a matching utterance, which serves to oppose her daughter’s
prior activity. Word-repetition ties the two opposing turns together
while simultaneously intensifying thematic opposition and signalling
interpersonal involvement. In the subsequent turn, Mary counter-
opposes her mother’s competence challenge by disqualifying her claim
as “ridiculous.”100 The particle “utterly” in the second part of her
turn serves to intensify opposition. Moreover, self-repetition
aggravates disagreement and displays a particular affective reaction
(probably outrage) at what Olivia has just said.
In the following extract from ‘night Mother, like Olivia in the
prior fragment, Jessie opposes her mother’s prior utterance by
explicitly denying her competence to talk about her daughter’s
emotions, and like Olivia, she uses contrastive mirroring to
construct her counter.
example (2): ‘night Mother
1288 MAMA Nothing I ever did was good enough for you and
1289 I want to know why.
1290 JESSIE That's not true.
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1291 MAMA And I want to know why you've lived here this
1292 long feeling the way you do.
> 1293 JESSIE You have no earthly idea how I feel.
1294 MAMA Well, how could I? You're real far back there,
1295 Jessie.
At the beginning of this sequence, Mama claims that her daughter has
never appreciated anything she did (“Nothing I ever did was good
enough for you” line 1288) and demands that Jessie provide an
explanation for her discontent with her mother’s behaviour (“and I
want to know why.” line 1289).101 In the following turn, Jessie
opposes Mama’s utterance by denying the truth of her assertion:
“That's not true.” (line 1290).102 Rather than defending her initial
claim, in the next turn, Mama produces another directive, demanding
that Jessie offer an account for her behaviour (lines 1291-1292).
Instead of providing the requested explanation, however, Jessie
responds by saying “You have no earthly idea how I feel” (line
1293). With this argumentative move, she claims that Mama is not in
a position to form an opinion about her daughter’s emotional life,
and thus also rejects Mama’s prior activity. The use of the particle
“earthly” serves to intensify opposition and indicate interpersonal
involvement. Like Olivia in the preceding example, Jessie builds her
counter by exploiting her mother’s previous utterance. In line 1293,
she takes up the formulation “feeling the way you do” from Mama’s
preceding utterance and transforms it into “how I feel,” thereby
constructing a mirroring utterance, which challenges her mother’s
prior statement. Verbal shadowing is employed to tie the disagreeing
moves together, while simultaneously re-evaluating perspectives on
the matter in question (i.e. Jessie’s emotions). In this way, a
close link is established at the structural level, while contrast is
stressed at the content level of the interaction.
In the extract from My mother below, Margaret refutes her
daughter’s demand to be treated like an adult, claiming that she is
too inexperienced to assess the consequences of her behaviour:
example (3): My mother I,4
1 MARGARET (Switches off the transistor.) I should never
2 have let you go to that party in Hammersmith!
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3 JACKIE Please, Mummy, leave me alone.
4 MARGARET You said you were staying with his parents!
5 JACKIE We were. But they didn't mind us sleeping,
6 together. Not everyone has your hang ups.
7 MARGARET Oh you can wound me sometimes, Jackie!
8 JACKIE You sound like Granny now.
9 MARGARET What am I going to tell Daddy?
10 JACKIE If you want me to behave like an adult, then
11 stop treating me like a child!
> 12 MARGARET (Pause.) You don't know what might happen.
13 JACKIE I might fall in love.
14 MARGARET (Trying to ignore this.) You can get pregnant
15 the first time, you know.
16 JACKIE Thanks for telling me now.
After a party, Jackie has stayed overnight at her boyfriend’s house
and, apparently, she has slept in a room together with him. Her
mother expresses her outrage at Jackie’s behaviour, asking
rhetorically “What am I going to tell Daddy?” in line 11. Rather
than addressing Margaret’s question, Jackie produces a directive
(“If you want me to behave like an adult, then stop treating me like
a child!” lines 10-11). With this utterance, she portrays Margaret’s
behaviour as inadequate and, at the same time, demands her to change
her conduct and treat her daughter like a mature person. In the
following turn, after a short pause, Margaret responds by saying
“You don't know what might happen” (line 12). By using this
argumentative move, she denies that Jackie is in a position to
estimate the possible consequences of her behaviour. In so doing,
she challenges her daughter’s competence and thereby discards her
prior contribution as unfounded. In the subsequent turn, Jackie
opposes her mother’s challenge with a counter-assertion. By stating
that she “might fall in love” (line 13), she implies the she does
know what might happen, thus contesting Margaret’s prior claim. When
Margaret puts forward an alternative position in the next turn,
claiming that Jackie “can get pregnant the first time” she has sex
with somebody (lines 14-15), Jackie responds with the sarcastic
retort “Thanks for telling me now” (line 16), implying that the
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information Margaret has just given her comes too late, and is
therefore useless.
In the preceding examples, competence challenges are produced
directly following the opponent’s utterance. By contrast, in the
following fragments, these argumentative moves are preceded by other
oppositional activities. For instance, in the extract from My sister
below, Madame Danzard’s competence challenge is prefaced by return
questions, which signal right at the beginning of her turn that
opposition is going to follow:
example (4): My sister 9
248 MADAME DANZARD What an extravagance! Can you imagine
249 if someone had seen...
250 ISABELLE (Standing up.) Oh Maman, you go too
251 far. (She starts up the staircase.)
252 MADAME DANZARD (Following her.) Do I? Do I, my dear?
> 253 You don't know this town like I do.
254 Imagine if the Flintons had been
here?
255 Or Madame Blanchard. Or... Madame
256 Castelneuve. I can't even think of
> 257 it... You think I go too far. No my
258 dear, you haven't lived here nearly
259 long enough.
In line 248, Madame Danzard expresses her exasperation at the fact
that Lea, one of the Danzards’ maids, is wearing a pink sweater for
work instead of proper work clothes: “What an extravagance!” In the
second part of her turn, she suggests to her daughter that it would
have caused a scandal if someone had seen their maid wearing such
clothes (lines 248-249). However, Isabelle cuts her off, claiming
that she is exaggerating: “Oh Maman, you go too far.” (lines 250-
251). The interruptive placement of Isabelle’s oppositional turn, as
well as the fact that she is starting to leave the room during her
talk indicate that she is unwilling to listen to her mother’s
tirade. Madame Danzard initiates her response to her daughter’s
opposition with a repeated return question: “Do I? Do I, my dear?”
(line 252). This turn beginning deserves closer examination.
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As discussed above, in friendly conversation, the preference
for agreement noticeably influences the shape of disagreeing turns.
While disagreements are expected to occur in certain environments,
agreements are commonly organised as preferred activities and
disagreements as dispreferred activities. Since disagreements are
treated as actions to be deferred, expressions of disagreement are
frequently prefaced by forms expressing pre-disagreement, i.e.
components that typically go in front of disagreements and that
signal that a disagreement is going to follow. By means of delaying
disagreements from early positioning, such components serve as
mitigating devices and thus demonstrate an orientation towards the
preference for agreement, as discussed above. For instance,
disagreement may be delayed by means of partial repeats or requests
for clarification which occur as pre-disagreement turns. Such forms
are also used to initiate repair on the prior speaker’s turn.103 As
Schegloff et al. (1977) have argued, in ordinary conversation there
is a preference for self-correction, that is, the party who produces
a turn with a trouble source generally corrects him- or herself.
When a party other than the speaker initiates repair such a turn is
generally occupied with little else than pointing to the trouble
source. Other-repair initiators indicate that the current speaker
has located a difficulty in something the other has said, but leave
it – at least in the first instance – to the prior speaker to
clarify, revise or restate their own initial statement in the
following turn.
While partial repeats or requests for clarification are
designed to locate just what it is in the co-participant’s prior
turn that the speaker is having trouble with, i.e. the repairable,
there is another form of other-repair initiation that does not
locate specifically what it is in the prior turn that the speaker is
having difficulties with. In employing this form, which is typically
realised by such objects as “Pardon?”, “Sorry?”, “What?”, a speaker
indicates that she has some problem with the other’s prior turn, but
does not specify where or what that problem is. In other words,
these types of repair initiators do not themselves identify the
repairable items in the prior turns, or specify the nature of the
difficulty that the speaker has with what her co-participant has
just said. For this reason, Drew (1996) calls these forms “open”
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class of repair initiations: “they leave ‘open’ what is the
repairable trouble which the speaker is having with the prior turn”
(72). In a study of instances of this kind of repair initiation in
naturally occurring telephone conversations, Drew (1996) has found
that the difficulty addressed through some “open” class repair
initiations is not a single specifiable repairable item located
precisely in the prior turn but rather concerns aspects of the
sequential connection between the prior turn and the preceding
sequence. His analysis of the sequential environment in which “open”
class repair initiators are employed shows that one environment in
which these forms of other-initiated repair are produced is
following a co-participant’s turn that is perceived as somehow
inapposite or inappropriate as a response to what the speaker said
in the turn preceding the repairable. In these cases, the speaker
apparently perceives that the interlocutor’s prior turn is somehow
inappropriate in terms of what came before, and this perception
triggers repair initiation. Drew shows that the repairable turns can
be in various ways sequentially ill-fitted. For instance, speakers
may initiate repair in circumstances where they perceive that their
co-participants do not fully align or affiliate with them. This
suggests that troubles generating “open” class repair initiators are
related to incipient differences or conflict between participants.
The return questions produced by Madame Danzard in the
preceding fragment (“Do I? Do I, my dear?” line 252) resemble the
“open” class repair initiators described by Drew in various aspects.
Firstly, they indicate that Madame Danzard has some difficulty with
Isabelle’s prior turn, but without locating specifically where or
what that difficulty is. Secondly, as discussed above, although
Madame Danzard’s turn is designed to prefer agreement, Isabelle’s
response to her mother’s prior remark is an explicit expression of
opposition (line 250-251); and with her return questions in lines
252-253 Madame Danzard construes Isabelle’s claim as questionable.
That is to say, by producing return questions in reaction to
Isabelle’s reply, Madame Danzard is treating that reply as an
inappropriate response to her own prior action.
However, as discussed above, other repair initiators generally
stand alone in a turn and permit the prior speaker to clarify,
revise or restate her own initial statement in the following turn.
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By contrast, the return questions in Madame Danzard’s utterance are
immediately followed by a disagreement within the same turn.
Subsequent to the preface, Madame Danzard produces a counter to
Isabelle’s utterance, challenging her daughter’s competence to judge
by claiming that she does not know the people in the town well
enough to foresee their reactions correctly: “You don't know this
town like I do.” (line 253). The return questions are similar to
pre-disagreement moves in that they defer a move of opposition by
placing a component that looks like an other-repair initiation at
the beginning of the turn; nevertheless, Madame Danzard moves so
quickly into the counter that no turn space is provided for Isabelle
to come in with a revision or restatement of her initial utterance.
Rather both the initial part of the turn marking disagreement and
the actual disagreement are produced as a single unit. Since no turn
space is provided for a response, the turn moves quickly to a
counter to Isabelle’s prior activity. Accordingly, we can say that
the return questions at the beginning of Madame Danzard’s response
are used to preface an oppositional turn and announce right at the
beginning of the turn that opposition is going to follow.104
Following the challenge to Isabelle’s competence, Madame Danzard
goes on to defend her initial position by listing a number of people
who, according to her, would have been scandalised at Lea’s
behaviour (lines 254-257). She closes her turn by picking up
Isabelle’s prior utterance again (“You think I go too far.” line
257) and adding an explicit counter in the form of a disagreement
token (“No my dear,” lines 257-258). Subsequently, she issues
another competence challenge, denying Isabelle’s ability to
anticipate people’s behaviour by claiming that she lacks the
necessary experience: “you haven't lived here nearly long enough.”
(lines 258-259).
This fragment illustrates that, in addition to enabling the
speaker to counter the opponent’s prior activity, competence
challenges provide the speaker with an opportunity for a reciprocal
display of expertise. They not only portray the recipient as
incompetent but also invoke a particular relationship between
speaker and addressee that categorises each of these participants in
an alternative way, namely as competent versus incompetent.
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While the competence challenge in the preceding fragment is
preceded by pre-disagreements in the form of return questions, in
the following extract from Alto, Florene prefaces the challenge to
her daughter’s competence with a directive that explicitly opposes
Wanda’s prior activity (lines 5-6):
example (5): Alto I, 1
1 WANDA Now I'm going to ask one more thing. "Ouija,
2 how old will I live to be and what will I die
3 of?"
4 FLORENE (She jerks her fingers from the planchette.)
5 Wanda, don't you be asking about dying!
> 6 You're just a kid. Besides, we're not
7 supposed to know things like that.
8 WANDA I don't see why not. I want to find out if
9 it knows when people will die. Let me ask
10 about somebody old.
11 FLORENE Now, Wanda, don't nose into such ghoulish
12 stuff.
13 WANDA Let me test it on Miz Hattie. We'll write down
14 what it says, and then when she does die,
15 we’ll know whether to believe it about
16 everything else.
17 FLORENE Well, it would be nice to have a dependable
18 source of advice. But Miz Hattie seems like
19 a good enough landlady so far, and I don't
20 want to think about her dying either. If she
21 died, this house would probably sell, and
22 we'd have to move again.
23 WANDA Let’s ask it anyway. I bet it knows.
24 FLORENE (Tentatively placing her fingers on the
25 planchette.) I just couldn't face another move
26 any time soon.
Wanda and her mother Florene are asking the Ouija board questions
about the future. The fragment starts with Wanda asking the board
about the time and cause of her death (lines 1-3). In the following
turn, Florene strongly opposes her daughter’s activity. She begins
her turn with a meta-communicative negative directive, reproaching
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Wanda for asking the board about her death. Her utterance construes
Wanda’s activity as a violation of some underlying social norm,
which says that people are not supposed to speculate on matters of
death. In addition, the raised voice indicates her indignation at
Wanda’s question. Subsequently, she makes explicit on what grounds
she challenges Wanda’s activity. Directly following the directive,
she says: “You're just a kid” (line 6). By referring to Wanda’s
youth, she implies that Wanda is too young to ask about death. She
goes on to support her position by making explicit the norm Wanda
has violated, stating that people are “not supposed to know things
like that” (lines 6-7). In the next turn, Wanda counter-opposes her
mother’s objection, declaring that Florene’s argument has not
convinced her: “I don't see why not.” (line 8). She goes on to
defend her position by giving reason for her activity (“I want to
find out if it knows when people will die.” lines 8-9), and then
adds a directive, asking for her mother’s permission to “ask about
somebody old” (lines 9-10). After some hesitation, Florene
eventually gives in and complies with her daughter’s request (lines
24-26).
In the extract from Alto below, explicit counters to Wanda’s
prior activities precede both of Florene’s competence challenges:
example (6): Alto II,3
101 WANDA ((...)) It's what we dreamed about, Mama!
102 FLORENE It's what I dreamed about. Me - not you!
> 103 You don't even know yet what you want.
104 But you deserve a chance to find out.
> 105 WANDA I do! I do too know! You're the one who
106 doesn't know anything. You don't even know
107 how to love anybody! I bet you never loved
108 him!
109 FLORENE Don't you ever say that! Ever! I'll always
> 110 love him. There are some things you don't
111 understand, Wanda.
112 WANDA I understand everything, and I love him more!
Prior to this fragment, Wanda and her mother Florene were arguing
about whether they should get on the bus to San Antonio to meet
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Wanda’s father there. While Wanda is eager to see her father again
and urges her mother to get ready, Florene refuses to go. The
sequence starts with Wanda trying to change her mother’s mind,
arguing “It's what we dreamed about, Mama!” (line 101). The loud
volume of voice indicates interpersonal involvement and reinforces
her claim. In the following turn, Florene directly opposes her
daughter’s activity by means of substitution: Her utterance retains
the shape of Wanda’s prior statement with the exception of the
personal pronoun “We” being replaced by “I” (“It's what I dreamed
about.” line 102), thus producing what Goodwin (1983) calls an
“aggravated correction.” Moreover, immediately following the
utterance containing the substitution, she adds “Me - not you!”
(line 102). By explicitly juxtaposing the pronouns, she intensifies
opposition. Moreover, the raised voice signals high emotional
involvement and aggravates disagreement. Following the correction,
Florene issues a competence challenge, claiming that Wanda is not in
a position to make the claim she is making because she is too young
to make any informed decisions (“You don't even know yet what you
want.” line 103) and should have “a chance to find out” (line 104).
In the subsequent turn, Wanda directly contradicts her mother’s
competence challenge through negation (“I do! I do too know!” line
105), thus claiming that her attribution of incompetence is
incorrect. She continues to confront Florene by producing a
competence challenge in return, claiming that it is Florene not she
who is incompetent to judge: “You're the one who doesn't know
anything.” (lines 105-106). Subsequently, she supports her argument
by specifying her mother’s deficiency, claiming that she is not
capable of loving someone: “You don't even know how to love
anybody!” (lines 106-107). Wanda terminates her turn by alleging
that Florene does not love her husband (line 107-108). The extreme
formulation “never” serves to intensify the confrontational
character of her utterance. In the next turn, Florene directly
opposes her daughter with a negative meta-communicative directive,
explicitly commenting on Wanda’s prior assertion. With this move,
she portrays Wanda’s utterance as offensive and demands her to
change her behaviour in the future: “Don't you ever say that! Ever!”
(line 109). Self-repetition and volume increase indicate
interpersonal involvement and intensify opposition. Following the
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directive, Florene contradicts Wanda’s utterance by means of
negation: “I’ll always love him.” (lines 109-110). The contrastive
use of the extreme formulation “always” in contrast to the adverb
“never” in Wanda’s utterance serves to reinforce opposition. The
contradiction is followed by another competence challenge, by which
Florene again claims that due to her youth and inexperience Wanda is
not in a position to judge: “There are some things you don't
understand, Wanda.” (lines 110-111). Again, Wanda directly
contradicts her mother’s challenge by means of negation: “I
understand everything,” (line 112). The extreme formulation
“everything” as opposed to the formulation “some things” in
Florene’s utterance serves to aggravate disagreement. Wanda closes
her turn by claiming that she loves her father more than Florene
does: “and I love him more!” With this last move, she is able to
confront her mother without disputing her prior claim that she will
always love her husband.
In the extracts discussed so far, one speaker challenges the
opponent’s prior activity by means of explicitly denying her
competence or status. By contrast, the following two fragments show
instances of competence challenges in which the speaker implicitly
challenges the opponent’s competence by alluding to a deficit on her
part. For instance, in the following extract from Avenue, Olga
opposes her mother’s prior assertion by suggesting that Mother is
not in a position to judge whether somebody is rich, since she
thinks that “everybody is rich” (line 369):
example (7): Avenue
384 MOTHER You know I had champagne at his place.
385 (Crosses to bureau.)
386 OLGA (Sarcastically.) Really?
387 MOTHER Sure, and only fancy people drink champagne.
388 He had two bottles and he took one out from
389 this brown shiny cabinet and he poured me some
390 and said, "Here, have some champagne." (She
391 picks up small perfume spray, and sprays
392 herself.)
393 OLGA (Spells out.) C-h-a-m-p-a-g-n-e.
394 MOTHER It sounds pretty, don't it? Oh, he's rich all
400
395 right. (Crosses R., sprays room.)
> 396 OLGA You think everybody is rich.
397 MOTHER Compared to us, everybody is.
The sequence starts with Mother telling Olga that she had champagne
at her boyfriend’s place (lines 384). She ignores the sarcastic tone
of Olga’s response (“Really?” line 386) and takes it as an
invitation to elaborate on her report (lines 387-390). When she
rounds her story off with the utterance “Oh, he's rich all right.”
(lines 394-395), Olga counters her by saying “You think everybody is
rich” (line 396). By claiming that Mother’s concept of wealth is too
broad and induces her to assume that “everybody is rich,” Olga
implies that Mother is not in a position to judge whether somebody
is rich and thereby rejects her mother’s prior assertion as
unqualified. In line 397, Mother defends her position and counter-
opposes her daughter by claiming that in comparison to their own
financial situation everybody else is indeed rich (“Compared to us,
everybody is.” line 397). Similar to Olivia and Jessie in extracts
(1) and (2) respectively, Mother builds her counter via contrastive
mirroring. She picks up Olga’s formulation “everybody is” and
incorporates it in her utterance. By this means, coherence is
emphasised at the level of wording, while opposition is stressed at
the level of content.
In the following extract from ‘night Mother, Mama opposes her
daughter’s announcement, suggesting that she cannot be taken
seriously due to her state of health.
example (8): ‘night Mother
> 207 MAMA It must be time for your medicine.
208 JESSIE Took it already.
209 MAMA What's the matter with you?
210 JESSIE Not a thing. Feel fine.
Prior to this exchange, Jessie, an epileptic, has told Mama that she
is going to kill herself. In line 207, Mama responds to her
daughter’s revelation by saying “It must be time for your medicine.”
With this utterance, Mama alludes to Jessie’s illness (i.e. her
epilepsy), suggesting that Jessie’s behaviour must be due to her
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medicine wearing off. By this means, Mama implies that Jessie is not
of sound mind and thus rejects her daughter’s prior remark as
invalid. In other words, she implicitly disqualifies her daughter on
the grounds that she is mentally unstable. However, in line 208
Jessie counters her mother’s challenge, claiming that she has
already taken her medicine (“Took it already.”) and thus reinforces
her initial position. Apparently, however, Mama still doubts her
daughter’s mental condition. In the next turn, she produces another
implicit competence challenge in the form of an interrogative,
requesting Jessie to account for her behaviour.  Her utterance
implies that there must be something wrong with her daughter:
“What's the matter with you?” (line 209). But Jessie insists that
she feels perfectly alright (“Not a thing. Feel fine.” line 210) and
thus implies that she is fully competent to make a rational
decision.
The preceding discussion has shown that disputants can oppose
the interlocutor’s prior activity by denying his or her competence
or status. Competence challenges such as “You don't know,” “You
don't understand” or “You have no idea” may be employed to call into
question not simply (an aspect of) the prior talk but the competence
or status of the party who produced that talk. As the preceding
examples have illustrated, speakers can deny the opponent’s
competence or status by referring to personal qualities such as, for
instance, age, profession, social role, mental stability, etc.
Competence is a matter negotiated on the interpersonal plane of
interaction. Accordingly, by producing a competence challenge, the
speaker initiates a change from the content level to the
interpersonal level of the ongoing interaction. Challenges to
competence present a threat to the addressee’s positive face, in
showing that the speaker has a negative evaluation of some aspect of
the addressee’s personal characteristics. As a result, following a
competence challenge, the recipient can either back down, and thus
lose face, or put up some defence against the other’s attack. Hence,
competence challenges are potential control manoeuvres, on that they
constrain the addressee’s options in formulating a response.
Moreover, as we have seen, apart from presenting an argumentative
resource that can be employed to counter the opponent’s prior
activity, competence challenges afford the speaker with an
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opportunity for a reciprocal display of expertise. In addition to
portraying the recipient as incompetent, they invoke a particular
relationship between speaker and addressee that categorises each of
these participants in an alternative way, namely as competent versus
incompetent disputants. Thus, this argumentative device represents a
discursive resource by which disputants can put opponents on the
defensive about their ‘disputing competence.’ Claiming that the
other is incompetent to argue conveys a specific view of which
characteristics and skills mark a competent disputant. In this
sense, similar to relevance challenges, competence challenges are
meta-argumentative acts that comment on the opponent’s competence in
relation to the ongoing dispute. In addition, since competence
reinforces arguments, whereas imputations of lack of competence
undermine them, disputing the opponent’s competence allows the
speaker simultaneously to challenge the position put forward by the
addressee in the prior activity. Therefore, competence challenges
provide a powerful argumentative resource that can be effectively
employed to oppose the interlocutor both on the interpersonal and
the content level of interaction. However, as we have seen,
recipients, too, have a wide range of oppositional strategies at
their disposal which they can utilise to counter-oppose the other’s
competence challenge. As described above, disputants can retaliate,
for instance, by disputing the truth value of the opponent’s
competence challenge or by returning a competence challenge, thus
turning the tables and putting the prior speaker in a position to
defend herself.
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If you can't answer a man's argument, all is not lost;
you can still call him vile names. (Elbert Hubbard)
7.8 Disqualifications
As I have shown in the previous section, one way in which disputants
can oppose an interlocutor’s prior activity is by means of
questioning her competence or status. A related phenomenon that
occurs quite frequently in my data is an explicit characterisation
of the prior speaker by means of a dispute strategy that I will call
‘disqualification.’
Disqualifications provide an argumentative resource that can be
used to build a turn that not only opposes prior talk but also
explicitly characterises the person who produced it in a negative
way. That is, similar to competence challenges, disqualifications
allow the speaker to simultaneously challenge both the position put
forward in the preceding turn and the actor responsible for stating
this position. Speakers can disqualify opponents by attributing a
negative value to them, their actions, values or beliefs or to
things or people attached to them.
Researchers have found corresponding phenomena in role-played
and naturally occurring arguments. For instance, in a study of
children’s disputes, Brenneis & Lein (1977) describe argumentative
statements such as “You dummy” or “Your shirt is filthy,” which
involve name-calling, or the ascription of a negative value to the
opponent or things attached to her. Likewise, M. H. Goodwin (1990)
notes that a frequent component of opposition turns in preadolescent
children’s arguments is pejorative person descriptors and insult
terms (e.g. “You is crazy boy.” or “You big lips.”), which
explicitly characterise the person who produced the talk being
opposed. Schank (1987) describes “transaktionale
Disqualifizierungen” in his study of conflict talk. According to
Apeltauer (1978) and Hundsnurscher (1993), insulting or name calling
(“Beschimpfen”) is a “quarrelling-specific” speech act.
Correspondingly, Messmer (2003, Ch.6) shows that negative
categorisations of the opponent routinely occur in aggravated,
emotionally loaded conflict sequences, which are characterised by a
high rate of accusations. Similarly, in a study of controversial
discussions in TV talk-shows, Gruber (1996a:164ff) finds that
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explicit evaluations of the interlocutor (“direkte
Personenwertungen”) frequently occur in dispute phases of talk.
In producing a disqualification, a speaker explicitly
characterises the opponent in a negative way. By portraying the
other as defective, the speaker simultaneously rejects the position
put forward by the addressee in the prior turn. Therefore,
disqualifications provide an argumentative resource that can be
employed to oppose the interlocutor both on the interpersonal and
the content level of interaction. Like competence challenges,
disqualifications are ad hominem arguments, as they are employed to
weaken a person’s argument or position by attacking that person in
some way (rather than the person’s point). Disqualifications thus
initiate a change from the content level to the interpersonal level
of the interaction.
Disqualifications present a severe threat to the addressee’s
positive face in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987: 66), since
they express the speaker’s dislike of one or more of the addressee’s
wants, acts, personal characteristics, goods, beliefs or values.
Consequently, following a disqualification, the recipient must
either back down, and thus lose face, or put up a defence against
the other’s attack. By virtue of limiting the addressee’s freedom of
action, disqualifications are control manoeuvres, i.e. attempts at
exercising discursive power in the local context of the interaction.
The face-threatening, even offensive nature of
disqualifications contributes to the sense of hostility in the
extracts under analysis and lends these conflict episodes their
specific adversative quality. The use of such devices distinguishes
the mother-daughter disputes in my data from other, less
confrontational forms of conflict talk such as critical discussions
or negotiations (cf. O’Rourke 2001; van Eemeren et al. 1993). For
instance, Schwitalla (1987: 107f) puts the use of speech activities
that involve “eine bestimmte negative, verletzende Behandlung des
Selbstwertgefühls des anderen” at the centre of his definition of
the activity type “Streitgepräch” (dispute, quarrel) as opposed to
other types of verbal conflict. Similarly, Spiegel (1995: 18-19)
argues that disputes exhibit an emotional conversational style,
which is characterised by the use of negative evaluative lexemes,
which refer to characteristics or behaviour of the interlocutor.
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In my corpus, disqualifications are produced directly following
the opponent’s preceding utterance or subsequent to other
oppositional activities. They typically have the syntactic form of
declarative statements such as “You're a fool!”, “You're funny, you
are and so stupid.” or “Even as a kid you were a brat.” The
following fragments illustrate several instances of this
argumentative device as well as a number of counter-strategies that
recipients can employ in response to disqualifications.
The example below contains two occurrences of
disqualifications. In lines 185-186, following a number of turn
components which challenge Olga’s prior activity and support her own
position, Mother disqualifies Olga by characterising her as being
“stupid about things” (lines 184-186). A few lines later, she issues
another disqualification this time insulting Olga by comparing her
to a “rotten egg” (line 192). However, as the subsequent turn-by-
turn analysis of the exchange shows, both of Mother’s
disqualifications are counter-opposed by Olga in the subsequent
turns.
example (1): Avenue
176 OLGA What if he doesn't ask you to marry him?
177 MOTHER You ask too many questions. You asked that
178 before.
179 OLGA What if- it's some sort of plot between him
180 and father.
181 MOTHER Your father's dead, Olga, the no-good
182 sonavabitch is dead and buried.
183 OLGA (Gives her a defiant look.)
184 MOTHER Whatsa matter with you? You know it's true.
> 185 We got proof of it. Sometimes you're stupid
186 about things. (Stands, goes U. C.)
187 OLGA I can think better than anyone.
188 MOTHER Thinking ain't enough. Do something if you're
189 so smart. (Challenging her.) Just what can
190 you do?
191 OLGA Nothing!
> 192 MOTHER Did you ever hear of the saying, "rotten
egg"?
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193 Well, that's you. They made that saying cause
194 they knew you were around.
195 (Crosses to make-up again.)
196 OLGA I can say a saying about you, too, but I'm
not
197 going to cause I don't want you to hit me.
198 MOTHER Go ahead. I won't hit you.
199 OLGA You always say that, but you hit me anyway.
200 MOTHER (Retouches her eyes.) You're getting smart,
201 Olga.
Prior to this extract, Mother has told Olga that she expects her
boyfriend to propose to her that night. In line 176, Olga expresses
her scepticism by asking “What if he doesn't ask you to marry him?”
In the following turn, rather than answer her daughter’s question,
Mother opposes her with a meta-communicative accusation:  “You ask
too many questions. You asked that before.” (lines 177-178). By
explicitly formulating Olga’s prior communicative activity as
violating some underlying conversational norm, Mother rejects her
daughter’s prior utterance and thus manages to avoid providing an
answer. However, Olga insists on her critical position and claims
that Mother’s boyfriend might be conspiring with her father (lines
179-180). In the following turn, Mother rejects her claim with a
counter-assertion, arguing that her father is dead (lines 181-182).
The use of the swear word “sonavabitch” serves to aggravate
opposition. When Olga displays her disapproval of Mother’s remark by
giving her “a defiant look” (line 183), Mother challenges her again
in the next turn. She begins her counter with a rhetorical question:
“Whatsa matter with you? (line 184). By proposing that there must be
something wrong with Olga, she construes her daughter’s reaction as
inappropriate. She then goes on to support her position by claiming
that the death of Olga’s father is an established fact, which Olga
knows: “You know it's true. We got proof of it.” (lines 184-185).
She concludes her turn with a disqualification, characterising Olga
as stupid on the grounds of her prior action: “Sometimes you're
stupid about things.” (lines 185-186). By this means, she not only
opposes Olga’s prior activity but also her way of thinking in
general. In the following turn, Olga answers back with a counter-
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assertion: By claiming that she “can think better than anyone” (line
187), she disputes the truth value of Mother’s preceding assertion.
However, Mother does not give in. At the beginning of the next turn,
she builds a counter by picking up a part of Olga’s formulation and
using it for her own position: “Thinking ain't enough.” This
disputing technique allows her to produce a matching utterance,
which serves to counter Olga’s prior activity and simultaneously to
put forward an alternative position by making use of Olga’s talk and
transforming it to her advantage. The oppositional moves are tied
together through word repetition, and the wording of the preceding
utterance is exploited to construct the next. As discussed above, by
this means, coherence is established at the structural level, while
a pronounced contrast is set up at the content level of interaction.
Subsequently, she issues a directive, demanding that Olga prove her
claim: “Do something if you're so smart.” (lines 188-189).
Immediately following the directive, she produces another challenge
in the form of an interrogative, requesting that Olga resume the
floor and provide evidence for her claim, while suggesting that she
cannot do so: “Just what can you do?” (lines 189-190). In fact, in
the following turn, Olga confirms this assumption by answering
“Nothing!” (line 191). In contrast to line 187, in which she
disputed her mother’s disqualification with a counter-claim, here
Olga makes no further attempt to defend herself. Instead, she
accepts and even exaggerates her mother’s criticism.105 The wording
of her response seems to signal submission, and thus might serve to
initiate a termination of the dispute sequence. However, the volume
increase, which suggests an aggressive tone of voice, indicates
that, in fact, Olga does not consent to her mother’s assessment,
i.e. that the conflict is not resolved. Indeed, following Olga’s
response, the argument continues. In lines 192-195, Mother opposes
Olga with a disqualification, equating her with a “rotten egg.” In
reaction to her mother’s insult, Olga claims that she could strike
back with a corresponding counter-insult (“I can say a saying about
you, too,” line 196) but will refrain from doing so for fear of
getting punished (“but I'm not going to cause I don't want you to
hit me.” lines 196-197). This meta-communicative strategy allows her
to counter her mother’s insult without having to bear the
consequences of an explicit offence. When Mother prompts her to “go
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ahead,” promising that she will not hit her (line 198), Olga opposes
her again. By arguing that she will not keep her promise (“You
always say that, but you hit me anyway.” line 199) she refuses to
comply with her mother’s request and simultaneously disputes her
claim that she will not hit her. In addition, by portraying Mother
as someone who frequently breaks her promise, she implicitly accuses
her of being a liar. Mother terminates this round of the dispute
with a meta-communicative remark. In lines 200-201, she explicitly
comments on her daughter’s communicative behaviour, claiming that
Olga is “getting smart.” By construing Olga’s activity as violating
some underlying norm concerning daughters’ verbal behaviour towards
their mothers, her utterance functions as an accusation. Moreover,
it implies a threat, warning Olga against pursuing her line of
arguing.
In the following extract, after the dispute has been centring
round a number of other issues for a while, Olga and Mother are
arguing about Mother’s current relationship again.106 The sequence
starts with Olga confronting Mother by claiming: “I’d rather be
alone than settle for him.”
example (2): Avenue
476 OLGA (Confronting her.) I'd rather be alone than
477 settle for him.
> 478 MOTHER You're a fool! If you were in my position,
479 (Crosses D. L. for drink.) you'd have to.
480 (Pours a drink, and swallows slowly.)
481 Sometimes I get cravings, like sometimes
482 it's for sour cream and pickles. (Faces away
483 from Olga.)
484 OLGA (Stunned.) Pregnant?
485 MOTHER (Proud.) Yeah. (Toasts with drink.)
486 OLGA (Sitting back down on high-riser.) How can
487 you do this to me? I'm all grown up and
488 you're going to walk around with a big belly.
> 489 You disgust me.
490 MOTHER (Crosses U. C. and then goes to sit beside
491 Olga, who is on high-riser.) Now it's no
492 disgust. I'm a woman and there's no disgust
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493 in what I've done. I thought you hated people.
494 So what do you care what they think?
495 OLGA It’s for myself, I’m ashamed. When I’ll
496 walk down the street, people are just going
497 to see how rotten and stupid I feel inside.
498 (Crosses D. R.)
499 MOTHER It’s my business, so don’t you go concerning
500 yourself. Besides, I like what I did. It felt
501 damn good.
503 OLGA Does he know?
504 MOTHER He knows it felt good.
505 OLGA I don’t mean that. I mean about – oh, I can’t
506 even say the word.
507 MOTHER I told him last night. I called him up and
508 told him. And tonight, I know he’s gonna
509 propose.
510 (Turns, faces up to MOTHER.) You know you're
511 OLGA always feeling sorry for everyone, but who's
512 sorry for you?
513 MOTHER I wanted it. You hear me!
> 514 OLGA (Crosses C. to prepare for "slap.") Too cheap
515 to buy protection!
516 MOTHER Take that back, don't let me hear you say
that
517 again.
> 518 OLGA Too cheap to buy pro-tec-tion!
519 MOTHER (Rises, crosses U. The slap is deliberate, a
520 punishment, not in anger.) You deserve worse
521 than that. (Sits.)
Olga’s utterance clearly displays her disapproval of Mother’s choice
of boyfriend and thus requires Mother to account for her behaviour
in the following turn. However, rather than explain why she is
having a relationship with the man in question, Mother opposes Olga
in the subsequent turn with a disqualification. She characterises
Olga as “a fool” (line 478) for having said what she said. The
increase in volume signals high involvement and serves to aggravate
opposition. Although the evaluation expressed in Mother’s response
primarily disqualifies Olga as a person, it can only be ascribed to
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Olga’s prior utterance. That is, Mother disqualifies Olga on the
grounds of her opinion rather than on the grounds of any other
evidence of her mental ability. Thus, by portraying Olga as a fool,
in addition to challenging Olga as a person, Mother simultaneously
expresses her rejection of her daughter’s stance. Immediately
following the disqualification, Mother produces an account in
support of her stance: “If you were in my position, you'd have to.”
(lines 478-480). Subsequently, she expands on her account,
specifying precisely what “position” she is in by insinuating that
she is expecting a baby. In the following turn, Olga issues a
request for clarification (“Pregnant?” line 484) to check whether
her understanding of Mother’s insinuation is correct. When Mother
confirms her inference (line 485), Olga opposes her with a blame-
implicative question (“How can you do this to me?” lines 486-487),
expressing both shock and indignation at Mother’s pregnancy.
Subsequently, she elaborates on her accusation, claiming that it is
unsuitable for Mother to “walk around with a big belly” at her age
(lines 487-488). She concludes her turn with an explicit expression
of contempt: “You disgust me.” (line 489). By this means, she
disqualifies Mother by portraying her as irresponsible and
despicable. Moreover, her utterance displays a very negative
affective reaction at what Mother has just told her and thus
aggravates opposition and escalates the dispute. In the following
turn, Mother rejects Olga’s depreciation with a negation: “Now it’s
no disgust.” (lines 491-492). She then goes on to support her stance
by denying the negative quality that Olga has attributed to her
behaviour, arguing that as a woman, getting pregnant is a natural
thing to do: “I'm a woman and there's no disgust in what I've done.”
(lines 492-493). Subsequently, she issues a demand for explanation,
obliging Olga to account for her hostile reaction: “I thought you
hated people. So what do you care what they think?” (lines 492-494).
When Olga provides the requested account, explaining that she feels
ashamed and is worried about what people might think of her (lines
495-498), Mother dismisses Olga’s argument, claiming that her
pregnancy is none of her daughter’s business: “It’s my business, so
don’t you go concerning yourself.” (lines 499-501). She then goes on
to support her position by claiming that she enjoyed what she did
and thus suggesting that she has no regrets: “Besides, I like what I
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did. It felt damn good.” (lines 501-502). In line 503, Olga
initiates a topic shift, by asking: “Does he know?” As discussed
above, this brings about a short time out from the dispute, as
subsequent to Olga’s question the mutual exchange of oppositional
moves is suspended for a number of turns. Mother’s reply (“He knows
it felt good.” line 504) displays her (real or pretended)
understanding of Olga’s prior turn as a request for information
about her boyfriend’s knowledge of her assessment of their sex
life.107 Her response elicits a self-repair (cf. Schegloff et al.
1977) from Olga in the next turn. She clarifies that her question
was actually referring to whether Mother’s lover is familiar with
her pregnancy: “I don’t mean that. I mean about – oh, I can’t even
say the word.” (lines 505-506). Mother replies that she has informed
her boyfriend of her condition the night before and expects him to
propose to her that night (lines 507-509). In the following turn,
Olga challenges her by saying “You know you're always feeling sorry
for everyone, but who's sorry for you?” (lines 511-512). As
discussed earlier, her utterance not only reveals that she doubts
that her mother’s lover is going to propose to her but also
presupposes that Mother is pitiable. In line 513, Mother strongly
rejects this presupposition, claiming that she “wanted it” (i.e. the
baby). The reinforcement “You hear me!” at the end of her turn and
the raised voice signal high emotional involvement and aggravate
opposition. In the next turn, Olga opposes her with another
disqualification: “Too cheap to buy protection!” (lines 514-515),
portraying her as both contemptible and stupid. This argumentative
devise allows her to degrade Mother and at the same time reject the
position expressed in her preceding turn. Here, too, the volume
increase signals high emotional involvement and aggravates
opposition. In addition, Olga apparently anticipates getting
”slapped” and is thus obviously conscious that her utterance conveys
an offence. In the following turn, Mother issues a threat: “Take
that back, don't let me hear you say that again” (lines 516-517),
construing Olga’s activity as an insult and implying that she will
be punished if she does not back down. In spite of her mother’s
threat, however, Olga repeats her prior utterance word for word in a
chant-like fashion: “Too cheap to buy pro-tec-tion!” line 518. The
(presumably) provocative tone of voice and the volume increase
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reinforce the confrontational character of her utterance and thus
contribute to the escalation of the dispute. As a result, Mother
carries out her prior threat and slaps her. The “deliberate” (line
519) use of physical violence marks both the culmination and the end
of the dispute. She closes her turn (and the current round of the
argument) with the claim that Olga “deserves worse than that” (line
520), thereby legitimising her use of physical violence.
In the extract below, Mother employs a disqualification to
oppose Olga’s assertion “Ribbons are for dogs”:
example (3): Avenue
427 MOTHER (Crosses to kitchen table, takes out a gaudy
428 ribbon from pocketbook.) This is pretty, but
429 too bad you can't wear it, cause your hair's
430 not set. (Puts ribbon back in pocketbook.)
431 OLGA Ribbons are for dogs.
432 MOTHER (Sits down, looks in face mirror to recheck
> 433 eyes.) You mean dogs that win contests.
You're
434 funny, you are and so stupid. Sometimes I
435 think I got more sense than you and I hardly
436 been educated.
437 OLGA Maybe you have.
438 MOTHER There you go agreeing with me again.
At the beginning of this sequence, Mother takes out a ribbon that
she has apparently brought for Olga, but then puts it away again
because, unfortunately, Olga cannot wear it, since her hair is not
set (lines 427-230). Although she does not explicitly criticise
Olga, her remark seems to function as a complaint. Mother employs a
conversational practice which is regularly used to package
complaints, namely the stating of redundant information. As noted
earlier, if speakers report a state of affairs when it is redundant
to do so, such as the fact that Olga’s hair is not set, their remark
invites an account of it. In the example above, we can see how
Mother employs this conversational practice as a method of blame-
giving: Her “noticing” (Schegloff 1988) that Olga’s hair is not set
construes Olga’s appearance as problematic and obliges her to offer
an account. However, in the following turn, instead of providing an
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explanation, Olga retorts that “Ribbons are for dogs.” (line 431).
By this means, she challenges the assumption involved in Mother’s
turn that the ribbon was meant for her and thus manages to avoid
addressing the complaint entailed in Mother’s utterance. At the
beginning of the next turn, Mother produces a formulation of Olga’s
prior remark: “You mean dogs that win contests.” (line 433).
Subsequently, she opposes Olga with a disqualification: “You're
funny, you are and so stupid.” (lines 433-434). By characterising
Olga as “funny” (presumably in the sense of odd) and “so stupid” she
not only invalidates Olga’s prior argument but also disputes her
mental ability. In the remainder of her turn, she expands on her
position, claiming that despite her inferior education, apparently
she “has got more sense” than Olga (lines 435-436). As this example
illustrates, like competence challenges, disqualifiers afford
speakers an opportunity for a reciprocal display of expertise. They
do not simply portray the recipient as defective but also evoke a
specific relationship between speaker and addressee that categorises
each of these participants in an alternative way – for instance, as
stupid versus sensible. In the following turn, Olga issues a
downgraded agreement (“Maybe you have.” line 437), which indicates
that she is backing down, presumably just to get out of the
interaction. However, Mother’s subsequent turn reveals that she
apparently does not hear Olga’s reply as an appropriate response to
her prior turn. Her meta-communicative utterance “There you go
agreeing with me again.” (line 438), which explicitly comments on
the communicative function of Olga’s activity, indicates that she
has not expected Olga to produce an agreement and is reluctant to
accept her daughter’s consent. Mother’s utterance clearly shows that
in dispute sequences, participants orient to the expectation of
disagreement both in the interpretation and production of
conversational contributions as discussed earlier.
Like Mother in the example above, in the following fragment,
Sadie discards her daughter’s prior claim as invalid by categorising
Barbs as “stupid” and “not having a clue”:
example (4): Perfect days II, 1
200 SADIE You just don’t know what to be at!
201 BARBS On the contrary I have never actually been
202 so one hundred percent clear about what I
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203 want.
> 204 SADIE Stupid. You think you are so bloody smart
205 but you don’t have a clue. Dream World,
206 that’s what you live in. Selfish. Selfish to
207 the core. Think it is a joke to bring up a
208 child on your own?
209 BARBS No. No I don’t. You did it well. For the two
210 of us. We turned out all right, me and our
211 Billy.
Directly preceding this extract, Barbs has told her mother that she
has just had sex with a gay friend of hers in order to get pregnant.
In reaction to her daughter’s revelation, Sadie confronts her,
claiming that she does not know what do with her life: “You just
don’t know what to be at!” (line 200). By this means, she not only
rejects Barbs’ prior activity but also calls into question her
common sense. The increase in volume signals Sadie’s shock and
indignation at what her daughter has just told her and thus serves
to intensify opposition. In the following turn, Barbs counter-
opposes her mother, defending her position by claiming that she
knows exactly what she wants (lines 201-203). In reaction, Sadie
opposes her again with a disqualification. She begins her turn by
characterising Barbs (and/or the position she has put forward in her
preceding utterance)108 as “Stupid” (line 204), thus rejecting her
prior statement as unqualified. Subsequently, she elaborates on her
counter, arguing that, contrary to her own assessment, Barbs does
not know what she is talking about: “You think you are so bloody
smart but you don’t have a clue.” (lines 204-205). The use of the
expletive “bloody” indicates Sadie’s annoyance and serves to
aggravate opposition. Subsequently, Sadie further elaborates on her
commentary on Barbs’ position by adding the judgement that a person
who would take such a stance must be both unrealistic (“Dream World,
that’s what you live in.” lines 205-206) and self-centred (“Selfish.
Selfish to the core.” lines 206-207). She concludes her turn with an
oppositional move that Gruber (2001) calls “implicit opposing
question”: “Think it is a joke to bring up a child on your own?”
(lines 207-208). This argumentative device allows the speaker to
confront the opponent with an unfavourable interpretation of her
point of view and obliges her to take a stance towards this
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interpretation. In the following, I will examine which aspects of
this last component of Sadie’s turn contribute to this function.
The second part of the interrogative (“it is a joke to bring up
a child on your own”) resembles a conversational formulation (cf.
Garfinkel & Sacks 1970; Heritage 1985; Heritage & Watson 1979,
1980), by which a speaker summarises, glosses, or develops the gist
of an interlocutor’s earlier statements. According to Heritage &
Watson (1979), “the primary business of formulations is to
demonstrate understanding and, presumptively, to have that
understanding attended to and, as a first preference, endorsed”
(138). However, in contrast to the examples discussed by Heritage &
Watson, Sadie’s formulation apparently expresses her exclusive
interpretation of Barbs’ position rather than an understanding that
she anticipates her daughter to share. This is indicated by the
first part of her remark (“Think”), which marks the utterance as a
question for clarification concerning Barbs’ attitude towards the
upbringing of a child as a single mother. In this respect, Sadie’s
last remark also resembles the “y’mean X?” other-initiated repair
format described by Schegloff et al. (1977), in which the next
speaker offers a possible understanding of the prior turn which the
previous speaker has to evaluate in the following turn. More
importantly, however, it is also similar to the type of formulation
that Heritage (1985) has labelled “inferentially elaborative probe.”
According to Heritage, inferentially elaborative probes are
formulations used by interviewers
to test or probe some aspect of an interviewee’s actions,
intentions, or attitude. This commonly involves thematizing
some presupposition of prior talk that, the interviewer
proposes, is implied in that talk or its real world context.
(1985: 108)
Such moves are expected to be rejected by the interviewee because
they portray her as being in conflict with or critical towards some
third party. Therefore, Heritage calls these devices “uncooperative
formulations” (110). By the same token, Sadie’s selective
formulation of her daughter’s position is expected to be rejected by
Barbs in the subsequent turn, since it portrays her as having an
unacceptable and unrealistic attitude towards the issue of child
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education. In fact, in the following turn, Barbs directly rejects
Sadie’s interpretation of her position by producing an outright
contradiction: “No. No I don’t” (line 209). The repetition of the
disagreement token “No” serves to intensify opposition and signals
high emotional involvement. In the remainder of her turn, she
elaborates on her position, arguing that Sadie herself coped well
with having to raise two children by herself: “You did it well. For
the two of us. We turned out all right, me and our Billy.” (lines
209-211).
In all of the preceding extracts, the opponent is explicitly
characterised as “a fool,” as “stupid,” “disgusting,” “cheap”  or
“selfish” for having said what she said or for having done what she
did. This unfavourable portrayal of the interlocutor is further
intensified with additional accounts (preceding or following the
disqualifications) supporting the speaker’s and/or rejecting the
addressee’s position (“You know it's true. We got proof of it.”, “If
you were in my position, you’d have to.”, “Sometimes I think I got
more sense than you and I hardly been educated.” and “You think you
are so bloody smart but you don’t have a clue.”).
Examples like those above demonstrate that a single opposition
turn can contain a variety of components that attend to and operate
on various phenomena (e.g. one component of the turn might deal with
something said in prior talk, while another addresses the character
of the person who produced that talk). The multiplicity of action
within individual turns raises questions about the common practice
of analysing arguments by glossing a turn at talk as an instance of
a particular kind of speech act (e.g. Jacobs 1987, 1989; Labov &
Fanshel 1977; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1988; van Eemeren et al.
1993).109
While the disqualifications in the prior extracts entail an
explicit characterisation of the opponent herself, in the following
example, Mother opposes Olga’s prior utterance by ascribing a
negative value to her daughter’s hobbies:
example (5): Avenue
365 MOTHER I think you'd better look for a job. You got a
366 body, go out and work, earn your own keep.
367 OLGA Next week.
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368 MOTHER You been saying that for over fifty weeks.
369 Over a year, and you even graduated and you're
370 not doing a thing, just listening to that
371 radio and mooning over your autograph album.
372 OLGA I like to.
> 373 MOTHER You like stupid things. But getting back to
374 tonight. You fix up the table pretty. Too bad
375 we don't have a lace tablecloth.
Prior to this extract, Mother and Olga were arguing about Mother’s
current relationship. The sequence starts with Mother telling Olga
to get a job and start earning “her own keep” (lines 365-366). When
Olga replies that she is going to start looking for a job the
following week (line 367), Mother opposes her, arguing that Olga has
put her off for more than a year promising to look for a job but
instead has been doing nothing but “listening to the radio and
mooning over her autograph album” (lines 368-371). In reaction to
her mother’s complaint, Olga issues the laconic reply “I like to”
(line 372). In the following turn, Mother opposes her again by
saying “You like stupid things” (line 373). As an argumentative
device, this utterance achieves several things: Firstly, by
attributing a negative value to Olga’s hobbies, Mother rejects
Olga’s prior argument as invalid. Secondly, by portraying Olga as
someone who likes “stupid things,” she disqualifies her daughter as
a sensible person. Directly following the disqualification, Mother
explicitly initiates a topic change (“But getting back to tonight.”
lines 373-374) and issues an unmitigated directive, telling Olga to
“fix up the table pretty” (line 3764). She moves so quickly into the
new topic that no turn space is provided for Olga to come in with a
defence of her own position or a counter of her mother’s.
As the preceding discussion has shown, disputants can oppose
the interlocutor’s prior activity by means of an explicit negative
characterisation. Disqualifications such as “You’re stupid,” “You’re
a fool” or “You like stupid things” may be employed to challenge not
simply (an aspect of) the prior talk but the personality of the
party who produced that talk. As the preceding examples have
illustrated, speakers can disqualify opponents by attributing a
negative quality to them, their actions, values or beliefs or to
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objects or people attached to them. By producing a disqualification,
the speaker initiates a change from the content level to the
interpersonal level of the ongoing interaction. Disqualifications
present a threat to the addressee’s positive face, since they
indicate that the speaker disapproves of some aspect of the
addressee’s personal characteristics, wants, beliefs, values, etc.
As a result, following a disqualification, the recipient can either
back down, and thus lose face, or put up some defence against the
other’s attack. Thus, similar to competence challenges,
disqualifications represent an argumentative resource by which
disputants can put opponents on the defensive about their general
competence or status. In fact, they challenge the other’s competence
in a more fundamental and more confrontational sense. Moreover, as
we have seen, apart from presenting an argumentative resource that
can be employed to counter the opponent’s prior activity,
disqualifications provide the speaker with an opportunity for a
reciprocal display of expertise. In addition to portraying the
recipient as defective, they invoke a particular relationship
between speaker and addressee that categorises each of these
participants in a different way.  As I noted above,
disqualifications allow the speaker to simultaneously challenge both
a position and the actor who put forward that position. Hence,
similar to competence challenges, they provide a powerful
argumentative resource that can be effectively employed to oppose
the interlocutor both on the content and the interpersonal level of
interaction. However, as the preceding examples have shown,
recipients have a wide range of counter-strategies at their disposal
which they can employ to dispute a preceding disqualification. For
instance, they can counter-oppose the prior speaker’s
disqualification with a counter-assertion. Or they can retaliate, by
means of meta-communicative remarks, which contest the activity’s
appropriateness.
These findings show that a single oppositional turn can
comprise a variety of components that address various aspects (e.g.
one component of the turn might attend to something said in the
preceding turn, while another may refer to the character of the
prior speaker). The diversity of action within single turns poses
questions about the widespread practice of analysing arguments by
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categorising turns as instances of a particular type of speech act.
Moreover, the examples in this section demonstrate that in analysing
oppositional moves in disputes, besides focusing on the talk through
which opposition is produced it is also necessary to take into
account how participants are portrayed and constituted through that
talk.
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7.9 Unfavourable comments
In the previous section, I have shown that one way in which the
disputants in my data challenge the opponent’s prior activity is by
explicitly characterising her in a negative way. A related
argumentative move that repeatedly occurs in my data involves the
negative evaluation of what the prior speaker has just said. This
can be done using what I will call ‘unfavourable comments.’
Unfavourable comments are typically meta-communicative110 declarative
statements that challenge the propositional content or the
appropriateness of the opponent’s preceding utterance. Meta-
communicative evaluations of the other’s preceding talk which the
disputants in my data use include remarks such as “That’s
ridiculous,” “That’s silly,” “Nonsense” or “You’re acting like a
baby.” In my corpus, such oppositional moves tend to occur in
association with other argumentative actions such as contradictions
(cf. below), counter-assertions (cf. below), demands for
explanation, or accusations.
Corresponding phenomena have been observed in naturally
occurring disagreement sequences. For instance, M. H. Goodwin
(1982a: 85; 1990: 153) shows that opposition turns in preadolescent
children’s arguments frequently involve actions that “comment upon
what was said in a prior turn.” Likewise, Pomerantz (1984: 87)
describes “critical assessments of the prior talk” such as “Oh
that’s ridiculous.” as one type of disagreement with prior speakers’
self-deprecations. Similar activities have also been observed in
disagreement sequences in institutional contexts. For example,
Gruber (1996a: 166) lists explicit evaluations of an interlocutor’s
prior utterance such as “es is ja a wirklicher Unsinn was sie sagen”
as an oppositional strategy in controversial discussions in an
Austrian TV-talk-show. Müller (1997: 197-202) observes that one way
in which participants in staff meetings reject interlocutors’
activities is by producing meta-communicative evaluations of others’
prior utterances. In addition, Schwitalla (1997: 132) discusses the
use of derogatory comments (“abqualifizierende Kommentare”) such as,
for example “das=s quatsch” as control manoeuvres in institutional
discourse.
As described above, unfavourable comments are meta-
communicative remarks that challenge the content or appropriateness
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of an interlocutor’s prior activity. Such argumentative moves allow
the speaker to avoid or put off complying with the sequential
requirements established by an interlocutor’s previous activity.
That is to say, by issuing an unfavourable comment the speaker may
evade or delay producing the conditionally relevant response to
another’s preceding turn. Hence, unfavourable comments provide a
discursive resource that disputants can employ to resist an
opponent’s attempt at constraining their freedom of action.
Unfavourable comments have a deep affinity with
disqualifications, as discussed above. Both kinds of argumentative
move portray the person being opposed in a negative fashion.
However, while disqualifications explicitly characterise the
interlocutor in a negative way (e.g. “You’re stupid.”), unfavourable
comments depict the opponent in an offensive way by means of
categorising what she has just said (e.g. “That’s just silly. You're
just being silly now.”). Hence, although their face-threatening
potential is lower than that of disqualifications, unfavourable
comments present a threat to the addressee’s positive face in the
sense of Brown & Levinson (1987: 66) because they indicate that the
speaker has a negative evaluation of the addressee’s prior activity.
Consequently, meta-communicative evaluations of the opponent’s
preceding activity provide an argumentative resource that allows
disputants to oppose the interlocutor on various levels of
interaction.
As mentioned above, unfavourable comments are typically
realised by declarative statements which remark on the opponent’s
preceding utterance. In many instances, coherence between the
comment and the talk it opposes is established by means of anaphoric
reference, for example, through the use of demonstrative pronouns
such as “this” or “that” (e.g. “That’s ridiculous.” or “That’s just
silly.”). By this means, a close link is established at the
structural level of interaction, while disagreement is emphasised at
the content level of interaction. This format is illustrated by the
following three examples:
example (1): Home
165 OLIVIA The other night I was in the Shop-Rite and
166 I ran into Mrs. Harris and her youngest
422
167 girl. She's getting married and they're
168 looking for their first house.
169 MARY JANE Yeah?
170 OLIVIA They've been looking and looking all over
171 town. So I said you should come look at
172 mine, I have exactly what you're trying
173 to find.
174 MARY JANE What?
175 OLIVIA She was so thrilled. She took my hands and
176 said, "Mrs. Dunn, I always loved your
house
177 from the outside when I used to pass it
178 every day on my way to school."
179 MARY JANE It's a development. They all look exactly
180 the same.
181 OLIVIA She said there was always something
special
182 about it. She remembered the white candles
183 I'd put in the window at Christmas and the
184 plastic life-size witch I'd hang on the
185 front door at Halloween to scare all the
186 kids. She said, "Mrs. Dunn. It's a dream
187 come true for me to have your house. I
188 wouldn't do a thing to it." I was so
189 flattered.
190 MARY JANE What?
191 OLIVIA So they're coming to take a look around.
192 MARY JANE Mother.
193 OLIVIA Well, I never said I was happy here.
194 MARY JANE You didn't say anything.
195 OLIVIA Then you should've asked me.
196 MARY JANE But I didn't know there was anything
197 wrong.
198 OLIVIA How could you not know? How could you
> 199 think I could stay here? That's just
200 silly. You're just being silly now. Of
201 course I can't stay here.
202 MARY JANE I just can't believe this. There's no
203 reason for this.
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At the beginning of this sequence, Olivia is reporting to Mary Jane
that she recently met the daughter of one of the neighbours, who is
looking for a house (lines 165-168). In line 169, Mary Jane issues
the “back-channel signal” (Duncan 1974; Yngve 1970) “Yeah?”, which
indicates that she is following her mother’s story and serves to
encourage Olivia to continue her report. When Olivia tells Mary Jane
that she has offered to show the young woman her house (lines 170-
173) and thus implies that she would be willing to sell it to her,
Mary Jane responds by exclaiming the question word: “What?” (line
174). While “Yeah?” in line 169 signals that she is listening and
prompts Olivia to go on, the interjection “What?” indicates that
Mary Jane’s alignment towards her mother’s account has changed. More
precisely, it displays incredulity and shock at what her mother has
just told her and thus construes her action as unexpected,
inappropriate and accountable.111 Yet, in the following turn, Olivia
simply carries on with her story without attending to her daughter’s
interjection (lines 175-178). When she describes the young woman’s
enthusiastic response to her offer and reports that the girl said
she always loved the house “from the outside” (line 177), Mary Jane
opposes her with a counter-assertion, claiming that all the houses
in the area “look exactly the same” (lines 179-180). Her use of the
intensifier “exactly” serves to reinforce the oppositional character
of her response. In the following turn, Olivia retaliates with a
counter-claim (cf. below), asserting that the girl said “there was
always something special about it” (lines 181-182). She immediately
goes on to support her argument by listing several details which the
girl remembered about the house and reporting that she said it was
“a dream come true” for her to have the house and that she “wouldn't
do a thing to it” (lines 186-188). Olivia closes her turn by
recounting that she was “so flattered” (lines 188-189) at what the
girl said, thus suggesting that she took her words at face value and
feels inclined to sell her the house. Again, Mary Jane reacts by
issuing the question word “What?” with emphatic rising intonation
(line 190), once more expressing disbelief and shock at what her
mother has just said. Instead of addressing her daughter’s affective
reaction, in the following turn, Olivia goes on to finish her
account by announcing that the young woman and her future husband
are going to inspect her house (“So they're coming to take a look
424
around.” line 191). Mary Jane responds to Olivia’s story simply by
saying “Mother” (line 192), presumably in a reproachful tone of
voice. Like her previous interjections, Mary Jane’s “Mother” signals
incredulity and shock at what her mother has just told her and
portrays her behaviour as objectionable. As discussed above, it
indicates that she disapproves of Olivia’s plan to sell her house
and, hence, constitutes an implicit accusation. In the following
turn, Olivia attends to the accusatory character of her daughter’s
activity, and produces an account for her behaviour (“Well, I never
said I was happy here.” line 193). As noted above, accusations
obligate the defendant to produce an account of some sort and thus
“to explain untoward behavior and bridge the gap between actions and
expectations” (Scott & Lyman 1968: 46). Olivia attempts to “bridge
the gap” between her offering Mrs. Harris’s daughter to inspect (and
eventually buy) her house on the one hand and Mary Jane’s obvious
expectation that she would keep the house on the other, by claiming
that she never said she was happy where she lived and thereby
portraying her behaviour as a logical consequence of her discontent
rather than an unpleasant surprise. However, Mary Jane is apparently
not satisfied with her mother’s explanation and opposes her again in
the next turn. Although she does not dispute Olivia’s assertion that
she “never said she was happy,” by claiming that her mother “didn’t
say anything” (line 194) she implies that Olivia failed to prepare
her daughter for a decision as crucial as the sale of her parents’
house. Hence, Mary Jane’s turn represents a complaint. The
oppositional character of her utterance is emphasised by means of
contrastive mirroring: She builds her counter by exploiting Olivia’s
prior formulation and transforming it to her advantage. In so doing,
she constructs a matching utterance, which enables her to oppose her
mother’s prior argument while simultaneously putting forward an
alternative position. In this manner, coherence is created at the
structural level, while a marked contrast is established at the
content level of interaction. However, Olivia is not willing to take
the blame and counter-opposes her daughter with a return-accusation
(“Then you should've asked me.” line 195), implying that Mary Jane
failed to show an interest in her mother’s mental condition. By this
means she shifts the responsibility for her daughter’s ignorance of
her plans on to Mary Jane herself. In other words, she turns the
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tables of accusation and forces her daughter to defend her position
rather than produce an account for her own behaviour. In fact,
Olivia’s manoeuvre is successful; in the following turn, Mary Jane
provides the requested account and offers an excuse. As described
earlier, excuses are accounts in which the defendant (implicitly)
admits that the activity in question is in some way inappropriate
but denies full responsibility by providing grounds through which it
can be understood as excusable, for instance, by arguing that the
shortcoming is explainable with reference to insufficient
information. By claiming that she “didn't know there was anything
wrong” (line 196-197), Mary Jane implicitly concedes that she failed
to ask her mother how she felt but denies that she is at fault by
arguing that her failure arose from a lack of knowledge rather than
a lack of interest. However, Olivia does not accept her daughter’s
excuse. Instead, she challenges her in the next turn. She begins her
counter with two interrogative constructions starting with the
question word “How” and the modal auxiliary “could”: “How could you
not know? How could you think I could stay here?” (lines 198-199).
Apparently, Olivia does not expect her questions to be answered;
rather she seems to use them as a way of making an exclamation. The
two rhetorical questions express both disbelief and indignation at
Mary Jane’s prior claim of ignorance, and thus serve to reject her
excuse as unconvincing and unacceptable. In the remainder of her
turn, Olivia further elaborates on her counter: Immediately
following the rhetorical questions, she produces an unfavourable
comment. With this argumentative move, she rejects Mary Jane’s prior
claim by characterising it as “just silly” (lines 199-200). Although
she does not explicitly insult her daughter, by categorising Mary
Jane’s utterance like that, she depicts her in an offensive way
through portraying her as someone who says silly things.
Subsequently, Olivia reinforces her counter by issuing another
unfavourable comment, which characterises Mary Jane’s behaviour as
“being silly” (line 200).112 Both comments portray Mary Jane in a
negative way; in the former case by means of categorising the
position she has put forward in the previous turn (“That's just
silly.”) and in the latter case through categorising her present
demeanour (“You’re just being silly now.”). Olivia concludes her
turn with the assertion: “Of course I can't stay here” (lines 200-
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201). The intensifier “of course” reinforces her claim and thus
aggravates opposition. It construes her own position as self-
evident, while at the same time implying that Mary Jane’s view is
absurd. In the following turn, Mary Jane reacts with disbelief and
lack of understanding at what her mother has just said. By claiming
that she “just can't believe this” and that “there's no reason for
this” (lines 202-203), she displays her disapproval of what Olivia
has told her and at the same time construes her mother’s actions as
both incomprehensible and inappropriate.
A few lines later in the same dispute sequence, Mary Jane
opposes Olivia with an accusation (“You were always like this.
Always like this.” (lines 243-244):
example (2): Home
243 MARY JANE You were always like this. Always like
244 this. I was 19 years old and you coulda
245 stopped me from going to California
246 with Jimbo to begin with and my life
247 woulda—
248 OLIVIA Nobody coulda stopped you.
249 MARY JANE You didn't even try! I was your daughter
250 and you didn't care where I ended up.
> 251 OLIVIA That's ridiculous. You didn't care where
252 you ended up.
The ECF with “always” serves to both intensify and legitimate her
criticism by construing Olivia’s failure to include her daughter in
her plans as a non-unique offence rather than a single instance.
Moreover, self-repetition serves to stress and underscore Mary
Jane’s position and thus aggravates the disagreement (cf. Gruber
1998: 491). In the remainder of her turn, Mary Jane elaborates on
her blame by citing Olivia’s failure to prevent her from going to
California with her husband as an example of her mother’s
inappropriate behaviour (lines 244-247). In line 248, however,
Olivia rejects her daughter’s accusation with an outright denial,
claiming that “Nobody coulda stopped” her. As discussed above, the
interruptive placement of her oppositional turn serves to aggravate
disagreement. However, Mary Jane insists on her critical position,
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and counter-opposes her mother’s denial, claiming that Olivia
“didn't even try” to stop her and alleging that she “didn't care”
about her daughter (lines 249-250). The increase in volume serves to
escalate the dispute even further. In the following turn, Olivia
once more rejects her daughter’s accusations. She begins her
oppositional turn with an unfavourable comment, categorising what
Mary Jane has just said as “ridiculous” (lines 251). With this
argumentative device, Olivia accomplishes at least two things:
firstly, she avoids producing the conditionally relevant response to
her daughter’s turn and thereby resists her attempt at constraining
her freedom of action. By returning an unfavourable comment in
response to Mary Jane’s accusation Olivia manages to avoid giving an
account for the violation that is implied by her daughter. Secondly,
in characterising Mary Jane’s prior utterance in this way, Olivia
depicts her daughter in a negative fashion by portraying her as
someone who makes ridiculous claims, and thus threatens her positive
face. The confrontational character of Olivia’s response is
reinforced by the remainder of her turn. Directly following the
negative evaluation of her daughter’s utterance, she launches a
counter attack, reversing the original participant roles and
obliging Mary Jane to produce an adequate response in the next turn
(“You didn’t care where you ended up.” lines 251-252). By this
return-accusation she turns the tables and puts the blame back on
Mary Jane, who is now obliged to provide an account in the next
turn. She builds her counter-assertion by repeating the exact
wording of her daughter’s prior utterance (“You didn’t care where I
ended up.”) and simply adjusting the personal pronoun. As discussed
above, this technique allows her to reject Mary Jane’s activity and
at the same time exploit her talk to construct an alternative
position. By this means, coherence is established at the level of
wording, while dissent is reinforced at the content level of
interaction.
In the example above, Olivia uses a meta-communicative
evaluation of Mary Jane’s prior utterance to preface a counter-
accusation. By contrast, in the following spate of talk, Mama
employs an unfavourable comment subsequent to a contradiction in
order to reinforce her opposition to Jessie’s prior threat to kill
herself.
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example (3): ‘night Mother
270 JESSIE If you call him, I'll just have to do it
271 before he gets here. Soon as you hang up the
272 phone, I'll just walk in the bedroom and lock
273 the door.
> 274 MAMA You will not! This is crazy talk, Jessie!
275 JESSIE Dawson will get here just in time to help you
276 clean up. Go ahead, call him. Then call the
277 police. Then call the funeral home. Then call
278 Loretta and see if she'll do your nails.
As discussed above, prior to this exchange, Mama has announced that
she is going to phone her son to ask for help in preventing Jessie
from killing herself. After her previous attempts to keep Mama from
calling her brother have failed, Jessie resorts to a threat: if Mama
does not comply, she will shoot herself at once (lines 270-273). In
line 274, Mama opposes her with an outright contradiction, negating
Jessie’s prior utterance: “You will not!” Immediately following the
contradiction, she issues an unfavourable comment, categorising
Jessie’s prior utterance as “crazy talk.” The volume increase in
combination with the turn-final address term aggravates
opposition.113 By issuing an unfavourable comment, Mama construes
Jessie’s activity as unacceptable and thus refuses to comply with
her daughter’s demand to abstain from calling her son. In other
words, the meta-communicative evaluation of Jessie’s utterance
provides an argumentative resource that enables Mama to resist her
daughter’s attempt at constraining her freedom of action. Moreover,
by characterising Jessie’s utterance as “crazy talk,” Mama portrays
her as a person who is acting crazy and therefore cannot be taken
seriously. In so doing, she obliges Jessie to defend her position in
the following turn and thus limits her freedom of action, because
submission would lead to a loss of face (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987:
68). However, in the following turn, Jessie simply reinforces her
preceding claim. By illustrating the consequences Mama would have to
face if she insisted on calling her brother, she implies that she is
going to carry out her threat if Mama does not back down (lines 275-
278).
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The sequential placement of the unfavourable comments in the
two preceding examples indicates that such argumentative moves tend
to occur following extended disagreement sequences in which the
opponents have mutually opposed each other’s positions in various
ways without reaching a resolution. Moreover, unfavourable comments
allow the speaker to display a negative affective reaction to what
the opponent has just said and thus signal high involvement. Hence,
they typically ‘turn up the emotional heat’ of an ongoing dispute.
The preceding instances of unfavourable comments take the form
of declarative statements in which anaphoric reference is used to
establish coherence between the meta-communicative evaluation and
the talk it opposes. By contrast, the following examples are
realised by the elliptical declarative “Nonsense.” This format is
typically used to initiate oppositional turns and is commonly
followed by additional disagreeing moves. Similar to partial
repeats, these remarks function as opposition prefaces which
announce right at the beginning of the turn that opposition is being
produced. For instance, in the exchange below, Mother uses this
format to preface a contradiction of her daughter’s preceding claim.
example (4): Tell me
1 MOTHER What’s the matter?
2 DAUGHTER I hear something. There's something in the
3 corner.
> 4 MOTHER Nonsense. There's nothing in the corner.
5 DAUGHTER But, Mama, I hear something!
6 MOTHER (With a sigh.) Alright, we'll turn on the
7 light and take a look. There, you see,
8 there's nothing in the corner.
This scene portrays a typical goodnight routine: mother is putting
her daughter to bed. Apparently, the girl signals that something is
bothering her, which prompts the mother to ask her “What’s the
matter?” (line 1). When the daughter replies that she hears
something and claims that “There’s something in the corner” (lines
2-3), Mother opposes her assertion in the following turn. She begins
her turn with an unfavourable comment, categorising what her
daughter has just said as “Nonsense” (line 4). By this means, she
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displays opposition at the very beginning of her turn. Immediately
following meta-communicative evaluation, Mother adds a
contradiction, negating her daughter’s prior utterance: “There’s
nothing in the corner.” However, in the following turn, the daughter
insists on her position, and repeats her prior claim: “I hear
something!” (line 5). The increase in volume serves to intensify
disagreement. In response to her daughter’s insisting, the mother
gives in and agrees to “turn on the light and take a look” (lines 6-
8).
In the example above, Mother uses an unfavourable comment to
preface a contradiction of her daughter’s prior assertion. However,
as the next extracts show, such moves can be employed to preface
various kinds of oppositional moves. For instance, in the following
spate of talk, the mother rejects her daughter’s complaint with an
unfavourable comment and then goes on to support her position by
adding a counter-assertion.
example (5): Tell me
550 DAUGHTER You're spoiling him.
> 551 MOTHER Nonsense. He's just a little frightened,
552 that's all. Children are afraid of the dark
553 now and then.
554 DAUGHTER He was trying to get your attention and he
555 succeeded. He knows very well there's
556 nothing in the corner. We go through that
557 routine every night. It's his way of
558 getting someone to sit with him.
559 MOTHER There's no harm in sitting here for awhile.
In this sequence, the mother and daughter are arguing about bringing
up children. In line 550, the daughter accuses her mother of
spoiling her grandson. In the following turn, Mother rejects her
daughter’s complaint with an unfavourable comment: By formulating
her daughter’s claim as “Nonsense” (line 551), she disputes the
validity of her accusation. Immediately afterwards, she produces a
counter-assertion, claiming that her grandson was “just a little
frightened.” The phrase “that’s all” at the end of her utterance
construes her daughter’s reaction as exaggerated and thus
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intensifies opposition. At the end of her turn, she issues a
generalisation: “Children are afraid of the dark now and then”
(lines 552-553). By this means, she portrays her grandson’s fear of
darkness as common and normal, and thus both legitimises her own
behaviour and construes her daughter’s complaint as unfounded and
out of place. In the following turn, the daughter opposes her again,
claiming that her son just pretended to be afraid to get his
grandmother to stay with him. She supports her position by arguing
that she and her son “go through that routine every night” (line
556-557), thus claiming superior knowledge of her son’s behaviour.
However, in the following turn, her mother discards her claim with a
counter-assertion, claiming: “There's no harm in sitting here for
awhile” (line 559).
While in the preceding extract, Mother uses the unfavourable
comment “Nonsense” to reject her daughter’s preceding complaint, in
the example below, she employs this format to oppose her daughter’s
prior assertions:
example (6): Tell me
172 MOTHER Big girls don't cry.
173 DAUGHTER (Petulantly.) I'm not a big girl.
174 MOTHER Of course you're a big girl. You're in
175 fourth grade. They don't put little girls
176 in fourth grade.
177 DAUGHTER I hate fourth grade.
> 178 MOTHER Nonsense, you love it. Why, just the other
179 day you told me you loved your teacher.
180 DAUGHTER I don't. I hate her.
> 181 MOTHER Nonsense. Why would you hate your teacher?
182 DAUGHTER Because she's an old meanie.
183 MOTHER Why, she seems just as nice as she can be.
184 DAUGHTER She's a mean old meanie.
> 185 MOTHER Now that's not nice.
186 DAUGHTER Well, she is.
At the beginning of this extract, the daughter is apparently crying.
In line 172, Mother opposes her with the cliché “Big girls don’t
cry.” By presupposing that her daughter is a big girl, she portrays
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her daughter’s behaviour as inappropriate. In line 173, the daughter
disputes the presupposition in her mother’s utterance, arguing that
she is “not a big girl.” However, Mother insists on her position and
counter-opposes her with a contradiction: “Of course you're a big
girl” (line 174). The use of the intensifier “Of course” at the
beginning of her turn emphasises disagreement. Directly following
the contradiction, she goes on to support her claim by arguing that
the fact that her daughter is in fourth grade is sufficient evidence
that she is not a little girl anymore (lines 174-176). In the
following turn, however, the daughter opposes her with a counter-
assertion. By claiming that she hates fourth grade (line 177), she
implies that she does not belong there and thereby rejects her
mother’s claim as invalid. In line 178, Mother rejects her assertion
with an unfavourable comment, categorising what she has just said as
“Nonsense” and immediately adds a counter-assertion (“you love it.”
line 178). In the remainder of her turn, she supports her position
by citing her daughter’s remark that she loved her teacher as
evidence (lines 178-179). However, in the next turn, the daughter
opposes her again, denying that she loves her teacher (“I don’t.”
line 180) and claiming that, in fact, she hates her. The use of the
antonym “hate” (as opposed to “love”) creates cohesion at the
structural level of interaction, while intensifying dissent at the
content level. Once again, Mother opposes her assertion with an
unfavourable comment, characterising her utterance as “Nonsense”
(line 181). She immediately adds a demand for explanation in the
form of an interrogative: “Why would you hate your teacher?”,
obliging her daughter to account for her claim in the following
turn. However, when the girl provides the requested account,
claiming that her teacher “is an old meanie” (line 182), the mother
does not accept her explanation. Instead, she expresses her doubts
about the truth of her assertion, arguing that her teacher “seems
just as nice as she can be” (line 183). When the daughter insists on
her position and repeats her prior claim (“She's a mean old meanie.”
line 184), Mother opposes her with another unfavourable comment,
characterising her remark as “not nice” (line 185). Although it
clearly represents a meta-communicative evaluation of prior talk,
this move differs from the preceding instances of unfavourable
comments in two respects. Firstly, while the unfavourable comments
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in lines 178 and 181 are used to preface additional oppositional
moves, the critical remark “Now that’s not nice” stands alone in a
turn. Secondly, rather than calling into question the propositional
content of the prior claim, it challenges the appropriateness of her
daughter’s preceding remark and obliges her to resume the floor
account for her utterance in the following turn. However, in line
186, the daughter responds simply by saying “Well, she is.” While
the “Well”-preface indicates that she does not dispute her mother’s
evaluation of her activity, she nevertheless insists on the
propositional content of her utterance.
Similar to the critical remark “Now that’s not nice” in the
preceding extract, the following instances of unfavourable comments
are employed to challenge the appropriateness of the opponent’s
preceding activity.
example (7): ‘night Mother
720 MAMA Good time don't come looking for you, Jessie.
721 You could work some puzzles or put in a
722 garden or go to the store. Let's call a taxi
723 and go to the A&P!
724 JESSIE I shopped you up for about two weeks already.
725 You're not going to need toilet paper till
726 Thanksgiving.
> 727 MAMA (Interrupting.) You're acting like some little
728 brat, Jessie. You're mad and everybody's
729 boring and you don't have anything to do and
730 you don't like me and you don't like going
731 out and you don't like staying in and you
732 never talk on the phone and you don't watch TV
733 and you're miserable and it's your own sweet
734 fault.
735 JESSIE And it’s time I did something about it.
736 MAMA Not something like killing yourself.
Prior to this extract, Jessie has tried to explain to her mother why
she wants to put an end to her life. At the beginning of this
sequence, Mama tries to dissuade her daughter from committing
suicide. She tells her that she has to take her life in hand (“Good
time don't come looking for you, Jessie.” lines 720-721) and
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proposes several activities she could engage in to keep herself busy
and make her life more attractive: “You could work some puzzles or
put in a garden or go to the store.” (lines 721-722). Mama closes
her turn with a directive, suggesting that they call a cab and go
shopping in the local supermarket: “Let's call a taxi and go to the
A&P!” (lines 722-723). Jessie responds by claiming that she has
already done the shopping and has even built up a rich supply of
household items (lines 724-726). In so doing, she rejects both
Mama’s suggestion and her attempts at distracting her from her plan
to put an end to her life. At the content level of interaction,
Jessie’s utterance informs Mama that she is “not going to need
toilet paper until Thanksgiving” (lines 725-726). At the
interpersonal level, however, her remark indicates that she is not
willing to discuss her plan to kill herself any further. Moreover,
the humorous key of her utterance (cf. Ch. 6.3.2) suggests that she
does not take the conversation or her mother’s concerns seriously.
This prompts Mama to issue an unfavourable comment: By formulating
Jessie’s activity as “acting like some little brat” (lines 727-728)
she rejects her daughter’s behaviour as inappropriate, offensive and
irresponsible. Hence, her utterance also acts as a reprimand and
obliges Jessie to provide an account for her conduct in the
following turn. The interruptive placement of Mama’s counter signals
her indignation and aggravates opposition. In addition, by
categorising Jessie’s behaviour in such a negative way, she
threatens her positive face and thus further reinforces the
confrontational character of her utterance. In the remainder of her
turn, she elaborates on her accusation, providing a detailed
description of her daughter’s behaviour (lines 728-734). In the
following turn, rather than disputing her mother’s accusation or
providing an explanation for her behaviour, Jessie confirms Mama’s
assessment and argues that it is time she “did something about it”
(line 735), suggesting that her plan to kill herself is but a
logical consequence of the situation Mama has just described. That
is to say, instead of putting up a defence against Mama’s attack,
she exploits her argument and uses it for her own position. In the
following turn, Mama disputes the implicature of Jessie’s prior
utterance, arguing that suicide is not the solution to her problems:
“Not something like killing yourself.” (line 736).
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In the following sequence, Mother uses an unfavourable comment
to avoid compliance with her daughter’s request:
example (8): Tell me
109 DAUGHTER Mama?
110 MOTHER (Exasperated.) What?
111 DAUGHTER (In a small voice.) Sing me a song.
> 112 MOTHER You're five years old and you're acting like
113 a baby!
114 DAUGHTER Please...
115 MOTHER Alright. If you're going to act like a baby,
116 I'll sing you a baby song.
Prior to this fragment, Mother has tried for some time to put her
daughter to bed. When the girl asks her to sing her a song in line
111, Mother responds with an unfavourable comment. By referring to
her daughter’s age and claiming that she is “acting like a baby”
(lines 112-113), she portrays her behaviour as inappropriate. Hence,
her critical remark has an accusatory function. By this means, she
manages to put off her daughter’s request while at the same time
obliging her account for her behaviour in the subsequent turn. The
volume increase indicates her exasperation and intensifies
opposition. However, when the daughter repeats her request (line
144), the mother eventually complies (albeit grudgingly) and agrees
to sing her a song, though one for babies (lines 115-116).
To conclude, the preceding discussion has shown that disputants
can oppose an interlocutor’s preceding activity by explicitly
evaluating what was said in the previous turn in a negative way.
Unfavourable comments such as “That’s silly,” “That’s ridiculous,”
or “Nonsense” may be employed to challenge the propositional content
of the prior speaker’s talk. In addition, the appropriateness of the
opponent’s prior activity may be called into question by means of
unfavourable comparisons such as “You’re acting like some little
brat,” or “You’re acting like a baby.” As we have seen, such
argumentative moves may be employed to oppose a variety of
activities. For instance, they can be used to refuse to comply with
another’s request, to reject an opponent’s accusation or to dispute
an interlocutor’s claim. They allow the speaker to avoid or put off
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complying with the sequential requirements established by the
interlocutor’s prior activity. That is to say, by issuing an
unfavourable comment, the speaker is able to evade or delay
producing the conditionally relevant response to another’s preceding
turn. Hence, unfavourable comments provide a discursive resource
that disputants can employ to resist the opponent’s attempt at
constraining their freedom of action, i.e. at exercising discursive
power.
Furthermore, with regard to the interpersonal plane of
interaction, unfavourable comments present a threat to the
addressee’s positive face in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987:
66), in showing that the speaker has a negative evaluation of some
aspect of the addressee’s behaviour (i.e. her actions, wants or
beliefs). As a result, following an unfavourable comment, the
recipient can either back down, and lose face, or put up some
defence against the other’s attack. Therefore, unfavourable comments
provide a conversational resource available to speakers that may be
exploited to resist and exercise interactional power at various
levels of the dispute-in-interaction.
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In a heated argument we are apt to lose sight of the
truth. (Publilius Syrus)
All you get from a circular argument is dizzy.
(Darrin Bell, Candorville)
7.10 Contradictions
Another common way in which the disputants in my data ‘do
opposition’ is by denying the truth of the prior speaker’s
utterance. I will refer to this arguing technique as
‘contradiction.’ Contradictions are a class of utterances that
dispute the propositional content of the prior speaker’s claim by
maintaining the opposite of what she has just said either through a
negation or by means of an affirmative sentence. Thus, (in contrast
to such arguing techniques as, for instance, relevance challenges or
competence challenges) contradictions aim primarily at the content
level of utterances rather than other planes of interaction.
Contradictions present a threat to the addressee’s positive face in
the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987), as they indicate that the
speaker thinks that the hearer “is wrong or misguided or
unreasonable about some issue, such wrongness being associated with
disapproval” (66). Consequently, contradictions put the defendant in
a position either to back down and accept a loss of face, or to
attempt to save face by means of insisting on her prior claim, and
thus maintain the disagreement sequence. In this sense,
contradictions are control manoeuvres, i.e. attempts at exercising
discursive power at the structural level of interaction, because
they limit the addressee’s freedom of action.
Similar oppositional moves have been described in studies of
children’s disputes, where they have been referred to as
“disagreement” (M. H. Goodwin 1990) or “denial” (Brenneis & Lein
1977). Likewise, in arguments between adults, conflict researchers
have observed arguing techniques such as “Zurückweisungen”
(Apeltauer 1978), “simple negation” (Vuchinich 1984; Knoblauch 1995)
and “contradictions” (Muntigl & Turnbull 1998), in which the speaker
utters a negation of the opponent’s previous claim. Similar
phenomena have been found in disagreement sequences in institutional
contexts. For example, in a study of controversial TV-discussions,
Gruber (1996a; 1998) describes “overt disagreements,” which dispute
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the truth of an interlocutor’s utterance, for instance, by means of
negation. Similarly, Spranz-Fogasy (1986) has observed that the most
frequent disagreement technique used in a corpus of mediation
hearings is what he calls “Gegenbehauptung,” which involves arguing
the opposite of what the opponent has claimed, usually by repeating
the interlocutor’s prior utterance using disagreement markers.
In my data, contradictions tend to be produced immediately
following or in overlap with the opponent’s prior turn. They stand
on their own in a turn or occur in combination with additional
oppositional moves. Contradictions often have the syntactic form of
a declarative sentence containing negative particles such as “no,”
“not,” “nothing,” “never,” etc., indicating that the opposite of the
prior speaker’s claim is true. For instance, in the following
extract from ‘night Mother, Mama uses a negative declarative
sentence which denies the propositional content of her daughter’s
utterance:
example (1): ‘night Mother
2216 MAMA You said you wanted to do my nails.
2217 JESSIE (Taking a small step backward.) I can't.
2218 It's too late.
> 2219 MAMA It's not too late!
2220 JESSIE I don't want you to wake Dawson and Loretta
2221 when you call. I want them to still be up
2222 and dressed so they can get right over.
Prior to this sequence, Jessie has announced that it’s time for her
to leave, implying that, eventually, she is going to carry out her
plan to commit suicide. Following several unsuccessful attempts to
dissuade her daughter from leaving, in line 2216, Mama tries to hold
Jessie back by reminding her that she promised to do her mother’s
nails. When Jessie refuses to comply with her Mama’s implicit
request to give her a manicure, claiming “It’s too late” (line
2218), Mama opposes her with a contradiction in the form of a
negation: “It’s not too late!” (line 2219). By this means, she
disputes the propositional content of Jessie’s prior claim through
maintaining the opposite of what her daughter has just said. The
increase in volume signals high involvement and serves to intensify
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opposition. Her mother’s aggravated disagreement prompts Jessie to
provide an extended account for her insistence on her schedule
(lines 2220-2222).
Similarly, in the following extract from Tell me, Mother
contradicts her daughter’s claim that “There’s something in the
corner” by means of a negation.
example (2): Tell me
1 MOTHER What’s the matter?
2 DAUGHTER I hear something. There's something in the
3 corner.
> 4 MOTHER Nonsense. There's nothing in the corner.
5 DAUGHTER But, Mama, I hear something!
6 MOTHER (With a sigh.) Alright, we'll turn on the
7 light and take a look. There, you see, there's
8 nothing in the corner.
This scene portrays a typical goodnight routine; mother is putting
her daughter to bed. When the daughter claims that “There’s
something in the corner” (lines 2-3), Mother opposes her with a
contradiction. Like Mama in the preceding example, she constructs
this oppositional move by repeating the proposition from her
daughter’s prior utterance with negative polarity (“There’s nothing
in the corner.” line 4). By negating her daughter’s utterance,
Mother asserts that the opposition of what the girl has just said is
true. In contrast to the previous extract, Mother does not produce
the contradiction immediately following the utterance it refers to.
Instead, she begins her turn with an unfavourable comment, which
reinforces her oppositional stance. As discussed above, by
categorising what her daughter has just said as “Nonsense” (line 4),
she disputes the propositional content of her utterance. Similar to
partial repeats, this meta-communicative evaluation functions as an
opposition preface which announces right at the beginning of her
turn that disagreement is being produced. In addition, it allows her
to display a negative affective reaction to what her daughter has
just said and thus serves to emphasise opposition. However, in spite
of her mother’s aggravated opposition, in the following turn, the
daughter insists on her prior claim (line 5). The increase in volume
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serves to intensify disagreement. Eventually, the mother gives in
and agrees to “turn on the light and take a look” (lines 6-8).
In the following extract from ‘night Mother, Jessie uses
negation to contradict her mother’s claim that her epilepsy was
effectuated by something she (Mama) did. In contrast to the
preceding examples, in which the speakers provide no alternative
position but simply challenge the interlocutors’ prior utterance by
negating its propositional content, here Jessie’s contradiction is
followed by an elaboration of her own standpoint.
example (3): ‘night Mother
1734 MAMA (Beginning to break down.) Maybe I fed you
1735 the wrong thing. Maybe you had a fever
1736 sometime and I didn't know it soon enough.
1737 Maybe it's a punishment.
1738 JESSIE For what?
1739 MAMA I don't know. Because of how I felt about
1740 your father. Because I didn't want any more
1741 children. Because I smoked too much or
1742 didn't eat right when I was carrying you.
1743 It has to be something I did.
> 1744 JESSIE It does not. It's just a sickness, not a
1745 curse. Epilepsy doesn't mean anything. It
1746 just is.
At the beginning of this passage, Mama speculates about possible
causes for Jessie’s disease. When in her turn-final utterance, she
hypothesises that her daughter’s epilepsy might be “a punishment”
(line 1737), Jessie challenges her with a demand for explanation
(“For what?” line 1738), requesting that she resume the floor and
provide a reason for her claim. Indeed, in the following turn, Mama
accounts for her prior utterance by listing a number of lapses on
her part, for which she might deserve punishment, and closes her
turn claiming that “It has to be something I did” (line 1743). At
line 1744, Jessie opposes her with a contradiction. By negating
Mama’s utterance (“It does not.”), she disputes the validity of her
claim. In the remainder of her turn, she elaborates her oppositional
position, arguing that her state of health is not a consequence of
her mother’s failures.
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Contradictions provide a discursive resource that can be
employed to challenge various kinds of activities on the part of an
opponent. In the exchanges above, this argumentative device is used
to dispute an opponent’s prior assertion. By contrast, in the
following extract from My sister, Madame Danzard uses this
oppositional move to deny the truth of her daughter’s preceding
accusation.114
example (4): My sister 9
22 ISABELLE One, two, three ... begin. Maman - that
23 is not fair.
24 MADAME DANZARD What's not fair?
25 ISABELLE You started at two.
> 26 MADAME DANZARD I did not. I absolutely did not.
27 However, if you insist, we'll start
28 again.
Madame Danzard and her daughter Isabelle are playing cards. When
Isabelle complains that her mother is being unfair, claiming that
she has started too early (line 25), Madame Danzard rejects her
daughter’s utterance by means of a negation: “I did not.” (line 26).
By maintaining that the opposite of what Isabelle has just said is
true, she disputes the truth of her daughter’s claim. Moreover, the
immediate repetition of the negative declarative in combination with
the intensifier “absolutely” displays her indignation at Isabelle’s
allegation and serves to intensify opposition. Nevertheless,
subsequent to her aggravated denial, she offers a compromise
proposing to restart the game, thus resolving the disagreement
sequence.
As mentioned above, a speaker contradicts by uttering the
negated proposition expressed by the previous claim. That is, if the
prior speaker has uttered an affirmative statement, the
contradiction consists in a negative declarative sentence containing
negative particles such as “no,” “not,” “nothing,” etc., as in the
examples above. If, by contrast, the talk that is opposed already
contains negative particles, the contradiction consists in an
affirmative declarative sentence, as the following extract from My
sister shows:
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example (5): My sister 12
15 MADAME DANZARD I want you to wear it Friday when we go
16 to the Flintons'.
17 ISABELLE But it won't be ready in—
> 18 MADAME DANZARD (Interrupting.) It will be ready. She
19 hardly has anything to do.
In this scene, Isabelle is trying on a new dress that needs
adjustments. The sequence starts with Madame Danzard telling
Isabelle that she wants her to wear the dress the following Friday
at their next visit to the Flintons’ (lines 15-16). When Isabelle
objects that the dress “won’t be ready” by then (line 17), her
mother opposes her with a contradiction. She constructs her
oppositional move by repeating her daughter’s prior statement but
using the opposite polarity (“It will be ready.” line 18), thus
denying Isabelle’s utterance. The interruptive placement of the
contradiction indicates high involvement and serves to aggravate
disagreement. Directly following the contradiction, Madame Danzard
produces an assertion providing evidence in support of her claim. By
arguing that the maid “hardly has anything to do” (line 19), she
implies that she will be able to finish the adjustments in time.
Contradictions that do not contain negative particles often
contain positive disagreement markers, such as, for instance, “yes”
or “too,” which assert the opposite of a negated prior claim, as the
following two examples illustrate:
example (6): ‘night Mother
1407 MAMA Ricky is too much like Cecil.
1408 JESSIE He's not. Ricky is as much like me as it's
1409 possible for any human to be. We even wear
1410 the same size pants. These are his, I think.
1411 MAMA That's just the same size. That's not you're
1412 the same person.
1413 JESSIE
1414 We look out at the world and we see the same
1415 thing: Not Fair. And the only difference
1416 between us is Ricky's out there trying to get
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1417 even. And he knows not to trust anybody and
1418 he got it straight from me. And he knows not
1419 to try to get work, and guess where he got
1420 that. He walks around like there's loose
1421 boards in the floor, and you know who laid
1422 that floor, I did.
1423 MAMA Ricky isn't through yet. You don't know how
1424 he'll turn out!
> 1425 JESSIE (Going back to the kitchen.) Yes I do and so
1426 did Cecil. Ricky is the two of us together for
1427 all time in too small a space. And we're
1428 tearing each other apart, like always, inside
1429 that boy, and if you don't see it, then you're
1430 just blind.
In this extract, Mama and Jessie are arguing about the character of
Jessie’s son Ricky. The sequence starts with Mama claiming that he
“is too much” like his father Cecil (line 1407). In the following
turn, Jessie opposes her with a contradiction (“He's not.” line
1408), and then goes on to argue that, in fact, Ricky bears an
unusually close resemblance to her. She closes her turn with a
supportive assertion providing evidence for her claim by pointing
out that she and her son “even wear the same size pants” (lines
1409-1410). In the following turn, Mama dismisses her argument as
invalid by disputing that the fact that they wear the same size
implies that they also have a similar character (lines 1411-1412).
However, Jessie insists on her position; she cites a considerable
number of characteristics that she and her son have in common as
evidence of their similarity (lines 1413-1422). Although Mama
apparently cannot dispute her daughter’s claim, she does not
surrender without a struggle. While she implicitly concedes that
Jessie is right in claiming that her son takes after her, by arguing
that Ricky is still in his adolescence and therefore Jessie does not
know “how he’ll turn out” (line 1424), she implies that he might
still change. The increase in volume signals high involvement and
serves to reinforce opposition. However, in the following turn,
Jessie again counters her with a contradiction. Her turn begins with
the positive disagreement marker “Yes,” which asserts the opposite
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of her mother’s negated prior claim. This is followed by a
repetition of the verb phrase from Mama’s prior statement produced
with the opposite polarity (“Yes I do” line 1425). In the remainder
of her turn, she expands on her position, arguing that her son’s
problems are obvious (lines 1426-1430).
Likewise, in the extract from Alto below, Wanda twice opposes
her mother’s preceding negative statements by means of
contradictions containing positive disagreement markers:
example (7): Alto II,1
119 WANDA (Scared, moves back, crying.) I don't want to
120 die.
121 FLORENE (Still fanning HATTIE.) Nobody does. Now stay
122 over here, and calm down. See how brave Miz
123 Hattie is?
124 WANDA It's easy for her to be brave. She's old and
125 already had her life. I haven't even started
126 to live yet.
127 FLORENE I haven't either. Not really.
> 128 WANDA You have too. You've been to Galveston and
129 Wichita Falls and had cocktails at nightclubs.
((...))
138 WANDA And you've had a chance to sing.
139 FLORENE I never had a chance to sing!
> 140 WANDA Yes, you did! You just didn't do it!
141 FLORENE The only time I ever got to sing was at that
142 nightclub in Galveston.
Outside, a fierce thunderstorm is raging, threatening to blow away
the house. Apparently, Wanda is very frightened; she is crying and
says she does not want to die (lines 119-120). Rather than
comforting her daughter, Florene tells her to step back from the
window and calm down (lines 121-122). She supports her position by
referring to the exemplary behaviour of their landlady, Miz Hattie
(lines 122-123). In the following turn, Wanda dismisses her mother’s
argument as invalid claiming that, due to a considerable difference
in age, Miz Hattie’s and her own situation are incommensurable
(lines 124-1269). When Florene picks up her daughter’s turn-final
utterance at line 127 and states that like Wanda, she has not really
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“started to live yet,” Wanda opposes her with a contradiction. She
builds her counter by repeating Florene’s statement but producing it
with the opposite polarity (“You have” line 128), and then adds the
positive disagreement marker “too,” which asserts the affirmative of
her mother’s negated prior claim. In the remainder of her turn, she
cites a prior trip of Florene to Galveston as evidence for her
antagonistic position (lines 128-129). Following a brief side
sequence between Florene and Miz Hattie (lines 130-137), Wanda
provides another piece of evidence in support of her argument,
claiming that – unlike her – Florene has had the opportunity to
practice her singing (line 138). In the following turn, Florene
opposes her with an aggravated contradiction (“I never had a chance
to sing!” line 139). By way of negation, she disputes the
propositional content of Wanda’s utterance. Moreover, the ECF
“never” as well as the increase in volume serves to intensify
opposition and signals high involvement. But Wanda insists on her
position and counter-opposes her mother with another contradiction:
“Yes, you did!” (line 140). Her turn begins with the positive
disagreement marker “Yes,” asserting the affirmative of her mother’s
negated claim. This is followed by a repetition of Florene’s prior
statement produced with the opposite, i.e. positive, polarity.
Contradictions may also involve emphatic adverbs such as “of
course” or “sure,” which reinforce the speaker’s claim that the
opposite of the opponent’s prior utterance is true, as exemplified
by the following two extracts:
example (8): Tell me
213 DAUGHTER Why am I left-handed? Nobody else in my class
214 is left-handed.
215 MOTHER Because you were born that way.
216 DAUGHTER Why was I born that way? Nobody else in my
217 class was born that way.
> 218 MOTHER Of course they were.
219 DAUGHTER I'm the only one!
220 MOTHER That's very strange. There are usually a lot
221 of left-handed children in a class.
222 DAUGHTER Well, I'm the only one.
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At the beginning of this sequence, the daughter asks her mother why
she is left-handed (line 213). Directly following the request for
information, she adds an assertion, claiming that “Nobody else” in
her class is left-handed (lines 213-214). In using the extreme
expression “nobody,” she construes her left-handedness as an
uncommon property and thus legitimises her query. In the following
turn, the mother answers her daughter’s question with the brief
statement “Because you were born that way” (line 215). At line 216,
the daughter issues another “Wh”-question, requesting that her
mother provide a more detailed account for her daughter’s left-
handedness. She builds her request for information by picking up a
part of her mother’s preceding statement and transforming it into an
interrogative (“Why was I born that way?” line 216). In doing so,
she formulates her mother’s prior turn as an unsatisfactory response
to her initial question, which requires further elaboration.
Moreover, immediately following the interrogative, she adds an
assertion, claiming that “Nobody else” in her class was born that
way (lines 216-217). As in her prior turn, the extreme formulation
“nobody” formulates her left-handedness as something atypical, and
thus serves to justify her inquisitiveness. At line 218, instead of
answering her daughter’s question, the mother opposes her with a
contradiction: “Of course they were.” By issuing an affirmative
declarative sentence that asserts the affirmative of her daughter’s
negated prior utterance, she disputes the propositional content of
her daughter’s claim. Furthermore, the emphatic “of course”
formulates as obvious her claim that the opposite of what the girl
has just said is true, and thus serves to intensify disagreement.
However, in spite of her mother’s aggravated opposition, the
daughter insists on her position, and maintains that she is “the
only one” in her class born left-handed (line 219). In addition, the
increase in volume signals high emotional involvement and serves to
further escalate disagreement. In response to her daughter’s
insisting, the mother backs down. Although she maintains that
“usually there a lot of left-handed children in a class” (lines 220-
221), she does not dispute her daughter’s claim any longer. The
sequence ends with the daughter repeating her assertion that she is
“the only one” (line 222).
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In the extract from ‘night Mother below, Jessie prefaces her
contradiction with the intensifier “sure” to add force to her claim
that the opposite of Mama’s prior assertion is true.
example (9): ‘night Mother
1953 MAMA (Quickly.) Jessie. I can't just sit here and
1954 say O.K., kill yourself if you want to.
> 1955 JESSIE Sure you can. You just did. Say it again.
1956 MAMA (Really startled.) Jessie! (Quiet horror.)
1957 How dare you! (Furious.) How dare you!
As noted above, prior to this brief extract, Mama has repeatedly -
but unsuccessfully - tried to dissuade Jessie from committing
suicide. At the beginning of this sequence, Mama launches another
attempt, claiming that Jessie cannot expect her to accept that she
is planning to kill herself without a word of protest, let alone
explicitly encourage her to do so (lines 1953-1954). At line 1955,
Jessie opposes her mother’s claim by means of a contradiction. She
constructs her turn-initial move by picking up the verb phrase of
Mama’s prior negative declarative statement (“I can’t”) and
producing it with the opposite polarity (“you can”). In addition,
she prefaces the contradiction with the emphatic adverb “Sure,” and
thereby intensifies disagreement. Subsequently, she adds an
assertion supporting her position, pointing out that Mama has just
produced exactly the utterance she claims she cannot make (“You just
did”). Finally, she concludes her turn with a directive, telling
Mama to repeat her prior statement (“Say it again.”). Mama’s
subsequent response reveals that she is completely taken aback by
her daughter’s reasoning. She begins her turn by exclaiming her
daughter’s first name (“Jessie!” line 1956), presumably in a
reproachful tone of voice. The interjection signals incredulity and
shock at what her daughter has just said and portrays her action as
both unexpected and inappropriate. Her response indicates that she
strongly disapproves of Jessie’s behaviour and, hence, constitutes
an accusation. This interpretation of her turn-initial utterance is
corroborated by the subsequent moves. Following the blame-
implicative address, Mama produces the formulaic interrogative
construction “How dare you!”, expressing both shock and indignation
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at Jessie’s prior utterance. The modal auxiliary “dare” construes
Jessie’s preceding activity as an offence. As discussed earlier, the
interrogative construction “How” + modal auxiliary “dare” + second
person pronoun is a conventionalised format for accusations and is
generally oriented to as such by conversationalists in the
production and interpretation of utterances. In addition, the volume
increase signals a negative affective reaction (i.e. horror and
anger, as indicated by the stage directions) at what Jessie has just
said and thus serves to aggravate disagreement. Moreover, the
subsequent repetition of the accusatory question signals high
emotional involvement and further aggravates opposition.
Contradictions are a class of argumentative moves by which a
speaker denies the truth of the prior speaker’s claim. They are
concerned with the content of the opponent’s previous utterance,
with its sense and reference. As Jackson & Scott (1980) have pointed
out, this involves “what is predicated in an utterance, as well as
all those attendant propositions that are presupposed or entailed by
a speaker in making the utterance” (255). In other words, besides
negating the proposition of the opponent’s prior utterance, as in
the extracts above, contractions may also dispute a presupposition
expressed in the interlocutor’s preceding statement, as the
following two examples illustrate:115
example (10): Tell me
172 MOTHER Big girls don't cry.
> 173 DAUGHTER (Petulantly.) I'm not a big girl.
174 MOTHER Of course you're a big girl. You're in
175 fourth grade. They don't put little girls
176 in fourth grade.
At the beginning of this sequence, the daughter is obviously crying.
Rather than comforting her daughter, at line 172, the mother
challenges her with the cliché “Big girls don’t cry.” By
presupposing that her daughter is a big girl – and as such should
not cry - she portrays the girl’s behaviour as inappropriate. In the
following turn, the daughter opposes her mother’s claim with a
contradiction. She disputes the presupposition of her mother’s
utterance, arguing that she is “not a big girl” (line 173), and
449
thereby also dismisses her mother’s criticism as invalid. Her
“petulant” tone of voice indicates a negative affective reaction at
her mother’s unsympathetic behaviour. However, Mother insists on her
position and counter-opposes her daughter with a reciprocal
contradiction: “Of course you're a big girl.” (line 174). As
described above, the intensifier “of course” at the beginning of her
turn emphasises disagreement. She immediately goes on to support her
position by citing the fact that her daughter is in fourth grade as
evidence for her claim (lines 174-176).
In the following extract from ‘night Mother, Jessie employs the
same device to challenge her mother’s preceding utterance.
example (11): ‘night Mother
1373 MAMA I married you off to the wrong man, I admit
1374 that. So I took you in when he left. I'm
1375 sorry.
> 1376 JESSIE He wasn't the wrong man.
1377 MAMA He didn't love you, Jessie, or he wouldn't
1378 have left.
> 1379 JESSIE He wasn't the wrong man, Mama. I loved Cecil
1380 so much. And I tried to get more exercise and
1381 I tried to stay awake. I tried to learn to
1382
1383 him, but he always knew I was trying, so it
1384 didn't work.
Prior to this extract, Mama and Jessie have been arguing about
Jessie’s failed marriage. While Mama initially claimed that she
never liked Jessie’s ex-husband Cecil, following a series of
disagreements, she eventually concedes that she engaged him as a
carpenter in order to set him up with Jessie: “I married you off to
the wrong man, I admit that.” (lines 1373-1374). She apologises to
Jessie for her failed matchmaking and explains that she was trying
to make amends by taking Jessie in after her husband split up with
her. In line 1376, Jessie opposes her with a contradiction disputing
the presupposition of her initial utterance: “He wasn’t the wrong
man.” But Mama counter-opposes her with a counter-assertion. She
cites the fact that Cecil left her as evidence that he did not love
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her (lines 1377-1378), and thus implies that he was the wrong man.
Yet, Jessie insists on her standpoint and repeats her prior
contradiction (line 1379). In the remainder of her turn, she expands
on her position providing an alternative explanation for why their
marriage did not work out (lines 1379-1384).
As the preceding examples have illustrated, contractions can be
employed to negate the proposition of the opponent’s prior utterance
as well as a presupposition expressed therein. In addition,
contractions can be used to dispute a pre-condition of the
interlocutor’s preceding statement, as the following two extracts
exemplify:
example (12): Home
344 MARY JANE But Ma. I can't go back to California. I
345 don't have any money to go anywhere. As
346 soon as you called me and ASKED me to come
347 here I started thinking about all kinds of
348 things and it started looking up again.
349 Coming back kind of washed away all my
350 mistakes. I can't explain it but it did.
351 It did.
352 OLIVIA Don't be silly.
> 353 MARY JANE I'm not being silly.
354 OLIVIA Well you're not making any sense. I hope
355 you don't go around talking to people like
356 this.
Previous to this brief exchange, Olivia and Mary Jane have been
talking about Mary Jane’s future plans. The sequence starts with
Mary Jane explaining to her mother why she cannot go back to
California. When she asserts that her return home seems to have
“washed away” all her mistakes (lines 349), Olivia challenges her
with a meta-communicative directive (“Don’t be silly.” line 352). By
this means, she construes Mary Jane’s prior statements as
inappropriate (i.e. silly) and demands that she change her
behaviour. In the subsequent turn, Mary Jane counters with a
contradiction: “I’m not being silly” (line 353). Mary Jane brings
into play one of the preconditions for valid requests for action
pointed out by Labov & Fanshel (1977: 78), namely that there is a
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need for the request. In issuing the imperative “Don’t be silly,”
Olivia presumes that Mary Jane is being silly and hence, there is a
need to make the request. Mary Jane contests this precondition by
denying that she is being silly, and thereby disputes the validity
of her mother’s claim.116 However, Olivia insists on her position and
maintains that Mary Jane is “not making any sense” (line 354). As
described above, the discourse marker “Well” at the beginning of her
turn not only signals that what is coming next will oppose the prior
talk in some way. It also indicates that in spite of Mary Jane’s
contradiction, Olivia persists in her opinion that her daughter’s
communicative behaviour is inappropriate and that she had better not
talk to people “like this” (lines 355-356).
In the extract from ‘night Mother below, Jessie too uses this
device to challenge one of the preconditions of Mama’s preceding
request:
example (13): ‘night Mother
209 MAMA What's the matter with you?
210 JESSIE Not a thing. Feel fine.
211 MAMA You feel fine. You're just going to kill
212 yourself.
213 JESSIE Waited until I felt good enough, in fact.
214 MAMA Don't make jokes, Jessie. I'm too old for
215 jokes.
> 216 JESSIE It’s not a joke, Mama.
In reaction to her daughter’s revelation that she plans to shoot
herself, Mama demands that Jessie account for her behaviour by
asking her: “What’s the matter with you?” (line 209). Her response
displays that Jessie’s assertion leads her to the assumption that
something must be wrong with her daughter. When Jessie claims that
she feels fine (line 210), Mama reacts with sarcasm. She repeats
Jessie’s claim and juxtaposes it with her prior announcement that
she is going to kill herself (lines 211-212). The combination of two
emotional states that are commonly perceived as mutually exclusive,
namely “feeling fine” versus “being at risk to commit suicide” sets
up a potentially humorous clash of frames. Moreover, the use of the
adverb “just,” which is commonly associated with pettiness and
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triviality, in combination with a topic as sensitive and serious as
suicide contributes to the paradoxical frame, and thus reinforces
the sarcastic tenor of her utterance. In the subsequent turn, Jessie
maintains the paradoxical frame set up by Mama’s prior utterance by
claiming that she waited until she felt good enough (line 213). At
line 214, Mama opposes her with a meta-communicative directive
explicitly commenting on the humorous potential of Jessie’s
utterance: “Don’t make jokes, Jessie.” Her negative imperative
formulates Jessie’s remark as inappropriate considering the
seriousness of the topic at hand (i.e. her suicidal intentions).
Subsequently, she adds a supportive assertion legitimising her
claim: “I’m too old for jokes.” However, in the following turn,
Jessie counter-opposes her with a contradiction. Like Mary Jane in
the preceding example, Jessie challenges the precondition that there
is a need for her mother’s request. By negating Mama’s assumption
that she was joking (“It’s not a joke, Mama.” line 216), she
disputes the validity of her mother’s directive.117
To recapitulate so far, contradictions are a class of
oppositional moves that can be used to negate the propositional
content, presupposition or precondition of the prior speaker’s
utterance. As the preceding examples have illustrated, they can be
employed to initiate turns expressing the speaker’s own standpoint
or providing an account for their dissent. Immediately following
these prefaces, speakers themselves may go on to provide a
formulation of their own stance or a reason for their
disagreement.118 However, more often than not, a commitment to an
alternative position on the matter in question is avoided. As we
have seen, in many instances, speakers neither offer an alternative
view for the opponent to argue with nor do they give a reason for
why they disagree. Rather, they oppose the prior speaker’s argument
simply by negating its propositional content. Some contradictions
are used to preface a following turn component in which the speaker
provides a formulation of her own standpoint or an account for her
oppositional stance. Other contradictions stand on their own in a
turn; they establish a different relationship between the
participants, in which the prior speaker rather than the current
speaker is required in the following turn, to account for the truth
of what she has said. For this reason, freestanding contradictions
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function as second position moves by means of which the speaker
challenges the other’s prior claim and simultaneously obliges her to
build a defence for her stance in the subsequent turn.119
Moreover, with regard to the interpersonal plane of
interaction, contradictions that stand on their own represent face-
threatening acts that threaten both the hearer’s positive and
negative face. Firstly, they threaten the addressee’s positive face
wants by denying the truth of her prior contribution. Secondly, they
present a threat to the addressee’s negative face by impeding her
freedom of action, since they put the recipient in a position of
accounting for the activity in question. Therefore, freestanding
contradiction provides an argumentative resource available to
speakers that they may exploit to exercise control over others at
the micro-level of interaction by constraining their freedom of
action.
As we have seen, the contradictions in the previous examples
are constructed by uttering the negated proposition or by negating
some presupposition expressed by or precondition of the opponent’s
previous claim. They are closely tied to the preceding utterance and
allow only a change in its polarity (unless a formulation of the
speaker’s own stance is provided in the remainder of the turn). In
this manner, a close link between the contradiction and the
utterance it refers to is established at the structural level of
interaction, while disagreement is emphasised at the content level.
Therefore, freestanding contradictions do not contribute to the
resolution of a dispute but rather increase the disagreement between
two parties. The use of this kind of oppositional move often results
in a series of mutual, consecutive rejections of the opponents’
views, i.e. “negative reaction cycles” (Spranz-Fogasy et al. 1993)
without any topical progression, and thus without any chance of
resolving the disagreement at hand.120 This is illustrated by the
following two examples:
example (14): My mother I,7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of the
131 valley!
> 132 MARGARET He's not.
> 133 DORIS He is.
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> 134 MARGARET He's not, just parking.
135 DORIS Curious method of parking.
In this scene, Doris and her twenty-year-old daughter Margaret are
in the garden folding the washing, when Margaret’s boy friend Ken
arrives in his new car. The sequence starts with Doris claiming that
the young man is crushing her flowers with his car: “He’s reversing
straight into my lily of the valley!” (lines 130-131). The volume
(and presumably high pitch) with which she delivers her utterance
signals a negative affective reaction (e.g. annoyance) at what she
sees and displays disapproval. In line 132, Margaret opposes her
with a contradiction, negating the propositional content of her
utterance: “He’s not.” However, Doris insists on her initial claim,
and counter-opposes her daughter in the following turn by issuing a
reciprocal contradiction, maintaining the affirmative of Margaret’s
negated prior claim: “He is.” (line 133). In line 134, Margaret
retaliates by repeating her preceding contradiction (“He’s not”),
and immediately adds a counter-assertion, by which she puts forward
an alternative interpretation of her boyfriend’s activity as “just
parking.” This prompts a sarcastic remark from Doris (“Curious
method of parking.” line 135), which displays that she is not
convinced by Margaret’s re-evaluation of what Ken is doing.
In this extract, both speakers insist on their respective
position without putting forward an alternative view the other might
argue with and without accounting for their oppositional stance.
Rather, the disagreement sequence progresses by the simple recycling
of opposing turns (i.e. “He is.” – “He’s not.”  - “He is.” – “He’s
not.”). In other words, the disputants are going around in circles
without approaching a (re)solution. By means of mutual negation,
coherence between the oppositional turns is established at the
structural level of interaction, while disagreement is emphasised at
the content level. Moreover, as mentioned above, the short turn
length of the oppositional moves signal aggravation.
Likewise, in the extract from Alto below, the disputants oppose
each other’s arguments in series of mutual contradictions without
elaborating on their respective points of view.
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example (15): Alto I,2
30 WANDA It might be too late then. He'll find a way if
31 I ask him.
> 32 FLORENE No, he won't!
> 33 WANDA Yes, he will!
34 FLORENE He'll say yes, and then leave it up to me to
35 find a way! (Catches herself.) Of course he'd
36 find a way if he could. But he can't. That's
37 all.
38 WANDA (Defiantly.) I’m going to write my daddy.
39 (Gets pencil and paper from the coffee table
40 and flings herself dramatically on sofa,
41 starting to write.)
Prior to this brief exchange, Florene and Wanda have been arguing
about whether Wanda might take singing lessons. After an extended
series of disagreements, Florene has offered Wanda a compromise,
promising her that once her father has established his career and
earns enough money, she will be allowed to take lessons. However,
Wanda rejects her mother’s offer of compromise, arguing that by
then, “it might be too late” (line 30) and claims that her father
will “find a way” to fulfil her wish if she asks him. In line 32,
Florene challenges her with a contradiction, negating the
propositional content of Wanda’s turn-final utterance: “No, he
won’t!” The increase in volume signals high emotional involvement
and intensifies opposition. However, Wanda insists on her initial
claim and issues a counter-contradiction: “Yes, he will!” (line 33).
Similar to Florene’s preceding turn, the volume increase turns up
the emotional heat of the argument and thus escalates the dispute.
In response to Wanda’s insisting, Florene takes a new tack: Instead
of counter-opposing Wanda with another contradiction, she issues a
counter-assertion expressing her standpoint, thus breaking out of
the interactional cycle. She initiates her turn by claiming that
even though her husband might permit Wanda to take singing lessons,
it would still be up to her to find a way to finance them (lines 34-
35). The volume of her utterance indicates annoyance and aggravates
disagreement. But after a short pause, Florene “catches herself”
(line 35) and slightly modifies her prior statement. By granting
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that her husband would “find a way if he could” (line 36), but
insisting that “he can’t” (line 37) she accounts for her extended
disagreement. However, Wanda does not accept her mother’s
explanation and insists on her original plan to write to her father
(line 38).
Similar to the extract just above (example 14), in the
beginning of this sequence, each speaker insists on her own
standpoint without providing an account for her oppositional stance.
The mutual contradictions do not contribute to the topical
development of the dispute but rather increase the disagreement
between the two parties, as the disagreement sequence moves forward
by the simple recycling of opposing turns (i.e. “He will.” – “No, he
won’t!”  - “Yes, he will!”), as well as by means of escalation
through the increase in volume. The spiral progression of the
dispute engendered by the mutual exchange of contradictions is not
terminated until one of the speakers changes course and employs
another arguing technique, providing an explanation of her position.
Nevertheless, the disagreement is not resolved and the dispute
sequence ends with neither party acquiescing.
In the two preceding examples, the speakers contradict each
other by picking up a part of the opponent’s prior utterance and
producing it with the opposite polarity. By contrast, in the
following extract from Tell me (which shows the continuation of the
conversation in example 2), the disputants construct their
contradictions by repeating the opponent’s entire utterance and
changing its polarity.
example (16): Tell me
141 DAUGHTER Mama!
142 MOTHER (Sitting up with a jolt.) What?
143 DAUGHTER There's something in the corner of my room!
> 144 MOTHER (Absolutely exasperated.) There is nothing
145 in the corner of your room!
> 146 DAUGHTER Mama, there's something in the corner of my
147 room, and I'm scared.
> 148 MOTHER There's nothing in the corner of your room,
149 do you hear? Absolutely nothing. There's
150 nothing to be frightened of. Now I've had
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151 just about enough, young lady, now you go to
152 sleep!
Prior to this scene, the mother has put her five-year-old daughter
to bed. In line 141, the daughter suddenly issues a summons
(“Mama!”), startling her mother from sleep and prompting her to ask
“What?” (line 142). In reply to her mother’s question about the
reason of her summons she claims: “There’s something in the corner
of my room!” (line 143). Instead of trying to soothe her, the mother
opposes her with a contradiction (presumably, because she is
familiar with that routine). She repeats her daughter’s complete
utterance but produces it with the opposite polarity, substituting
the absolute “nothing” for the pronoun “something” (lines 144-145).
The volume of her utterance and the tone of voice signal high
emotional involvement and intensify opposition. However, the
daughter insists on her claim, and repeats her own prior statement,
adding that she is scared (lines 146-147). Again, instead of
comforting her, the mother opposes her with a contradiction,
recycling her own prior negation (line 148-149). The subsequent
repetition of the extreme formulation “nothing” in combination with
the intensifier “absolutely” emphasises disagreement. Following the
contradiction, the mother elaborates her standpoint, claiming
“There’s nothing to be frightened of” (line 150). She terminates her
turn – and the dispute at hand – with a directive, telling her
daughter to go to sleep, thus drawing on her superior social status
as a mother.
As the three preceding examples have shown, contradictions that
are not followed by a formulation of the speaker’s own standpoint or
an account for their disagreement may give rise to negative reaction
cycles, in which the disputants oppose each other in a series of
mutual, consecutive rejections of their positions. Since neither
participant offers an alternative view that the other might argue
with or gives a reason for their oppositional stance, the arguments
proceed without any topical progression, and thus without any chance
of resolution. Hence, disputes that move forward by means of
reciprocal contradictions often end in a stand-off with participants
continuing to maintain opposing positions, as illustrated in
examples (14) and (15). Alternatively, such argumentative sequences
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might end in a submission terminal exchange with one party
signalling submission either verbally or nonverbally, thus accepting
a subordinate position. This form of conflict termination is
illustrated in example (16), where after a series of mutual
contradictions the daughter eventually complies with her mother’s
demand to go to sleep.121
The preceding discussion has shown that in using a
contradiction, a speaker denies the truth of the opponent’s prior
claim, maintaining the opposite of what she has just said.
Contradictions are characteristically constructed by repeating a
phrase from the opponent’s preceding utterance but using the
opposite polarity. In this manner, at the structural level of
interaction, they establish a close link to the utterance they refer
to, while stressing disagreement at the content level.
Another practice that can be used to dispute the truth of the
prior speaker’s claim involves explicit expressions of contradiction
such as “That’s not true” or “That’s a lie.” While in the instances
above, coherence between the contradiction and the talk it opposes
is established through word repetition, here the opposing turns are
tied together by means of anaphoric reference, i.e. through the use
of the demonstrative pronoun “that.” Corresponding expressions, such
as “Das stimmt nicht,” “Das ist nicht wahr” or “Das ist gelogen”
have also been observed in naturally occurring disagreement
sequences in German (Apeltauer 1978: 197; Gruber 1996a: 153; Spranz-
Fogasy 1986: 35-37). It appears that these constructions represent
conventionalised formats for contradictions and are oriented to as
such by conversationalists in the production and interpretation of
utterances.
As the following examples illustrate, such explicit expressions
of contradiction can take the form of negative declarative
statements that explicitly deny the truth of the opponent’s
preceding utterance.
example (17): ‘night Mother
1136 MAMA ((...)) But I bet you wouldn't be killing
1137 yourself if he were still alive. That's a
1138 fine thing it to figure out, isn't?
> 1139 JESSIE (Filling the honey jar now) That's not true.
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1140 MAMA Oh no? Then what were you asking about him
1141 for? Why did you want to know if I loved
1142 him.
1143 JESSIE I didn't think you did, that's all.
Prior to this extract, Jessie has asked Mama whether she loved her
husband. After reminiscing about her unhappy marriage, Mama returns
to the topic of Jessie’s suicide and claims that Jessie would not
kill herself if her father was still alive (lines 1136-1137). In the
subsequent turn, Jessie opposes her with an explicit expression of
contradiction, challenging the truth of the proposition in Mama’s
utterance: “That’s not true.” (line 1139). In the following turn,
rather than putting up a defence for her own prior claim, Mama turns
the tables and calls into question the truth of Jessie’s preceding
assertion by means of a return question: “Oh no?” (line 1140).
As noted above, the particle “Oh” at the beginning of a turn
marks that the speaker has arrived at a realisation. By the same
token, the “Oh”-preface at the beginning of Mama’s turn seems to
suggest that Jessie’s preceding contradiction has made her aware
that actually the opposite of her own prior claim is true. However,
the remainder of her turn reveals that in fact she does not agree
with Jessie’s statement: directly following the return question, she
adds a series of interrogatives, demanding that Jessie provide
evidence for her claim by accounting for her questions about her
parent’s marriage (line 1140-1142). In the following turn, Jessie
provides the required explanation, stating she asked Mama whether
she loved her husband simply because she wanted to confirm her own
assumptions: “I didn't think you did, that's all.” (line 1143).
Some time later in the same conversation, Mama complains that
Jessie has never appreciated anything she did, and demands that she
provide an explanation for her alleged discontent (lines 1288-1289):
example (18): ’night Mother
1288 MAMA Nothing I ever did was good enough for you
1289 and I want to know why.
> 1290 JESSIE That's not true.
1291 MAMA And I want to know why you've lived here
1292 this long feeling the way you do.
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1293 JESSIE You have no earthly idea how I feel.
As in the extract above, Jessie opposes her with an explicit
expression of contradiction (“That's not true.” line 1290), denying
the validity of her assertion. However, in contrast to the previous
exchange, rather than defending her own prior claim or directly
counter-opposing Jessie’s contradiction, in the next turn, Mama
ignores her daughter’s counter and produces another demand for
explanation (lines 1291-1292). Instead of providing the requested
account, however, Jessie counters her mother’s request by claiming
that Mama is not in a position to form an opinion about her
emotional life: “You have no earthly idea how I feel” (line 1293).
Like Jessie in the preceding example, in the following extract
from Stuck, Lula explicitly denies the truth of her mother’s prior
utterance by claiming that what she has just said is “not true”:
example (19): Stuck 6b
129 MOM Ohhhh... nothing's ever been good enough
130 for you, Lula—
> 131 LULA That's not true.
132 MOM What's so great about you anyway?
133 LULA Nothing—
In the interaction preceding this exchange, Lulu has suggested that
she might leave home some day, triggering an extended series of
disagreements. After several unsuccessful attempts at dissuading
Lulu from her plans, Mom issues a complaint, claiming that her
daughter is impossible to please (“nothing’s ever been good enough
for you”). The ECFs with “nothing” and “ever” construe Lula’s
discontent as a character trait rather than a random occurrence, and
thus serve both to reinforce and legitimate Mom’s claim. In the
following turn, Lula opposes her with an explicit expression of
contradiction, challenging the truth of the proposition in her
utterance: “That’s not true.” (line 131). The interruptive placement
of her opposing turn displays high emotional involvement and
aggravates opposition. Like Mama in the example above, in the
following turn, Mom passes over her daughter’s contradiction and
produces another challenge, asking her: “What's so great about you
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anyway?” (line 132). By constructing her turn in this way, Mom
presupposes that Lulu considers herself “great,” and demands that
she substantiate her assumed superiority, while suggesting that she
cannot do so. Indeed, in the following turn, Lulu responds by saying
“Nothing” (line 133). By this means, she corroborates her mother’s
suggestion that she cannot provide evidence that she is superior,
while at the same time maintaining her initial position that she is
not fastidious or considers herself superior.
In the preceding examples, the contradictions are realised by
negative declarative statements that dispute the truth of the prior
speaker’s claim. As the following extract from Home displays, such
moves can also take the form of a meta-communicative affirmative
statement explicitly formulating opponent’s preceding utterance as
“a lie”:122
example (20): Home
257 OLIVIA You make one mistake after another for 20
258 years and you never took responsibility
259 for one second! You brought babies into
260 this world that you could barely feed
261 'cause that husband of yours couldn't
262 hold down a job.
> 263 MARY JANE That's such a lie! How could you say that?
264 OLIVIA (Overlapping.) Oh, keep your voice down.
Prior to this exchange, Mary Jane and her mother have been arguing
about whether Olivia has been taking enough interest in her
daughter’s life. Mary Jane has repeatedly accused her mother of
neglecting her, while Olivia has persistently denied her daughter’s
allegations. At the beginning of this sequence, Olivia issues a
series of accusatory claims, which portray Mary Jane’s behaviour as
irresponsible (lines 257-262), thus shifting the blame back to her.
In the following turn, Mary Jane issues an explicit expression of
contradiction (“That’s such a lie!” line 263), disputing the truth
of her mother’s prior claim by maintaining that what Olivia has just
said is a lie. Her utterance presents a severe threat to Olivia’s
positive face, as it explicitly calls into question her veracity.
Moreover, by virtue of implying that Olivia has lied, it functions
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as an accusation.123 The accusatory character of Mary Jane’s
utterance is reinforced by the subsequent turn component.
Immediately following the contradiction, she issues a blame-
implicative question (“How could you say that?” line 263), which, as
discussed above, construes Olivia’s prior utterance as an offence
and obliges her to account for her claim in the subsequent turn.
However, instead of providing the required account or putting up a
defence against Mary Jane’s claim, Olivia issues a meta-
communicative directive telling Mary Jane to “keep her voice down”
(line 264).
To conclude, with a contradiction a speaker denies the truth of
the opponent’s prior claim, maintaining the opposite of what the
other has just said. This is usually done by uttering the negated
proposition expressed by the opponent’s previous utterance. That is,
if the prior speaker has uttered an affirmative statement, the
contradiction consists in a negative declarative sentence containing
negative particles such as “no,” “not,” or “nothing,” etc. If, by
contrast, the talk that is opposed already contains negative
particles, the contradiction will be cast in positive terms.
Contradictions that do not comprise negative particles often contain
positive disagreement markers, such as “yes” or “too,” which assert
the affirmative of a negated prior claim. In addition,
contradictions may involve emphatic adverbs such as “of course” or
“sure,” which reinforce the speaker’s claim that the opposite of the
opponent’s prior utterance is true. Besides negating the proposition
of the opponent’s prior utterance, contractions may also dispute a
presupposition or precondition embodied in the interlocutor’s
preceding statement.
Contradictions provide a discursive resource that can be
employed to challenge various kinds of activities on the part of an
opponent such as assertions or accusations. They tend to be produced
immediately following or in overlap with the opponent’s prior turn.
They can be used to initiate turns expressing the speaker’s own
standpoint or providing an account for her dissent. Immediately
following these prefaces, speakers themselves go on to provide a
formulation of their own stance or give a reason for their
disagreement. Contradictions can also stand on their own in a turn.
Such freestanding contradictions dispute the prior argument’s truth
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value without making clear on what grounds its propositional content
is being negated and without providing an alternative position that
the opponent might argue with. The important characteristic of these
moves is that they require the opponent to defend her position,
while enabling the speaker to argue without putting forward an
alternative view of her own. In this way, freestanding
contradictions function as second position moves by which the
speaker challenges the other’s prior claim and simultaneously
obliges her to build a defence for her stance in the subsequent
turn. By forcing the prior speaker to resume the floor and put up a
defence for her claim in the subsequent turn, contradictions that
stand on their own in a turn limit the opponent’s freedom of action.
Hence, they represent attempts at exercising discursive power at the
structural level of interaction. Moreover, contradictions that are
not followed by a formulation of the speaker’s own standpoint or an
account for her disagreement often result in negative reaction
cycles, in which the disputants oppose each other in a series of
mutual, consecutive rejections of their positions. Since neither
participant offers an alternative view that the other might argue
with or gives a reason for her oppositional stance, the arguments
proceed without any topical progression, and thus without any chance
of resolution.
Besides negating the proposition, preconditions or
presuppositions expressed by the prior speaker’s utterance,
disputants may also deny the validity of an opponent’s preceding
claim by means of explicit expressions of contradiction. These can
take the form of negative declarative statements which explicitly
deny the truth of the opponent’s preceding utterance, as in “That’s
not true.” Alternatively, they may be formulated as meta-
communicative affirmative statements, which formulate the opponent’s
preceding utterance as a lie (e.g. “That’s a lie”). In these cases,
coherence between the contradiction and the talk it opposes is
established by means of anaphoric reference (rather than by way of
word repetition). Obviously, these constructions represent
conventionalised formats for contradictions and are oriented to as
such by conversationalists in the production and interpretation of
utterances.
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Contradictions present a threat to the addressee’s positive
face, since they indicate that the speaker thinks the hearer is
wrong, misguided or unreasonable about some issue, and thereby
express disapproval. They oblige the defendant either to back down
and accept a loss of face or to attempt to save face by means of
insisting on her prior claim. Freestanding contradictions also
present a threat to the hearer’s negative face by impeding her
freedom of action, since they put some pressure on the recipient to
defend her position. Therefore, they provide a conversational
resource that disputants have at their disposal to exercise
discursive power at the structural level of interaction.
However, although contradictions represent a powerful
discursive resource by which disputants can put opponents on the
defensive about the validity of their claim and even about their own
credibility, this does not mean that recipients are incapable of
offering resistance. As we have seen, they may turn the tables by
means of a counter-contradiction. In addition, they may simply
ignore the opponent’s contradiction and carry on with their own line
of argument. Alternatively, they may issue a meta-communicative
utterance, challenging the appropriateness of the interlocutor’s
activity.
These findings show that the truth value of conversational
contributions plays a crucial part not only in consensus-oriented
conversations but also in dispute-sequences of talk, and can thus
become the focus of oppositional moves: As noted above, like
conversationalists engaged in friendly talk the disputants in my
data can be seen to orient to the expectation to act in accordance
with Grice’s (1975, 1989) Cooperative Principle and the Conversional
Maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relation and Manner it encompasses. The
maxim of Quality requires speakers to try to make their
contributions true, refraining from saying anything believed to be
false and avoiding statements for which there are inadequate grounds
for belief (Grice 1989: 26-27). This maxim thus prohibits utterances
which are insincere. As the preceding discussion demonstrates,
contributions to disputes must be true; otherwise their validity may
be challenged. This finding corresponds to the ideal model of
argumentation proposed by van Eemeren et al. (1993: 7-11). They
maintain that in “critical discussions” the Gricean maxim of Quality
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has to be acted upon, i.e. contributions must be sincere. Likewise,
Spranz-Fogasy (2002) lists “integrity” as a prerequisite of
appropriate contributions to argumentative discourse, which can be
disputed or claimed.
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What a difference a word makes...
7.11 Confrontational corrections
In the preceding section, I looked at contradictions, that is,
oppositional moves by which a speaker denies the truth of the
opponent’s preceding utterance. A related arguing technique that
recurs in my data involves challenging a specific element (i.e. a
word or phrase) in the prior speaker’s talk.124 I will label this
argumentative device ‘confrontational correction.’
One of the ways the disputants in my corpus correct an element
in the opponent’s preceding talk is by employing a technique which
Halliday & Hasan (1976: 146) call “substitution,” or “the
replacement of one item in a sentence with another having a similar
structural function.” When correction is done be means of
substitution, a speaker repeats (some of) the opponent’s prior talk
while changing the item being challenged, as in the substitution of
“tell” for “see” in the paired utterances “There's just not that
much to things that I could ever see - That you could ever tell, you
mean” in lines 980-981 from ‘night Mother:
example (1) ‘night Mother
971 MAMA I hate those birds. She says I don't
972 understand them. What's there to understand
973 about birds?
974 JESSIE Why Agnes likes them, for one thing. Why they
975 stay with her when they could be outside with
976 the other birds. What their singing means.
977 How they fly. What they think Agnes is.
978 MAMA Why do you have to know so much about things,
979 Jessie? There's just not that much to things
980 that I could ever see.
> 981 JESSIE That you could ever tell, you mean. You
982 didn't have to lie to me about Agnes.
983 MAMA I didn't lie. You never asked before!
Prior to this sequence, Mama and Jessie have been talking about the
fact that Mama’s friend Agnes has many birds as pets. At the
beginning of the extract, Mama expresses her dislike of the animals
(“I hate those birds.” line 971), which, according to her friend, is
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due to her ignorance of birds. In her turn-final utterance, she
issues a request for information, asking her daughter: “What's there
to understand about birds?” (lines 972-972). Considering her obvious
negative stance towards the animals, Mama’s request for information
seems to suggest that, in fact, there is nothing to understand about
birds, and thus, that she does not really expect an extended answer
from Jessie. Thus, her interrogative represents a rhetorical
question.125 When Jessie gives an extensive reply nonetheless,
listing a whole range of things that might be worth knowing about
birds (lines 974-977), Mama opposes her in the subsequent turn. She
begins her turn with an interrogative starting with the question
word “Why”: “Why do you have to know so much about things, Jessie?”
(line 978). As noted earlier, “Why”-questions are frequently used by
disputants for the packaging of criticism. In addition, the
sequential placement of the interrogative within the context of
disagreement contributes to its contextualisation as an expression
of disapproval rather than a request for information. Moreover,
rather than providing Jessie with an opportunity to answer her
question, directly following the interrogative, Mama issues an
assertion, accounting for her critical position: “There's just not
that much to things that I could ever see.” (lines 979-980). In the
following turn, Jessie opposes Mama’s statement with a
contradiction: In line 981, she repeats Mama’s prior utterance with
an adjusted personal pronoun and substitutes the verb “tell” for
“see” in Mama’s statement: “That you could ever tell, you mean.”
Directly following the correction, she issues an assertion,
expressing disapproval of something Mama said at an earlier point in
their conversation: “You didn't have to lie to me about Agnes.”
(lines 981-982). By presupposing that Mama lied to her, Jessie’s
utterance functions as a complaint. In the subsequent turn, instead
of providing an account for her assumed failure, Mama rejects her
daughter’s criticism by means of a denial: she disputes the
presupposition expressed in Jessie’s utterance (“I didn't lie.” line
983) and subsequently proposes an alternative view of the issue in
question, claiming that Jessie “never asked before.” The increase in
volume signals a negative affective reaction, e.g. indignation, at
Jessie’s imputation and aggravates disagreement.
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The argumentative character of Jessie’s corrective action in
line 981 becomes obvious if we look at the preceding extract against
the background of the organisation of corrective sequences in
everyday, consensus-oriented conversation. As Schegloff et al.
(1977) have argued, in ordinary conversation, there is a preference
for self-correction. Conversely, other-correction is a structurally
dispreferred activity and is highly constrained in its occurrence.
They found that in everyday talk, the party who produces a turn with
a trouble source generally corrects it herself. When a participant
other than the speaker initiates a repair, such a turn is usually
occupied with little else than pointing to the trouble source in the
prior speaker’s turn; the competence to correct an error is
attributed to the first speaker by the second. Even though the
second speaker could provide the repair, she allows the prior
speaker another opportunity to do the correction herself. Thus,
other initiation in second position presupposes full competence of
the original speaker and amounts to a request for self-correction.
This is illustrated by the following example from Schegloff et al.
(1977: 377):
example (2) GTS1:II:2:54
Ken: ‘E likes that waider over there.
> Al: Wait-er?
Ken: Waitress, sorry.
Al: ‘At’s bedder,
As this sequence shows, the other-initiated repair format exhibits
two characteristic features. Firstly, the discovery of an error is
typically modulated through the use of markers of uncertainty.
Rising intonation is utilised over the term singled out for
revision, as indicated by the question mark following the partial
repeat “Wait-er” in Al’s first turn. This intonation contour
displays uncertainty and requests that the prior speaker assist in
clarifying what is formulated as a problem. Secondly, locating the
trouble source is frequently the only activity performed in the
turn. The activities of locating the trouble and providing a remedy
are separated into distinct turns performed by different
individuals. Although Al points to something problematic in Ken’s
talk, Ken is allowed to do the correction himself. By restricting
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the activity in his turn to locating the trouble, the second speaker
proposes that the party who produced the error has the competence to
remedy it, and provides the initial speaker with an opportunity to
do so. In fact, following the repair initiation, in turn 3, Ken
produces a revised version of the term in his initial utterance
(“Waitress”), which is then ratified by Al in the final turn of the
sequence (“‘At’s bedder”).
By contrast, correction done through replacement does not
provide the party being opposed a place to remedy the trouble source
on her own. For instance, if Jessie in example (1) had wanted to do
her correction as other-initiated repair rather than as opposition,
she could have issued a turn consisting only of “That you could ever
see?” produced with tentative rising intonation. Such a turn would
have provided Mama an opportunity to attempt a remedy on her own.
Instead, by skipping the partial repeat preface and producing a
correction immediately following the utterance containing the
repairable, Jessie does not leave a specific place for Mama to
revise her initial utterance prior to the correction.
Moreover, at the interpersonal level of interaction, rather
than proposing the competence of the party whose turn contains the
repairable to self-correct, unmodulated corrections like Jessie’s
portray the prior speaker as lacking the competence to remedy the
error on her own. The correction marker “you mean” at the end of
Jessie’s utterance suggests that she knows better than Mama herself
what she (Mama) intended to say in her prior turn.126 This is quite
presumptuous, since, as Norrick (1991) points out, in interaction
between speakers with approximately equal speaking ability, status
and background knowledge, “the only significant imbalance consist in
the current speaker alone knowing what he or she intends to say”
(78). Unmitigated corrections thus indicate a perceived asymmetry in
ability to accomplish the correction successfully.127 For this
reason, like contradictions, corrections pose a potential threat to
the addressee’s positive face in the sense of Brown & Levinson
(1987), because they convey a judgement by the speaker about a gap
in the interlocutor‘s linguistic competence or world knowledge. As a
result, corrections put the recipient in a position either to back
down and accept a loss of face, or to attempt to save face by means
of insisting on her prior formulation, and thus sustaining
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disagreement. In this sense, corrections represent control
manoeuvres, i.e. attempts at exercising discursive power, as they
constrain the addressee’s freedom of action.
Furthermore, the confrontational character of unmitigated
corrections may be reinforced by a number of structural and prosodic
features. Whenever correction in my corpus is done by means of
substitution, the utterance containing the replacement frequently
comprises several devices that increase the salience of the term
being offered as a correction, and thus aggravate opposition.
Firstly, the speaker characteristically repeats a part of the
interlocutor’s preceding talk while changing the item being
challenged. Repetition of the opponent’s talk frames the term being
replaced and serves to emphasise that what is being produced is a
correction of something the other person said. Moreover, the
parallel structure of the utterance which contains the correction in
combination with the sequential position of the corrective action
suggest that the replacement term is spoken with a “contrastive
stress” (Ladd 1980: 78), placing special emphasis on the substitute
element and thereby intensifying opposition.128 Thus, in example (1),
the verb “tell” in Jessie’s utterance “That you could ever tell, you
mean.” (line 982) is presumably produced with emphatic stress, and
is thus marked as an alternative to “see” in Mama’s preceding
statement.
The following section from Alto, also illustrates this
phenomenon very nicely:
example (3): Alto II,3
97 FLORENE I'm sorry, Wanda. We can't live that way.
98 WANDA I can. I can live any ole way as long as I
99 can be with Daddy. It's what we dreamed about,
100 Mama!
> 101 FLORENE It's what I dreamed about. Me - not you!
102 You don't even know yet what you want.
103 But you deserve a chance to find out.
Prior to this extract, Wanda and her mother have been arguing about
whether they should get on the bus to San Antonio to meet Wanda’s
father there. Following a sequence of aggravated disagreements, in
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line 97, Florene tries to make peace. She apologises to her daughter
(“I’m sorry, Wanda.”), and provides an explanation for her repeated
refusal to comply with her request to get on the bus. However,
rather than accept her mother’s apology and explanation, Wanda
opposes her with a contradiction, denying Florene’s prior utterance:
“I can.” (line 98). Subsequently, she restates and elaborates on her
initial contradiction, thus reinforcing disagreement. Wanda builds
her oppositional move by systematically modifying her mother’s prior
utterance. The structure of Florene’s statement is retained, but the
phrase “that way” is changed to “any ole way”, the pronoun “We” is
change to “I”, and the negation is deleted (lines 98-99). In this
way, coherence is signalled at the word level, while opposition is
emphasised at the content level of interaction, as discussed above.
Wanda concludes her turn with a supportive assertion. In a desperate
attempt to persuade Florene to get on the bus, she claims that they
had been looking forward to living together as a family for a long
time (“It's what we dreamed about” line 99). She reinforces her
claim by terminating her turn-final utterance with the exclamation
“Mama!” (line 100). The volume increase in combination with the kin
term signals high emotional involvement and emphasises her
request.129 Yet, Florene does not comply. Instead, she opposes Wanda
with a correction. Like Jessie in example (1), she uses the
substitution format to package her oppositional move. Her turn
initial-utterance is a verbatim repetition of Wanda’s prior
statement, with the exception of “we” being replaced by “I”: “It’s
what I dreamed about.” (line 101). As mentioned above, the identical
shape of Florene’s utterance serves to underline that what is being
offered is a correction of something Wanda said, and thus to
emphasise disagreement. In addition the structural as well as the
sequential aspects of the corrective action suggest that the
replacement term “I” is produced with emphatic stress, and is
thereby marked as a substitute of “we” in Wanda’s preceding
statement. The confrontational character of Florene’s correction is
further intensified by her subsequent move. Directly following the
corrective utterance, she produces an utterance that even more
clearly indicates that Wanda is in error: By contrasting the
objective first person singular pronoun “Me” with the second person
singular pronoun “not you!” (line 101), Florene puts additional
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emphasis on the replaced item and in so doing, further stresses
disagreement. Moreover, the raised voice signals emotional agitation
and exacerbates opposition. Following the two corrective utterances,
Florene issues a competence challenge, disputing Wanda’s capacity to
discuss the issue in question: “You don’t even know yet what you
want.” (line 102). She closes her turn with an assertion,
legitimising her resistance against Wanda’s appeals by claiming that
she wants to provide her with an opportunity to find out what she
wants for herself (line 103).
As the preceding examples have shown, when using the
substitution format to build an oppositional move, speakers can be
seen to employ a number of devices to highlight the substitute
element, and thus to increase the salience of their utterance as
argumentative action. For instance, they typically repeat a part of
the opponent’s preceding talk while changing the item being
challenged. Furthermore, the replacement term is usually spoken with
a contrastive stress, putting special emphasis on the term being
offered as a correction, and thereby intensifying opposition.
As mentioned above, in ordinary conversation, there is a
preference for self-correction, whereas other-correction is marked
as a dispreferred activity and is highly constrained in its
occurrence. There are, however, environments in which other-
correction does occur. For instance, in the context of the telling
of a story in conversation, a participant may use other-correction
of the teller as a bid to become a co-teller of the story (cf.
Schegloff et al. 1977: 380). Another environment which is conducive
to unelicited, unmodulated other-correction is interaction between
adults and children, in particular between parents and children.
Schegloff et al. (1977) suggest that the status of the child as not-
yet-competent may account for the different preference structure of
corrective sequences in this environment. In this context, other-
correction appears to be “a vehicle for socialization ... a device
for dealing with those who are still learning” (381). Likewise,
Norrick (1991: 71) argues that parent-child interaction illustrates
the structural preference for corrective action by a more competent
speaker, in particular for parental correction of children’s errors,
typically in the immediately following turn, suspending the
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preference for self-correction in ordinary conversation discussed
above. He gives the following examples:
example (4): Norrick (1991: 71)
1 Coco (2,10): Make these flowers here-in.
> 2 Father: Put ‘em in here.
3 Coco: Yeah.
example (5): Norrick (1991: 71)
1 Nick (4,3): Frosch haben die Haken vorne.
> 2 Mother: Frösche haben die Haken vorne.
3 Nick: Ja.
In both extracts, the correction of the child’s error is produced as
a preferred action, i.e. without any markers of mitigation, in
second position. Since the child is assumed incapable of self-
repair, the parent, following a pedagogical motivation, produces an
unmodulated correction immediately following the turn containing the
error. As in examples (1) and (3), the corrective move is
constructed by repeating a part of the child’s prior talk and
replacing the item being challenged. In example (4), the father
substitutes “put” for “make” and in example (5), the mother
substitutes “Frösche” for “Frosch.”
According to Norrick (1991), the organisation of corrective
sequences like those above is based on such factors as the asymmetry
in language ability in favour of adults, as well as their goal of
improving their children’s language behaviour, and their willingness
to let children finish their utterance before they initiate a
corrective sequence, thereby changing the focus of the interaction
to one of language learning.130
As the preceding examples illustrate, an unmitigated correction
appears to be less face threatening if the addressee regards it as
an act of support (rather than a control manoeuvre) in the ongoing
interaction. Thus, in both sequences, the parent’s unmodulated
correction of the child’s language error is accepted and ratified by
the recipient in the subsequent turn. In addition, the family
setting might be conducive to the use of unmitigated corrections.
Nevertheless, taking corrective action on another’s speech
might be received as uncalled-for imposition, (rather than accepted
as well-meant help), just as any linguistic token can be produced
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and received either as an expression of solidarity or an attempt to
exert control (cf. Tannen 1986a, 1987, 1993, 2001, 2003). As the
following extract from Tell me shows, a parent’s correction of a
child’s language error might well be perceived as a control
manoeuvre, in particular in the context of disagreement:
example (6) Tell me
198 DAUGHTER I don't want the dumb old thing anyway.
199 MOTHER Well, of course you do. If everyone else
200
201 It's only natural.
202 DAUGHTER No I don't neither.
> 203 MOTHER Either.
204 DAUGHTER What?
205 MOTHER Either. No you don't, either.
206 DAUGHTER I already said I don't.
In the interaction prior to this sequence, the eight-year-old
daughter has told her mother that she hates her teacher. When the
mother inquires about the reason for her aversion, the girl tells
her that except for her, every child in her class got a reward. In
line 198, the daughter takes comfort in telling herself that she
does not feel she has missed anything, reinforcing her claim by
referring to the item in question with the derogatory phrase “the
dumb old thing”. In the following turn, the mother opposes her with
a contradiction, asserting the affirmative of her daughter’s negated
assertion: “Well, of course you do.” (line 199). The emphatic adverb
“of course” reinforces her claim that the opposite of her daughter’s
prior utterance is true. Subsequently, she issues a number of
supportive assertions, corroborating her claim: “If everyone else in
the class has one, you'll want one, too. It's only natural.” (lines
199-201). However, in line 202, the daughter counter-opposes her
with another contradiction, insisting on her prior claim: “No I
don't neither.” In the following turn, instead of responding to her
daughter’s insisting, Mother issues a correction. In contrast to the
preceding examples, however, she does not use the substitution
format described above. Rather than construct the corrective move by
repeating a part of her daughter’s prior talk and replacing the item
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being challenged, she simply produces the corrected version of the
error in her daughter’s utterance: “Either” (line 203). By
introducing a corrective sequence, she shifts the focus of the
ongoing interaction to one of language learning. In so doing, she
brings about a local asymmetrical relationship and thus a new
“footing.”131 As this example shows, linguistic competence provides a
resource which disputants can exploit to produce an asymmetric
relationship. However, in contrast to the examples cited by Norrick
(1991), in which the parent’s correction is accepted and ratified by
the recipient in the following turn, here, the daughter at first
questions and then rejects the mother’s correction. Immediately
following her mother’s corrective action, the daughter initiates a
repair sequence herself, by issuing a request for clarification
(“What?” line 204), signalling trouble in understanding. This
prompts her mother to repeat the replacement term, and subsequently
to elaborate on her correction by adding a substitution format:
“Either. No you don't, either.” (line 205). Yet, following the
inserted repair sequence, rather than ratifying her mother’s
elaborated correction the daughter dismisses it as invalid,
claiming: “I already said I don't.” (line 206).
To summarise so far, taking unmitigated corrective action on
another’s speech poses a potential face threat, since it not only
suggests that the prior speaker’s utterance contains a mistake but
also that she lacks the competence to remedy the error on her own.
Correspondingly, in ordinary, consensus-oriented conversation,
unmitigated other-correction is structurally marked as a
dispreferred activity and is highly constrained in its occurrence.
The potential face threat of unmodulated corrections might be toned
down in interactions which are characterised by a mutually perceived
asymmetry in the speakers’ respective responsibility for correctness
and ability to achieve it (e.g. adult-child interaction, talk
between teacher and student, and interaction between native and non-
native speakers), which overrides the usual organisation of
corrective sequences as described above. In these contexts, the
recipient usually appears to view the corrective action as friendly
help in the ongoing interaction, rather than as a control move.
However, as the preceding example has demonstrated, even in
situations in which speakers interact with apparently different
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linguistic competence, rather than accept an interlocutor’s
correction as a well-meant attempt to facilitate further
interaction, the recipient may treat it as unnecessary imposition.
One environment that seems to be particularly conducive to the
perception of another’s corrective action as a control manoeuvre is
dispute sequences.
In the extract above, in spite of the obvious difference in the
participants’ linguistic competence, the mother’s correction of her
little daughter’s language error is rejected as an unwanted
intrusion. The confrontational nature of unmodulated corrections
becomes even more obvious, in conversations between speakers with
approximately equal status, linguistic ability and background
knowledge. Consider, for instance, the following extract from
Neaptide, in which Joyce’s reaction to her daughter’s unmitigated
correction reveals her assessment of Claire’s corrective action as
an unnecessary and unwelcome imposition:
example (7): Neaptide I, 2
79 JOYCE What a life, I ask you. I tell you I need
80 one of those Help programmes all to myself.
81 I thank God I'm not a Catholic, that's all I
82 can say, not that he's not the best pope so
83 far, this one.
84 VAL (Flatly.) Hurray, hurray, it's Mother's Day.
85 JOYCE What's got into you these days, Val? You
86 used to be so sensitive.
87 CLAIRE Mum!
88 JOYCE (To CLAIRE.) Which is more than I can say
89 for you, I'm afraid, young lady.
> 90 CLAIRE Woman.
91 JOYCE Oh Claire, where is all this nitpicking
92 getting you? (Firmly.) I'll tell you one
93 thing for nothing: when you were born, they
94 didn't say to me, “Mrs Roberts, you've got
95 a lovely little baby woman.”
96 CLAIRE I'm sure they didn't say “You've got a
97 lovely little baby lady” either.
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Prior to this extract, Joyce has been complaining to her daughters
Claire and Val that her neighbours are making noise at night,
disturbing her sleep. The sequence starts with Joyce continuing to
lament, moaning over life in general and the catholic church in
particular (lines 79-83). When Val issues a sarcastic remark, rather
than commiserate with her mother (“Hurray, hurray, it's Mother's
Day.” line 84), Joyce challenges her in the next turn. She initiates
her turn with an interrogative, expressing disapproval of Val’s
behaviour (“What's got into you these days, Val?” line 85). By
designing her utterance in this way, she both presupposes that
lately, Val’s behaviour has been somehow and obliges her to account
for her demeanour. As discussed above, the utterance-final address
term signals a certain affective reaction (e.g. disbelief or
exasperation) at Val’s remark and reinforces her criticism. Directly
following the blame-implicative question, she adds an assertion,
claiming that Val “used to be so sensitive” (lines 85-86). By using
the past tense, Joyce implies that Val is not sensitive any more.
Her utterance thus amounts to an expression of disapproval. In
reaction to her mother’s attack on her sister, Claire simply
exclaims: “Mum!” (line 87), presumably in a reproachful tone of
voice. As discussed above, the exclamation of the term of address
signals a negative affective reaction such as incredulity or shock
at what her mother has just said and portrays her behaviour as
inappropriate and objectionable. The vocative thus constitutes a
blame-implicative address.
However, her reproach is completely ignored by Joyce, who
simply goes on with her tirade, now focusing her criticism on
Claire. In saying: “Which is more than I can say for you, I'm
afraid” (lines 88-89), she suggests that, in contrast to her sister
Val, Claire has never been sensitive, and in so doing expresses
disapproval. Moreover, the phrase “I’m afraid” signals that she
considers Claire’s alleged lack of compassion as a character flaw,
and thus reinforces her criticism. Finally, Joyce’s oppositional
stance is further emphasised by the (grammatically optional) term of
address “young lady” at the end of her turn.
As noted earlier, Leech (1999) has shown that turn-final
vocatives usually combine an addressee-identifying function with a
relationship-maintenance function. Similarly, Lerner (2003) has
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found that post-positioned address terms are often used to display a
particular stance towards the relationship with a recipient. Hence,
adding an address form to the end of a turn may serve to underscore
a personal concern for a problem. Likewise, Bernardy (1996) and
Kramer (1975) maintain that address terms at the close of utterances
may serve to emphasise activities and underline the speaker’s
emotions. Moreover, in addressing her daughter with a social title
rather than her first name or a term of endearment, Joyce reduces
the degree of intimacy (cf. McConnell-Ginet 1978; Wardaugh 1986;
Zwicky 1974), and thus emphasises her critical stance towards
Claire. In addition, as noted earlier, while the use of social
titles like “my lady” and honorifics like “madam” used to indicate
the speaker’s intention of being polite, today, such address terms
are generally used ironically. In fact, the term of address “young
lady” is conventionally employed in the context of reprimanding
children. Thus, the mock-polite address term “young lady” at  the
end of Joyce’s turn, indicates a perceived asymmetry in authority
with Joyce in superior position. In the subsequent turn, rather than
contesting the content of her mother’s claim, Claire opts for a
meta-linguistic remark, challenging her mother’s word choice. At
line 90, she produces a correction, issuing the corrected version
(i.e. “Woman”) of what she considers a trouble in her mother’s
utterance (i.e. “lady”). Switching from the content to the meta-
linguistic level of interaction and introducing a corrective
sequence enables her to break the frame Joyce invoked in her prior
utterance, and shift the focus of the conversation from her
temperament to her mother’s speech. However, in the next turn, Joyce
dismisses her daughter’s correction as “nitpicking” (lines 91-92)
prefacing her turn with a change of state token and an address term
“Oh Claire,” presumably signalling exasperation. Following the meta-
communicative remark, she adds a supporting assertion, corroborating
her claim by stating that when Claire was born, people did not refer
to her as “a lovely little baby woman” (lines 92-95). In so doing,
she ridicules Claire’s insistence on being referred to as a “woman”
rather than a “lady.” But Claire does not give in. Although she does
not dispute the truth of her mother’s claim, she counters by arguing
that she was surely not referred to as “a lovely little baby lady”
either (lines 96-97). Claire constructs her turn by systematically
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transforming her mother’s preceding utterance into a counter to that
very talk. The skeleton of its structure is retained, but Joyce’s “a
lovely little baby woman” is changed to “a lovely little baby lady”.
In an almost literal sense, then, Joyce’s own words are used against
her. As described above, in this way, a close link is established at
the word level, while disagreement is stressed at the content level
of interaction.
As we have seen, speakers may correct an element in another’s
preceding talk either by using the substitution format, i.e.
repeating (part of) the prior talk while replacing the item being
challenged, as in examples (1), (3), (4) and (5), or by simply
issuing the corrected version of the trouble source, as in examples
(6) and (7).
When correction is done through substitution, the utterance
containing the replacement regularly comprises a number of
structural and prosodic devices that increase the salience of the
term being offered as a correction, and thus intensify opposition.
For instance, the speaker typically repeats a part of the opponent’s
preceding talk while changing the item being challenged. Other-
repetition frames the term being replaced, and serves to emphasise
that what is being offered is a correction of an error in the
opponent’s prior utterance. In addition, the parallel structure of
the opposing utterances in tandem with the sequential position of
the corrective action suggest that the replacement term is spoken
with a contrastive stress, putting special emphasis on the
substitute element, and thereby aggravating disagreement.
When, in contrast, the corrective utterance consists only of
the corrected version of the supposed error, it may contain a term
of address, contributing to the argumentative character of the
activity,132 as illustrated by the following extract from Perfect
days:
example (8): Perfect days I, 2
35 SADIE And if you don’t want them yourself you can
36 always take them into the saloon, save you a
37 few bob’s worth of glossies.
> 38 BARBS Salon, mother, salon.
39 SADIE I know... (Gives a withering glance of
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40 contempt at her wee joke having been
41 misunderstood.)
42 BARBS -For Christsake you make me feel like Miss
43 Kitty out of Cat Balou. Anyway, c’mon...
Sadie has brought her daughter some magazines. When Barbs does not
show any enthusiasm for her small present, Sadie tells her that if
she does not want to read them herself, she can take them to her
hair salon for her customers to read (lines 35-37). In the following
turn, rather than accepting her mother’s suggestion, Barbs issues a
correction, producing the corrected version of the mistake in her
mother’s utterance. Subsequently, she immediately adds a term of
address and then repeats the correction (“Salon, mother, salon.”
line 38).
As address terms are optional syntactic elements and generally
admit some variation from a particular addresser to a particular
addressee, they provide a crucial resource for displaying alignment
towards the addressee or something she has said or done. In terms of
semantic content, like “Mama” in example (3) and “Mum” in example
(7), “mother” is a kin term, indicating a high degree of intimacy
between the interlocutors, and as such, at first glance, appears to
be functionally equivalent to these terms. However, a closer look at
the sequential context in which it is uttered reveals that it
conveys a particular alignment.
Dickey (1997: 260) distinguishes between marked and unmarked
forms of address for given dyads and suggests that the communicative
function of address terms lies in the fact that they are not the
normal forms for a given dyad and thus convey a particular emotion.
Extending the scope to communities of practice, McConnel-Ginet
(2003: 77) maintains that the significance of specific forms of
address lies in the history of patterns of usage within and across a
particular community of practice and in the connection between
addressing and other aspects of social practice that create social
relations and mark them with deference and liking or with
condescension and aversion.133
From this perspective, it is noteworthy that in the interaction
preceding the above sequence, Barbs exclusively uses the term “mum”
to address Sadie. In line 38, she deviates from this usage pattern
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for the first time, addressing her with “mother”. So, in this dyad,
“mum” appears to be the unmarked term of address. By contrast
“mother” is marked and therefore conveys a specific affective
reaction at or alignment towards Sadie’s prior activity.134 Moreover,
according to Wardaugh (1986: 260), using a nickname or pet name
shows greater intimacy than first name. He maintains that our choice
of address terms is governed by a variety of social factors such as,
for example, the participants’ social relationship, the
transactional status (i.e. service encounter, doctor-patient, etc.)
and the particular occasion. Correspondingly, we might argue that by
using “mother” rather than an abbreviation like “mum”, Barbs
distances herself from Sadie and thus emphasises her oppositional
stance. Finally, the repetition of the corrected element at the end
of her turn also serves to emphasise disagreement.
In the subsequent turn, Sadie responds to her daughter’s
correction simply by saying “I know” (line 39). In so doing, she
disputes the need for Barbs’ corrective action by declaring that the
item she is offering as a correction is not newsworthy.135 By
claiming that her daughter has presented something she already knew,
Sadie construes Barbs’ correction as an uncalled for imposition. By
the same token, she rejects the underlying assumption that she lacks
the competence to correct the trouble item herself, suggesting that
she was making a play on words. By insinuating that Barbs did not
recognise the pun, she turns the tables of communicative ability,
calling her daughter’s humour competence into question.
In response to her mother’s rejection of her correction, Barbs
issues another challenge. She initiates her turn with an expletive:
“-For Christsake” (line 42). By this means, she turns up the
emotional heat of the argument and signals right at the beginning of
her turn that opposition is going to follow. Moreover, the
interruptive placement of her turn aggravates disagreement.
Subsequent to the opposition preface, she produces an accusation,
complaining that by referring to her hair salon as saloon, Sadie
makes her feel “like Miss Kitty out of Cat Balou” (lines 42-43).
However, directly following the rebuke, she switches the topic and
prompts Sadie to leave with her for dinner: “Anyway, c’mon ...”
(lines 44-45). The argument thus ends in a stand-off, with the
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participants changing the speech activity and dropping the conflict
form.
While in the preceding examples the corrective actions are
produced directly following the utterance containing the trouble
item, they may also be preceded by other oppositional moves. For
instance, in the extract from ‘night Mother below, Jessie’s
correction at line 1245 is heralded by a contradiction:
example (9) ‘night Mother
1239 JESSIE (As she starts to clean out the
1240 refrigerator.) Now, you know the milkman
1241 comes on Wednesdays and Saturdays, and he
1242 leaves the order blank in an egg box, and
1243 you give the bills to Dawson once a month.
1244 MAMA Do they still make that orangeade?
> 1245 JESSIE It's not orangeade, it's just orange.
1246 MAMA I'm going to get some.
At the beginning of this exchange, Jessie explains the delivery
terms and payments arrangement she has made with the milkman to Mama
(lines 1239-1243). When Mama asks her whether the milkman still
produces orangeade (line 1244), instead of answering her question,
Jessie issues a correction, challenging an item in Mama’s utterance.
She begins her turn with a negative statement (“It's not
orangeade”), disputing Mama’s assumption that the product in
question is called orangeade, and immediately adds an assertion,
providing the corrected version the trouble item: “it's just orange”
(line 1245). However, Mama passes over her daughter’s correction,
and announces that she intends to order a quantity of the beverage
under discussion (line 1246). Her reaction reveals that she takes
Jessie’s response as a ‘Yes.’
As the following extract from Perfect days shows, the “it’s not
x, it’s y” construction is one routine way of packaging
contradiction-cum-corrections:
example (10): Perfect days I, 2
120 SADIE I was a widow before I was thirty.
121 BARBS Christ, mother I wish you wouldn’t always say
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122 that: “I was a widow before I was thirty.”
123 SADIE I was. I was a widow before my thirtieth
124 birthday.
125 BARBS OK. But... Bloody saying it like that. “My
126 Life Story”...
> 127 SADIE It’s not a story, it’s a fact. You and Billy
128 were my whole life.
129 BARBS I know. I know...
Prior to this exchange, Barbs and her mother have had a difference
of opinion about whether, at the age of sixty-one, Sadie is old.
While Barbs has claimed that she is not, Sadie has countered that
she did not have a chance to do something with her life. In line
120, she supports her position by asserting: “I was a widow before I
was thirty.” Her utterance is challenged by Barbs in the following
turn. She initiates her oppositional turn with an expletive followed
by an address term: “Christ, mother” (line 121). As discussed above,
by this means, she displays a negative affective reaction at what
Sadie has just said, and signals right at the beginning of her turn
that disagreement is going to follow. Subsequently, Barbs issues a
meta-communicative statement, expressing disapproval of Sadie’s
preceding remark: “I wish you wouldn’t always say that” (lines 121-
122). The ECF with “always” construes Sadie’s activity as a
recurring (rather than a random) occurrence, and thus serves to both
legitimise and reinforce Barbs’ criticism. Moreover, by subsequently
repeating her mother’s prior utterance verbatim – presumably in a
mocking tone of voice - (line 122), Barbs is able to caricature
Sadie by portraying her action as inappropriate or
disproportionate.136 But Sadie insists on her position, and issues a
slightly altered version of her initial claim: “I was. I was a widow
before my thirtieth birthday.” (lines 123-124). In the following
turn, Barbs seems to back down at first. She prefaces her turn with
the agreement token “OK.” (line 125). However, immediately following
the partial agreement, she issues a disagreement marker (“But” line
125), signalling that opposition is about to follow. In fact, after
a short pause, she produces a move which clearly signals that she
insists on her preceding criticism. She initiates her utterance with
an expletive (“Bloody”), thus reinforcing the argumentative
character of her utterance. Subsequently, she produces a meta-
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communicative utterance (“saying it like that. ‘My Life Story’ ...”
lines 125-126), remarking on what Sadie has just said or, to be more
precise, how she has said it. As in her own preceding turn, by
imitating her mother’s utterance, she ridicules Sadie, portraying
her action as inappropriate. In the following turn, Sadie issues
another counter-opposition. She initiates her turn with a
contradiction, challenging the adequacy of Barbs’ prior utterance,
and immediately adds a correction, substituting the term “fact” for
“story”: “It’s not a story, it’s a fact.” (lines 127). She closes
her turn with a supportive assertion, legitimising her position by
claiming: “You and Billy were my whole life.” (lines 127-128). In
line 129, Barbs concedes and ratifies her mother’s prior assertion –
though probably in a tone of voice signalling exasperation - (“I
know. I know ...”), and thereby terminates the disagreement
sequence.
In the following extract from Raisin, Beneatha also prefaces
her correction with a contradiction. But due to the structure of the
utterance containing the trouble source (“why you has to flit” line
57), her turn displays a different structure than the two preceding
instances; rather than an “It’s not x, it’s y” construction,
Beneatha’s turn exhibits an “I don’t x, I y” structure:
example (11): Raisin I, 1
51 MAMA Why you got to flit so from one thing to
52 another, baby?
53 BENEATHA (Sharply.) I just want to learn to play the
54 guitar. Is there anything wrong with that?
55 MAMA Ain't nobody trying to stop you. I just
56 wonders sometimes why you has to flit so
57 from one thing to another all the time. You
58 ain't never done nothing with all that
59 camera equipment you brought home—
> 60 BENEATHA I don't flit! I- I experiment with different
61 forms of expression—
Prior to this sequence, Beneatha has informed Mama that she is
planning on taking guitar lessons. Instead of encouraging her,
Mama’s reaction to Beneatha’s announcement reveals that she has
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reservations about her daughter’s endurance. She calls Beneatha’s
stamina into question, citing her short-lived memberships in a play-
acting group and a horseback-riding club as examples of her
flightiness. The extract begins with Mama asking her: “Why you got
to flit so from one thing to another, baby?” (lines 51-52). As
discussed above, “Why”-questions are frequently used by disputants
to package criticism. By designing her utterance in this way, Mama
presupposes that Beneatha is in the habit of flitting from one thing
to another and obliges her to account for her demeanour in the
following turn. In addition, the sequential placement of the “Why”-
question within the context of disagreement contributes to its
contextualisation as an expression of disapproval rather than a
simple request for information. In fact, Mama makes allowance for
the accusatory character of her by adding a term of endearment
(“baby”) at the end of her turn, which serves to soften or redress
the face threat of her utterance (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 108).
In the following turn, rather than explicitly attending to her
mother’s assumption of inconsistency, Beneatha accounts for her
sudden decision to start taking guitar lessons simply by saying: “I
just want to learn to play the guitar” (lines 53-54). The “sharp”
tone of voice indicates a negative affective reaction (e.g. anger or
defiance) at Mama’s criticism. In addition, she closes her turn with
a challenge in the form of an interrogative, daring Mama to
criticise her again: “Is there anything wrong with that?” (line 54).
In reaction to Beneatha’s challenge, at first, Mama seems to back
down, ensuring her that no one intends to keep her from learning to
play the guitar: “Ain't nobody trying to stop you.” (line 55).
However, following the partial concession, she restates her initial
claim that Beneatha keeps taking up new hobbies but does not stick
to them: “I just wonders sometimes why you has to flit so from one
thing to another all the time.” (lines 55-58). Self-repetition
reinforces her claim, and the extreme-case formulation with “all the
time” portrays Beneatha’s change of hobbies as a frequent activity
rather than a random occurrence and thus serves to legitimise her
complaint. Subsequently, Mama issues a supportive assertion,
substantiating her claim about Beneatha’s fickleness by citing the
fact that she bought photo equipment but did not use it: “You ain't
never done nothing with all that camera equipment you brought home—”
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(lines 57-59). The extreme formulations “never”, “nothing” and “all”
serve to reinforce her claim and thus aggravate opposition. In the
following turn, instead of addressing the content of Mama’s
utterance, Beneatha issues a correction, challenging her mother’s
choice or words. By way of switching from the content to the meta-
linguistic level of interaction, she is able to shift the focus of
the conversation from her alleged unsteadiness to her mother’s
speech. She initiates her turn with a contradiction (“I don't flit!”
line 60), disputing the presupposition built in Mama’s utterances
that she keeps flitting “from one thing to another.” Subsequently,
she offers an alternative formulation (“I - I experiment with
different forms of expression—” lines 60-61) as a correction of the
repairable in her mother’s statement. The interruptive placement of
her counter and the volume increase signal high emotional
involvement and intensify disagreement.
In the following extract from Alto, we find still another
contradiction-cum-correction format, notably “I’m not mad at x, I’m
mad at y.” The different constructions that are used in my data
originate from the dissimilar trouble sources prompting the
corrections: In extracts (9) and (10), both Jessie and Sadie replace
a noun (“It's not orangeade, it's just orange; “It’s not a story,
it’s a fact.”), thus producing an “It’s not x, it’s y” construction.
By contrast, in extract (11), Beneatha substitutes a verb: “I don't
flit! I - I experiment.” Hence, her utterance exhibits an “I don’t
x, I y” structure. In the example below, Florene replaces a
prepositional phrase (“I'm not mad at her! I'm mad at you!”).
Consequently, her counter takes the form “I’m not mad at x, I’m mad
at y”:
example (12): Alto I, 3
72 WANDA I don't see why you're mad at her.
> 73 FLORENE
74 me, Wanda. Talked me into spending my hard
75 earned ironing money to take you to the picture
76 show. And let me think you wanted us to see it
77 together so we could have it to remember for a
78 long time to come, like we always have when we
79 saw picture shows.
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80 WANDA I wanted us to see it.
81 FLORENE Hah! I might as well have stayed at home. Once
82 we got there all you did was talk about Althea
83 Lockwood and her interpretation of it. You
84 never once asked me my opinion.
Prior to this extract, Florene and her daughter have been talking
about Wanda’s music teacher. In the course of their conversation,
Florene has passed a number of sarcastic remarks about Miz Lockwood.
This prompts Wanda to say, “I don't see why you're mad at her” (line
72). With this utterance, she accomplishes several things. Firstly,
by presupposing that Florene is “mad” at her music teacher, she
attributes a specific emotion to her mother. Moreover, by
introducing her turn with the phrase “I don’t see why,” she signals
lack of understanding for her mother’s attitude, and implicitly
demands that Florene provide an explanation for her alleged anger.
However, in the following turn, rather than providing the requested
account, Florene opposes her. Florene’s turn contains multiple
elements: Firstly, she issues a contradiction, which negates the
presupposition built in Wanda’s utterance, and thus openly states
that she is in error: “I'm not mad at her! (line 73). This is
followed by a correction, in which the personal pronoun “her” is
replaced with “you”: “I'm mad at you!” Florene’s raised voice
reinforces the confrontational character of her utterance.
Subsequently, she produces an accusation, claiming that Wanda
“deceived” her pretending that she wanted to go to the movies with
her (lines 73-79). In the following turn, Wanda rejects her mother’s
accusation, claiming that she wanted to see the movie with her (line
80). However, Florene insists on her standpoint. She supports her
position by claiming that during the film, Wanda only talked about
her music teacher’s view of it and did not show any interest in her
mother’s opinion (lines 81-84).
Contrary to the preceding examples, in the following extract
from Perfect days, Barbs’ correction of her mother’s prior talk is
preceded by two alternative argumentative techniques, namely a
contradiction and a competence challenge:
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example (13): Perfect days I, 2
135 BARBS I don’t see how I can possibly be pushing
136 forty when I still don’t even know what I
137 want to be when I grow up.
138 SADIE Peak of your profession! Fabulous salary!
> 139 BARBS I don’t have a salary. You don’t even know
140 what a salary is do you? I have a business.
((...))
At the beginning of this sequence, Barbs expresses her unease at the
fact that she is almost forty and is still not sure what she wants
in life (lines 135-137). Her mother opposes her in the following
turn with a counter-assertion (cf. below). In claiming that Barbs is
at the “peak of her profession” and has a sizable income (line 138),
Sadie challenges the presupposition in her daughter’s prior
utterance that she still does not know what she wants in life. The
volume increase signals an affective reaction (e.g. disbelieve) at
what Barbs has just said and aggravates disagreement. In the
subsequent turn, Barbs counter-opposes her mother with a series of
argumentative moves. She initiates her turn with a contradiction in
the form of negation, disputing the presupposition in her mother’s
prior utterance that she has a salary: “I don’t have a salary.”
(line 139). Subsequently, she adds a competence challenge (cf.
above), calling into question Sadie’s capacity to talk about the
subject of income: “You don’t even know what a salary is do you?”
(lines 139-140). Barbs’ competence challenge is designed in a way
that prefers a ‘no’ answer: By formulating her utterance as a
negative assertion followed by a tag question, Barbs projects a
negative response from her mother (cf. Sacks 1992, vol 2: 414). This
“questioner-preferred answer” (ibid), however, would confirm Barbs’
negative evaluation of Sadie’s competence. The combination of
asserting a critical position and following it with a tag question
inviting a “no” contributes to the argumentative character of Barbs’
utterance. Since Barbs’ utterance is built to favour a response from
Sadie which is in agreement with her daughter’s competence
challenge, it ultimately invites disagreement. However, Barbs does
not provide Sadie with an opportunity to come in with a response.
Immediately following the competence challenge, she adds a
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correction, replacing the term “salary” in her mother’s utterance
with “business” (line 140).
The following extract from ‘night Mother, illustrates yet
another correction format. Jessie packages her correction of Mama’s
prior utterance as an imperative:
example (14): ‘night Mother
1312 JESSIE Cecil left me because he made me choose between
1313 him and smoking.
1314 MAMA Jessie, I know he wasn't that dumb.
1315 JESSIE I never understood why he hated it so much when
1316 it's so good. Smoking is the only thing I know
1317 that's always just what you think it's going to
1318 be. Just like it was the last time, right there
1319 when you want it and real quiet.
1320 MAMA Your fits made him sick and you know it.
> 1321 JESSIE Say seizures, not fits. Seizures.
1322 MAMA It's the same thing. A seizure in the hospital
1323 is a fit at home.
1324 JESSIE They didn't bother him at all. ((...))
Jessie and Mama are talking about the reasons for the failure of
Jessie’s marriage. When Jessie claims that her husband Cecil left
her because she did not give up smoking (lines 1312-1313), Mama
opposes her with a counter-assertion (cf. below), stating that she
knows Cecil better than to accept her explanation as true: “Jessie,
I know he wasn't that dumb.” (line 1314). In the following turn,
instead of addressing her mother’s counter, Jessie continues
contemplating the merits of smoking (lines 1315-1319). But Mama will
not drop the issue. In line 1320, she produces another counter to
Jessie’s initial claim. She argues that Cecil was revolted by her
epileptic seizures, suggesting that they are the reason he left:
“Your fits made him sick and you know it.” Moreover, in claiming
that her daughter is well aware of Cecil’s real motive for leaving
her, she implies that Jessie was lying before, thus aggravating
opposition. In the subsequent turn, rather than contesting the truth
of her mother’s claim, Jessie opts for a meta-communicative remark,
challenging her mother’s word choice. In line 1321, she issues a
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correction in the form of an imperative, demanding that Mama
substitute the term fit for seizures when referring to her epilepsy:
“Say seizures, not fits. Seizures.” By introducing a corrective
sequence, Jessie brings about a switch from the content to the meta-
communicative level of interaction, thus shifting away the focus of
the conversation from her relationship problems to her mother’s
diction. Self-repetition signals high emotional involvement and
aggravates opposition. However, in the next turn, Mama dismisses her
daughter’s correction as invalid, claiming that the terms in
question are synonyms, whose use solely depends on the context:
“It's the same thing. A seizure in the hospital is a fit at home.”
(lines 1322-1323). After her correction has been invalidated, Jessie
switches back to the content level of interaction and issues a
contradiction, disputing the truth of Mama’s penultimate claim:
“They didn’t bother him at all.” (line 1324). The emphatic adverb
“at all” serves to reinforce disagreement.
To conclude, as the preceding discussion has shown, besides
taking up an oppositional stance towards the truth of the prior
speaker’s utterance (in issuing a contradiction), a speaker may take
up an oppositional stance towards a single element in the prior
speaker’s utterance, challenging a word or phrase in the opponent’s
talk. I have labelled this type of argumentative move
confrontational correction. Corrections can be produced directly
following the utterance containing the trouble item or they can be
preceded by other oppositional moves such as contradictions or
competence challenges.
One of the ways a speaker may correct an element in the
opponent’s preceding talk is by means of substitution. In contrast
to repair operations in consensus-oriented conversation, which are
generally done in a mitigated way, corrective actions done through
substitution are not modulated or delayed in any way. Other-
initiated repair by means of a partial repeat produced with
tentative rising intonation, provides an opportunity for the prior
speaker to correct the trouble item herself. By contrast, correction
done through replacement does not afford the party being opposed a
place to remedy the error on her own: By skipping the partial repeat
preface and producing a correction immediately following the
utterance containing the repairable, the speaker does not leave a
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specific place for the interlocutor to revise her initial utterance
prior to the correction.
Forms of confrontational correction occur repetitively
throughout my data, and indeed, the participants can be seen to
shape their turns so as to emphasise their confrontational
character.137 As described above, when correction in my corpus is
done by means of substitution, the utterance containing the
replacement frequently contains a number of features that increase
the salience of the term being offered as a correction, and thereby
aggravate opposition. The utterance correcting a prior one
frequently maintains the structure of the prior utterance with the
exception of the element being replaced. Other-repetition serves to
frame the substitute term and to emphasise that what is being
produced is a correction of something the opponent said. Moreover,
the structural and sequential aspects of the corrective action
suggest that the replacement term is spoken with a contrastive
stress, putting special emphasis on the substitute element and
thereby intensifying opposition. When, in contrast, the corrective
utterance only consists of the corrected version of the supposed
error, it may contain a term of address, contributing to the
argumentative character of the activity.138
At the interpersonal level of interaction, rather than
proposing the competence of the party whose turn contains the
repairable to self-correct, unmodulated corrections portray the
prior speaker as lacking the competence to remedy the error on her
own. In other words, unmitigated corrections indicate a perceived
asymmetry in ability to accomplish the correction successfully. For
this reason, like contradictions, corrections pose a potential
threat to the addressee’s positive face in the sense of Brown &
Levinson (1987), because they convey a judgement by the speaker
about a gap in the interlocutor‘s linguistic competence or world
knowledge. As a result, corrections put the recipient in a position
either to back down and accept a loss of face, or to attempt to save
face by means of insisting on her prior formulation, and thus
sustaining disagreement. In this sense, corrections can be
considered control manoeuvres, as they constrain the addressee’s
freedom of action.
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Moreover, as we have seen, corrections can be employed as a
means of diversion. They provide an argumentative resource that
disputants can  use to oppose the prior speaker’s talk when the
content of her utterance cannot be disputed. For instance, following
requests for information they may be used to avoid providing the
conditionally relevant response, as in example (9). In addition,
subsequent to accusations, by introducing a corrective sequence and
switching from the content to the meta-linguistic level of
interaction, the speaker is able to shift the focus of the
conversation from her alleged failure to the inaccurateness of the
prior speaker’s speech, as in examples (7) and (11). In this sense,
corrections may act as attempts to control the content level of
interaction.
However, recipients have several techniques at their disposal
that they can employ to counter-oppose an opponent’s correction. As
we have seen, disputants may dismiss another’s correction as
invalid, for instance, by claiming they did not produce an error, as
in example (6), or that the trouble item and the replacement term
are synonyms, as in example (14). Moreover, corrections may be
challenged by means of meta-communicative remarks, portraying them
as inappropriate, as in example (7). In addition, as illustrated in
example (8), an addressee may retaliate by challenging the relevance
of the corrective action, claiming that she already knew the item
the speaker has presented and produced the repairable on purpose.
Finally, corrections may simply be ignored, as in example (9).
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7.12 Counter-claims
Another way in which the disputants in my data recurrently oppose
one another’s prior activity is by way of an oppositional move that
does not directly contradict or challenge the other’s claim but
achieves opposition indirectly by means of presupposition or
implication. I will refer to this type of argumentative speech
act(ion) as ‘counter-claim’ or ‘counter-assertion’ respectively.
Counter-claims do not use overt, direct negative linguistic
constructions to express opposition but rather rely on indirect
devices such as presupposition and implication to achieve pragmatic
negation (Goffman 1983; Grice 1975; Labov 1972; Labov & Fanshel
1977; Searle 1979; Tsui 1994). In this type of oppositional move,
information about the basis of opposition is not overtly specified
but may be inferred.
Similar oppositional moves have been described in prior studies
of conflict interaction. For instance, in a study of role-played
children’s disputes, Brenneis & Lein (1977), describe “negating or
contradictory assertions,” i.e. statements that are in direct
contradiction to a preceding assertion, without being simple
statements of a negative. Corresponding arguing techniques have also
been observed in arguments between adults, both in casual settings,
where they have been labelled “indirect negations” (Vuchinich 1984),
“counter-assertions” (Coulter 1990), or “counterclaims” (Muntigl &
Turnbull 1998), and in institutional contexts, where they have been
referred to as “Alternativbehauptungen” (Spranz-Fogasy 1986) or
“pragmatic disagreements” (Gruber 1996a, 1998).
Counter-claims commonly have the syntactic form of a
declarative sentence. In my data, they tend to be produced
immediately following or in overlap with the opponent’s prior turn.
They can stand on their own in a turn or occur in combination with
other argumentative devices, indicating their argumentative
character, and thus contextualising them as oppositional moves.
Counter-claims can be used to oppose a variety of actions on
the part of the opponent. For instance, they can be employed to
challenge a prior directive. In the fragment below, the mother first
puts off her daughter’s request with a counter-claim and then openly
rejects it.
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example (1): Tell me
104 DAUGHTER Tell me a story.
> 105 MOTHER Your Daddy told you a story.
106 DAUGHTER Tell me another story.
107 MOTHER No more stories tonight.
In line 104, the daughter issues a directive, asking her mother to
read her a story.139 In the following turn, instead of complying with
the girl’s request, the mother responds with a counter-claim: “Your
Daddy told you a story.” (line 105). While she does not openly
refuse to comply with her daughter’s request, she challenges one of
the preconditions for valid requests for action mentioned above,
namely that there is a need to perform the requested action (cf.
Labov & Fanshel 1977: 78; Tsui 1994: 173). By claiming that the
action requested by her daughter has already been performed (albeit
by someone else), Mother contests this precondition thereby putting
off the request. In reaction to the temporisation, the daughter
renews her request, drawing on another mechanism of discourse: If a
request has been put off by giving an accounting, it is possible to
renew the request if the conditions governing the accounting can be
shown to have changed (cf. Labov & Fanshel 1977: 88). By asking her
mother to tell her “another story” (line 106), the daughter changes
the conditions mentioned in the mother’s temporisation, which allows
her to reinstate her initial request. This time, Mother responds
with an outright, unaccounted refusal, declining to perform the
requested action and also closing the topic of bedtime stories: “No
more stories tonight.” (line 107).140
In the following fragment, Mama opposes her daughter’s demand
to “get the manicure tray and sit down” (line 1728) with a counter-
claim challenging the underlying assumption that she (still) wants a
manicure.
 example (2): ‘night Mother
1724 JESSIE If I'd known I was an epileptic, Mama, I
1725 wouldn't have ridden any horses.
1726 MAMA Make you feel like a freak, is that what I
1727 should have done?
1728 JESSIE Just get the manicure tray and sit down!
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> 1729 MAMA (Throwing it to the floor.) I don't want
1730 a manicure!
1731 JESSIE Doesn't look like you do, no.
Prior to this fragment, Mama has revealed to Jessie that her
epilepsy is not really the result of a riding accident but that in
fact she already had epileptic seizures as a child. In reaction to
this revelation, Jessie complains that she would not have done
something as dangerous as horse riding if Mama had told her about
her illness (lines 1724-1725). In the following turn, Mama counters
her daughter’s complaint with a challenging question. By asking
Jessie whether she should have made her “feel like a freak” (line
1726), Mama implies that she only wanted to protect her and thus had
no alternative but to keep quiet about her epilepsy. In so doing,
she rejects Jessie’s criticism as unjustified. In the following
turn, rather than answer her mother’s question, Jessie initiates a
topic change by issuing an imperative, telling Mama to “get the
manicure tray and sit down” (line 1728). The aggravated format in
tandem with the increase in volume signal emotional agitation and
reinforce her demand. But although during the interaction preceding
this extract, Mama has repeatedly reminded Jessie that it is time
for her weekly manicure, instead of complying, she produces a
counter-claim that challenges the grounds for Jessie’s directive: by
issuing a negative assertion, claiming that she does not want a
manicure (line 1729), Mama disputes the assumption underlying
Jessie’s imperative that there is a need for the requested action,
and thereby rejects her daughter’s directive.141 Her raised voice and
her non-verbal reaction accompanying the counter (she throws the
manicure tray to the floor) indicate emotional agitation and
aggravate opposition.
In my data, counter-claims are also used to oppose a preceding
assertion. In the following three extracts, one of the disputants
puts forward a competing claim about the issue referred to by the
opponent’s prior utterance, presenting an interpretation of reality
that is incompatible with (and considered superior to) that of the
opponent.
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example (3): Avenue
638 OLGA (Looking at her hand.) I have a wart on my
639 hand.
640 MOTHER (Goes to sit beside her again, examines it,
641 touches her hand gently; soothingly.)
642 Warts are from playing with frogs.
> 643 OLGA (Pulling her hand away.) It's from the cold.
644 I know it is.
645 MOTHER (Becoming angry.) Why you complaining now,
646 after all these years!
At the beginning of this fragment, Olga remarks that she has a wart
on her hand (lines 638-639). In response, Mother sits beside her and
strokes her hand, in an attempt to soothe her (lines 640-641). When
she states that “Warts are from playing with frogs” (line 642),
however, Olga challenges her with a counter-claim. By maintaining
that “It’s from the cold” (line 643), she implicitly disputes her
mother’s prior assertion. Her subsequent assertion: “I know it is.”
(line 644) serves to support her counter-claim and emphasises
opposition. Moreover, the fact that she pulls her hand away signals
irritation or frustration and further intensifies disagreement.
Mother’s response displays that she interprets her daughter’s
utterance as a challenge. She explicitly formulates Olga’s activity
as complaining: “Why you complaining now, after all these years!”
(lines 645-446), with her raised voice signalling indignation and
reinforcing opposition.
example (4): My mother said I, 4
35 MARGARET It's a serious step you've taken, you've no
36 idea—
> 37 JACKIE It was no big deal. It was a relief to get
38 it over with. I cried afterwards. Then I
39 laughed. I expect it's better with someone
40 you're in love with.
Previous to this segment, Jackie has told her mother that she has
had sex for the first time. Margaret reacts with disapproval to her
daughter’s revelation, calling it a “serious step” (line 35) and
claiming that Jackie has “no idea” about the potential consequences
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of her actions. But Jackie interrupts her in mid-utterance to
produce a counter-claim. In asserting that “It was no big deal” and
“a relief to get it over with” (lines 37-38), she implicitly
disputes her mother’s prior claims. While her turn implies
opposition rather than openly express it, the interruptive placement
emphasises dissent and thus acts as a negative counterbalance.
In the fragment from ‘night Mother below, Jessie challenges her
mother’s prior announcement using a counter-claim, which is in turn
challenged by Mama with another counter-claim:
example (5): ‘night Mother
262 MAMA Well, I'm calling Dawson right now. We'll see
263 what he has to say about this little stunt.
> 264 JESSIE Dawson doesn't have any more to do with this.
> 265 MAMA He's your brother.
266 JESSIE And that's all.
As noted earlier, prior to this extract, Jessie has revealed to Mama
that she intends to kill herself. After various unsuccessful
attempts at dissuading her daughter from her plan to commit suicide,
Mama takes a new approach and decides to call on her son, Dawson, to
help her bring Jessie to terms. In lines 262-263, Mama announces
that she is going to call Jessie’s brother to inform him about his
sister’s suicidal intentions. In the following turn, Jessie issues a
counter-claim. By arguing that her brother has nothing to do with
her decision (line 264), she implicitly opposes her mother’s plan to
involve him. In line 265, Mama counter-opposes her with another
counter-claim, arguing that Dawson is her brother. By referring to
their blood relationship, Mama implies that Jessie’s intention to
commit suicide obviously also concerns her brother, and thereby
counters her daughter’s prior objection. However, Jessie dismisses
her argument simply by saying: “And that’s all” (line 266). While
she does not deny her mother’s claim that Dawson is her brother, she
disputes the assumption expressed in Mama’s utterance that their
relationship necessarily implies that her decision to kill herself
concerns him.
In the extracts above, counter-claims are employed to oppose a
preceding request or assertion. By contrast, in each of the
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following two examples, the daughter uses this argumentative device
to reject her mother’s prior offer of compromise.
example (6): Alto I,2
26 FLORENE I can't help it. Your daddy's trying to get
27 established in his career. Once he gets where
28 he needs to be, then everything will be
29 different.
> 30 WANDA It might be too late then. He'll find a way
31 if I ask him.
32 FLORENE No, he won't!
As described above, prior to this fragment, Florene and Wanda have
been arguing about whether Wanda might take singing lessons. When
Florene tries to put her off until her father has “established his
career” (lines 26-29), Wanda rejects her compromise offer with a
counter-claim, arguing that by then, “it might be too late” (line
30). Subsequently, she adds a supportive assertion, claiming that
her father will “find a way” to fulfil her wish if she asks him. In
line 32, Florene challenges her with a contradiction, negating the
content of her turn-final utterance: “No, he won’t!” Her raised
voice signals high emotional involvement and adds force to her
counter.
example (7): My mother I,6
25 MARGARET When she's grown up, you can tell her; when
26 she's sixteen.
> 27 JACKIE It'll be too late!
28 (Silence.)
29 Give me back the bags.
In the interaction preceding this extract, Jackie has agreed to
entrust her baby to her parents’ care. When they actually come to
pick up the baby, she has misgivings about her parents raising her
daughter as if she was their child. When she claims that she wants
the girl to know that she is her real mother, Margaret objects that
it will be better for all if the girl does not know. But Jackie
insists on their claim and an argument ensues. At the beginning of
this fragment, Margaret concedes that she can tell her “when she’s
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sixteen” (lines 25-26). Like Wanda in the preceding extract, Jackie
rejects her mother’s suggestion with a counter-claim; and like
Wanda, she claims that by the time her daughter is grown up, “It’ll
be too late” to tell her the truth (line 27). The volume increase
signals emotional agitation and reinforces her counter. Moreover,
following a short silence, she demands that her mother give her back
the bags (line 29), thereby expressing her refusal to give the baby
away.
In the following extract from ‘night Mother, Jessie employs
counter-claims to reject her mother’s suggestions, thereby foiling
Mama’s efforts to cheer her up and dissuade her from committing
suicide.
example (8): ‘night Mother
718 MAMA I'll teach you to crochet.
> 719 JESSIE I can't do any of that nice work, Mama.
720 MAMA Good time don't come looking for you, Jessie.
721 You could work some puzzles or put in a garden
722 or go to the store. Let's call a taxi and go to
723 the A&P!
> 724 JESSIE I shopped you up for about two weeks already.
725 You're not going to need toilet paper till
726 Thanksgiving.
727 MAMA (Interrupting.) You're acting like some little
728 brat, Jessie. ((...))
As discussed above, prior to this sequence, Jessie has tried to
explain to her mother why she is unhappy with her life and wants to
end it. When Mama tries to cheer her up by offering to teach her to
crochet (line 718), Jessie rejects her offer with a counter-
assertion. By claiming that she “can’t do any of that nice work”
(line 719), she not only declines Mama’s offer but also frustrates
her attempt to perk her up. Similarly, when Mama suggests several
things she could do to occupy herself (lines 721-722), and proposes
that they go shopping (lines 722-723), Jessie opposes her with a
counter-claim: She tells Mama that she has already done the shopping
and has even built up an ample supply of toilet paper (lines 724-
726). In so doing, she rejects Mama’s suggestion and thwarts her
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desperate attempts at distracting her from her plan to put an end to
her life. Mama responds by claiming that Jessie is “acting like some
little brat” (lines 727-728). Her reaction reveals that she is
frustrated and angry that Jessie rejects her offers of help and
refuses to talk about her decision with her. The interruptive
placement of the counter signals her indignation and further
aggravates opposition.
As the following extract from Avenue illustrates, counter-
claims can also be employed to challenge a prior personal attack:
example (9): Avenue
179 OLGA What if- it's some sort of plot between him
180 and father.
181 MOTHER Your father's dead, Olga, the no-good
182 sonavabitch is dead and buried.
183 OLGA (Olga gives her a defiant look.)
184 MOTHER Whatsa matter with you? You know it's true.
185 We got proof of it. Sometimes you're stupid
186 about things. (Stands, goes U. C.)
> 187 OLGA I can think better than anyone.
188 MOTHER Thinking ain't enough. Do something if you're
189 so smart. ((...))
As described earlier, prior to this segment, Mother has told Olga
that she expects her boyfriend to propose to her that night.
However, Olga has reacted with scepticism. At the beginning of this
fragment, she claims that her mother’s boyfriend might be conspiring
with her father (lines 179-180). In the following turn, Mother
discards her objection with a counter-claim, arguing that Olga’s
father is dead (lines 181-182), thus implying that he cannot
possibly be plotting against her. When Olga displays her disapproval
of Mother calling her father a “no-good sonavabitch” by giving her
“a defiant look” (line 183), Mother challenges her again in the next
turn. The turn-initial rhetorical question: “Whatsa matter with
you?” (line 184) implies that there must be something wrong with
Olga and construes her reaction as inappropriate. The following
supportive assertion states that Olga knows that the death of Olga’s
father is an established fact (lines 184-185). Mother concludes her
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turn with a personal attack, characterising Olga as stupid on the
grounds of her prior reaction: “Sometimes you're stupid about
things.” (lines 185-186). In the following turn, Olga answers back
with a counter-claim: By asserting that she “can think better than
anyone” (line 187), she disputes the truth of Mother’s preceding
attribution. The ECF serves to emphasise her claim and aggravates
disagreement. However, Mother does not give in. In the next turn,
she refutes Olga’s counter by asserting: “Thinking ain't enough.”
(line 188) and dares her to prove her cleverness, while implying
that she cannot do so: “Do something if you're so smart.” (lines
188-189).
To sum up so far, counter-claims are oppositional moves in the
form of declarative statements, which express disagreement not by
means of direct negative linguistic constructions but via indirect
devices such as presupposition and implication. They can be used to
oppose a range of actions on the part of the opponent, such as
directives, assertions, offers, suggestions and personal attacks.
As counter-claims do not contain an overt negation of the
opposed utterance, there is often no explicit reference, and thus no
or only a weak cohesive link to the prior utterance. However,
counter-claims may be preceded by other argumentative devices, which
indicate the adversative character of the utterance and establish
coherence. In fact, the counter-claims in my data are frequently
prefaced by some linguistic token that announces right at the
beginning of the turn that opposition is being done. These
disagreement prefaces are meta-pragmatic markers that signal that
the following utterance is an expression of discord with the
previous one. That is, they function as contextualisation cues
(Gumperz 1982), framing the ensuing talk as disagreement.142 For
example, as discussed above, dissent may be signalled through an
expression of negative polarity at the beginning of a turn
containing the counter-claim. By initiating their utterances in this
way, speakers signal that they are starting a turn that somehow
opposes the interlocutor, or something she has said or done.
Consider, for instance, the following two fragments:
example (10): Alto II, 3
60 WANDA We'll sing so good we'll bring that time back,
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61 Mama.
> 62 FLORENE No. I think it's over. Over for good, Wanda.
> 63 WANDA No. I won't let it be. I'll bring it back.
64 I know all about it.
example (11): ‘night Mother
2201 MAMA I'm ready for my manicure, I guess. Want me
2202 to wash my hands again?
2203 JESSIE (Standing up.) It's time for me to go, Mama.
> 2204 MAMA (Starting for her) No, Jessie, you've got all
2205 night!
2206 JESSIE (As Mama grabs her.) No, Mama.
In each of these extracts, the disagreement token “no” is placed in
front of a counter-claim, indicating right at the beginning that
opposition is being produced. Moreover, dissent is further
emphasised by means of various linguistic, paralinguistic and non-
linguistic devices. For instance, in example (10), disagreement is
intensified by way of self-repetition (“it's over. Over for good”
line 62); in example (11), volume increase signals high emotional
involvement and highlights opposition (lines 2204-2205). In
addition, Mama’s non-verbal behaviour (line 2206) reinforces her
challenge of Jessie’s repeated attempts at leave-taking.143
In the following passage, Madame Danzard’s counter-claim is
prefaced with the extreme adverb “never” (line 33). Like the
polarity expression “no” in the preceding extract, “never” indicates
directly at the beginning of the turn that opposition is about to be
produced.
example (12): My sister, 9
29 ISABELLE One ... two ... three ... start.
30 MADAME DANZARD (Inspecting her cards.) I don't have
31 anything to start with.
32 ISABELLE You always do that. Start first.
> 33 MADAME DANZARD Never. That's your imagination.
34 ISABELLE (Shrieking.) I saw you.
35 MADAME DANZARD Quiet, Isabelle. (Looking at her cards.)
36 This is absurd. I can't move a thing.
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In addition to expressions of polarity and extreme adverbs, in my
data, counter-claims are frequently prefaced by the discourse marker
“But.” As discussed above, “But” typically functions as a
disagreement preface, signalling upcoming opposition. It can be used
to initiate disagreements which challenge, defend, or both. As a
result, by prefacing their turns with “But,” disputants signal that
the following utterance is a disagreement with something the
opponent has said or done, as illustrated in the following two
extracts:
example (13): ‘night Mother
755 MAMA You could keep books. You kept your dad's
756 books.
> 757 JESSIE But nobody ever checked them.
758 MAMA When he died, they checked them.
example (14): Home
339 OLIVIA I meant what I said on the phone. That
340 you should start again. I meant that.
341 MARY JANE
342 OLIVIA I can't help you.
> 343 MARY JANE But Ma. I can't go back to California. I
344 don't have any money to go anywhere. As
345 soon as you called me and ASKED me to come
346 here I started thinking about all kinds of
347 things and it started looking up again.
348 Coming back kind of washed away all my
349 mistakes. I can't explain it but it did.
350 It did.
351 OLIVIA Don't be silly.
352 MARY JANE I'm not being silly.
353 OLIVIA Well you're not making any sense. I hope
354 you don’t go around talking to people like
355 this.
In each of these fragments, one of the disputants initiates a
counter-claim with the dissent marker “But,” thereby emphasising
rather than delaying or disguising opposition. In extract (13),
“But” is used to preface a counter-claim that challenges the
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opponent’s prior assertion, whereas in extract (14) “But” is used to
initiate a counter-claim that defends or reasserts the speaker’s own
prior claim, following a challenge on the part of the opponent.
Extract (14) also illustrates another discourse marker that is
recurrently used in my data to preface counter-claims, namely
“Well.” As noted above, similar to “But,” “Well” signals that
opposition is about to be produced, thus framing or contextualising
the following utterance as a disagreement.
Following the counter-claim in line 343, Mary Jane elaborates
on her position, describing what she felt when her mother asked her
to return home after her failed marriage and what her home coming
means to her (lines 344-350). However, in the next turn, Olivia
refutes her explanation, implying that Mary Jane is being “silly”
(line 351). When Mary Jane rejects her mother’s criticism (line
352), Olivia produces a counter-claim, insisting that Mary Jane is
“not making any sense” (line 353). As discussed above, by initiating
her counter with “Well,” Olivia acknowledges her daughter’s prior
refutation, while maintaining her disapproval of Mary Jane’s
behaviour, by signalling that she has not changed her stance as a
result of her denial. In addition, her turn-final appeal to Mary
Jane not to talk to people “like this” (lines 354-355), reinforces
her prior claim and underlines opposition. 144
The use of “Well” in dispute sequences as a disagreement
preface to indicate continuing opposition is also exemplified in the
following segment from Tell me:
example (15): Tell me
292 DAUGHTER Everybody else can.
> 293 MOTHER Well, you're not everyone else.
294 DAUGHTER Nancy can. Nancy's mother said she could.
> 295 MOTHER Well, I'm not Nancy's mother. If Nancy's
296 mother thinks Nancy's old enough, that's her
297 business. But I'm your mother, and I say
298 "no."
As described above, in the interaction prior to this extract, the
daughter has repeatedly but unsuccessfully asked her mother for
permission to join her friends in some activity. After an extended
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exchange of requests and rejections, in line 292, the girl changes
tack and issues a counter-claim, asserting that all her friends have
their parents’ permission to go: “Everybody else can.” By means of
the ECF with the universal pronoun “everybody,” she is able to both
challenge her mother’s refusal and legitimise her original request.
But Mother counters by saying: “Well, you're not everyone else.”
(line 293). As noted earlier, the preface “Well” signals that what
is coming next will be a disagreement and that, regardless of her
daughter’s objection, Mother is firm in her rejection of the girl’s
request. Moreover, contrastive mirroring creates a strong link
between the opposing utterances at the level of wording, while
emphasising disagreement at the level of content. After her mother
has refuted her ECF, the daughter tries a different approach and
names one of the children who got permission to go to support her
claim: “Nancy can. Nancy's mother said she could.” (line 294). Once
more, Mother opposes her with a counter-claim. By pointing out that
she is “not Nancy's mother” nor does she share her liberal views
(lines 295-298), she invalidates the girl’s argument. Again, her
counter-claim is prefaced with “Well,” which indicates that
opposition is going to continue despite her daughter’s argument.
Disagreement is further emphasised by the turn-final “no,”
presumably produced with emphatic intonation.
In addition, in my corpus, counter-claims are recurrently
prefaced with a partial repeat, as in the following two extracts:
example (16): Raisin III
27 BENEATHA Wasn't it you who taught me to despise
28 any man who would do that. Do what he's
29 going to do.
30 MAMA Yes- I taught you that. Me and your
31 daddy. But I thought I taught you
32 something else too... I thought I
33 taught you to love him.
> 34 BENEATHA Love him? There is nothing left to love.
example (17): My sister 3
41 MADAME DANZARD (She eats with a certain relish.) Wait
42 till the Blanchards come to dinner. I'll
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43 have her make her rabbit paté. Won’t that
44 surprise them! The best cook we’ve had
45 in years.
46 ISABELLE Oh I don’t know– Marie wasn’t so bad.
> 47 MADAME DANZARD Marie? Please. The way she cooked a pot
48 au feu– ahhh- It still makes me shudder.
49 ISABELLE You exaggerate, Maman.
> 50 MADAME DANZARD Exaggerate? I'm being kind. Marie would
51 have murdered a veal like this.
As discussed in detail above, in initiating their turns with a
partial repeat, disputants not only signal that disagreement is
going to follow but also actively challenge what the prior speaker
has just said. That is to say, these prefaces not only contextualise
the forthcoming turn as a disagreement but also reinforce the
oppositional character of the utterance.
To conclude, counter-claims are a class of oppositional moves
that do not directly challenge or contradict an opponent’s prior
activity but accomplish opposition indirectly by way of
presupposition or implication. Counter-claims commonly have the
syntactic form of a declarative sentence. They can stand on their
own in a turn or be accompanied by other argumentative devices,
indicating their argumentative character, and thus contextualising
them as oppositional moves. In my data, counter-claims are often
preceded by disagreement prefaces such as expression of polarity
like “No,” dissent markers like “But” and “Well,” partial repeats or
by other oppositional moves such as contradictions to indicate the
adversative character of the utterance and establish coherence. In
addition, their argumentative character is signalled and reinforced
by structural, paralinguistic and/or non-verbal features such as,
for instance, sequentially interruptive placement, repetition, tone
of voice, and volume increase. Counter-claims provide a discursive
resource that can be employed to challenge various kinds of
activities on the part of an opponent such as directives,
assertions, offers, suggestions and personal attacks. They tend to
be produced immediately following or in overlap with the opponent’s
prior turn. Counter-claims present a potential threat to the
addressee’s positive face, as they indicate that the speaker thinks
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that the hearer is wrong or misguided or unreasonable about some
issue, and thereby express disapproval.
However, some researchers have argued that counter-claims
present a less severe face threat than other, more direct
oppositional moves, which involve the direct expression of negation
or challenge. For instance, according to Vuchinich (1984), what he
calls “indirect negation” is a “fully mitigated” variant of
performing an oppositional move, which avoids direct hostility.
Similarly, in their ranking of disagreement types from most to least
face-aggravating, Muntigl & Turnbull (1998) classify counterclaims
as the least face-aggravating type of disagreement, as it mitigates
damage to the other’s face. In their data, however, counter-claims
tended to be preceded by mitigating devices such as pauses,
agreement tokens and accounts, delaying and softening the
disagreement. By contrast, as we have seen, in my data, counter-
claims are often prefaced by dissent markers, which emphasise rather
than downplay their argumentative character, and thus aggravate
rather than mitigate their face-threatening potential. As in the
previous sections then, the disputants in my data display an
orientation towards dissent and confrontation rather than consent
and harmony. Instead of mitigating disagreement and work towards the
resolution of conflict, they can be seen to actively work to
emphasise opposition and sustain disagreement. This is further
evidence that in the context of mother-daughter disputes the
interactional process of conflict is more important than its
outcome.
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7.13 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined what types of speech actions are
chiefly used by the disputants in my data and how these actions and
the ways in which they are packaged contribute to the adversarial
character of the interaction.
As the previous sections have shown, in my corpus, opposition
is accomplished by means of various different illocutionary acts.
These include accusations, directives, demands for explanation,
threats, relevance challenges, competence challenges,
disqualifications, unfavourable comments, contradictions,
corrections and counter-assertions.
While these argumentative actions can in principle be performed
in a mitigated or aggravated manner using direct or indirect
constructions, the preceding discussion has demonstrated that in my
data such actions are routinely produced in ways that reinforce
rather than minimise their face-threatening potential. Instead of
being preceded by mitigating devices such as pauses, agreement
tokens and accounts, which delay and soften the disagreement, the
oppositional moves in my data are often prefaced by dissent markers,
which stress rather than downplay their argumentative character, and
intensify rather than lessen the potential face-threat they carry.
Moreover, paralinguistic, prosodic, and nonverbal cues such as, for
example, increased volume, contrastive stress and exaggerated
intonation contours, facial expression and gestures further
emphasise the argumentative character of turns. The resulting face-
threatening and sometimes even offensive nature of the speech
actions contributes to the sense of hostility in the conflict
sequences under analysis and their antagonistic nature.
Both the kinds of speech actions employed and the ways in which
these actions are packaged show, once more, that the disputants in
my data display an orientation towards dissent and confrontation
rather than consent and harmony. Instead of mitigating disagreement
and working towards the resolution of conflict, the participants
design their turns so as to emphasise opposition and sustain
conflict. This is further evidence that in the mother-daughter
conflicts under analysis the interactional goal is not conflict
resolution. The choice and design of argumentative actions as well
as the ensuing affective and confrontational key of the exchanges
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contextualises the mother-daughter interaction in my data as
emotionally charged disputes or quarrels and distinguishes them from
other forms of conflict talk such as negotiation, discussion and
argumentation.145
The previous discussion has also revealed that such aspects as
the relevance, truth, informativeness and clarity of conversational
contributions apparently play an important part in the
accomplishment of arguments just as in friendly conversation and can
therefore become the focal point of oppositional moves.
As noted above, the participants in my data can be seen to
orient to the expectation to act in accordance with Grice’s (1975,
1989) Cooperative Principle and the Conversational Maxims it
encompasses; even though they are unmistakably engaged in
oppositional talk, they cooperate in constructing the
(inter)activity of disputing. The Gricean maxims require that
participants try to make their contributions be true, efficient,
relevant and clear, and thus prohibit utterances that are insincere,
inefficient, irrelevant and incomprehensible. As we have seen,
speakers display an orientation towards the expectation of
sincerity, informativeness, relevance and clarity in verbal
conflict. Contributions to disputes must be true, pertinent,
properly informative and comprehensible; otherwise their validity
may be challenged, for example, by means of contradictions,
relevance challenges, and demands for explanation.146,147
In addition, the preceding analyses evidence (once more) that
power is not a fixed social entity but a dynamic relationship that
is continuously negotiated in and through talk-in-interaction and
that this dynamics is most evident in the manifest collision of
control manoeuvres and resistance in verbal conflict sequences.
Hence, (conflict) talk constitutes a valuable site for the analysis
of the ways in which participants jointly (re)produce and transform
social order and their position vis-à-vis one another through the
formatting and sequencing of actions and their responses.
To conclude, conflict, opposition and involvement are emergent
social phenomena, which are mutually accomplished and displayed by
participants in the ways they interact with each other. Structural
aspects of conversation such as preference and turn-taking
organisation and formal cohesion are among the discursive resources
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which conversationalists can employ to establish and make known the
kind of (inter) activity they are engaged in, their alignment
towards each other and the current topic of talk, and their degree
of involvement in the interaction. Sequential phenomena
contextualise conflict talk, opposition and high emotional
involvement and thus distinguish the mother-daughter interaction in
my data as aggravated forms of conflict talk. However, structural
properties are not the only conversational features that play a role
in framing the interaction in my data as antagonistic. In addition
to the sequential organisation of talk, both the kinds of speech
actions employed and the ways in which they are designed so as to
emphasise opposition and sustain disagreement reveal that the
disputants orient towards dissent rather than consent and thus
contextualise the mother-daughter interaction in my data as
emotionally charged disputes and mark them from other - less
confrontational, resolution oriented - forms of conflict talk.
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Notes for chapter 7:
1 To quote Maynard (1985: 3): “any utterance or action may contain objectionable
features and may become part of a dispute.”
2 However, as noted above, while initial opposition is a prerequisite for argument,
it is not a sufficient condition, because it can be responded to in various ways.
Only if the opposed person responds with a counter-opposition, a conflict is fully
under way.
3 For a more detailed discussion of Sacks’ (1992) observations, cf. Hutchby (1996a,
Ch. 3).
4 Cf. Apeltauer (1978: 144); Frankenberg (1976, 1979: 51-52); Goffman (1971: 124f);
Gruber (1996a: 196f); Günthner (2000: 78); Laforest (2002: 1596); Newell & Stutman
(1989/90: 144); Sacks (1992, vol. 1: 636).
5 This is reflected by Günthner’s (2000: 56) findings that in German everyday
speech, expressions of criticism of another person’s behaviour such as, for
instance, “Vorwurf,” “Vorhaltungen,” “Be/Klagen,” “Beschwerden,” “Lästern,” and
“Beschuldigungen” overlap to a considerable extent.
6 A similar view is adopted by Benoit (1995); in his study of image restoration
strategies, he uses the terms “accuse,” “attack,” “berate,” “blame,” “censure,”
“complain,” “condemn,” “criticise,” “rail against,” “rebuke,” “reproach” and
“object” synonymously to refer to communicative reactions, expressing disfavour
with another’s actual or perceived wrong-doing.
7 Apeltauer (1978: 145), Hundsnurscher (1993: 144) and Laforest (2002: 1596)
consider the identicalness of addressee and defendant as a distinctive feature of
accusations (i.e. “Vorwürfe” and “reproaches” respectively).
8 Cf. also Drew & Holt’s (1988: 399), Emerson & Messinger’s (1977: 127), and
Laforest’s (2002: 1596) descriptions of complaint as well as Gruber’s (1996a: 197)
and Günthner’s (2000: 76) definitions of “Vorwurf.”
9 In her study on accusatory activities in naturally occurring German conversation,
Günthner (2000: 56) distinguishes expressions of disapproval that are produced in
the presence of the accused person, which she calls “Vorwürfe”, from expressions of
disapproval which are issued in the defendant’s absence.
10 Extending Pomerantz’s observations, Edwards (2000) shows that, in addition to the
uses in complaint sequences identified by Pomerantz, ECFs can work as devices for
displaying the speaker’s stance towards some state of affairs, rather than the
literal accuracy of a description. Moreover, he demonstrates that by virtue of
their extremity, ECFs are used and oriented to by speakers as “nonliteral” (i.e.
not accountably accurate), metaphorical descriptions in hearably performing irony,
exaggerating, teasing, joking, etc. For further discussion of ECFs and their
relation to hyperbole cf. Norrick (2004).
11 Return-complaints as responses to complaints will be discussed in more detail
below.
12 Messmer (2003, Ch. 6) also notes the routine use of ECFs in accusations in
aggravated conflict sequences.
13 This corresponds to the findings of Boxer (2002), Laforest (2002) and Tannen
(2002).
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14 Similar aspects of accusations have been discussed by Apeltauer (1978: 144),
Burton (1980: 145), Frankenberg (1976: 51, 1979: 51), Gruber (1996a: 196), Günthner
(2000: 78), Hundsnurscher (1993: 144), Messmer (2003, Ch. 6), Pomerantz (1978), and
Rehbein (1972: 294).
15 Gruber (1996a: 201) calls such accusation formats, in which the evaluative
component is implicit, “structurally deficient.”
16 As this sequence illustrates, “it’s not guaranteed that if you make a complaint
your complaint will be the topic. It is perfectly well possible, systematically,
that if you make a complaint, your complaining will be the topic.” (Sacks 1992,
vol. 1: 638)
17 The formulation of accusations as interrogatives has also been observed in
naturally occurring disputes by Apeltauer (1978: 154-157), courtroom cross
examinations (Atkinson & Drew 1979: 105), TV discussions (Gruber 1996a: 202-204),
everyday conversation (Günthner 2000: 85-95); Laforest (2000: 1600-1604), news
interviews (Clayman & Heritage 2002) and police interviews (Thornborrow 2002: 46-
48).
18 For discussion of the use of interrogatives with “Why” as requests for accounts
in ordinary conversation cf. Apeltauer (1978: 156), Günthner (2002: 90), Koshik
(2003), Laforest (2000), and Sacks (1992, vol. 1: 14).
19 This argumentative device will be discussed in detail in Ch. 7.4.
20 Moreover, the stage directions preceding Mother’s contribution: “Angry, scared,
she has gone too far.” (line 308) suggest that her utterance be produced in a way
which signals that she is well aware that she has committed an offence and
understands Olga’s interrogative as an accusation.
21 A similar view is expressed by Apeltauer (1978: 160) in his study of verbal
conflicts. He maintains that in German, question formats such as “Wie kannst du
...?” are typically used to realise accusations.
22 For a more detailed discussion of the functions of self-repetition in naturally
occurring conflicts cf. Gruber (1998: 491).
23 A detailed discussion of various types of responses to accusations will follow
below.
24 In particular, Sacks (1992) has described the use of “Well” in argument sequences
as an appositional tying technique, which signals that what is coming next will be
a disagreement. The use of “Well” as a turn preface to indicate continuing
opposition has also been observed in naturally occurring disagreement sequences.
For instance, as M. H. Goodwin (1982: 85) has observed, turn prefaces such as
“Well” occur frequently in children’s disputes and function to signal both that the
validity of the immediately prior talk will not be challenged, and that opposition
will be continued. Similarly, Thornborrow (2000: 55) discusses the use of “Well” as
a turn preface to indicate continuing opposition in police interviews.
25 According to Bernardy (1996), the exclamation of address terms indicates the
speaker’s emotional state and usually reveals shock. Correspondingly, Leech (1999)
notes that while vocatives characteristically serve the pragmatic functions of
summoning attention, identifying the addressee of a speaker’s remark and/or
establishing/maintaining social bonds between speaker and addressee, they may also
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have “a more directly emotive function, as when a parent addresses a child loudly
Egon!, in protest at the music being turned up too loud” (108-109).
26 Address forms are grammatically optional, and their occurrence is thus always
potentially significant. Research on terms of address has shown that, like all
linguistic forms, they can serve a variety of functions (cf. Bing 1995; Braun 1988;
Dickey 1997; Dunkling 1990; Hartung forthcoming; Kramer 1975; Leech 1999; Lerner
2003; McConnell-Ginet 1978, 2003; Wardaugh 1986; Wolfson & Manes 1980; Wootton
1981b, and others). Hence, the function of an address word cannot be determined
without taking into consideration the linguistic and extra-linguistic context in
which it is used. Several factors have been shown to be relevant for the assessment
of the communicative function of a given form of address. These include, for
instance, the overall relationship between speaker and hearer, the history of
patterns of usage within and across a particular dyad or community of practice
(Eckert& McConnell-Ginet 1992, 1999), the interactional context in which the
address term is uttered, and the position of the address term within an turn (i.e.
turn-initial, mid-turn or turn-final). Leech (1999) suggests that turn-final
vocatives usually combine an addressee-identifying function with a relationship-
maintenance function. Similarly, Lerner (2003) finds that post-positioned terms of
address tend to be used as a device to demonstrate a particular stance toward the
relationship with a recipient. He suggests that adding an address form to the end
of a turn may serve to underscore a personal concern for a problem. Likewise,
Bernardy (1996: 75ff) maintains that the use of address terms at the close of
exclamatory sentences may serve to underline the speaker’s emotions. This
corresponds to Kramer’s (1975: 206ff) observation that in literary texts, address
words usually emphasise activities such as, for instance, requests or promises.
These findings suggest that the exclamation of “Jessie” at the end of Mama’s turn
signals a negative affective reaction (e.g. shock and/or exasperation) to Jessie’s
prior utterance.
27 Correspondingly, in his study of family discussions, Knoblauch (1991: 174) states
that the strongly stressed exclamation “What?” expresses disagreement by way of
calling into question and requiring justification of the preceding utterance. In
black children’s disputes, too, “What” has been found to frequently function as a
disagreement preface, initiating oppositional turns (M. H. Goodwin 1982, 1983,
1990; M. H. Goodwin & C. Goodwin 1987).   
28 For example, Frankenberg (1979: 51) claims that with an accusation the speaker
requests the addressee to account for an action which she has caused, permitted or
performed. In order to remedy the failure, the accused is supposed to produce an
excuse or justification. The same view is expressed by Apeltauer (1978: 144),
Burton (1980: 157), Hundsnurscher (1993: 144) and Rehbein (1972: 294).
29 There are, of course, numerous theories of defensive communicative acts or image
restoration strategies and typologies of accounts apart from that of Scott & Lyman
(1968), e.g. Austin (1961); Burke (1973); Goffman (1971); Schlenker (1980);
Schonbach (1980, 1990); Semin & Manstead (1983); Sykes & Matza (1957); Tedeschi &
Reiss (1981). For an overview and detailed discussion of these various approaches
cf. Benoit (1995, Ch. 3: 31-61).
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30 Cf. also Dersley & Wootoon (2000), Frankenberg (1976, 1979), Fritz &
Hundsnurscher (1975), Günthner (2000), Holly (1979), and Rehbein (1972), whose
studies draw on Scott & Lyman’s work.
31 In Dersley & Wootoon’s (2000) terminology, justifications represent a form of
“not at fault” denials.
32 In Dersley & Wootoon’s (2000) terms, like justifications excuses are a type of
“not at fault” denials.
33 Adopting Labov & Fanshel’s (1977:100) terms, we might assume a Rule of Accounts,
which holds that if a speaker A makes a statement about “AB-events” it is heard as
a request for an account of some sort.
34 For a discussion of the use of noticing to do complaining in naturally occurring
conversation cf. Schegloff (1988: 128f).
35 As Goffman (1971: 143f) puts it: “An apology is a gesture through which an
individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offence and
the part that dissociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the
offended rule.”
36 Likewise, research on discourse markers has described the communicative function
of “Oh” as information or news receipt, marking the receipt of new information, or
recognition display, marking the recognition of familiar information (Aijmer 2002;
Fraser 1988, 1990; Schiffrin 1987). Aijmer points out that “Oh” may also express an
affective stance to a preceding utterance or to the hearer. As Person (1999, Ch. 3)
has shown, the communicative functions of “Oh” in literary discourse parallel those
in naturally occurring conversation.
37 Aijmer (2002) notes that “Oh” may introduce conventionalised phrases for
apologising (e.g. “Oh I’m (so) sorry,” “Oh sorry”). She argues that “Oh is
intensifying and is therefore appropriate together with an apology which requires
some ‘gushing’ (Edmondson & House 1981: 153)” (149).
38 This type of response is labelled “didn’t do it” denial by Derseley & Wootoon’s
(2000).
39 This corresponds to the findings of several studies of conflict interaction: For
instance, Laforest (2002) claims that although complaints do not automatically set
off an argument, they nonetheless frequently initiate dispute, are an essential
element of arguments and cluster in episodes of aggravated conflict. Similarly,
Newell and Sutmann (1989/90) argue that while complaints do not always function to
initiate conflict episodes, “confrontations always begin with complaints” (148).
Likewise, Gruber (1996a) maintains that accusations instigate either a whole
dissent turn sequence or a topic shift within a dissent turn sequence by
contributing a new topical aspect.
40 M. H. Goodwin (1982, 1990: 152) observes a similar opposition strategy in
children’s disputes. She describes return and exchange sequences (Pomerantz 1975:
26), in which a move equivalent to the one being opposed is returned.
41 Extract (26) illustrates the termination of conflict by means of withdrawal. As
discussed above, this type of conflict termination occurs when an opponent becomes
too distraught to continue the conflict and withdraws from the conversational
activity or physically leaves the area, thus leaving the conflict in a stand-off
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with no terminal exchange. The aggravated directive and the use of self- and other
repetition signal Mary Jane’s high emotional involvement.
42 To quote Sacks (1992, vol. 2: 433), “there’s a way in which the production of a
complaint can free the talk from what the talk has priorly been. ... It’s a
characteristically known thing that talk on any topic can “end up in an argument,”
and one of the ways that that’s a formal possibility for conversation has to do
with there being places in it where some kinds of interactional events can be freed
from whatever they were about and themselves multiply. So a complaint can be met by
a counter-complaint, an the counter-complaint can be met by another complaint, and
one can kind of rapidly get into an argument that – intendedly or not – loses the
course of talk out of which it seemed to come.” As discussed above, the process
operating in such exchanges of mutual (counter-) is that of “symmetrical
schismogenesis” (Bateson 1935, 1958, 1972, 1979), whereby the disagreement between
the interactants progressively increases as they respond to each other in
identical, mutually alienating ways.
43 Cf. also Messmer (2003, Ch. 6) on the crucial role of what he calls
“Anschuldigungskommunikation” in aggravated conflict sequences.
44 For a discussion of the function of directives cf. also Apeltauer (1978), Burton
(1980), Ervin-Tripp (1977), Fraser (1975), Jacobs & Jackson (1983), Labov & Fanshel
(1977), Searle (1969, 1977, 1979), Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) and Tsui (1994).
45 Burton (1980: 132) points out that, although directives are generally seen as
eliciting a non-linguistic response (i.e. a “react”), they might also solicit a
verbal response. For instance, the utterance “Tell me your name” is a command that
requests a verbal response. She suggests that “a directive implies an instruction
to perform something, and that performance might well include a verbal
performance.”
46 In their study on the structure of conversational argument, Jackson & Jacobs
(1980) describe similar sequences introduced by an oppositional turn as “insertion
sequences,” which are designed to get a back down from a disagreeable first-pair
part of the main adjacency pair (e.g. a directive) without supplying the
dispreferred second-pair part (e.g. a refusal). In example (3), while the insertion
sequence initiated by Isabelle’s contradiction does not result in a back down by
Madame Danzard on her initial directive, it leads to shift of the focus of the talk
from the adequacy of Isabelle’s table manners to the appropriateness of the term
“toy.” The dispute sequence ends in a stand-off and no second-pair part to Madame
Danzard’s initial directive is ever supplied.
47 The multiple control aspects of such utterances have also been noted in studies
on interactional dominance and control. Both in the initiative–response coding
scheme by Linell et al. (1988) as well as in Rogers & Farace’s (1975: 229)
relational-control coding system, meta-communicative imperatives like the above are
categorised as termination or inhibiting moves, by which topics, phases, or
complete interactions are closed. In both frameworks, such moves are classed as
control manoeuvres, i.e. attempts at exercising interactional dominance.
48 For discussion of similar oppositional moves, cf. Gruber’s (2001) study of the
strategic use of what he calls “opposing questions” in controversial TV
discussions.
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49 Burton (1980: 80) also notes that directives in conflict sequences can be produced
in mitigated or aggravated fashion to soften or highlight their oppositional
character. Other researchers have used a variety of different terms to refer to
these phenomena. Apeltauer (1978: 86-122) differentiates between “requests,”
“directives,” “suggestions,” and “offers.” Gruber (1996a: 212-226) distinguishes
four types of what he calls “directing speech actions,” namely “imperatives,”
“appeals,” “requests,” and “offers.” Rogers & Farace (1975: 229) distinguish between
“orders” and “instructions” as two types of regulative responses of different
intensities. Tsui (1994: 91-95) discriminates between “requestives” (prospecting
either compliance or non-compliance) and “directives” (prospecting only compliance)
as two subclasses of “initiatives,” in order to capture the dimension of mitigation
and aggravation.
50 M. H. Goodwin (1988: 57-58) states: “The ways in which speakers format their
directives and sequence turns to them provide for a range of possible types of
social arrangements between participants. Some directive/response sequences display
an orientation towards a differentiation between participants and result in
asymmetrical forms of relationships. Others, by way of contrast display an
orientation towards seeking to minimize distinctions between participants and
result in more egalitarian or symmetrical arrangements of social relationships.”
51 Cf. Rogers & Farace (1975: 229) on the mitigating function of accounts following
directives.
52 According to Blum-Kulka & Olshtain (19884: 203), such a “point of view” provides
a more mitigated form of directive. Likewise, M. H. Goodwin (1988: 69) argues that
the use of “let’s” “mitigates the appearance of control.”
53 Thornborrow (2002) expresses the same view in her analysis of the interplay of
discursive power and participant frameworks in institutional talk (e.g. police
interviews).
54 By contrast, in their study of disagreements in naturally occurring arguments,
Muntigl & Turnbull (1998) found that corresponding argumentative moves, which they
call “challenges,” are often preceded by reluctance markers such as “Well,” which
display disagreement with the prior turn.
55 However, in response to stories, recipients frequently summarise the gist of the
prior speaker’s narrative, for instance, with formulations such as “you were young,
okay,” “you were being an educator,” etc. to display their interpretation of what
they have been told (Norrick, personal communication 2003).
56 Cf. Rogers & Farace (1975: 229) on the mitigating function of accounts following
directives.
57 In Rogers & Farace’s (1975: 229) terms, Wanda’s reaction represents a
“disconfirmation,” and is categorised as a strong one-up move/control manoeuvre in
their relational control coding system. A similar view is put forward by Bilmes
(1997: 520): “Ignoring someone is perhaps the sincerest form of insult – and, in
the realm of manners, the deepest cut of all- but it can be used to express
disapprobation as well as contempt ... interactional ignoring occurs only when the
ignoree has some possible claim on our attention. ... Ignoring is a positive act of
non-doing: it is an act produced through absence, and so related to conversational
silence.”
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58 By designing her directive as an imperative, Florene displays that she strongly
expects her daughter to carry out the requested action, leaving her no option but
to comply (cf. Tsui 1994:93; Linell 1990: 159). Hence, her order constrains Wanda’s
freedom of action and thus presents a control manoeuvre. As discussed above, on the
interpersonal plane, Florene’s imperative assumes a power differential between
herself and her daughter with her in a superior position, which authorises her to
control her daughter’s behaviour.
59 Demands for explanation may also initiate proper insertion sequences (e.g. A:
“Close the door.” - B: “Why?” - A: “It’s cold.” - B: “Okay.”). In such cases, they
may simply interrupt an ongoing sequence of talk rather than foment an argument.
60 A similar idea is expressed by Apeltauer (1978: 90), who argues that one of the
preconditions for requests (as opposed to commands) is an asymmetrical relationship
between the participants with the addressee in the dominant position, which allows
him or her to refuse to perform the requested action.
61 The formulaicity of such exchanges is corroborated by the following sequence,
which was given in the issue of the a–word-a-day mailing list from September 10,
2003 (ed. by Arnu Garg) to exemplify the meaning of the term ipse dixit: “Child:
Why do I have to go to bed at eight every day? Parent: “Because I said it.”
62 Wanda’s use of the term of address “Mama” suddenly brings Florene’s role as a
mother (who can give or withhold permission) into play, and signals that Wanda is
backing down.
63 The close affinity between directives and threats has been pointed out by several
researchers. For instance, Tsui (1994) defines threats as a subclass of “mandatives”
(i.e. directives by which the speaker attempts to get the addressee to perform (or
refrain from performing) an action for the benefit of the speaker himself), which
have “the additional feature of explicitly stating that the speaker himself [sic]
will bring about the undesirable consequence should the addressee refuse to comply”
(129). M. H. Goodwin (1988: 60) observes that turns containing an imperative arguing
for the speaker’s relative control vis-à-vis the recipient may be accompanied by
“semantic aggravators” (Becker 1982: 8) such as, for example, threats and phrases
demanding immediate action, which display the speaker’s view of the recipient’s
subordinate status.
64 Similar definitions have been put forward by Apeltauer (1978: 98), Searle &
Vanderveken (1985: 193), Sprey (1071), Tedeschi (1970), Tedeschi & Bonoma (1977:
215), Tsui (1994: 128-129), and others.
65 By contrast, in conversational narrative, the “x and y” construction is
conventionally heard as expressing a temporal sequence (Norrick, personal
communication).
66 It must be noted that the future activity Jessie is threatening to perform in
example (1), i.e. shooting herself, is first and foremost an action to her own
detriment. However, in view of the fact that losing their child is generally
considered the worst thing that can happen to a parent, Jessie’s suicide would
clearly constitute the most severe punishment for Mama.
67 A corresponding expression in German is “Pass (bloß) auf was du sagst!”
68 Corresponding expressions in German are “Sei bloß vorsichtig!” and “Pass bloß
auf!” (cf. Franke 1983: 244). It must be noted, however, that such formulations may
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also be used to package warnings. The close resemblance of warnings and threats has
been noted by several authors. Fraser (1975a: 173), for instance, suggests that a
threat is a special type of warning in which the speaker takes on the
responsibility for bringing about the disadvantageous action. Similarly, Sadock
(1974: 143) maintains that warnings for which we assume the warner has control over
the consequences of not heeding the warning are described as threats (cf. also
Apeltauer 1978: 112; Broadie 1972: 187-190). Tsui (1994: 133) and Green (1975: 124)
maintain that warnings are performed in the interest of the addressee, whereas
threats are performed in the interest of the speaker, and point out that the giver
of a warning assumes that some ill will befall the addressee if she does not listen
to it. By contrast, some researchers do not differentiate between the two
activities. For example, Brenneis & Lein (1977: 51) list the following utterances
as instances of threats, which they define as promises of personal harm to the
opponent, those attached to him, or in general: “I’ll kill you,” “I’m going to tell
the teacher on you,” “The building will fall down if you do that.” In the
terminology adopted here, the last example constitutes a warning.
69 The sequence-terminating potential of such utterances has also been noted in
studies on interactional dominance and control. Both in the initiative–response
coding scheme by Linell et al. (1988) as well as in Rogers & Farace’s (1975: 229)
relational-control coding system, meta-comments like the above are categorised as
termination or inhibiting moves, i.e. framing moves or boundary markers, by which
topics, phases, or complete interactions are closed. Accordingly, such moves
represent control manoeuvres, i.e. attempts to exercise interactional dominance.
70 For detailed discussion of the dialogic functions of discourse particles as
boundary markers, cf. below.
71 Apeltauer (1978: 101-102) has observed similar expressions in German dispute
sequences (e.g. “Also jetzt hab ich genug”; “Jetzt ist aber wirklich genug”), which
typically occur towards the end of dispute phases and are used to mark the limit
between verbal and nonverbal sanctions.
72 As mentioned above, this definition of insisting differs from that by Gruber
(1998: 490) and Eisenberg & Garvey (1981: 159), who argue that in insisting a
speaker may either repeat her own prior utterance verbatim (or nearly verbatim)
without increasing or decreasing directness or reinforce it with a simple “Yes” or
“No.”
73 As discussed above, in terms of Rogers & Farace’s (1975) relational-control
coding system, Wanda’s reaction qualifies as a “disconfirmation.” This move
suggests an ignoring of other, that is, not just a disagreement with what was said,
but rather a denial or negation of the other’s right even to attempt to define the
relationship (cf. also Bilmes 1997 on the potential functions of ignoring). That is
to say, in ignoring her mother’s demand, Wanda not only rejects Florene’s attempt
at exercising control over her, but also challenges the assumption of superiority
underlying her aggravated directive.
74 For a detailed discussion of counter-claims, cf. Ch. 7.12.
75 Apeltauer (1978: 104) also argues that this type of threat-cum-ban (i.e. “Droh-
Verbot”) is used to invoke (or establish) a power differential with the speaker in
superior position.
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76 Polanyi & Scha (1983) list “Alright” as a PUSH/POP marker, i.e. a discourse
structure signaling device “used to mark movement from one discourse unit to
another” (64). Bangerter et al. (2004) find that the primary function of “Alright”
in telephone calls is to coordinate entry into or exit from joint projects (e.g.
side sequences and phone calls). They observe that “Alright” is typically used to
transit from the entry phase to the body and from the body to the exit phase, or
even to the end of a (telephone) conversation.
77 Apeltauer (1978: 101-102) has observed similar expressions in German dispute
sequences (e.g. “Also jetzt hab ich genug”; “Jetzt ist aber wirklich genug”), which
typically occur towards the end of dispute phases and function as boundary markers,
i.e. they are used to mark the limit between verbal and nonverbal sanctions.
78 However, in high society, members of the aristocracy may still be addressed by
such titles.
79 Interestingly, boys receive “young man” not “gentleman.”
80 As Wolfson & Manes (1980: 79) have pointed out, “the choice of a form of address
is one of the ways in which speakers ... may express and indeed influence their own
status in relation to that of others.” Thus, the mock-polite address term “young
lady” at the end of Mother’s turn, indicates a perceived asymmetry in authority.
81 Correspondingly, Bernardy (1996) states that address terms may be used as
warnings, for instance, to sever the interlocutor’s line of argument.
82 In this fragment, Ruth and Mama can be seen to align against Beneatha through
both opposing her (cf. Maynard 1986 on collaboration in multi-party disputes).
83 Research on discourse markers has yielded that in addition to signalling the
recognition of familiar information or the receipt of new information   “Oh” may
have an intensifying function and displays the speaker’s emotional alignment
towards the addressee or something she has said or done. For instance, Fraser
states that “Oh” is an interjection that “encodes an entire basic message typically
involving the speaker’s emotional state” (1990: 391). Schiffrin (1987) notes that
“Oh” might function as speaker intensification conveying, for instance, that the
interlocutor has pursued her position “beyond reasonable expectations of intensity”
(98). Aijmer (2002: 98-99) also finds that “Oh” can be associated with affect and
has a reinforcing or intensifying function. In her analysis of discourse particles
in the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English, she finds that “Oh” typically combines
with exclamations, expletives and vocatives, to express and emphasise the speaker’s
affective stance towards the hearer or what is said (e.g. surprise indignation,
sympathy, disappointment, etc.): “When oh occurs in the lexicalised combination oh
God, the effect is stronger that of the speaker used the simple God” (99).
84 Research on the dialogic functions of “Now” as a discourse particle has yielded
that “Now” may have a framing function, marking a boundary or break between two
parts in a conversation. For instance, Schiffrin (1987: 242-244) notes that in
interpersonal arguments, “Now focuses attention on pivotal moves such as, for
example, the speaker’s next move as a contrast with what preceded.” Similarly,
according to Aijmer (2002: 95), “Now is a boundary signal between discourse units,”
marking, for instance, a change to a new stage in a conversation. For discussion of
the functions of “Now” in fictional dialogue see Person (1999: 86-88).
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85 Franke (1983: 237-238) describes similar expressions such as „Klar?“;  „Ist das
klar?“; „Verstanden?“ and „Haben wir uns verstanden?“ He maintains that in
combination with a repeated command, such appended questions function as a means of
intensifying the force of the speaker’s claim. If the addressee responds with a yes
token, she signals her willingness to comply with the command.
86 Correspondingly, in his study of controversial TV-discussions, Gruber (1996a,
1998) has observed that topic changes during conflict episodes can cause what he
calls “time outs”: as soon as a topic change occurred during a conflict, the
“dissent organisation” of talk (i.e. preference for disagreement, high frequency of
interruptions and overlapping talk, increased number of cohesive devices between
subsequent turns) was replaced by “consent organisation” (i.e. preference for
agreement, few interruptions and overlap sequences, no hostile repetitions of
previous turns by others). But as soon as the topic was introduced again, the
organisational features of talk changed back to the dissent organisation.
87 Competence challenges will be discussed in detail in Ch. 7.7.
88 While in another context, Beneatha’s utterance may be heard as an ironic allusion
to the stereotypical docile Afro-American servant, the stage directions, the
characterisation of the participants throughout the play as well as the subsequent
interactions between Beneatha and Mama all contribute to the contextualisation of
Beneatha’s response as genuine submission.
89 For a detailed discussion of various types of opposing questions in conflict
sequences cf. Gruber (2001).
90 Buckman (1992: 49) expresses a similar view in his discussion of medical
consultation: “Some sentences are phrased as questions but are not, in fact,
questions at all. Biased questions are responses that we (occasionally) phrase in
the form of a question, but which are statements about our assessment of the
situation. They often reflect our own ambivalence – we know that we are under an
obligation not to sit in judgement on the patient’s situation but feel a strong
desire to do so. In order to conform with what we see as a professional behaviour,
we disguise the judgement as a question” (quoted in Heritage 2002a: 1432). For
further discussion of yes/no questions, which convey reversed polarity assertions
cf. also Koshik (2002).
91 Research on role-playing among children’s groups has yielded that requests for
permission are most frequently used by children playing younger children to
‘mothers’ and constitute a way of displaying subordination (Corsaro 1985: 83; M. H.
Goodwin 1988: 80f). Gordon & Ervin-Tripp (1984) maintain that “true permission
requests imply that the addressee has control over the speaker and that the
speaker’s wishes are subject to the hearer’s approval.”
92 Although Mother does not explicitly state that she will punish Olga, as mentioned
above, meta-communicative imperatives like “Watch that tongue” are partly formulaic
and are conventionally used and interpreted as threats.
93 Apeltauer (1978) adopts a similar view, stating that this type of threat-cum-
command, which he labels “Droh-Gebot,” is employed to influence the addressee’s
behaviour and to attempt to invoke or establish a power structure (100, 104).
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94 A similar view is put forward by Messmer (2003: 242ff), who argues that threats
commonly make manifest a structurally latent power imbalance, and therefore
frequently occur in parent-child communication.
95 Muntigl & Turnbull (1998) put forward a similar view in their discussion of
“irrelevancy claims” in naturally occurring disputes.
96 On the importance of newsworthiness in conversation cf. Sacks (1973: 139), (1974:
341).
97 Correspondingly, in a study of arguments on British talk radio shows, Hutchby
(1996a, b) has found that hosts frequently use “So?” as a second position move both
to challenge the validity of callers’ prior contributions and to put them in a
position of providing an account for the relevance of their remarks within the
dispute’s agenda.
98 That is to say, while the mother-daughter arguments in my data are characterised
by aggravated disagreement, they nevertheless require a minimum of cooperation on
the part of the disputants. For a distinction and detailed discussion of various
kinds of cooperativeness, cf. Gruber (1996a, 1998).
99 For more detailed discussion of this matter from the perspective of argumentation
theory, cf., for instance, O’Rourke (2001, esp. Ch. 7).
100 A detailed discussion of this disputing practice will be offered in Ch. 7.9.
101 Personal need or desire statements such as Mama’s “I want to know why...” are a
type of directives as described by Ervin-Tripp (1977: 166-167).
102 This argumentative device will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 7.10.
103 For a detailed discussion of the organisation of repair in conversation, cf.
Schegloff et al. (1977).
104 Researchers have observed a similar use of partial repeats as prefaces to
aggravated opposition in children’s disputes (M. H. Goodwin 1983, 1990) and as
prefaces to disagreements with prior speaker’s self-deprecations (Pomerantz 1984).
105 In a discussion of disputes between parents and their teenage children, Tannen
(2001: 196-198) calls this arguing strategy, by which the speaker intensifies
rather than denies another’s criticism, the “aikido approach.”
106 As Gruber (1998: 477) has pointed out, in the course of a conflict episode,
there is a high probability for what he calls “nested” conflicts: new conflicts
might emerge with the initial conflict “waiting” for further processing (cf. also
Knoblauch 1991, 1995). Correspondingly, during Mother’s and Olga’s extensive
conflict sequence in Avenue, the dispute alternately centres round several
contentious issues, which are cyclically taken up again by the disputants in the
course of the argument without being resolved.
107 As  Sacks (1992, vol. 1) has observed, claims not to have heard can be employed
as a device in interaction, enabling speakers to avoid doing an action which might
properly go in that slot, but without simply ignoring what they properly ought to
do. Building on Sacks’s remarks, Drew (1997) argues that it is important to
distinguish the use of a repair form which implies a claim not to have heard or
understood the prior repairable turn, from the actual probable or possible
cognitive states of a speaker thus initiating repair. While both Sacks and Drew are
referring to requests for clarification, the upshot of their remarks is that
Mother’s response, which displays a certain understanding of Olga’s prior turn,
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might be used as a communicative device, allowing her to avoid answering a more
unpleasant aspect of her daughter’s question while still providing the
conditionally relevant response to Olga’s request for information.
108 Argumentative moves by which the speaker disqualifies what the opponent has said
in the prior turn will be discussed in detail in the following section.
109 M. H. Goodwin (1990) expresses a similar view in her study of black children’s
disputes.
110 Bußmann (1990) defines meta-communication as “communication about
communication.” Correspondingly, meta-communicative statements are utterances by
which the speaker “durch unmittelbaren Bezug auf Äußerungen diese durch Korrektur,
Präzisierung, Stellungnahme, Kommentar u.a. erläutert oder modifiziert” (483).
Likewise, Tannen (2001: 8-9) describes meta-communicating as “talking about
communication,” i.e. “about ways of talking.”
111 Similarly, in his study of family discussions, Knoblauch (1991: 174) states that
the strongly stressed exclamation “What?” expresses disagreement by way of calling
into question and requiring justification of the preceding utterance. In black
children’s disputes, too, “What” has been found to frequently act as a disagreement
preface, initiating oppositional turns (cf. M. H. Goodwin 1982, 1983, 1990; M. H.
Goodwin & C. Goodwin 1987).
112 In contrast to the examples of disqualifications described above (e.g. “You're
funny, you are and so stupid.”), which are used to challenge the opponent’s general
competence, Olivia’s comment only refers to Mary Jane’s current behaviour, which is
indicated by the use of the present progressive and the adverb “now.”
113 Leech (1999) suggests that turn-final vocatives usually combine an addressee-
identifying function with a relationship-maintenance function. Similarly, Lerner
(2003) finds that post-positioned terms of address tend to be used as a device to
demonstrate a particular stance toward the relationship with a recipient. He
suggests that adding an address form to the end of a turn may serve to underscore a
personal concern for a problem. Likewise, Bernardy (1996) maintains that the use of
address terms at the close of exclamatory sentences may serve to underline the
speaker’s emotions. This corresponds to Kramer’s (1975: 206ff) observation that in
literary texts, address words usually emphasise activities such as, for instance,
requests or promises. These findings suggest that the exclamation of “Jessie” at
the end of Mama’s turn signals a negative affective reaction (i.e. shock and/or
exasperation) to Jessie’s prior threat.
114 The practice of building oppositional responses to accusations by means of
negation has been discussed in Ch. 7.2 under the heading of “denial.”
115 Gruber (1996a: 152-157) also describes contradictions (“inhaltliche
Widersprüche”) that either dispute the proposition or the presupposition of the
opponent’s prior utterance. Similarly, Apeltauer (1978:197) states that such moves
“beziehen sich nicht nur auf das Geäußerte, sondern auch auf das Mitbehauptete, die
Präsuppositionen.” Accordingly, he distinguishes two types of contradictions
(“Zurückweisungen”): “solche, die sich direkt auf Äußerungen beziehen (Typ 1), und
solche, die sich auf das Mitbehauptete beziehen (Typ 2).”
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116 Likewise, Labov & Fanshel (1977: 86-87) maintain that speakers may refuse a
preceding request for action by addressing to the prior speaker a negative
assertion about one of the four preconditions.
117 It is noteworthy that at first glance, the contradictions in examples (12) and
(13) seem to challenge a presupposition expressed in the prior speakers’
utterances. Both Olivia’s “Don’t be silly” as well as Mama’s “Don’t make jokes”
look very similar to utterances such as “Quit being silly” or “Stop making jokes.”
In issuing the latter statements, a speaker presupposes that the addressee is being
silly or is making jokes respectively. The important point is that presuppositions
of these statements will remain constant even when the statements are negated. By
contrast, the propositions contained in Olivia’s and Mama’s utterances do not
remain constant under negation; rather they are reversed to the opposite.
118 By contrast, Apeltauer (1978) distinguishes “Zurückweisungen,” which involve the
simple negation of the opponent’s prior claim, from “Widersprüche,” in which a
negation is followed by a counter-assertion in the same turn: „Während mit der
ZURÜCKWEISUNG eine Festlegung meist vermieden wird, beinhaltet WIDERPSRECHEN die
Festlegung auf eine Gegendarstellung” (200).
119 As described earlier, there is an asymmetry between going first and going second
with one’s view on a potentially controversial issue. While going first means
having to state one’s position (and, subsequently, developing a defence), going
second allows to argue merely by attacking the opponent’s position, for instance,
by disputing the truth of their utterance.
120 Similar means of maintaining opposition have been found in naturally occurring
conflict sequences. For instance, in black working-class childrens’ disputes, one
of the most common ways of sustaining contradiction is through “recycling”; each of
two opposing parties repeats a prior position with the effect than an extended
series of disagreements is produced (cf. M. H. Goodwin 1983: 672-675; M. H. Goodwin
& C. Goodwin 1987: 212). Correspondingly, in a study of controversial TV-
discussions, Gruber (1996a: 163) observes that the use of explicit rejections which
are not followed by further accounts or justifications may result in
“Interaktionskreisläufe,” which emphasise and aggravate disagreement while
preventing thematic progression. Several researchers have noted that such types of
disputes are less complex in structure than disputes with justifications or
supporting arguments (cf. Corsaro & Rizzo 1990; Eisenberg & Garvey 1981; Genishi &
di Paolo 1982; Piaget 1926).
121 It must be noted, however, that in this type of conflict termination, too, the
disagreement is merely settled, not resolved. Settling a dispute means that the
difference of opinion is simply set aside or suspended, temporarily or forever
(e.g. by way of compromising or fighting it out). By contrast, a dispute is
resolved only if the doubt about the standpoint expressed by one party is retracted
because the argument offered to support it is convincing or if the other party
withdraws the standpoint by virtue of realising that it cannot stand up to the
criticism levelled against it (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 34; van Eemeren
et al. 1993: 34-35).
122 A corresponding format has been observed in naturally occurring dispute
sequences in German. For instance, Spranz-Fogasy (2002) describes a rhetorical
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device that frequently occurs in conflict talk both in institutional and everyday
contexts, which involves a challenge to the interlocutor’s integrity, for instance,
by accusing him or her of lying. Likewise, Spiegel (1995) discusses a disputing
strategy by which the speaker alleges that the interlocutor has lied, typically by
means of a meta-communicative utterance.
123 Spranz-Fogasy (1986: 37) expresses a similar view. He states that this
formulation involves the disqualification of the interlocutor and that the
accusatory character of this utterance overlays the contradictory character.
124 The close affinity between the activities of contradicting and correcting the
prior speaker’s utterance has been noted before in the literature on conflict
interaction. For instance, in a study of controversial TV-discussions, Gruber
(1996a: 153) differentiates contradictions (“direkte inhaltliche Widersprüche”)
which dispute the truth of the prior speaker’s claim from those which challenge the
accuracy of what the prior speaker has just said. He notes that the latter may
focus on the appropriateness of terms used by the opponent in that utterance.
Similarly, in a study of Afro-American children’s disputes, M. H. Goodwin (1983:
670) states that “correction and disagreement are related kinds of next moves to
prior moves in that they challenge either an element in prior speaker’s talk or the
action put forward by prior speaker.”
125 According to Matthews (1997: 322), a rhetorical question is “a question which
does not invite a reply: e.g. How can I climb that?, if implying ‘I can’t climb
it’.”
126 However, as pointed out by Schegloff et al. (1977: 378-379), some other-
corrections and repair initiations are playful teasing of the original speaker.
Feigned misunderstandings starting with “Y’mean” and similar markers are often used
to call attention to ambiguous meanings, and thus to initiate joking. (For a more
detailed discussion of this matter, cf. Jefferson (1985) and Schegloff (1987b)).
However, such non-serious corrections do not occur in my data and, therefore, are
not taken into account in the present discussion.
127 For similar views on this matter cf. M. H. Goodwin (1983: 660) and Jefferson
(1978: 3), who, in her discussion of “exposed” correction, states that “the
business of correcting can be a matter of not merely putting things to rights ...
but of specifically addressing lapses in competence and/or conduct” (original
emphasis). Similarly, Norrick (1991), argues that unmodulated other-correction in
second position signals the speaker’s conviction that the prior speaker lacks the
ability to produce the correction him- or herself, and that this perceived
asymmetry in responsibility for correctness and ability to achieve it overrides the
usual organisation of corrective sequences as described by Schegloff et al. (1977).
128 This assumption is corroborated by M. H. Goodwin (1983, 1990: 1950-151) in her
study of opposition moves in black children’s disputes. She observes that “The
utterance correcting a prior one frequently maintains a shape similar to that of
the prior utterance with the exception of the item being replaced, produced with
emphatic stress, and thus marking it as alternative to a similar item in the
preceding utterance” (1983: 663). Similarly, in a study of cohesive devices in
naturally occurring arguments, Schwitalla (2002: 112-113) finds one means of
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aggravating disagreement is prosodic reinforcement through accentuation of
particular elements in an utterance.
129 Leech (1999) suggests that turn-final vocatives usually combine an addressee-
identifying function with a relationship-maintenance function. Similarly, Lerner
(2003) finds that post-positioned terms of address tend to be used as a device to
demonstrate a particular stance toward the relationship with a recipient. He
suggests that adding an address form to the end of a turn may serve to underscore a
personal concern for a problem. Likewise, Bernardy (1996) maintains that the use of
address terms at the close of exclamatory sentences may serve to underline the
speaker’s emotions. This corresponds to Kramer’s (1975) observation that in
literary texts, address words usually emphasise activities such as, for instance,
requests or promises. These findings suggest that the exclamation of the kin term
“Mama” at the end of Wanda’s turn at line 101 signals a specific affective reaction
(i.e. shock, disbelief or exasperation) to Florene’s refusal to get on the bus and
serves to reinforce her plea to get on the bus.
130 As Norrick (1991) shows, these observations about adult-child interaction,
particularly parent-child interaction, may be generalised to any situation where
speakers interact with significantly different ability in the language used, such
as, for instance, talk between teacher and student, regardless of any age
difference, as well as interaction between native and non-native speakers. He
demonstrates that “common to all the situations in which a second speaker
repeatedly took unmarked corrective actions was a perceived imbalance in background
information and/or language ability toward the second speaker. In each of the
situations, the second speaker acted to facilitate further interaction toward what
he or she judged to be the common goal, and followed a pedagogical motivation with
the corrective actions”(78). In these environments, the potential face threat of
unmodulated corrections appears to be minimised, as the recipient apparently views
the corrective action as friendly help in the ongoing interaction, rather than as a
control move. Based on these findings, he argues that the organisation of
corrective sequences depends on the relationship of the participants, particularly
their perception of (differences in) their respective abilities to accomplish the
action, as well as their interactional goals.
131 As noted earlier, “a change in footing implies a change in the alignment we take
up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the
production or reception of an utterance” (Goffman 1986: 128).
132 Similarly, in a study of children’s disputes, M. H. Goodwin (1990) observes that
“contest terms” such as “honey” or “dear heart” are frequently placed at the end of
argumentative turns, with the talk preceding them being occupied with the work of
displaying opposition (150-151). For instance, she finds that terms of address such
as “dear heart” may be added at the close of corrective utterances done through
substitution, in order to emphasise opposition (87). While these terms may be
neutral modes of address or even terms of endearment as regards their semantic
content, they appear to obtain their affective valence from the way in which they
are embedded within a larger field of action. The findings in my data as well as
Goodwin’s observations show that within the context of a dispute, the production
and interpretation of address terms is governed by the participants’ orientation
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towards mutual opposition. This corroborates the suggestion made earlier that the
dispute frame involves a change in footing (Goffman 1986: 128), which is displayed
by the way disputants deal with the production and reception of utterances (or
parts of utterances).
133 Similar views have been put forward by several authors. For instance, Stein
(2003) uses a markedness-based approach to establish the social, pragmatic and
emotional meanings of the occurrences of particular terms of address. He argues
that the norm in any address term system can also be viewed as the unmarked usage
pattern from which deviations have to be accounted for as marked usages that convey
some special meaning. Stein suggests that terms of address are “subtle linguistic
indicators of social relations and the management of emotional states at a time”
(251-252). Likewise, Mazzon (2003) states that one of the major points of interest
in the research of address terms is to account for situations in which characters
“deviate” from the expected usage pattern. According to her, such deviations mirror
the complex and changing social attitudes of the characters towards each other as
well as the changing levels of distance versus intimacy and power versus
solidarity. She argues that address switches with the same interlocutor are most
frequent in literary data because they contribute “to portraying interaction
between characters” (225).
134 According to Stein (2003: 44), the common denominator for all marked forms of
terms of address is “some sort of emotional value (positive or negative).” Likewise
Salmon (1967: 59) states that switches generally signal “moments of strong emotion,
pleasant or otherwise.”
135 For that reason, Sadie’s “I know” functions as a relevance challenge as
described above.
136 As Schwitalla (1997: 128-130) has pointed out in a study of institutional talk,
imitating an interlocutor’s prior utterance often expresses a derogatory attitude
and may serve as a power move, i.e. a means of establishing an asymmetric
relationship.
137 The argumentative character of corrections has also been noticed by Piazza
(1999), who states that “other-repairs” which address a specific trouble item in an
utterance “convey ... the hostility existing between interlocutors and reflect the
conflict” (1006).
138 Leech (1999) speculates that vocatives are not used among close associates where
neither addressee-identifying role nor their relationship-maintenance role is felt
to be necessary, presumably, because the participants are completely sure of their
mutual relationships. In an analysis of the spoken part of the London Corpus of
Spoken and Written English (LSWE) corpus, he found that while in some conversations
vocatives are extremely frequent, in mother-daughter interactions, no vocatives
occur. However, in my data of mother-daughter disputes, vocatives are used quite
frequently. While the participants are clearly close associates, they find
themselves in relationship-negotiating interactions. As we have seen, address terms
repeatedly occur in turn initial, medial and final position. However, in the
context of a dispute, rather than summon attention or identify the addressee, they
function as indicators of the complex and shifting interpersonal alignments of the
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characters towards each other as well as the continuously changing levels of
distance versus intimacy and power versus solidarity.
139 It is noteworthy that she formulates her directive as an imperative. Research
into children’s use of directives has shown that children very frequently use
directives and that a large proportion of the directives they address to mothers
are imperatives rather than mitigated forms of directives (Ervin-Tripp 1977; Ervin-
Tripp et al. 1984; 1990). According to Ervin-Tripp (1977), the high rate of
directives from young children in part results from their dependency. Moreover,
there are structural limits to the kinds of directives children are capable of
producing and hence, young children cannot be expected to produce complex
formulations. Apparently, contextual factors, such as speakers’ dependency and
their linguistic competence may repeal the preconditions for valid requests for
action as described by Labov & Fanshel (1977). Another reason for the high number
of imperatives to mothers is that their social role is typically one of providing
for the child’s needs. Since their role is one of care-giving, requests usually do
not present a major intrusion or unusual demand. In addition, as Ervin-Tripp et al.
(1984) indicate, some control acts such as the daughter’s “Tell me a story.”
uttered at bedtime in this extract may have companionship as their goal rather than
the assertion of power. While such directives generally require that the addressee
be in a better position than the speaker to fulfil the act requested, their primary
goal is social. Therefore, Ervin-Tripp et al. label such utterances “person-
centered control acts” (116). Consequently, to use Tannen’s (2002) terms, although
it is an attempt to affect the mother’s behaviour and hence presents a “control
manoeuvre”, at the same time the daughter’s imperative in the example above is also
a bid for closeness, i.e. a “connection manoeuvre”. Thus, this episode illustrates
the interplay of control and connection, of power and intimacy, which, as noted
earlier, is inherent in any relationship, conversation, and utterance.
140 As Tsui (1994: 177) states, a temporisation to a request is often a face-saving
device, as it avoids refusing a request outright. This supports Muntigl &
Turnbull’s (1998) claim that counterclaims are relatively less face threatening
than other oppositional moves as, for instance, contradictions or relevance
challenges.
141 Correspondingly, Labov & Fanshel (1977: 86-87) note that speakers may refuse a
preceding request for action by addressing to the prior speaker a negative
assertion about one of the four preconditions.
142 Corresponding techniques have been observed in prior studies on conflict talk.
For instance, in his study of controversial TV discussions, Gruber (1996, 1998)
reports that “pragmatic disagreement” expresses opposition not (only) by means of
negation but with (turn-initial) pragmatic markers. The most frequent “disagreement
markers” in his data were “No” and “(Oh) yes,” “But” and “Well?”. Similarly,
Spranz-Fogasy (1986) notes that in his corpus of mediation hearings,
“Alternativbehauptungen” were often preceded by other techniques to indicate the
opposing character of the utterance and establish coherence. These include the
disagreement tokens “No” and “Yes,” which, as noted earlier, he refers to as
“Reklamation.”
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143 Extract (11) also demonstrates that expressions of opposite polarity may not
only preface further oppositional moves but can also stand alone in a turn (or in
combination with an address term) as minimal (disagreeing) responses. For similar
observations cf. Gruber (1996a, 1998) and Spranz-Fogasy (1986).
144 According to Pomerantz (1984), “Well” is a dispreference marker, and as such
serves to mitigate disagreement. However, as the examples from my data suggest, in
the context of an already established dispute, turn-initial “Well” merely seems to
signal that opposition is going to continue without necessarily functioning as a
mitigating device.
145 For instance, according to van Eemeren et al. (1993: 12) argumentation is “a
procedure whereby two or more individuals try to arrive at an ‘agreement’.” The
main function of argumentation thus consists “in managing the resolution of
disagreements” (13). They propose a normative model of argumentative discourse as
“the systematic exchanges of resolution-oriented argumentative moves” (16), which
they label “critical discussion.” As an idealised activity type, critical
discussions do not contain as accusations, orders, prohibitions, threats, and
similar sorts of communicative acts since they are unsuitable to the resolution of
disagreement (28ff). Threats, for example, are unsuited to the resolution of
disagreement, since a disagreement cannot be resolved through strategies that end a
discussion without mutual consent. Similarly, a criticism is not an acceptable move
in a critical discussion, because it “is an act, whose point can be to express
disapproval of the addressee – which is exactly the kind of thing that can
sidetrack a discussion” (35, fn5). Correspondingly, Kotthoff (1989: 188) states
that “Argumentation” is based on a contentions issue, which is to be resolved.
Following Jacobs & Jackson (1989, 1982), she defines argumentation as
“disagreement-relevant” expansions of adjacency pairs. “Disagreement–relevant”
speech acts are those, which may lead to consent. These include, explanations,
clarification requests, justifications, examples, and the like, but exclude
insults, prohibitions, ridiculing the opponent, etc.
Similarly, “negotiation,” according to O’Rourke (2001, Ch. 4), is driven by a
sustained desire for agreement in the context of a difference of interests;
successful negotiation will typically involve argumentation adduced in favour of
initial positions and then a series of compromises. By contrast, “quarrels” are
conversations fed by emotion that can lead to name-calling, shouting, and violence.
According to Schwittala (1987: 108) “Streitgespräche” are characterised by
the use of “Äußerungen, die als Vorwürfe, Anklagen, Kritik, vielleicht sogar
Schmähung, Beleidigung und Beschimpfung verstanden werden,” which constitute
attacks on the interlocutor’s image. Correspondingly, Hundsnurscher (1993)
maintains that “Streit” - as opposed to “Konflikt” - is distinguished by the
occurrence of specific, “aggressive” or “expressive” speech acts, which lend this
form of conflict talk its characteristic affective character. These “quarrelling-
specific speech acts” include accusations, insisting and insults. For similar views
cf. Apeltauer (1978); Fill (1989); Gruber (1996a); Knoblauch (1991, 1995); Messmer
(2003, esp. Ch. 6); Rehbock (1987); Schank (1987); Spiegel (1995); and Walton
(1992).
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146 The validity of the maxim of clarity is illustrated by the following example
from My sister, in which Madame Danzard challenges the comprehensibility of her
daughter’s contribution and demands that Isabelle make herself clear:
example: My sister 9
220 MADAME DANZARD What is the world coming to? I couldn't
221 believe my eyes.
222 ISABELLE But Maman-
223 MADAME DANZARD There are no buts involved here.
224 ISABELLE Maybe she didn't know, Maman.
225 MADAME DANZARD (Gathering up the cards.) Of course she
226 knew. She deliberately put it on and wore
227 it. That sweater must have cost-
228 ISABELLE (Interrupting.) Maybe-
229 MADAME DANZARD I wonder if I pay them too much.
230 ISABELLE Maybe she didn't buy it, Maman.
231 MADAME DANZARD What?
232 ISABELLE (Rising, and walking to the staircase.)
233 Maybe it wasn't her.
234 MADAME DANZARD What are you talking about?
> 235 Make yourself clear, Isabelle.
236 ISABELLE Maybe it was her sister who gave her that
237 sweater. Didn't you see? It was handmade.
238 MADAME DANZARD (Softly.) Oh. Yes. Yes. Now I see. (Softer
239 yet.) I believe you're right, Isabelle.
240 ISABELLE I think so, Maman.
At the beginning of this fragment, Madame Danzards expresses her exasperation at
the fact that Lea, one of the Danzard’s maids, is wearing a pink sweater for work
instead of proper work clothes (lines 220-221). During the following course of the
conversation, Isabelle repeatedly tries to point out to her mother that there may
be an acceptable explanation for Lea’s attire, but Madame Danzard will not listen
to her daughter’s objections (lines 222-229). When Isabelle at last finds her voice
and points out that Lea may not have bought the sweater herself (line 230), Madame
Danzard issues a first request for clarification (line 231). And when Isabelle
rephrases her prior utterance (line 233) Madam Danzard more openly challenges the
intelligibility of her daughter’s utterance, asking: “What are you talking about?”
(line 234), presumably in an irritated tone of voice, and demanding: “Make yourself
clear, Isabelle.” (line 235). In so doing, she calls into question the
comprehensibility of her daughter’s contribution and demands that she make the
required amendments in accordance with the maxim of clarity. Only after Isabelle
has elaborated on her preceding utterance, explaining what she was trying to say
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and providing evidence in support of her suggestion, does Madame Danzard concede
that her daughter may be right (lines 238-240).
147 Cf. also van Eemeren et al. (1993, Ch. 1) and Spranz-Fogasy (2002) on the
preconditions for appropriate contributions to argumentative discourse.
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In every dispute between parent and child, both cannot
be right, but they may be, and usually are, both wrong.
It is this situation which gives family life its
peculiar hysterical charm. (Isaac Rosenfeld)
8 Summary and conclusion
In this study I have examined women’s discursive practices in
constructing and negotiating mother-daughter disputes and underlying
power relationships as portrayed in contemporary plays by women. In
this discussion of conflict and power in (fictional) mother-daughter
interaction, I have pursued various strands of analysis. I have
attended to the turn-by-turn details of (conflict) talk as situated
interaction, I have looked at aspects of the (para)linguistic
choices speakers make in designing and delivering their utterances,
and I have considered the role of wider contextual aspects such as
the participants’ social identities and relationship, gender, etc.
for the production and interpretation of talk. In doing so, I have
drawn on a range of methodological frameworks that fall under the
umbrella of interactional sociolinguistics, drawing, inter alia, on
the analytical tools of CA, Gumperz’ concept of contextualisation,
Goffman’s and Brown & Levinson’s notion of face (work) and
politeness.
I have investigated how the structural organisation of the
mother-daughter disputes in my data differs from other interactional
contexts and thus contributes to the framing or contextualisation of
this specific speech activity. In particular, I have examined the
relationship between various aspects of the sequential organisation
of conversation and the procedures by which the adversative
character of oppositional moves in my data is highlighted (rather
than downplayed). In addition, I have looked at the types of
argumentative actions that occur in my data and the ways in which
these actions and their responses are formatted and sequenced to
uncover the dynamics of the delicate power play that can take place
between mothers and daughters and that is enacted in conflict talk.
 This study thus contributes to a number of research fields,
including work on intergenerational communication, gender and
discourse, research on conflict talk, research on power in
interaction, and stylistics. In this section, I will briefly
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summarise the findings of the present study and discuss their
significance.
Dramatic dialogue as a data source for conflict analysis
The working hypothesis of this study has been that the procedures
for the analysis of naturally-occurring conversation are profitable
for the study of play-talk and, conversely, that dramatic dialogue
is a rewarding research object for the analysis of everyday
conversation, and in particular for the study of conflict talk. I
have shown that, despite obvious differences, dramatic dialogue –
especially in the case of modern plays – closely resembles ordinary
talk, and thus can be analysed by drawing on procedures for the
study of natural conversation. Dramatic dialogues are created by
individuals who live and participate in the society they portray in
plays. Accordingly, the interaction rendered in plays reflects how
dramatists envisage the mechanisms of interpersonal exchange in real
life. This is also, or especially, true for plays by women. Many
plays by women can be considered slice-of-life accounts of family
life, and in particular of mother-daughter relationships, reflecting
the authors’ personal experience as conversationalists and their
observations as lay sociologists, as it were. Thus, play texts allow
us to see how women perceive and conceptualise crucial relationship
issues, such as power and conflict in mother-daughter relationships,
and the manifestation of these issues in (verbal) interaction.
Consequently, dialogues in plays by women have particular merit as a
source of data for the analysis of conflict talk between mothers and
daughters - and it is as such that they have been exploited here.
Conceptualisations of (interpersonal) conflict: causes versus process
I have briefly discussed some of the ways in which conflict and its
discourse has been conceptualised in order to delineate the scope of
the study. Numerous investigators focus on the underlying sources of
conflict and define conflict as goal incompatibility occurring
between two or more individuals or groups (cf. Coser 1956; Deutsch
1971, 1973a, b; Fincham & Bradbury 1991; Galtung 1973; Shantz 1987;
Thomas 1976; and Waln 1982). Such motive-centred conceptions put the
accent on the preconditions of conflict. However, the presence of
underlying sources does not necessarily mean that conflict will
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arise. Moreover, while such emphases provide an insight into
possible causes of conflict, they do not clearly identify an
occurrence of conflict in ongoing interaction. Finally, although
such motive-centred approaches reveal possible sources of conflict,
the conflict itself, i.e. the ways in which conflict emerges,
progresses and ends remain concealed. Other researchers focus on the
expression of underlying incompatibilities in interaction as a
defining characteristic of conflict. From this perspective, conflict
is conceptualised as mutual opposition, the overt display of
differences between (at least) two individuals or groups. Conflict
is considered as a social activity, created and conducted primarily
by means of talking (cf. Bavelas et al. 1985; Foss 1980; Frost &
Wilmot 1978; Garvey & Shantz 1992; Mack & Snyder 1973; Rehbock
1987). In keeping with this interactional view of language as the
means for establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships
and for performing socially organised interactions between
individuals, I view interpersonal conflict as an emergent process,
which is jointly and sequentially accomplished by the participants
in and through talk-in-interaction. Therefore, rather than analyse
why people conflict and with what outcomes, we should examine how
people conflict, i.e. the interactional procedures participants
employ to accomplish the activity. Consequently, the analysis of the
participants’ verbal exchanges becomes the principal means of
investigating conflict. In the present study, the emphasis has thus
been on the interactive processes through which actual conflicts
emerge and develop in order to study conflict as a structured and
functional (inter)activity in and through which participants
construct social reality. The interactive work can be observed by
looking at the structural organisation of the talk, the speech acts
used, and the formatting of turns and sequences.
Power in (conflict) interaction
Previous research has shown that (verbal) conflict provides an
important arena for the constitution of social relations, and in
particular for the negotiation of power relationships. Like
conflict, power is a large ‘can of worms’: there is a multitude of
different conceptualisations of power. What it is, where it is
located, and how it can be analysed are all questions that continue
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to be hotly debated in the broad field of social and discourse
studies. Following a rough overview of some of the major differences
in the theories on power, a working definition of power was
provided: power was defined as the potential ability of one actor to
get her way and to control (influence) another’s actions and/or
beliefs. This potential rests on participants’ access to power
resources (or bases of power), which are mobilised by the actors
involved in the course of their interaction in order to exert
control. However, this ability or capacity to control others and
influence social outcomes can be made manifest only in interpersonal
dynamics. Thus, power is not a property or an attribute of
individuals but part and parcel of social interaction. Moreover,
power is not a static social category that is imposed by some pre-
existing social structure; rather it is a dynamic relationship that
is constantly (re)produced or modified in and through social
interaction. Nevertheless, it is also grounded in social structures
that exist prior to interaction. The relationship between power and
talk in (conflict) interaction cannot be accounted for simply in
terms of pre-existing social relations of power which determine
discursive structures, but neither can it be accounted for in
isolation from those relations (cf. Giddens’ 1976, 1981, 1984 notion
of the “duality of structure”). A key element in the approach I have
taken in this study is that power relations in interaction are not
fixed, predetermined states of affairs, but are constantly shifting
and being redefined between participants on a very local level. From
this very local moment-by-moment interactional perspective, power
can be construed as one participant’s ability to affect or influence
what the interlocutor does in the next turn. These shifts can be
observed by looking at the minute details of the talk. The social
practice of language in interaction is a primary site where power
relations can be seen to be constructed and resisted. Power
relationships are joint interactional accomplishments; they are
interactively and dynamically achieved, maintained, and transformed
by the participants in and through interaction by drawing on various
resources (both intrinsic and extrinsic to the interaction) to
influence each other and affect social outcomes. A prime locus for
the (re)construction and negotiation of power relationships is
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conflict interaction, i.e. the open clash of control attempts and
resistance.
Methodology
The investigation of the interactive sequential procedures by means
of which participants jointly accomplish conflict and thereby
(re)construct and negotiate social (power) relationships calls for
an analytic framework that takes into account both local (micro)
aspects of talk-in-interaction and global (macro) aspects of social
structure. The present study has therefore operated within an
interactional sociolinguistic framework of discourse analysis.
Interactional sociolinguistics integrates two aspects of context in
the analysis of verbal interaction between mothers and daughters:
the local, sequential context of talk and the global, socio-cultural
context. In terms of methodology, it draws heavily on the analytical
tools and findings of CA. That is, the study includes a micro-
analysis of talk-in-interaction, examining the sequencing of actions
(e.g. turn-taking organisation, preference organisation and tying
techniques) and the design specifics of actions (e.g. syntactic
structure, wording, prosody, as well as paralinguistic and nonverbal
features). However, it also takes into account macro-level aspects
of context such as background knowledge about socio-cultural,
linguistic and interactional norms (e.g. norms of politeness) as
well as such ethnographic particulars as participants’ gender, age,
social roles and relationships, and interactional history. By
combining micro-level analysis of the form, content, and sequential
placement of utterances with ethnographic and socio-cultural
information, we are able to analyse how verbal conflict is jointly
and sequentially accomplished by participants in interaction, how
the activity type is contextualised or framed, and how participants
(re)construct and negotiate their social identities and (power)
relationships in the course of (conflict) interaction.
The sequential organisation of mother-daughter dispute
Based on a concept of (interpersonal) conflict as a situated local
interactional accomplishment which is jointly constituted by the
participants through the mutual exchange of oppositional moves, I
have analysed the particulars of talk-in-interaction to uncover how
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the mother-daughter disputes in my data are mutually and
interactionally created, conducted and terminated by the
participants. I have shown that verbal conflict is sequentially and
interactionally accomplished by the participants through the
reciprocal exchange of oppositional moves in successive turns at
talk. Verbal conflicts contain a minimum of three mutually opposing
turns. They begin by means of an action that can be construed as
arguable being opposed, with the initial opposition itself being
treated as an arguable action in the subsequent turn. They proceed
by way of each opposition being consecutively treated as an arguable
action. They end when oppositional turns cease to be produced and
other activities are taken up. Thus, the definition of verbal
conflict that forms the basis of the present study is structural in
nature; it specifies and locates an occurrence of conflict in
successive turns at talk. Approaching verbal conflict in this way
places the analytic focus directly on the sequential organisation of
talk-in-interaction as the framework within which participants
accomplish conflict talk.
I have also shown that, like conflict opening, conflict
termination is jointly and sequentially accomplished by the
participants. Verbal conflicts begin and proceed through mutually
expressed opposition and end with mutual abstinence from opposing
moves. Opposition ceases either because the conflict has been
resolved or settled by the participants or because it has been
dropped by one or both of them. Despite the stress on resolution as
the principal way of terminating conflict in much of the literature
on conflict, almost none of the mother-daughter disputes under
analysis are resolved. Instead, conflict is terminated mostly
through stand-offs. In fact, not only does resolution rarely occur
in my data, it is apparently not a goal of the interaction. This
finding suggests that the intergenerational arguments in my data
serve other purposes than the reconciliation of opposing views. A
crucial function of mother-daughter conflicts is the negotiation of
power relationships (through the exchange of oppositional moves,
i.e. control attempts and resistance), and this function is
accomplished whether conflict is resolved or not. For instance, in
closing an argument by means of submission, the participants
jointly, sequentially establish a local hierarchy, thereby
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reproducing or modifying global social structures – depending on the
outcome of the dispute. Consequently, verbal conflict represents a
crucial locus for examining the ways in which participants negotiate
their status with respect to one another. The investigation of the
process and outcomes of verbal conflicts between mothers and
daughters reveals how the social order of the moment can be
formulated, challenged, and reconstituted through talk-in-
interaction. Although social structure is negotiated in every
interaction, conflict talk constitutes a crucial activity through
which participants (re)produce social organisation and negotiate
social relationships. Thus, an understanding of how social structure
is negotiated will benefit from an understanding of how arguing is
accomplished. By examining closely the ways in which conflicts are
mutually and interactionally constituted, sustained and terminated,
we can obtain insights into the central role of conflict in the
joint accomplishment and transformation of social order.
Aggravated versus mitigated disagreements
Starting from a model of verbal conflict that views dispute as a
joint sequential accomplishment, I have examined the relationship
between various aspects of the sequential organisation of
conversation and the procedures by which the adversative character
of oppositional moves in my data is highlighted. Taken together,
these sequential features allow a characterisation of the verbal
conflicts in my data as aggravated conflicts on the structural plane
of interaction: firstly, the mother-daughter disputes under analysis
are characterised by suspending the preference for agreement order
of ordinary conversation. The oppositional turns in my data are not
structured so as to minimise opposition. Disagreements no longer
show any features of dispreferred seconds as described in the CA-
literature. They are not delayed sequentially by means of
hesitation, nor are they pushed back in the construction of turns
through the use of initial agreement tokens. On the contrary,
instead of mitigating their disagreement through the use of
reluctance markers, the women in my data emphasise the oppositional
character of their turns by prefacing their utterances with various
dissent markers. That is to say, in the construction of
argumentative turns, participants display an orientation towards the
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structural preference for disagreement. That means, rather than show
a concern for the avoidance of open discord organising their talk so
as to display deference to each other in accordance with the
principles of face-saving or polite behaviour proposed by
sociolinguistic research (Brown & Levinson 1987; Goffman 1967;
Leech 1983), participants exhibit an orientation to the expectation
of dissent and ‘impoliteness.’ This context-specific preference
structure provides one conversational resource by means of which
participants can frame or contextualise an ongoing (inter)activity
as a heated dispute.
Secondly, in addition to the departure from the standard
preference organisation, the mother-daughter disputes in my data are
characterised by a change in the standard turn-taking mechanisms as
described by Sacks et al. (1974). (Attempted) speaker changes do not
occur at transition relevance places but at disagreement relevance
points: opponents produce disagreements immediately when
propositions, etc. in the current speakers turn occur which they do
not agree with. By initiating their oppositional turns in the midst
of, rather than at the possible completion of the opponent’s turn,
disputants can stress disagreement. This turn-incursive positioning
reinforces disagreements in that it involves the deliberate
interruption of a turn in progress. Interrupting is thus another
structural means by which the speakers in my data accomplish
aggravated opposition. Thus, apart from exchanging unmitigated
disagreements, participants make the ongoing talk recognisable (both
to each other and observers) as a heated dispute by packaging these
disagreements in the sequential form of interruptions, placing them
immediately at or shortly after a point in the opponent’s turn at
which an arguable action has been identified. This requires that the
disputants monitor closely what the opponent is saying. Apparently,
dispute talk is a highly structured activity progressing through the
detailed sequencing of oppositional turns.
Interruptions are often thought to be involved in the
establishment or maintenance of power in interaction. As the
analyses in this study have shown, disputants can indeed exert a
form of discursive control through the use of a particular
interruption technique. Disputants may use post-response-initiation
interruption as an arguing device to constrain the opponent’s
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participation options. The participants in my data can be seen to
use this form of countering, or overriding a response-in-progress to
deal with unfavourable responses. This device provides a
conversational resource that can be used as a means of constraining
the options open to the opponent in formulating a response - in
particular a counter or a defence - to a preceding assertion or
challenge. Countering or overriding a response-in-progress by means
of an oppositional move packaged as an interruption provides a
conversational resource that disputants can exploit to restrict the
options available to the opponent for developing a response that is
perceived as unfavourable to the interrupter’s position. In this
way, interruptions-cum-challenges can be employed to exercise
control over both the structure and content of the ongoing
interaction.
Thirdly, the mother-daughter disputes in my corpus display a
noticeably high degree of formal cohesion between successive turns.
In producing subsequent argumentative moves, disputants regularly
tie not only to the type of action the prior utterance performs but
also to various (structural and lexical) features it exhibits. Links
to the opponent’s as well as the current speaker’s own prior turns
are established and explicitly marked via recurrence of words,
phrases, or whole utterances. The use of such cohesive ties between
successive turns is a further structural device which the speakers
in my data utilise in building aggravated oppositional moves and
thereby making the ongoing talk recognisable as a heated dispute. On
the one hand, by means of various types of contrastive mirroring,
disputants exploit and manipulate the lexical and syntactic
structure of the opponent’s prior talk as a resource for shaping a
counter to that very talk. In this way, a pronounced contrast is set
up between the opponents’ positions on the content level of
interaction, while at the same time a close link is created on the
structural and lexical level of interaction. The various types of
contrastive mirroring are dialogical dispute devices in that they
always relate locally to the opponent’s preceding utterance, and
therefore - despite the pronounced contrast they establish between
participants’ positions - display cooperativeness on the structural
plane of interaction. Moreover, while argument has frequently been
viewed negatively as a troublesome and disorderly type of talk, when
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this activity is examined in detail, it turns out that it is in fact
accomplished through a process of very intricate coordination
between the disputants. In order to construct counters by means of
contrastive mirroring, speakers must follow very closely what the
opponent is saying. This shows that dispute talk is a highly orderly
(inter)activity co-constructed by the participants through carefully
orchestrated oppositional moves. On the other hand, disputants can
proceed by means of skip-connecting, i.e. repeating (a part of)
their own prior utterances, thus reinforcing their own positions. In
heated phases of arguments, disputants frequently construct
subsequent argumentative moves by simply repeating their own
utterance more or less verbatim several times. While contrastive
mirroring mainly serves to intensify the opposition between the
disputants’ positions, this practice of ‘standing pat’ is a
monological arguing device, which primarily serves to reinforce the
speaker’s own point of view, and typically adds no new substantial
information to the interaction.
The mother-daughter disputes in my corpus are thus
distinguished by the following sequential features: (1) a change in
preference organisation with disagreements being the structurally
unmarked and hence preferred reactions to an opponent’s turn; (2) a
change in turn-taking organisation with an increased number of
competitive overlaps and simultaneous stretches of talk; and (3) the
frequent use of formal cohesive ties between turns of opponents or
the same speaker. This structural organisation of conflict sequences
provides a scale of emotional involvement in conflict episodes and
thus allows us to differentiate between mitigated and aggravated
forms of verbal conflict: if only one of the three discursive
features occurs in a strip of talk, we are dealing with a mild
controversy, whereas if all three occur, we are dealing with an
emotionally charged dispute. On this view, the sequential
organisation of the mother-daughter disputes in my data differs from
other interactional contexts and thus contributes to the framing or
contextualisation of these interactivities as fierce altercations.
This impression is corroborated by the occurrence of paralinguistic
and prosodic features such as volume increase, tone of voice,
contrastive stress and noticeable emphatic intonation contours,
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which also signal high emotional involvement and convey the
oppositional character of turns and their level of intensity.
Argumentative speech act(ion)s in mother-daughter disputes
Furthermore, I have looked at the speech act level of talk. I have
examined what types of speech actions are chiefly used by the
disputants in my data and how these actions and the ways in which
they are packaged contribute to the adversarial character of the
interaction.  By looking at the form and sequencing of actions and
their responses, I have investigated how, within the mother-daughter
dyad, the social order of the moment is formulated, challenged, and
reconstituted in the course of an ongoing dispute, thereby exploring
the interplay of conflict and power in intergenerational
interaction.
In my corpus, opposition is accomplished by means of various
different illocutionary acts. Of these, the most prominent are:
accusations, directives, demands for explanation, threats, relevance
challenges, competence challenges, disqualifications, unfavourable
comments, contradictions, corrections and counter-assertions. While
these argumentative actions can in principle be performed in a
mitigated or aggravated manner using direct or indirect
constructions, in my data such actions are routinely produced in
ways that reinforce rather than minimise their face-threatening
potential. Instead of being preceded by mitigating devices such as
pauses, agreement tokens and accounts, which delay and soften the
disagreement, the oppositional moves in my corpus are often prefaced
by dissent markers, which stress rather than downplay their
argumentative character, and intensify rather than lessen the
potential face-threat they carry. Moreover, paralinguistic,
prosodic, and nonverbal cues such as, for example, increased volume,
contrastive stress and exaggerated intonation contours, facial
expression and gestures further emphasise the argumentative
character of turns. The resulting face-threatening and sometimes
even offensive nature of the speech actions contributes to the sense
of hostility in the conflict sequences under analysis and their
antagonistic nature. Both the kinds of speech actions employed and
the ways in which these actions are packaged show that the
disputants in my data display an orientation towards dissent and
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confrontation rather than consent and harmony. Instead of mitigating
disagreement and working towards the resolution of conflict, the
participants design their turns so as to emphasise opposition and
sustain conflict. This is further evidence that in the mother-
daughter conflicts under analysis the interactional goal is not
conflict resolution. The choice and design of argumentative actions
as well as the ensuing affective and confrontational key of the
exchanges contextualises the mother-daughter interaction in my data
as emotionally charged disputes or quarrels and distinguishes them
from other forms of conflict talk such as negotiation, discussion
and argumentation. Moreover, the ways in which the argumentative
actions and their responses are formatted and sequenced in my data
uncover the dynamics of the delicate power play that can take place
between mothers and daughters and that is enacted in conflict talk.
In conclusion, this study has shown that conflict, opposition
and involvement are emergent social phenomena, which are mutually
accomplished and displayed by participants through the ways in which
they interact with each other. The co-construction of dissent and
emotional involvement takes place on various communication levels:
the sequential level, the speech-act level, the lexical level, and
the level of paralinguistic and nonverbal communication. These
levels mutually and reciprocally contextualise utterances as
oppositional and the interaction as dispute. Structural aspects of
conversation such as preference and turn-taking organisation and
formal cohesion are among the discursive resources which
conversationalists can employ to establish and make known the kind
of (inter)activity they are engaged in, their alignment towards each
other and the current topic of talk, and their degree of involvement
in the interaction. Sequential phenomena such as unmitigated
disagreements and corrections, confrontational interruptions, and
preference for disagreement contextualise conflict talk, opposition
and high emotional involvement and thus distinguish the mother-
daughter interaction in my data as aggravated forms of conflict
talk. However, structural properties are not the only conversational
features that play a role in framing the interaction in my data as
antagonistic. In addition to the sequential organisation of talk,
both the kinds of speech actions employed and the ways in which they
are designed so as to emphasise opposition and sustain disagreement
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reveal that the disputants orient towards dissent rather than
consent and thus contextualise the mother-daughter interaction in my
data as emotionally charged disputes. Moreover, the mother-daughter
conflicts are distinguished as quarrels by the display of negative
affective reactions through a range of paralinguistic and prosodic
and nonverbal features, which signal emotional agitation and further
emphasise the argumentative character of turns. The resulting face-
threatening and sometimes even offensive nature of the speech
actions contributes to the sense of hostility in the conflict
sequences under analysis, and their antagonistic nature marks them
from other forms of conflict talk.
Although the present data were drawn from fictional mother-
daughter disputes in plays, the practices of constructing conflict
talk and building oppositional moves displayed therein are by no
means restricted to fictitious argumentative exchanges. The
structure of arguments between mothers and daughters as portrayed in
contemporary drama very closely resembles that observed in naturally
occurring disputes. In addition, research on real-life conflict talk
in a range of interactional contexts has described a number of
similar sequential phenomena in aggravated phases of conflict to
those found in my data. Furthermore, corresponding argumentative
speech act(ion)s and paralinguistic and nonverbal cues have been
reported for natural and pseudo-natural conflict interaction. This
confirms the assumption that playwrights rely on their (underlying)
knowledge of how everyday conversation works in their creation of
dialogue in drama. Dialogues in plays are a rewarding research
object for the analysis of talk-in-interaction, and in particular of
conflict interaction.
Implications of this study
The findings of this study have several implications for the study
of naturally occurring arguments. Firstly, they clearly show that,
while conflict talk has often been evaluated negatively as a
disruptive and disorderly type of discourse, on close examination,
this activity turns out to be achieved via a process of very close
coordination between the opposing parties. The sequential analysis
of the mother-daughter interaction in my data has demonstrated that
verbal dispute is highly orderly and progresses through the
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meticulous sequencing of oppositional turns. For instance, placing
argumentative interruptions immediately at or shortly after a point
in the opponent’s turn at which an arguable action has been
identified requires that the disputants monitor closely what the
opponent is saying. Likewise, building counters by means of
contrastive mirroring requires that speakers pay exact attention to
what the opponent is saying. In fact, the more aggravated opposition
is at the content level, the more finely tuned the disagreeing moves
are to those of the adversary both at the structural and the lexical
level of interaction. This delicate adjustment requires that the
participants closely follow what the other is saying at a range of
linguistic levels. Thus, while at the content level of interaction,
opposition is stressed and reinforced, at the structural and lexical
level of talk, there is strong formal cooperation in these sequences
of conflict talk. In other words, the mother-daughter disputes in my
corpus are both highly confrontational and cooperative at the same
time. These findings clearly show that describing argumentative
discourse in terms of speech actions and restricting analysis to the
sequencing of those actions overlooks a crucial aspect of the
interaction, notably the vital importance of the surface structure
of the talk for sequential organisation. Attention to aspects of the
detailed sequencing of oppositional turns provides essential insight
into how conversationalists in general, and mothers and daughters in
particular, ‘do disputing’ in a sequentially organised way,
proceeding turn by turn by producing talk that connects to prior
talk.
The results of this study also show that such aspects as the
relevance, truth, informativeness and clarity of conversational
contributions apparently play an important part in the
accomplishment of aggravated arguments just as in friendly
conversation and can therefore become the focal point of
oppositional moves. The participants in my data can be seen to
orient to Grice’s (1975, 1989) Cooperative Principle and the
Conversional Maxims it encompasses. This evidences, once more, that,
although they are unmistakably engaged in oppositional talk,
disputants cooperate in constructing the (inter)activity of
quarrelling.
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In addition, the outcomes of this study have implication for
the study of power in interaction. It clearly demonstrates that the
relationship between power and discourse can neither be explained
simply in terms of pre-existing social structures which determine
discursive structures, nor can it be accounted for in isolation from
those social structures. Power relations are not fixed,
predetermined states of affairs, but dynamic relationships, which
are continuously negotiated between participants on a very local
level in talk-in-interaction, by utilising various resources (both
intrinsic and extrinsic to the interaction) to exert control over
each other and influence social outcomes. The social practice of
verbal interaction, and especially of conflict-talk-in-interaction,
is a key site where power relations can be seen to be
(re)constructed and counteracted in the overt clash of control
manoeuvres and resistance.
The findings of this study also have implications for gender
research. My analysis also shows that female dramatists apparently
conceive of mother-daughter interaction as much more confrontational
than the stereotype of consent-oriented, cooperative, face-saving,
harmonious female communication that can frequently be found in the
literature on gender and discourse would have it.1
In particular, in the mother-daughter disputes in my corpus,
the women’s disputing style differs considerably from the feminine
conflict style that has been observed in other argumentative
contexts. Studies on gender specific disputing styles (Kotthoff
1984, 1989, 1991, 1992a, b; 1993c; Sheldon 1992, 1993, 1996; Tannen
1990, 1994b; Trömel-Plötz 1992, 1996) have claimed that women tend
to avoid offensive arguing, evade direct confrontation, defend their
positions less vehemently and show a stronger concern for harmony in
the interaction than men.
For instance, Sheldon’s (1992, 1993, 1996) work on the way
conflict is managed in the talk of three-year-olds in the setting of
the pre-school playgroup shows that girls use more mitigated forms
than boys, and thus are involved in less conflict and are able to
resolve conflict more easily when is arises. Sheldon (1996: 58)
describes “double-voice discourse,” a feminine conflict management
strategy, “which has an overlay of mitigation, effectively softening
the force of dispute utterances rather than escalating discord.” She
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argues that double-voice discourse does not conform to the classical
definition of conflict as a heavy-handed adversarial activity but is
better described as “negotiation,” with participants communicating
with one another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter:
“to arrive through discussion at some kind of agreement or
compromise about something” (Grove et al. 1967, quoted in Sheldon
1996: 58).
Similar observations have been reported for adults, especially
in the context of institutional discourse. In her studies of TV
discussions and discussions between university students and
lecturers, Kotthoff (1984, 1989, 1991, 1992a,b, 1993c) finds that in
argumentative sequences, women generally use a more cooperative
speech style and orient towards consent, whereas men use a more
confrontational speech style and orient towards dissent. She finds
that men tend to confront their co-participants with unmitigated
positions. They defend their positions more vehemently, do not show
an orientation towards consent and emphasise opposition. By
contrast, women formulate their positions more openly, frequently
express their understanding of the other’s position, show an
orientation towards consent and emphasise consent. She concludes
that men seem to be more interested in pushing through their
position, while women appear to be more interested in finding a
solution that is acceptable for both parties.2
Correspondingly, in a study of TV discussions and interviews
among women, Trömel-Plötz (1992, 1996) finds a range of properties
of women’s talk “pointing toward collaboration, creative atmosphere,
balance of speaking rights, cooperative style, symmetry, and mutual
support when women talk with each other” (1992: 581). These include
the following mechanisms, which Trömel-Plötz (1992: 582) ascribes to
“a basic fairness in the conversational practice of women, and
which, according to her, “contribute to women’s conversations being
free of competition”:
a) Women frequently protect the face of an opponent by packing
criticism, by implicit correction, or by withholding reproach
where these would be appropriate. ...
c) ... women withhold power gestures, e.g. they do not use
toppings to show their superiority over an opponent; they do not
devalue the content of other speakers.
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d) Women are willing to compromise. ...
(Trömel-Plötz 1992: 582)
In contrast, the women in my data frequently attack the face of an
opponent by openly expressing criticism and reproach, or by explicit
correction. Rather than withholding power gestures, they often pull
rank to get their ways. They also recurrently devalue the content of
other speakers. Moreover, instead to working towards compromise, the
women in my data work to maintain disagreement.
While Trömel-Plötz (1992: 582) finds that women’s
conversational style is characterised by “respectfulness” in that
“women withhold personal attack and insults,” the women in my data
frequently personally attack and insult each other.
Trömel-Plötz (1992: 582) reports that women’s talk is marked by
“conversational generosity.” “Women are seen to be generous in
complimenting and commending others and in attributing expertise to
them” and “are seen to generously use speech acts, such as praise,
compliments, and commendation, which evaluate other speakers
positively” (587). These serve to construct competence for the other
speakers, and contribute to the collaborative achievement of
equality. Trömel-Plötz’ findings are in sharp contrast to the
results of this study. As the preceding analyses have shown, the
mother-daughter disputes under analysis display a frequent use of
unmodified competence challenges, disqualifications and unfavourable
comments. Rather than attributing expertise to the interlocutor and
collaborating to achieve equality, the women in my data recurrently
employ argumentative devices that allow them a reciprocal display of
expertise: they question the opponent’s competence and thereby
demonstrate their own superiority.
Among the mechanisms by which the women in Trömel-Plötz’ data
achieve equality are “refraining from power gestures like
correction, reproach, and criticism” (583). In addition, “if power
gestures are necessary, women are seen to give a motivation for them
and/or tone them down; e.g., they pack criticism, depersonalise an
attack, or modify a correction or objection” (584). By toning down
power gestures, women refrain from constructing a higher status for
themselves at the expense of others: “Using weaker means than would
be available according to one’s status has as a consequence that
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status differences are equalized” (584). According to Trömel-Plötz
(1992: 588), these findings show that “women handle power
differently: rather than confirming hierarchical differences, they
undo hierarchies and rankings in favour of a more equal distribution
of power and rights.” She even goes so far as to claim that the
orientation towards cooperation and equality displayed in women’s
communicative behaviour also holds in the context of dispute:
Der Wille, mit anderen zusammenzuarbeiten, anstatt Autorität
einzusetzen, die Macht zu teilen, anstatt auf Macht zu bestehen,
der Wille zur Verständigung ist vielleicht die hervorstechendste
Eigenschaft von Frauengesprächen. Daraus ergeben sich andere
Züge wie z.B., dass ohne zu konkurrieren und ohne abzuwerten
geredet wird. Das gilt selbst noch im Streitgespräch – die
Beiträge der Gegnerinnen werden als gleichgewichtig betrachtet,
seien sie inhaltlich noch so unerwünscht; die Gegnerinnen werden
nicht als Personen angegriffen oder zerstört.
(Trömel-Plötz 1996: 372, my emphasis)
However, as the portrayal of mother-daughter interaction in my data
suggests, this does not seem to be true for mother-daughter
disputes, where power gestures are used frequently and with gusto.
The women in my data explicitly criticise, reproach each other, use
disqualifications, i.e. activities that stress rather than mitigate
opposition. The recurrent use of such devices contributes to the
sense of hostility in these exchanges and lends these conflict
episodes their specific adversative quality. Trömel-Plötz (1992,
1996) describes the collaborative achievement of equality, whereas
my data are characterised by continuous struggles for control: pre-
existing hierarchies (i.e. status differences) are reproduced by the
mothers by means of control acts such as accusations, directives,
correction, etc. At the same time, such structures are actively
challenged by the daughters by means of counter-accusations,
refusals to comply with directives, etc.
Thus, the representation of women’s talk in the plays
investigated runs counter to the stereotype of female
conciliatoriness and cooperativeness. In contrast to the prevalent
stereotype that female interaction is organised with reference to
politeness and a dispreference for dispute (Gilligan 1982: 9-10;
Lever 1976: 482; Piaget 1965: 77), the women in my data do not
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exhibit an orientation towards the creation of support and the
minimisation of disagreement. On the contrary, the mother-daughter
interaction in my data is characterised by the frequent occurrence
of aggravated disagreement. Moreover, instead of displaying an
orientation towards conflict resolution, the women can be seen to
actively work to sustain conflict, and termination is achieved
mostly through submission and stand-off rather than compromise.
The way women playwrights dramatise mother-daughter disputes by
drawing on their own communicative experiences calls into question
the notion that women generally display an orientation towards
cooperative, supportive, face-saving interaction. Rather, it
suggests that women’s communicative practices are closely related to
a range of features as, for example, the local interactional
context, the participants’ social identities and relationships, and
their (shared) interactional history. This corroborates Eckert &
McConnell-Ginet’s (1992: 464) claim that “to understand precisely
how language interacts with gender ... requires that we look
locally, closely observing linguistic and gender practices in the
context of a particular community’s social practices.”
These findings have implications for the study of women’s
communicative practices in naturally occurring conversation in so
far as they show that in examining women’s talk-in-interaction, it
is necessary to abandon generalisations about and stereotypes of
female discourse in favour of a context-sensitive approach taking
into account sociological and situational factors such as the
speaker’s social identities and relationships, their (shared)
interactional history, and the local context of the interaction.3 By
looking at women’s communicative strategies in the context of
mother-daughter dispute as portrayed in contemporary plays by women,
we can reconstruct the tacit knowledge by which women organise
verbal conflict in a specific speech community or community of
practice (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet’s 1992), namely the family.
Rather than avoiding offensive arguing, evading direct
confrontation, toning down disagreement and showing a strong concern
for harmony, the women in are shown to have extended arguments
constructed through turns that highlight and escalate rather than
mitigate disagreements. Rather than using strategies which are
typically associated with a female speech style such as empathy, an
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orientation towards consensus, personal closeness and harmony and
camouflaging their power through polite ways of speaking (cf. Camras
1984: 263), the women in my data employ antagonistic discourse
strategies, explicitly categorising the interlocutor in negative
ways, etc. in asserting their positions and interactively
(re)establishing status hierarchies. The way mother-daughter
interaction is portrayed in my data suggests that in the context of
mother-daughter dispute, gender seems to be less salient than the
speakers’ parent-child relationship. Apparently, family dispute,
especially between mother and daughter, is a speech activity that is
governed by different rules and expectations and allows different
contributions than conflict episodes in institutional settings such
as the TV interviews and discussions analysed by Trömel-Plötz and
Kotthoff.
Finally, the findings of this exploratory study may have
implications for family counselling and family therapy. Family
arguments, including parent-child arguments, are of great importance
in family therapy. Detailed interaction analyses might provide a
basis for suggestions to improve family therapy and family
counselling training and for the development of communication
training programmes that could help family members (in particular
mothers and daughters) to improve their conflict resolution
techniques and interpersonal communication skills to ultimately
improve their family relationships.
Generalisability of the findings
My analysis has demonstrated some of the ways in which conflict and
power relations can be accomplished and negotiated in mother-
daughter interaction as portrayed in contemporary plays by women. It
does not by any means encompass all of the ways in which conflict is
achieved and in which power is negotiated in mother-daughter
interaction. The participants’ discursive practices reported here
represent realisations of argumentative actions and of the activity
type dispute. The list of realisation is not comprehensive, and
considering how creative people are in the realisation of
communicative actions in ongoing talk-in-interaction, a
comprehensive list may not be possible.
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This raises several questions, which regularly emerge in
conjunction with an inquiry like the present one, regarding the
generalisability of the findings of such a study. Since my analysis
of conflict and power was limited to one specific interactive
constellation: mother and daughter, readers may find themselves
wondering whether conflict and power are negotiated in similar (or,
indeed, different) ways in other constellations.
For example, if the disputants had been father and daughter,
would there be other forms of interaction? Or would the interactions
be similar, demonstrating that the parent-child relationship is the
primary factor influencing the negotiation of conflict and power
relations rather than the gender of the parent. In a similar vein,
the question might be posed concerning the effect of the child’s
gender on the interaction. More generally, we could ask whether
similar discursive practices might be found in all instances of
parent-child interaction or even of intergenerational interaction in
general.
Likewise, assuming that authors draw on their own communicative
experience in constructing dialogue in play, we might ask what (if
any) impact the gender of the playwright might have on the way
parent-child interaction in general or mother-daughter interaction
in particular is depicted in plays.
Finally, the question might be posed whether the fact that this
study is based on a corpus of constructed dialogues affects the
results, i.e. whether similar discursive practices might be found in
instances of naturally-occurring mother-daughter interaction.
This is but a small sample of some of the questions which might be
raised on the basis of the present inquiry. While all these
questions are interesting and worth further investigation, it was
not the aim of the present study to pursue them.
Qualitative research does not provide answers to questions
concerning generalisability in the usual sense of the word. As an
instance of the research orientation, the present inquiry is
similarly unable (and does not aim) to answer questions about how
often the arguing practices outlined here will occur in which
settings and between which (groups of) actors. What it can do,
however, is provide a way of looking at – a window on - conflict and
power. By looking through this (or a similar) window, interactional
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ways of accomplishing conflict and power can be investigated in
other similar, or even different, contexts.
Thus, the general relevance of the present inquiry lies in this
methodological sense, i.e. in developing a way to observe and
investigate conflict and power (and gender) in interaction, rather
than in the empirical generalisability of its results.
Besides this general methodological consideration, the research
topic itself warranted an exploratory, in depth investigation into
how conflict and power is accomplished in the specific context of
mother daughter-interaction in the fictional world of plays. By
showing how conflict and power are achieved in a limited number of
cases, I was able to discover and delineate recurrent patterns,
which can, ultimately serve as a starting point for further
research. The activity type ‘dispute’ is realised in specific ways
in specific situations and by specific participants but, as this
study suggests, it is realised in similar ways by mothers and
daughters. Moreover, since mother-daughter relationships are basic,
the same patterns may occur in other kinds of close relationships.
Future research will determine whether the findings and conclusions
of this study hold more generally.
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Notes for chapter 8:
1 Some models of female interaction have proposed that, while male speakers exhibit
a competitive and more confrontational style of discourse, women use a more
cooperative, supportive and harmonious style of speech (Coates 1989, 1991; 1994;
1998; Maltz & Borker 1991; Tannen 1990: 149 ff). Correspondingly, it has often been
assumed that conflict, argument, and opposition are a male domain.
2 However, Kotthoff emphasises that these are merely tendencies in men’s and women’s
communicative behaviours: „Ich verwende die gefährliche Ausdrucksweise vom
‚männlichen und weiblichen Gesprächsstil’ als idealtypisch verkürzte Kategorien. Es
ist aber davon auszugehen, dass Frauen und Männer ein mehr oder weniger breites
stilistisches Repertoire beherrschen, welches sie je nach Kontext unterschiedlich
zur Anwendung bringen“ (Kotthoff 1993c: 92). „Es besteht kein Zweifel, dass die in
den 70er Jahren aktuelle These, Frauen und Männer sprächen kontextübergreifend
anders und dies sei einer unterschiedlichen Sozialisation anzulasten, heute in
dieser Schlichtheit nicht mehr vertreten werden kann“ (Kotthoff 1996a: 9). „Heute
sehen wir, dass es kaum Sprechverhalten gibt, die kontextübergreifend so oder so
von Frauen und Männeren unterschiedlich ausgeübt werden... Jedes Geschlecht
beherrscht eine ganze Bandbreite von Stilen, die aber je nach Kontext
unterschiedlich angewendet werden und den Kontext als solchen mitproduzieren ...
Die bedeutende Frage lautet nicht, wie Frauen und Männer reden, sondern wie sie
durch welche Arten von Rede welche Kontexte aufbauen und was dies für sie bedeutet”
(ibid: 12, my emphasis).
3 Wodak (1997: 1-2) states that some of the research on gender “has isolated the
variable of sex/gender from other sociological or situational factors and has made
hasty generalizations about genderlects.” She proposes that “a context-sensitive
approach which regards gender as a social construct would lead to more fruitful
results” (ibid). Moreover, she suggests a look at gender “in connection with the
socio-cultural and ethnic background of the interlocutors, and in connection with
their age, their level of education, their socio-economic status, their emotions
and the specific power-dynamic of the discourse investigated.” For similar views,
cf. also Cameron 2003; M. H. Goodwin 2003; Günthner 1992; Kakavá 2001.
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They seemed almost, with staring at one another, to tear
the cases of their eyes. There was speech in their
dumbness, language in their very gesture.
(William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale)
9 Appendix: drama-reading conventions
As discussed in chapter 2, the empirical part of this study is based
on a corpus of eleven contemporary plays by women. More precisely, I
am looking at play scripts, rather than transcriptions of recordings
of theatre performances or naturally-occurring talk. As a result,
certain crucial aspects of conversation such as intonation patterns
and volume of voice are already encoded in the written text, which
have to be decoded by the reader/analyst; they are given an abstract
visual representation in written form (e.g. punctuation). In this
section, following a brief discussion of the role of paralinguistic
and nonverbal cues in the production and interpretation of meaning
in interaction, I will present a set of ‘drama-reading conventions,’
to illustrate how I have dealt with the information the play texts
provide about features of the characters’ speech.
In everyday face-to-face conversation, both speakers and hearers
use verbal (linguistic and paralinguistic) and nonverbal cues to
communicate effectively. Speakers, for example, may mark the end of
an utterance using non-linguistic cues such as intonation, eye
contact, a nod, or some combination of these; hearers may provide
speakers with various feedback tokens demonstrating understanding
such as the verbal “uh-huh” and the nonverbal nod (cf. M. H. Goodwin
& C. Goodwin 1987). Body language and speech have a mutual and
reciprocal relationship, each contextualising the interaction (Fornel
1992: 172-173; Kendon 1994: 193). Although both speech and body
language may be understandable apart from each other, they usually
work together, mutually providing for their interpretive context.
Discourse analytic studies have demonstrated this “reciprocal
contextualisation” (Fornel 1992: 1972) for a variety of head and body
movements, including gaze, nods, body posture, facial expressions,
hand gestures and physical distance or proxemics (C. Goodwin 1986; C.
Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin 1990; M. H. Goodwin 1990; M. H. Goodwin & C.
Goodwin 1987; C. Heath 1984, 1986, 1992; Schegloff 1984; Streeck &
Hartge 1992). These nonverbal cues are used by both speakers and
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recipients in the co-construction of meaning. They can serve a range
of different functions within various communicative environments.
They may refer retroactively to previous speech, occur simultaneously
with the related utterance, or proactively alert the recipient as to
what type of speech (e.g. agreement vs. disagreement) is going to
follow.
Literature is purely graphic and, therefore, emphasises the
verbal aspect of communication. However, as the examples discussed
in this study demonstrate, the representation of face-to-face
conversation in drama clearly includes nonverbal aspects of
communication. All of the play texts in my corpus contain
descriptions of the fictional characters’ head and body movements in
the stage directions, thus displaying the dramatists’ awareness of
the interplay of speech and body language. Just as in naturally
occurring conversation, body movement as represented in dramatic
dialogue may occur simultaneously with or independently of speech.
As Korte (1997) and Person (1999) have shown, body language in
literary discourse contains much - if not all - of the functional
variety that is found in natural communication and can be analysed
with the same functional categories.
The co-construction of meaning in interaction is also influenced
by the participants’ competence in producing and recognising
appropriate prosodic features of utterances. It is not only what is
said but also how it is said (i.e. the pitch, tone and volume of the
speaker’s voice) that provides the context for the production and
interpretation of meaning. In fact, a multitude of conversational
features including lexis, syntax, prosody, body language, and the
sequential context of utterances mutually and simultaneously
contribute to meaningful interaction in everyday talk. Prosody by
definition occurs simultaneously with verbal items. Prosodic research
(Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 1996) suggests a variety of functions for
prosody such as conveying emotional and attitudinal information.
As a graphic medium, writing cannot reproduce prosody
completely. This is evident in the fact that no standard
transcription system for prosody has been adopted yet. For example,
the studies in Couper-Kuhlen & Selting (1996) use various
transcription systems. As Couper-Kuhlen & Selting (1996: 9) remark:
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Until the basic categories relevant to a prosody-for-
conversation are agreed upon, it seems futile to expect
notational standardization.
Despite such difficulties, although dramatic dialogues may not
represent the fullness of prosody used in naturally occurring
conversation, they clearly include information about prosodic
features of the characters’ speech.1
To recapitulate so far, body language and prosody – two
important aspects of everyday talk that remain difficult to represent
in the graphic medium of writing even for current researchers in the
respective fields – are also represented in dramatic discourse.
Moreover, when writers do represent such conversational elements, the
representations in their literary contexts function as the elements
do in their conversational contexts.2 In the following, I will look
at the ways in which paralinguistic and nonverbal aspects of
conversation are depicted in my data. Detailed analyses of the
following examples are provided in chapters 6 and 7. I will first
look at the ways in which prosody is represented in the dramatic
dialogues under analysis.
In her diachronic study of punctuation, Bergien (1994: 243)
found that in 16th and 17th century English, “punctuation was
primarily guided by prosodic consideration” and is often still
related to prosodic features. Therefore, punctuation is one means of
compensating for the limitations of writing to depict prosody, as the
following examples from my data illustrate.
A COMMA TYPICALLY INDICATES A LEVEL, CONTINUING INTONATION:
example (1): Avenue
365 MOTHER I think you'd better look for a job. You got a
> 366 body, go out and work, earn your own keep.
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A PERIOD DENOTES A FALLING TONE IN THE PRECEDING ELEMENT:
example (2): ‘night Mother
1373 MAMA I married you off to the wrong man, I admit
> 1374 that. So I took you in when he left.
> 1375 I'm sorry.
> 1376 JESSIE He wasn't the wrong man.
DOUBLE QUOTATION MARKS INDICATE SPEECH SET OFF BY A SHIFT IN THE SPEAKER’S VOICE:
example (3): Home
> 189 OLIVIA She said, "Mrs. Dunn. It's a dream come
190 true for me to have your house. I wouldn't
> 191 do a thing to it." I was so flattered.
A QUESTION MARK COMMONLY DENOTES RISING INTONATION IN THE PRECEDING ELEMENT,
marking, for instance, requests for information:
example (4): Perfect days I, 2
> 25 SADIE Zat all you got?
26 BARBS No, there’s all these.
example (5) Raisin I, 1
> 27 MAMA What time you be home from school today?
28 BENEATHA Kind of late. (With enthusiasm.) Madeline is
29 going to start my guitar lessons today.
A QUESTION MARK FOLLOWING REPETITION TYPICALLY INDICATES A FALLING-RISING
INTONATION PATTERN, denoting that the repeated lexical item is called
into question:
example (6): My sister 3
45 MADAME DANZARD ((...)) The best cook we’ve had in years.
46 ISABELLE Oh I don’t know – Marie wasn’t so bad.
> 47 MADAME DANZARD Marie? Please. The way she cooked a pot au
48 feu – ahhh – It still makes me shudder.
50 ISABELLE You exaggerate, Maman.
> 51 MADAME DANZARD Exaggerate? I’m being kind. Marie would
52 have murdered a veal like this.
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This extract clearly shows how prosodic features of the characters’
speech (marked by punctuation) and the sequential context of
utterances work together in providing the context for the production
and interpretation of meaning.
AN EXCLAMATION MARK COMMONLY INDICATES A RAISED VOICE OR SHOUTING. It may be
used to indicate emotions such as shock, astonishment, horror, or
anger:3
example (7): My mother I, 7
130 DORIS He's reversing straight into my lily of the
> 131 valley!
example (8) Raisin I, 1
127 BENEATHA Well - neither is God. I get sick of hearing
128 about God.
> 129 MAMA Beneatha!
example (9): ‘night Mother
1953 MAMA I can't just sit here and say O.K., kill
1954 yourself if you want to.
1955 JESSIE Sure you can. You just did. Say it again.
> 1956 MAMA (Really startled.) Jessie! (Quiet horror.)
> 1957 How dare you! (Furious.) How dare you!
CAPITALS AND ITALICS CONVENTIONALLY SHOW HEAVY STRESS OR INDICATE THAT THE ELEMENT
IS LOUDER THAN THE SURROUNDING DISCOURSE:
example (10): Home
344 MARY JANE But Ma. I can't go back to California. I
345 don't have any money to go anywhere. As soon
> 346 as you called me and ASKED me to come here I
347 started thinking about all kinds of things
348 and it started looking up again. Coming back
349 kind of washed away all my mistakes. I can't
350 explain it but it did. It did.
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example (11): Stuck 6b
135 MOM Have a drink.
136 LULA I don't want one.
> 137 MOM BORING, don't want to have a drink with your
138 mom.
example (12): ‘night Mother
275 JESSIE Dawson will get here just in time to help
276 you clean up. Go ahead, call him. Then call
277 the police. Then call the funeral home. Then
> 278 call Loretta and see if she'll do your nails.
Prosodic information can also be represented by explicit references
to the tone or pitch of the speaker’s voice in the stage directions
(in parentheses and italicised). In these cases, the nonverbal is
‘translated’ into the verbal. Prosodic aspects of utterances can be
designated by specific lexical items. For instance, THE LEXICAL MEANINGS
OF CERTAIN VERBS (E.G. “CHALLENGE”) AND ADVERBS (E.G. “SARCASTICALLY,”
“PETULANTLY,” “KINDLY,” ETC.) ARE ROUTINELY ASSOCIATED WITH INTONATION:
example (13): Avenue
188 MOTHER Thinking ain't enough. Do something if
> 189 you're so smart. (Challenging her.) Just
190 what can you do?
191 OLGA Nothing!
example (14): Avenue
384 MOTHER You know I had champagne at his place.
385 (Crosses to bureau.)
> 386 OLGA (Sarcastically.) Really?
example (15): Tell me
172 MOTHER Big girls don't cry.
> 173 DAUGHTER (Petulantly.) I'm not a big girl.
example (16) Raisin I, 1
120 BENEATHA I am going to be a doctor and everybody
121 around here better understand that!
> 122 MAMA (Kindly.) 'Course you going to be a doctor,
123 honey, God willing.
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Aspects of timing are also marked by punctuation. A SINGLE DASH OR
ELLIPSIS WITHIN A SPEAKER’S TURN FOLLOWED BY A RE-START CUSTOMARILY INDICATES AN
INSTANCE OF SELF-INTERRUPTION:
example (17): Raisin I, 1
> 61 BENEATHA I don't flit! I- I experiment with different
62 forms of expression—
example (18): Neaptide II, 3
43 JOYCE Yes, normal custody. Not one who deals
> 44 with... you know... special circumstances.
In both of these extracts, the speaker interrupts herself and then
produces a re-start. In ordinary conversation, this is a routine way
of stalling time. In example (17), the interjacent discourse marker
“you know” following the minimal pause acts as a “filler.” This
hesitation phenomenon gives the speaker a second to think about what
she wants to say.
PAUSES WITHIN A SPEAKER’S TURN CAN ALSO BE EXPLICITLY MARKED IN THE STAGE
DIRECTIONS (IN PARENTHESES AND ITALICISED):
example (19): My mother I, 7
> 140 DORIS Margaret, that's enough! (Pause.) After all,
141 he is going to marry an English girl.
Although dramatic discourse is limited by its linear, graphic mode of
presentation, there are various ways by which sequential aspects of
talk such as simultaneous speech and interruptions can be represented
in the exchanges that occur between fictional characters. For
instance, A SINGLE DASH OR ELLIPTICAL PERIODS AT THE END OF A SPEAKER’S
UNCOMPLETED UTTERANCE COMMONLY MARKS THE ONSET OF OVERLAPPING TALK AND INDICATES
INTERRUPTION:
example (20): My sister 9
220 MADAME DANZARD What is the world coming to? I couldn't
221 believe my eyes.
> 222 ISABELLE But Maman-
223 MADAME DANZARD There are no buts involved here.
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example (21): Tell me
308 MOTHER One more word and up to your room.
> 309 DAUGHTER But...
310 MOTHER Another word, and up you go.
> 311 DAUGHTER But Mom...
312 MOTHER Alright, that's it. That is it. I've
313 heard enough. It might be a good idea,
314 young lady, if you went up to your room.
example (22): My mother I, 7
136 MARGARET That's typical, you think all Americans
137 are brash and wear loud check shirts and
138 chew gum and want to marry English girls.
> 139 You're just prej-...
140 DORIS Margaret, that's enough! (Pause.) After
141 all, he is going to marry an English girl.
In each of these extracts, one speaker ends her utterance at a non-
completion point because of the other speaker’s overlapping speech.
Neither “But Maman-” nor “But (Mom)...” nor “You’re just pre-...”
constitutes a complete proposition.
INTERRUPTION CAN ALSO BE INDICATED BY RESPECTIVE LEXICAL ITEMS (E.G.
“INTERRUPTING,” “CUTTING OFF,” “OVERLAPPING”) IN THE STAGE DIRECTIONS (IN
PARENTHESES AND ITALICISED):
example (23): My sister 12
17 ISABELLE But it won't be ready in—
> 18 MADAME DANZARD (Interrupting.) It will be ready.
19 She hardly has anything to do.
example (24): Neaptide II, 3
46 JOYCE (Sighs.) I just wish...
> 47 CLAIRE (Cutting her off.) It's no good bloody
48 wishing, is it? Please get on with it.
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In both of these examples, the first speaker is clearly interrupted
by the second as denoted by the first speaker’s speech ending
abruptly without syntactic closure and the lexemes “interrupting”
and “cutting her off” in the stage directions.
In the extract below, interruption is indicated by the lexical
item “overlapping” in the stage directions. While the cut-off of the
first speaker’s turn is not explicitly marked, the term
“overlapping” suggests the onset of the second speaker’s talk prior
to the completion of first speaker’s speech:
example (25): Home
265 MARY JANE That's such a lie! How could you say that?
> 266 OLIVIA (Overlapping.) Oh, keep your voice down.
> 268 MARY JANE (Overlapping.) He got laid off that time,
269 Ma! Laid off!
Apart from signifying prosodic features, STAGE DIRECTIONS (IN PARENTHESES
AND ITALICISED) INDICATE A VARIETY OF NON-VERBAL BEHAVIOURS, INCLUDING GAZE, BODY
MOVEMENTS, BODY POSTURE, FACIAL EXPRESSIONS AND HAND GESTURES. These may occur
simultaneously with speech, e.g. reinforcing the illocutionary force
of the utterance, or independently of speech, e.g. by way of
answers, as in examples (26) and (28).
example (26): Avenue
181 MOTHER Your father's dead, Olga, the no-good
182 sonavabitch is dead and buried.
> 183 OLGA (Gives her a defiant look.)
184 MOTHER Whatsa matter with you? You know it's true.
example (27) Avenue
149 OLGA Yes, I know. Didn't you ever get tired and
150 sore from all that work?
> 151 MOTHER (Stops activity and looks angrily at her.)
152 I'm thinking of two ways to take what you
153 just said. And if it's the bad way I'm
154 thinking to be right, you're gonna get a bar
155 of soap in your mouth.
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example (28): Avenue
231 MOTHER Hey, one day I bought a piece of gum, the
232 kind that has the fortune in it and what do
233 you think it said?
> 234 OLGA (Shrugs and turns away.)
235 MOTHER Guess, go on, take a guess.
> 236 OLGA (Shrugs again.)
example (29): Home
300 OLIVIA Just shut up. Shut up.
301 MARY JANE You shut up. You just shut up forever. How
> 302 about that? (She rushes into the bedroom.)
303 I'm so sick of this.
example (30): ‘night Mother
2216 MAMA You said you wanted to do my nails.
> 2217 JESSIE (Taking a small step backward) I can't. It's
2218 too late.
example (31): ‘night Mother
> 178 MAMA (Coming over now, taking over now.) What
179 are you doing?
180 JESSIE The barrel has to be clean, Mama. Old
181 powder, dust gets in it...
182 MAMA What for?
183 JESSIE I told you.
> 184 MAMA (Reaching for the gun.) And I told you, we
185 don't get criminals out here.
> 186 JESSIE (Quickly pulling it to her.) And I told
187 you... (Then trying to be calm.) The gun is
for me.
example (32): Alto I,1
23 WANDA Let’s ask it anyway. I bet it knows.
> 24 FLORENE (Tentatively placing her fingers on the
25 planchette.) I just couldn't face another
26 move any time soon.
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example (33): Alto II, 1
> 51 FLORENE (Points to the envelope.) What is that?
In addition to editorial comments by the authors, the examples
discussed in the present study also entail ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY THE
ANALYST. These ARE ENCLOSED IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES:
example (34): Alto II, 4
33 FLORENE Wanda, you bridle your tongue right now, and
34 apologize to everybody for being rude.
35 WANDA No! I will not!
36 FLORENE Wanda, you heard me.
37 WANDA I won't say something just because you want
38 me to. It is gossip, because Miz Lockwood
39 wouldn't act that way. And I won't take back
40 what I said.
> ((The argument terminates with Althea Lockwood
entering the stage.))
ELLIPTICAL PERIODS IN DOUBLE PARENTHESES INDICATE THE OMISSION OF TEXT:
example (35): Alto II, 1
123 FLORENE See how brave Miz Hattie is?
124 WANDA It's easy for her to be brave. She's old and
125 already had her life. I haven't even started
126 to live yet.
127 FLORENE I haven't either. Not really.
128 WANDA You have too. You've been to Galveston and
129 Wichita Falls and had cocktails at nightclubs.
> ((...))
138 WANDA And you've had a chance to sing.
139 FLORENE I never had a chance to sing!
140 WANDA Yes, you did! You just didn't do it!
141 FLORENE The only time I ever got to sing was at
142 that nightclub in Galveston.
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Notes for chapter 9:
1 For a detailed discussion of the representation of prosody in fictional narrative
cf. Person (1999, Ch. 5).
2 Correspondingly, Khader (2000: 81) notes that “drama texts are full of
paralinguistic features which function to communicate intention and feelings.” In
addition, non-linguistic features of communication such as proxemics and kinesics
“help to communicate interpersonal relations as well as to create the contextual
atmosphere in dramas” (82).
3 Cf. Person (1999: 83) for a similar reading of exclamation points in fictional
narratives.
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